CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/10/02

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02733145
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: April 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2019
• Publication Date: October 2, 1951

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2 October 1951
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
USSR
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3.3(h)(2)
FAR EAST
2. French staff officer sees no end to Viet Minh rebellion (page 3).
3.. Chinese Communists conclude satisfactory arrangements to
receive Indonesian goods (page 4).
NEAR EAST
4. Denunciation of Anglo-Egyptian Treaty increasingly favored
in Egypt (page 4).
WESTERN EUROPE
5. French and British contend expenses threaten Allied military
strength (page 5).
LATIN AMERICA
6. Comment on Argentine "army revolt" (page 6).
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USSR
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)(2)
FAR EAST
2. French staff officer sees no end to Viet Minh rebellion:
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The chief of the French Bureau of National
Defense in Indochina does not see how the
Viet Minh can ever be defeated in the field
unless they should commit "collective
suicide" against French defenses. He be-
'eves a t e t reat to the Hanoi beachhead has been temporarily re-
moved, but that the Viet Minh can go on recruiting indefinitely, while
the French effort is approaching its financial, manpower, and materiel
ceiling.
Comment: Although the fighting is now go-
ing against the Viet Minh, the French and the Vietnamese must create
a dynamic Vietnamese army and administration to take advantage of
this favorable trend. Progress has been slow, owing partly to materiel
deficiencies and partly to mutual French-Vietnamese suspicion and re-
crimination.
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3.
Chinese Communists conclude satisfactory
arrangements
to receive
Indonesian goods: 3 3(h)(2)
Comment: Indonesia prohibits the export
of tires to any destination andhas prohibited the export to China of
strategic materials, including rubber, in consonance with the UN-
sponsored embargo. Government controls are easily evaded, how-
ever, and shipment via Macao is standard procedure for items
smuggled to the Chinese Communists. Recent reports allege that
Macao officials are planning to make the Portuguese colony a more
important transit base for strategic shipments to the Communists
and are especially interested in stepping up shipments from Portu-
guese Timor, which adjoins Indonesian territory.
NEAR EAST
4. Denunciation of Anglo-Egyptian Treaty increasingly favored in Egypt:
3.3(h)(2)
Sentiment in Egypt favoring denunciation
of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty is in-
creasing, despite the outward atmosphere
of calm within the country. The US Em-
bassy in Cairo reports that there is wide-
spread skepticism in Egypt over the "new
proposals" promised by the British and
indeed considerable doubt whether the new
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prrsals will be sufficiently liberal to counter the current anti-Western
feeling in Egypt.
On 30 September the US Ambassador asked
King Farouk to delay Egypt's abrogation of the treaty until the propo-
sals could be advanced. Farouk replied that he could prevent Egypt
from acting "for a brief space but not for long. " The King added that
he had told the Egyptian Government to prepare papers for abrogating
the treaty, even though he hoped it would not be necessary to use them.
Comment: The successful implementation
of the Middle East Command scheme -- the "new proposals" -- depends
in large measure upon Egypt's approval of the plan. Once Egypt has
taken the drastic step of abrogating the 1936 treaty, it will be difficult,
if not impossible, to induce the Egyptian Government to consider a new
defense scheme involving the present British base on the SlieZ Canal.
WESTERN EUROPE
5. French and British contend expenses threaten Allied military strength
in Austria:
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3.3(h)(2)
The French and British commanding gener-
als in Austria have again informed the US
commander that the maintenance or rein-
forcement of their forces in Austria at the
strength considered necessary will be im-
periled unless an additional allotment to occupation costs is forthcoming
from the Austrian Government. The US Legation believes that this
argument will be used by French and British negotiators at the current
tripartite discussions in Vienna.
The Legation proposes, therefore, that
French and British requirements be acknowledged as falling within the
framework of European defense and the Military Assistance Program.
Their needs could thus be met without imposing an additional burden on
the Austrian economy.
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TOpECT
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Comment: British and French requests
for US support in a new approach to the Austrian Government on this
question have heretofore been rejected on the grounds of overriding
Austrian political and economic considerations. The merit of the
procedure suggested by the US Minister is that US external assistance
would not benefit the Soviet military establishment in Austria, which
would share in any increase in Austrian occupation costs allocations.
However, any overt association of Allied forces in Austria with the
European defense program would be subject to Soviet charges that
Austria is being brought into the "aggressive" North Atlantic Alliance.
LATIN AMERICA
6. Comment on Argentine "army revolt":
Further information on the 28 September
"army revolt" suggests that the government suppressed the beginnings
of a weak revolt which it was convinced would fail because of the lack
of army support. Since the most powerful army generals -- whose
backing would be necessary to effect a successful coup -- were not
involved in the plot, the army leadership apparently adhered to its
agreement to support Peron through the elections if Senora de Peron
withdrew her candidacy.
Peron's police have been aware of increased
plotting among various military and civilian groups during the past
several months, and in previous cases the government has neutralized
any real threat by arrests or the shifting of army personnel. It is
likely that in this instance, Peron's security measures were primarily
calculated to reap propaganda benefits and identify his military oppo-
nents. The US Military Attache in Buenos Aires was on 29 September,
however, still not ready to discard the possibility that the government
planned the entire incident for these purposes.
4.
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