CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/07/07

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02003079
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: April 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2019
• Publication Date: July 7, 1951

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7 July 1951
Copy No. c/
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS, y
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CLASS. CHANGED ,TO:
NEXT REVIEW DATE:00
AUTH: HR 70;4
DATEptil:11.
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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4UMMARY
GENERAL
I. UK now supports the admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO
(Page 3).
FAR EAST
Ambassador Mucci� gives recommendations on cease-fire problems
(Daze 3).
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4. US Embassy analyzes recent revolt in Thailand (page 5).
5. Short life predicted for Indonesian cabinet (page 6).
VAR EAST
6. Deadline`for Iranian oil production cutoff nearing (page 7).
EASTERN EUROPE
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GENERAL
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1. UK now supports the admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO: 3.3(h)(2)
The US Embassy in Athens reports that the
British Ambassador has delivered a formal
confidential note to the Greek Government
announcing that Britain supports the admis-
sion of Greece and Turkey to NATO as full members. The note reportedly
contains no reservations on this policy and expresses the hope that the
opposition of certain other NATO members can be overcome.
Comment: British acceptance of the US-
proposed admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO will doubtless lead
to the reluctant acquiescence of Norway and Denmark, and will place
the burden of opposition upon Portugal and the Netherlands. France has
expressed reservations toward the proposal and remains concerned over
failure of the US and UK to recognize sufficiently French interest and
influence in the Mediterranean.
FAR EAST
bassador Mucci� gives recommendations on cease-fire problems: 3.3(h)(2)
US Ambassador Mucci� in Pusan, comment-
ing on the proposed cease-fire talks, warns
that any arrangements made should be based
on the premise that no other settlement of
territorial and political issues will be reached in the foreseeable future.
In order to make these decisions more palatable to the Republic of Korea
and to Asiatic public opinion, he recommends that the Korean member
be given a prominent position in the negotiations.
With respect to a possible 20 mile buffer zone,
Muccio cautions against the creation of a third territorial entity in Korea
administered by non-Koreans, and suggests that this can be avoided by
designating a line approximately midway in the demilitarized zone which
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would permit administration of two halves by the adjoining Korean regimes.
He adds that South Korean public opinion would find any other dividing line
more acceptable than the 38th Parallel. Mucci� also recommends that
neither the 40,000 Korean prisoners of war who were impressed into the
North Korean army nor the North Korean refugees be turned over to the
Northern authorities against their will.
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US Embassy analyzes recent revolt in Thailand:
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3.3(h)(2)
The US Embassy in Bangkok comments
that the navy's plans for a coup d'etat were
only part of a much larger plot that was to 3.3(h)(2)
have included police, army and air units.
Apparently, a small group of naval officers acted prematurely and
their co-conspirators were unable to render support. In the Embassy's
opinion, the,probable consequences of the attempted coup are: (a) the
navy's strength and political influence will be drastically reduced;
(b) the government will come more firmly under dictatorial military
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rule; (c) Premier Phibun is likely to become a figurehead for a four-
man, rivalry-ridden military junta; and (d) the Communists will
exploit a number of propaganda possibilities to discredit the govern-
ment in the eyes of the people.
5., n_st_lifs_preclicted for Indonesian cabinet:
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US Ambassador Cochran in Djakarta pre-
dicts that the current cabinet, formed by
a coalition of the Masjumi and National
parties (the two largest), will not last
long unless Prime Minister Sukiman demonstrates stronger leadership
and his ministers evidence greater competence. The chief threat to
the life of the cabinet derives from the moderate wing of the Masjumi,
which recently has severely criticized the government's financial-
economic policies. The National Party, although maintaining its
support of the cabinet, is so concerned over the inefficient adminis-
tration of the Economic Affairs Minister -- a Nationalist -- that it
has urged him to resign. Cochran feels that any important crisis
could precipitate the cabinet's collapse.
Comment; There is no immediate like-
lihood that the Masjumi moderates will withdraw support from the
Sukiman cabinet and precipitate its fall. They fear the emergence of
an even weaker cabinet subject to internal Communist pressure or one
which would include the Communists. However, the present govern-
ment has taken virtually no steps toward the achievement of law and
order and has failed fo improve the country's unsound condition.
Except for the recent Indonesian adherence Ao the UN embargo, no
firm stand has been taken against Communism on either a domestic
or external level.
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I L71�
NEAR EAST
6. Deadline for Iranian oU_prothietionsad f,,Q.Lm,axing�
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UK Count3elor Middleton has informed
the US Embassy that the refinery at 3.3(h)(2)
Abadan will have to shut down by 14 July.
if there are no more tanker loadings.
The closing date of the installations could, of course, be postponed
If the dispute over the form of loading receipts could be settled and
loadings were resumed. Following a shut-down, operations could
begin without delay at any time within three months. Meanwhile,
the Medical Officer aboard the UK cruiser Mauritius states that
the maximum time the vessel can remain in Abadan without danger
to health is two weeks.
comment: Agreement to change the
loading receipt form to suit the UK would constitute an abrupt reversal
of Iranian policy, and remains improbable in the light of Iran's recent
stand.
EASTERN EUROPE
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