CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/09/02

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02014431
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: April 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2019
• Publication Date: September 2, 1951

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2 $eptember 1951
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULIETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN.-CLASS.
L DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED Ta IS S Ctoo?
NEXT REVIEW DATE.
AUTTi HR 70-
DA
REVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. British ambassador recommends headquarters outside Egypt for
proposed Mediterranean command (page 3).
2. Egyptian diplomats make last minute effort to postpone UN action
on Canal issue (page 3).
FAR EAST
4. Macao prepares for increased trade with Communists (page 5).
NEAR EAST
5. Afghanistan and Iran reach oil agreement (page 6).
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WESTERN EUROPE
7. French concurrence in Germany's admission to NATO is foreseen
for 1952 (page 7).
8. Schuman adds Moroccan question to Washington agenda (page 8).
9. French Premier considers coal shortage serious problem (page 8).
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GENERAL
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1. British ambassador recommends headquarters outside Egypt for proposed
Mediterranean command:
The British Ambassador to Egypt has recom-
mended to his government that the headquarters
of the proposed Allied command for the eastern
Mediterranean should be located outside Egypt,
since its location there would prejudice the chances of obtaining Egypt's
participation in the command structure.
Comment; One of the main reasons which led
the British to propose this combined regional command, which would ini-
tially include the UK, the US, France, Turkey and -- they hope -- Egypt,
was their belief that Egyptian nationalist sentiment would prove less hostile
to granting military facilities to such a multinational organization than to
Britain alone. Available evidence suggests, however, that the current
mood in Egypt would preclude agreement not merely to the command head-
quarters but to the stationing at present of any foreign troops on Egyptian
soil.
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2. Egyptian diplomats make last minute effort to postpone UN action on Canal
issue:
Both the Egyptian Ambassador and Egypt's
Chief UN Delegate have approached US
officials with the aim of developing a new
formula for settling the Suez Canal dispute,
now before the UN Security Council. Both
men have asked the US to help in postponing
the UNSC action on this issue.
The UN Delegate frankly expressed his
concern over the unexpected support the USSR gave the Egyptian request
for delay. He suggested that this embarrassing situation be resolved by
further postponement on the pretext of appointing a committee or individual
to investigate the matter further.
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In answer to the US comment that the best
way to counter the Soviet move would be for Egypt to lift the restrictions,
the Egyptian Delegate intimated that internal political problems would
prevent Egypt from complying with such a suggestion. He then warned
that the proposed UN resolution would "further prejudice the US position
In the entire Arab world. "
Comment Egyptian desire to avoid an
4dverse Security Council decision on the Canal issue has not been suf-
liciently strong to induce It to make a compromise offer which might be
acceptable. While some Egyptian leaders recognize the dangers of Soviet
support, there are other nationalists who agree with the Foreign Minister,
who has been quoted as welcoming the Soviet maneuver as "a happy
surprise. "
FAR EAST
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. Macao prepares for increased trade with Communists:
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Mac :o officials are planning to make the
Portuguese colony a more important transit
base for strategic shipments to the Com-
munists. The Macao government has pur-
chased three ships and intends to acquire three more for direct trade with
Japan; four other vessels will be chartered to step up service with Portu-
guese Timor; and quick turn-around is planned for vessels bringing petroleum
from Thailand and the Philippines.
P. J. Lobo, MacaOys Director of Economics,
is personally connected with these deals, at the same time officially dis-
claiming ability to prevent the traffic. Twelve trade advisers from Peiping
were recently added te the staff of the Nan Kwang Company, the principal
Communist purchasing agency in Macao.
Comment: Communist interest in utilizing
Macao as a smuggling base has become particularly manifest since Hong
Kong broadened its export control program 1 st June. Petroleum appears
currently to be the principal item in this traffic, but truck tires, crude
rubber, metals, motor vehicles, auto parts, radio equipment, and on
occasion Munitions are also handled.
