CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/09/27

Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
02020553
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
U
Document Page Count: 
6
Document Creation Date: 
April 15, 2019
Document Release Date: 
April 22, 2019
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
September 27, 1951
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PDF icon CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULL[15603073].pdf166.07 KB
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Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2020553 Nve-fur -Lulu, 1 Nie 27 September 1951 Copy No. 47 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN DOCUMENT NO. NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ! i DECLASSiRED CLASS. CHANGED TO: T$ S NEXT REVIEVV DATE: AUTH: HRt -..7 o DA747401 V. RiTIVEWER: Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 3.5(c) wof Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2020553 -3.5(c) 3.5(c) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2020553 iouiucr .F. SUMMARY FAR EAST 1. Burmese to defer UN appeal on Chinese Nationalist troop issue (page 3 WESTERN EUROPE 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) 3. French seek US assurances of zoninterference in North African internal affairs (page 4). 6. Dutch seek to delay tevision of Dutch-Indonesian agreement (page 6).. (h)(2) TOP 2 - ET Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2020553 3.5(c) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 26'r9/04/02 CO2020553 TOP CRET FAR EAST 1. Burmese to defer UN appeal on Chinese Nationalist troop issue: B urma has agreed to defer an appeal to the UN regarding Chinese Nationalist troops in Burma, pending the reaction to its proposals that the US persuade Taipei to recall Nationalist General Li Mi to 'iwan and to order his troops to leave Burma or surrender for in- ternment. Burma also wants the US to ask Thailand to stop arms smuggling and to prevent the use of Thai airstrips by planes which the Burmese assume are supplying the Nationalists. 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) The US Embassy in Rangoon believes that the pos- sibility still exists that Burma's army commander, General Ne Win, with the collaboration of the newly-appointed Burmese Ambassador to Peiping, might attempt a covert arrangement giving the Chinese Communists a free hand to deal with the Nationalists. 3.3(h)(2) Comment: the Chinese Nationalist forces are in the process of disintegration, thus tending par- tially to resolve the international problems that their presence in Burma has created. WESTERN EUROPE 3.3(h)(2) 3 Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2020553 3.5(c) � , Approved for Release: 20-19/04/02 CO2020553 3.3 3. French seek US assurances of affairs: 3.5(c) (h)(2) 3.3(h)(2) noninterference in North African internal 3.3(h)(2) The French Foreign Office, "deeply stirred" by the "official treatment" accorded Tunisian nationalist leader Bourghiba on his current visit to the US, has approached the American Embassy in Paris for written assurance of US noninter- ference in North African internal affairs. 3.3(h)(2) Foreign Minister Schuman and President .Auriol sed over the question, and the cabinet has refused clear- ance for a US Military Survey Mission to proceed to Tunis. Meanwhile, this mission has met delaying tactics and firm demands from the Resident Gcanarni in Algiers for exact details of the survey proposal in that area, 3.3(h)(2) Comment: Despite assurances to Schuman that the US was not anxious to have the Moroccan question discussed in the UN, the Foreign Office in Paris have remained deeply distrust13:3(h)(2) of the US attitude toward the nationalist movement in North Africa. These French suspicions cloud the outlook for a rapid working out of US-French air base arrangements and US acquisition of further military facilities in North Africa. - 4 - T:C3SECgfl' Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2020553 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2020553 TSE RET 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) 5. French reportedly see value of German divisions: . 3.3(h)(2) Although the French Government realiied that only full-strength German divisions would be of any military value, it believed that its resist- ance to the idea put France in a good bargaining position in negotiations with the US. These sentiments were reportedly ex- pressed by the French NATO Deputy 3.3(h)(2) Comment: There have been indications for some months that the French would not insist on a strict limitation of the size of national units in the European Defense Forces, and recently the govern- ment agreed to abide by SHAPE' s decision on the minimum SiZe considered compatible with military needs. However, France does not envision German divisions that would be completely self-sufficient fighting units. - 5 - Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2020553 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2020553 TC:3 SECRET 6. Dutch seek to delay revision of Dutch-Indonesian agreement: 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) The Dutch Ambassador to the US has stated.that, although his govprnment recognizes the Union Agreement with Indonesia "as dead," the present cabinet, which negotiated the Dutch-Indonesian agreemrents, finds it difficult to agree to a revision at this time. Any tactic designed to delay consideration of this question until the Dutch elections in the spring of 1952 must, moreover, avoid any suggestion of a "Netherlands willingness to revise" the Union Agreement. The ambassador suggested that the initiative for a delay should come from Indonesia, possibly from Vice President Hatta, and added that "Dutch interests would not necessarily be harmed" by such action. Comment: It is probable that the Dutch are convinced of their inability to achieve a compromise and are seeking US support to prevent Indonesia froth taking unilateral action. Also, the present government may fear a cabinet crisis if the Indonesian question, which has been relatively quiescent, is not injected into domestic politics. Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2020553 3.5(c)