CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/12/02

Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
02008390
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
U
Document Page Count: 
7
Document Creation Date: 
April 15, 2019
Document Release Date: 
April 22, 2019
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
December 2, 1951
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PDF icon CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULL[15603140].pdf133.27 KB
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Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2008390 .. iUk1tK1 � *pi SECURITY INFORMATION 2 December 1951 Copy No, 47 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN.1602.0e DOCUMENT NO. - NO CHANGE IN CLASS. iI DECLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANGED TO: IS S NEXT REVIEW DATE 1001 AUT HR 70-2 DAT REVIEWER Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SECURITY INFORMATION Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2008390 3.5(c) 3.5(c) 3.5(c) 3.5(c) 4-� Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2008390 SUMMARY FAR EAST 3.5(c) 3.3(h SOUTH ASIA 4. Ceylon may change its rubber policy (page 5). 5. United States Embassy comments on Thai coup (page 5 EASTERN EUROPE 6. Another leading Czechoslovak Communist reported under arrest (page 6). (2) 3.3(h)(2) TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2008390 3.5(c) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2008390 P. SECRET FAR EAST 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) 3 Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2008390 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2008390 'Del" SEC-RET 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) 3.3(h)(2) TOP-SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2008390 3.5(c) J. Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2008390 --TAV --1"--SEeRET- SOUTH ASIA 4. Ceylon may chan:e its rubber policy: time, 3.3(h)(2) Ceylon's Finance Minister has stated to US Embassy officials that he is greatly interested in the American proposal to buy a large quantity of Ceylon's rubber over a period of a proposal on which he had not previously been consulted. Both the Minister and the Governor of the Central Bank are concerned over the weakening of Ceylon's dollar trade position. The two officials believe it will be possible to convince the Ceylonese Prime Minister not to permit further export of rubber to, Communist China. Comment: The influential Ceylonese rubber growers may have induced their TOWinment to reconsider US bulk pur- chases, in view of the difficulties encountered in arranging the 2 October shipment to China and the slim prospect that further shipping will be available in the future. 5. United States Embassy comments on Thai coup: accor 3.3(h)(2) The recent coup in Thailand was motivated by the desirer of the dominant military clique to prevent the King's exercising his limited pow- ers and to obtain civil and Parliamentary con-- mbassy in Bangkok. 3.5(c) Although the coup was a purely internal develop- ment and will not affect Thailand's pro-Western foreign policy, the Embassy's "first impression" of the new regime is that it will be less stable than predecessor. The Embassy also points out that the legal position of the new government is not clear and that there is a possibility that the King may abdicate rather than accept the new administration. TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2008390 3.5(c) 0,401 Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2008390 TP SECRET Comment: The rivalries among the various military leaders have not been eliminated by their joint seizure of complete control. The retention of Phibun as Premier, however, will preserve his political acumen as a stabilizing influence. The coup was obviously timed to present the King with a fait accompli. Despite Thai veneration of the monarchy, the King's abdication, which appears quite doubtful, would be unlikely to precipitate unrest. EAST:ERN EUROPE 6. Another leading Czechoslovak Communist reported under arrest: 3.3(h)(2) The US Embassy in Prague has received a fairly reliable report that Bedrich Geminder, one of the chief links between the Czechoslovak Communist Party and Moscow, was arrested at the Prague broadcasting station on 29 November, Comment: The close timing of Geminder's reported arrest with that of Rudolf Slansky emphasizes the seripusness with which the USSR must regard its current problems in Czechoslovakia. These arrests are the only known cases of trusted Moscow Communists being deposed in Eastern Europe since the war. Geminder was generally regarded as the most powerful behind-the-scene official of the Party. As head of its International Secretariat, he worked closely with Rudolf Slansky. He was Party representative in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Czechoslovak representa- tive to the Cominform, and he had held several important editorial positions. 3.5(c) 6 TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2008390 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2008390 'IVP-M01-ET 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2008390 3.5(c)