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NEAR EAST
Afghanistan and Iran reach oil. agreement:
Agreement between Iran and Afghanistar3.3(h)(2)
for the delivery of oil to Afghanistan has
been formally announced in Kabul.. The
US Embassy in Afghanistan, in expressing
doubt of the feasibility of overland transportation, points out that the
roads linking Ir n with Afghanistan are inadequate for regular and size-
able oil shipments.
Comment Both countries are impelled by
obvious propaganda motiv ,s. Afghanistan wishes to free itself from
dependency upon Pakistan and the USSR. Iran needs to sell oil. Afghani-
stan's annual oil consumption, however, is equivalent to only a small
fraction of one d y's norm 1 production of the Abadan refinery.
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WESTERN EUROPE
7. French concurrence in Germany's dmission to NATO is foreseen for,
1.952
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According to a report from the US Embassy
in London, a "responsible official" of the
French Foreign Office has stated that he and
some of his colleagues are personally con-
vinced that Germany's membership in NATO is both inevitable and de-
sirable.
These officials emphasize, however, that
the worst way of accompli hing this would be for the US or UK to raise
the issue with the French before or at the time when the Germans agree
to a defense contribution. In the opinion of the source, French public
opinion would be able to accept German membership in NATO about six
months after that date, or about mid-1952.
Comment This is the first indication that
any French officials are prepared to consider German admission to NATO
at a definite future d te. In all spects of the German problem, French
officials stress the importance of c reful timing in order to insure that
German commitments to the common defense will induce a further swing
of Fre ch public opinion in f vor of new steps toward German equality.
A relatively tolerant ttitude tow rd Germany has been developing in
France since July 1949, when Schuman informed the Assembly that Ger-
many's participation in NATO was "unthinkable" and a question that "can
never come up now or even at a later d te. "
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Schuman adds Moroccan question to Washington agenda:
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French Foreign Minister Schuman plans
to add the question of Morocco to the agenda
for his bilateral talks with Secretary Acheson.
A memorandum is now being drafted in the
Foreign Office outlining France's policies and practices in Morocco.
Because the Foreign Office believes that
US officials want future French policy to be built around the nationalist
Istiqlal party, the memorandum will disparage the party and point out
that Istiqlal rule would result only in civil war and chaos. The French
will draw heavily on the paradox of US and Communist support for Istiqlal,
and stress the "advantages to the West of a cooperative Morocco in case
of war. "
The memorandum will not contain an over-
all plan for the progressive IndepegAdence of French North Africa, a
policy long recommended by US diplomats.
Comment: Sensitivity of the French over
US influence in their Moroccan protectorate has become an obsession.
US diplomats have not advoc ted that French policy be built around the
Istiqlal party, which not only does not have US support but also has re-.T
jected all Communist overtures.
The US has repeatedly urged that the French
adopt a concrete progr m looking toward greater autonomy for Morocco--
a policy similar to the grnting of independence to the Philippines. These
recommendations have been rejected by the French.
9. French Premier considers coal shortage serious problem:
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French Premier Pleven has told Ambassador
Bruce and Mr. Harriman that the general
European coal shortage poses the greatest
eco omic problem currently facing France.
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The French feel that solutions for this
problem should be sought in the coming Foreign Minister& talks. One
possibility would be to finance coal shipments from the US out of mili-
tary assistance funds to the extent that the coal is to be used in the
manufacture of military items.
Comment: According to official French
estimates of 1 July, France will produce about 55 million metric tons of
coal in 1951 and obtain 5 or 6 million tons from the Saar. The balance
of French import needs for 1951 is estimated at over 15 million tons, of
which the traditional suppliers in Europe cannot furnish more than 9
million tons. Of the rem tiling gap of over 6 million tons, for which
France looks to the US, less than one-fourth was obtained from the US
in the first half of 1951. Meanwhile French steel production is at only
80 percent of capacity.
The Office of ECA' s Special Representative
in Paris estimates that foreign dem nds upon the US for coal in fiscal
year 1952 might rise as high s 30 million tons at a cost representing
about three-fourths of total US foreign economic aid.
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