CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/09/27
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
02020553
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
6
Document Creation Date:
April 15, 2019
Document Release Date:
April 22, 2019
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
Publication Date:
September 27, 1951
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULL[15603073].pdf | 166.07 KB |
Body:
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Nve-fur -Lulu, 1 Nie
27 September 1951
Copy No.
47
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
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CLASS. CHANGED TO: T$ S
NEXT REVIEVV DATE:
AUTH: HRt -..7 o
DA747401 V. RiTIVEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
FAR EAST
1. Burmese to defer UN appeal on Chinese Nationalist troop issue (page 3
WESTERN EUROPE
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3.3(h)(2)
3. French seek US assurances of zoninterference in North African internal
affairs (page 4).
6. Dutch seek to delay tevision of Dutch-Indonesian agreement (page 6).. (h)(2)
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FAR EAST
1. Burmese to defer UN appeal on Chinese Nationalist troop issue:
B urma has agreed to defer an appeal to the UN
regarding Chinese Nationalist troops in Burma,
pending the reaction to its proposals that the US
persuade Taipei to recall Nationalist General
Li Mi to 'iwan and to order his troops to leave Burma or surrender for in-
ternment. Burma also wants the US to ask Thailand to stop arms smuggling
and to prevent the use of Thai airstrips by planes which the Burmese assume
are supplying the Nationalists.
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3.3(h)(2)
The US Embassy in Rangoon believes that the pos-
sibility still exists that Burma's army commander, General Ne Win, with the
collaboration of the newly-appointed Burmese Ambassador to Peiping, might
attempt a covert arrangement giving the Chinese Communists a free hand to
deal with the Nationalists. 3.3(h)(2)
Comment: the
Chinese Nationalist forces are in the process of disintegration, thus tending par-
tially to resolve the international problems that their presence in Burma has created.
WESTERN EUROPE
3.3(h)(2)
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3. French seek US assurances of
affairs:
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(h)(2)
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noninterference in North African internal
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The French Foreign Office, "deeply stirred" by
the "official treatment" accorded Tunisian
nationalist leader Bourghiba on his current visit
to the US, has approached the American Embassy
in Paris for written assurance of US noninter-
ference in North African internal affairs.
3.3(h)(2)
Foreign Minister Schuman and President .Auriol
sed over the question, and the cabinet has refused clear-
ance for a US Military Survey Mission to proceed to Tunis. Meanwhile, this
mission has met delaying tactics and firm demands from the Resident Gcanarni
in Algiers for exact details of the survey proposal in that area, 3.3(h)(2)
Comment:
Despite assurances to Schuman that the
US was not anxious to have the Moroccan question discussed in the UN, the Foreign
Office in Paris have remained deeply distrust13:3(h)(2)
of the US attitude toward the nationalist movement in North Africa. These
French suspicions cloud the outlook for a rapid working out of US-French air
base arrangements and US acquisition of further military facilities in North
Africa.
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TSE RET
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5. French reportedly see value of German divisions: . 3.3(h)(2)
Although the French Government realiied that
only full-strength German divisions would be of
any military value, it believed that its resist-
ance to the idea put France in a good bargaining
position in negotiations with the US. These sentiments were reportedly ex-
pressed by the French NATO Deputy
3.3(h)(2)
Comment: There have been indications for
some months that the French would not insist on a strict limitation of the size
of national units in the European Defense Forces, and recently the govern-
ment agreed to abide by SHAPE' s decision on the minimum SiZe considered
compatible with military needs. However, France does not envision German
divisions that would be completely self-sufficient fighting units.
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6. Dutch seek to delay revision of Dutch-Indonesian agreement:
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3.3(h)(2)
The Dutch Ambassador to the US has stated.that,
although his govprnment recognizes the Union
Agreement with Indonesia "as dead," the present
cabinet, which negotiated the Dutch-Indonesian
agreemrents, finds it difficult to agree to a revision at this time.
Any tactic designed to delay consideration of
this question until the Dutch elections in the spring of 1952 must, moreover,
avoid any suggestion of a "Netherlands willingness to revise" the Union
Agreement. The ambassador suggested that the initiative for a delay should
come from Indonesia, possibly from Vice President Hatta, and added that
"Dutch interests would not necessarily be harmed" by such action.
Comment: It is probable that the Dutch are
convinced of their inability to achieve a compromise and are seeking US
support to prevent Indonesia froth taking unilateral action. Also, the present
government may fear a cabinet crisis if the Indonesian question, which has
been relatively quiescent, is not injected into domestic politics.
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