CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/09/16

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02745278
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: April 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2019
• Publication Date: September 16, 1951

Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2745278
�161Y 1 Ur 6EL:111S-1-
16 September 1951
Copy No.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
r DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO:
NEXT FIEVIEW DATE:
47
..vs4tylo
REVIEWEF
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2745278
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
Approved f3r Release:i019/04/02 CO2745278
SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. Anglo-French conference proposed to alleviate disagreements over
Middle East (page 3).
FAR EAST
3.5(c)
2. French-Vietnamese friction over the concept of the French Union
foreseen (page 3).
3, De Lattre plans to revive issue of French participation in Indochinese
aid program (page 4).
4. India advises Burma to delay submission to UN of Chinese Nation-
alist troop question (page 5).
NEAR EAST
�
5. Effects of British embargo on Iranian economy (page 5).
WESTERN EUROPE
6. National veterans' group formed in West Germany (page 6).
3.3(h)(2)
-2
Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2745278
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/0z.1./0.2 CO2745278
GENERAL...1Y J(liJ1
Anglo-French conference proposed to alleviate disagreements over
Middle East:
� 3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
The British Foreign Office confirms that
the French Foreign Minister has proposed
a conference with Great Britain to discuss
"international questions of common interest"
In view of the danger of Anglo-French disagreements, particularly on
Middle East and North African questions. ,The Foreign Office expects
a general conference some time after the French Foreign Minister's
return from Ottawa.
Comment: Since France was excluded from
the Anglo-American bilateral discussions on Mediterranean defenses in
Malta last spring, fears of American, and especially British encroach-
ment upon French influence in the Middle East have been increasing.
In the Washington tripartite talks, however, Great Britain has indicated
a desim for French support in solving Britain's problems in the area,
particularly on the question of the Middle Eastern command.
FAR EAST
3.3(h)(2)
. French-Vietnamese friction over the concept of the French Union fore-
seen:
The US Charge in Saigon believes that the
prospective first convocation of the High
Council of the French Union may bring to
a head the problem of whether the status
of the Associated States of Indochina is to be one of genuine association
or subordination.
The emphasis which Vietnamese spokesmen
have placed on full equality within the French Union, when compared
with De Lattre's statement that commonwealth dominion status is hardly
Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2745278
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2745278
SEUE.E'r
in prospect for Vietnam, denotes the pote hal explosiveness of this
issue. The Charge states his belief that implementation of the French
Union, along the restricted lines envisaged by France in 1944.1,01 be
deeply resented by the Vietnamese public and will embitter French-
Vietnamese relations for years to come. He urges that no American
Statement be issued which implies approval of the organizational
aspects of the French Union.
3.5(c)
3. De Lattre plans to revive issue of French participation in Indochinese
aid program: 3.3(h)(2)
General e Laftre's proposed agenda for
his meet4ngs with ECA officials in Wash-
ington is "highly disappointing, " in the
opinion of the US Charge at Saigon. The
Charge feels that it indicates the French attitude towards the US
economic aid program in Indochina has remained the same -- that US
economic aid to the Associated States should not be administered
bilaterally, but with official French participation.
The US Charge refers to the original
American decision to vise a program whose benefits would be
applied directly through the Associated States, in order to strengthen
the prestige of the native governments in the eyes of the populations.
This would prevent the French from diverting the aid to their own
interest. He concludes that if De Lathe's agenda were made known
to inferm d Vietnamese, it would violently irritate and offend them.
Comment: Although the French insisted
almost two years ago on participation in the economic aid program,
they subsequently appeared to accept administration by the US and
the Associated States, De Lathe's reported intent to revive the
issue of French participation is not surprising, however, in the light
of continuing French criticism of the ECA program in Indochina.
Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2745278
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2745278
I ur bEA..;11Z-1:
3.5(c)
4. India advises Burma to delay submission to UN of Chinese Nationalist
troop question: 3.3(h)(2)
India has advised Burma to delay JO pro-
jected submission to the UN of the question
of Chinese Nationalist troop activities along
the Sino-Burmese border. India, has also
expressed the hope that the US can do something toward eliminating
this danger to peace in Asia since the US, as the "chief supplier of
foreign arms to Southeast Asia," may be accused by Communist powers
of assisting the Nationalists.
Comment: Last May, when Burma first
planned to take this case to the UN, it was dissuaded from doing so by
US representations, Indian admonitions against hasty action, and the
movement of the troops in question out of Burma into Yunnan. Now
that the defeated Nationalist troops have reentered Burma, any Western
advice to delay may be less successful. If the case is not submitted,
it will probably be largely because of Indian influence.
NEAR EAST 3.3(h)(2)
Effects of British embargo on Iranian econom
The British embargo on the export of
certain scarce commodities to Iran,
according to the American Embassy in
Tehran, will be felt immediately in the
case of sugar, already in short supply. The ban will also affect,
although less quickly, cotton piece goods which can no longer be
bought from the US because of Iran's inability to convert sterling to
dollars,
Comment: The British action in shutting
off these imports will encourage opposition to Prime Minister MoOlsa-
deg among moderates. At the same time, it will probably result in
an even more intransigent attitude on the part of the present govern-
ment,which will see in this action further confirmation of "British
Imperialism."
- 5 -
Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2745278
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2745278
fel-P�SECRET
WESTERN EUROPE
National veterans' group formed in West Germany:
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
Representatives of all the leading West
German veterans' organizations met at
Bonn on 8 September and took action to
unite in a single national veterans' group
called the Association of German Soldiers. The new alliance, still
subject to ratification by the component groups, elected a provisional
leadership which will draw up policies and arrange for an election of
permanent officers.
Local US officials, noting that German
veterans have for some time been violating the Allied law prohibiting
such organizations, state that any Allied attempt now at enforcement
would cause considerable resentment, especially since all the
political parties have been assiduously cultivating the veterans' votes.
The officials comment that the new association, despite an assertion
that it will not enter politics, has clearly denwnstrated that it has
political aims. They add that it is not yet certain whether the group
will be able to curb radical and anti-Allied minority elements and refrain
from becoming a threat to US policies in Germany.
Comment: This is the second major move
to unite the West German veterans' organizations. In late July a
notable merger resulted in the formation a the German Soldiers'
Federation, claiming over 80, 000 members, which initiated the Bonn
conference. So far, most of the groups represented in the new associ-
ation have demonstrated a moderate political line, and have supported
German rearmament. Until the new association can demonstrate much
greater cohesiveness and exert a strong control over its components,
It is not likely to constitute a serious threat to US interests.
6
Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2745278
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2745278
� .� .
3.5(c)
3.3(h
)(2)
7
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2745278
3.5(c)