CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/11/01

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02008387
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: April 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2019
• Publication Date: November 1, 1951

Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2008387
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SECURITY INFORMATION
Nirai
1 November 1951
Copy No.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 1(IF
DOCUMENT NO.
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SECURITY INFORMATION
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SUMMARY
FAR EAST
1. Chinese Nationalists aroused over alleged statements of Japanese Prime
Minister (page 3).
NEAR EAST
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3.3(h)(2)
. New Greek Government not expected to last lonce (nacre 51
3.3(h)(2)
WESTERN EUROPE
7. Harassing of German interzonal trade continues (page 6).
8. Schuman anticipates French initiative for settling the Saar question
(page 7).
LATIN AMERICA
3.3(h)(2)
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TOPS
FAR EAST
1. Chinese Nationalists aroused over alleged statements of Japanese Prime
Minister: 3.3(h)(2)
Prime Minister Yoshida's reported statement
before the Japanese Diet on 30 October that
Japan would "gladly" negotiate a peace treaty
with the Chinese Communists without the
"slightest objection" has shocked the Chinese Nationalist Government, ac-
cording to the US Charge at Taipei.
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He reports that Yoshida's recent comments, in-
dicating that Japan will make no early decision on the Chinese treaty question,
are producing a highly embarrassing and unsettling situation in Formosa.
This is damaging to the US aid program, is helping the Communists, and is
giving the impression that "the Japanese are already throwing their weight
around in the traditional manner."
Meanwhile, the Chinese Foreign Minister has re-
quested US help in meeting charges that Yoshida's statements actually represent
US policy and are "intended both as a direct Japanese and indirect US slap-
down for the Nationalist Government."
Comment: There is as yet no official confirmation
of, Yoshida's alleged statement. M previous Diet speeches he has attempted to
maintain a non-committal attitude on the Chinese treaty question, out of
deference both to diverse international opinion and to domestic political oppo-
sition. He has officially assured the US, however, that the Japanese Govern-
ment has no intention of concluding a bilateral treaty with the Communist
regime.
Despite the strong anti-Communist stand of the
Japanese Government, the Nationalists remain skeptical of Japanese intentions
and have repeatedly urged the US to intercede in their,behalf.
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NEAR EAST
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3.3(h)(2)
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5. New Greek Government not expected to last long:
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Liberal leader Venizelos accepted the post of
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign
Affairs in the new coalition government against
his better judgment. The US Embassy in Athens,
which expressed this opinion, added that Venizelos obviously withheld some of
the best of the Liberal Party members from cabinet posts, perhaps to use
them in further maneuvers. The length of time that the new government re-
mains in office will probably depend to a large extent on Venizelosv attitude.
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,_Comment:
That the uneasy coalition government created on
z't October is ,not given a long life expectancy. New elections are expected
within the next few months.
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Meanwhile, continuing instability will prevent
Greece from contributing significantly to NATO or the Middle East Command.
3.3(h)(2)
WESTERN EUROPE
Harassing of German interzonal trade continues:
3.3(h)(2)
The Allied Commandants in Berlin report that
Soviet and East German authorities have still not
demonstrated that they intend to comply with their
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oral agreement to cease interference with Berlin trade. The Commandants
recommend that economic pressure be brought to bear on the East Zone,
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Comment: The Allied High Commission decided
on 24 October to suspend interzonal trade entirely if USSR and East German
officials did not remove restrictions on Berlin traffic by midnight 1 November,
As French and British officials had been reluctant, prior to the 24 October
meeting, to stop interzonal trade; this counteraction may still be postponed
pending a possible change in East German tactics.
Little trade has moved since the signing of the
interzonal trade pact on 20 September. Although the West Germans appear
to have shipped roughly three times as much to East Germany as they have
received, the East Germans have shown considerable displeasure that key
shipments, such as iron and steel, have been delayed.
. Schuman anticipates French initiative for settling the Saar question: 3.3(h)(2)
French Foreign Minister Schuman has stated that
the French Government might "begin exploring
ground" in the coming months for a solution to
the Saar problem and that he did not think the
present arrangement could continue indefinitely. He hopes that the question
will be settled before the 1953 Saar elections.
Schuman sees a definite possibility for solving
the Saar problem "in the context of a federal Europe, " with the territory en-
joying a special status, perhaps as a trusteeship of the European community. He
believes that some Germans, "including possibly Adenauer himself, favor
such a solution. 3.3(h)(2)
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LATIN AMERICA
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