CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/12/02
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
02008390
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
7
Document Creation Date:
April 15, 2019
Document Release Date:
April 22, 2019
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
Publication Date:
December 2, 1951
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULL[15603140].pdf | 133.27 KB |
Body:
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SECURITY INFORMATION
2 December 1951
Copy No,
47
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN.1602.0e
DOCUMENT NO. -
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
iI DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: IS S
NEXT REVIEW DATE 1001
AUT HR 70-2
DAT REVIEWER
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SECURITY INFORMATION
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SUMMARY
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4. Ceylon may change its rubber policy (page 5).
5. United States Embassy comments on Thai coup (page 5
EASTERN EUROPE
6. Another leading Czechoslovak Communist reported under arrest
(page 6).
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SOUTH ASIA
4. Ceylon may chan:e its rubber policy:
time,
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Ceylon's Finance Minister has stated to US
Embassy officials that he is greatly interested
in the American proposal to buy a large
quantity of Ceylon's rubber over a period of
a proposal on which he had not previously been consulted. Both the
Minister and the Governor of the Central Bank are concerned over the
weakening of Ceylon's dollar trade position.
The two officials believe it will be possible to
convince the Ceylonese Prime Minister not to permit further export of
rubber to, Communist China.
Comment: The influential Ceylonese rubber
growers may have induced their TOWinment to reconsider US bulk pur-
chases, in view of the difficulties encountered in arranging the 2 October
shipment to China and the slim prospect that further shipping will be
available in the future.
5. United States Embassy comments on Thai coup:
accor
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The recent coup in Thailand was motivated by
the desirer of the dominant military clique to
prevent the King's exercising his limited pow-
ers and to obtain civil and Parliamentary con--
mbassy in Bangkok.
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Although the coup was a purely internal develop-
ment and will not affect Thailand's pro-Western foreign policy, the Embassy's
"first impression" of the new regime is that it will be less stable than
predecessor. The Embassy also points out that the legal position of the new
government is not clear and that there is a possibility that the King may
abdicate rather than accept the new administration.
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Comment: The rivalries among the various
military leaders have not been eliminated by their joint seizure of complete
control. The retention of Phibun as Premier, however, will preserve his
political acumen as a stabilizing influence.
The coup was obviously timed to present the
King with a fait accompli. Despite Thai veneration of the monarchy, the
King's abdication, which appears quite doubtful, would be unlikely to
precipitate unrest.
EAST:ERN EUROPE
6. Another leading Czechoslovak Communist reported under arrest: 3.3(h)(2)
The US Embassy in Prague has received a
fairly reliable report that Bedrich Geminder,
one of the chief links between the Czechoslovak
Communist Party and Moscow, was arrested
at the Prague broadcasting station on 29 November,
Comment: The close timing of Geminder's
reported arrest with that of Rudolf Slansky emphasizes the seripusness
with which the USSR must regard its current problems in Czechoslovakia.
These arrests are the only known cases of trusted Moscow Communists
being deposed in Eastern Europe since the war.
Geminder was generally regarded as the most
powerful behind-the-scene official of the Party. As head of its International
Secretariat, he worked closely with Rudolf Slansky. He was Party
representative in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Czechoslovak representa-
tive to the Cominform, and he had held several important editorial positions.
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