CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/11/08

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02739306
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: April 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2019
• Publication Date: November 8, 1951

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SECURITY INFORMATION
8 November 1951
Copy No.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SECURITY INFORMATION
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
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I. Soviet representative offers proposal for armament census (page 3).
USSR
2. Comment on Bolshevik Revolution Anniversary speech (page 4).
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SOUTH ASIA
4. Comment on political developments in Kashmir age 5).
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WESTERN EUROPE
6. Belgian and Dutch troop commitments for Korea not likely to be
increased (page 7)
LATIN AMERICA
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GENER AL
1. Soviet representative offers proposal for armament census:
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In an approach to a member of the US dele-
gation to the UN General Assembly, Soviet
delegate Tsarapkin suggested a US-Soviet
meeting on outstanding issues. Specifically,
'he maintained that the Soviet Union was prepared for an international
armament census and inspection of arms production. Alleging that real
international inspection was meant, Tsarapkin said it must be "based on
abolition of the use of atomic weapons in warfare and on a limitation of
conventional armaments. "
Comment Tsarapkin 's remarks probably
foreshadow a new Soviet proposal regarding armaments and atomic
weapons in this session of the General Assembly.
The USSR in 1948 rejected a Western pro-
posal for an arms census. Soviet acceptance of inspection appears con-
ditioned on prior agreement to abolition of the use of atomic weapons and
to arms limitation. The USSR's attitude toward inspection in the atomic
energy negotiations has been that it should be periodic and limited to
announced facilities. Tsarapkin's proposal does not appear to provide
for atomic energy control.
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USSR
2. Comment on Bolshevik Revolution Anniversary speech:
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Politburo member L. P. Beriya's keynote
address on the occasion of the 34th Anniversary of the Bolshevik Revo-
lution appears designed to emphasize to the world the USSR's increased
economic and military strength in comparison with the rearming West,
while claiming the continued existence of a "basis for agreement" with
the West.
However, Beriya warned Western leaders
not to construe the USSR's desires for peace as a sign of weakness, re-
peatedly recalled the Nazi invaders' defeat by the Soviet Union at a time
when it was much less prepared than at present, and stated that another
world war would result in the destruction of capitalism.
To emphasize Soviet strength in basic war
industries, Beriya gave absolute figures rather than percentages for
the 1951 increases in steel, coal and oil production, and total steel pro-
duction was hailed as roughly equal to that of Great Britain, France,
Belgium and Sweden combined. Although not specifically mentioning the
recent atomic explosions in the USSR, Beriya who reputedly heads the
Soviet atomic energy program, did not mention the recent atomic explo-
sions in the USSR, but he drew particularly marked applause when he
stated that the army and navy "possess all modern types of weapons."
Treatment of the Korean war, which re-
ceived significantly little attention in comparison to Bulganin's address
on this occasion last year, seemed to indicate the Kremlin's desire to
disassociate itself from this conflict if not to achieve an actual cease-
fire. While Bulganin had drawn a parallel between the situation at that
time and the early reverses of the Bolsheviks in the civil war period,
Beriya, without mentioning Chinese assistance, was simply "convinced
that the brave Korean people will find a worthy way out of the bloody '
conflict. "
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FAR EAST
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3.
SOUTH ASIA
4. Comment on political developments in Kashmir:
The recently elected permanent President of the
Kashmir Constituent Assembly, Ghulam Saddiq, is reputedly one of the two
leading Communists in Kashmir. Long an important adviser in Prime Minister
Sheikh Abdullah's government, Saddiq is now in a favorable position to increase
his power and influence.
Under Saddiq's guidance, the Constituent Assembly
may be expected to uphold Sheikh Abdullab's recent statement that, except in
foreign affairs, the people of Kashmir have full freedom to draft a constitution
according to their own desires. The Assembly may act on the Sheikh's suggestion
that Kashmir cooperate with India but retain its sovereignty as a state.
India has publicly advocated the establishment of
the Assembly and has championed the right of the Kashmiris to decide their own
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fate, which India confidently expects to be accession to India. Pending a
final solution of the problem by the United Nations, India might experience
some embarrassment if it prevented the Kashmiris from assuming a con-
siderable degree of autonomy.
If the Abdullah government continues its
Communist-tinged policies and if Kashmir becomes a semi-autonomous state,
Communist capabilities for obtaining control of the Himalayan borderlands
adjacent to India and Pakistan will be materially improved.
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WESTERN EUROPE
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Belgian and Dutch troop commitments for Korea not likely to be increased:
Belgium and the Netherlands have expressed regret
at their inability to furnish additional troops
for Korea. A Belgian official mentioned the
problem of ordering conscripts abroad.
A Dutch Foreign Office spokesman stated that
the volunteer system and the lack of incentives
has even made replacements for the original
contingent difficult to obtain. The Dutch spokesman added that About 2, OUO
Amboinese soldiers, well-trained in guerrilla warfare and now in the
Netherlands, probably would be willing to be used as a contingent to Korea,
but the Indonesian Government has taken a strong stand against such employ-
ment.
Comment: To affirm their support of the UN
resolution condemning the North Korean aggression, Belgium and the
Netherlands each sent a token force of about battalion strength to Korea in
the early part of the Korean affair.
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LA TIN AMER ICA
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