CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/09/12

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02745275
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: April 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2019
• Publication Date: September 12, 1951

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J. Nei
12 September 1951
Copy No.
47
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENTNO
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
; DECLASSIFIED
CLASS, CHANGED TO: TS 8
NEXT REVIEW�DATE�
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REVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. Turkey will be asked to join US, UK in approach to Egypt (page 3).
v2. Egypt to be invited to participate in Middle East Command (page 3).
USSR
3. Tass denies presence of Soviet troops in North Korea (page 4).
FAR EAST
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5. Israeli Prime Minister still unable to form government (page 6).
EASTERN EUROPE
6. Yugoslav actions further Jeopardize Yugoslav-Italian relations (page 6).
WESTERN EUROPE
7. Long range adverse effect on Berlin economy seen (page 7).
LATIN AMERICA
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GENERAL
Turkey will be asked to join US, UK in approach to Egypt:
It is planned to offer full membership in NATO
to Turkey and Greece at the Ottawa meeting of
NATO on 15 September, according to a recent
US memorandum. As a "member elect" Turkey
will be asked to join immediately with the US and the UK in an approach to
Egypt, designed to enlist the latter in a Middle East Defense Command in
which Egypt will share the authority and responsibility of maintaining ade-
quate regional defense. 3 3(h)(2)
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The approach to Egypt is designed to bring that
country into a Middle East command before it can carry out its threat to ab-
rogate the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty. Turkish insistence on full member-
ship, a time consuming procedure since accession of each new member must
be ratified by each NATO government, might defeat this maneuver. Current
Egyptian irritation over Turkey's failure to support Egypt on the Suez ques-
tion at the UN may detract from Turkish intercession with Egypt at this
time.
2. Egypt to be invited to _participate in Middle East Command:
3.3(h)(2)
Egypt will be asked to participate in the proposed
Middle East Command as a founding member on
the basis of full equality under procedures cur-
kently being discussed in the tripartite Foreign
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Egypt would be a member of the Middle East
Chiefs of Staff committee. Its officers would be included in the integrated
headquarters of the Supreme Allied Command for the Middle East, which
Egypt is to be asked to locate on its soil.
The present British bases in Egypt would be
handed over formally to Egypt on the understanding that they would simul-
taneously become Command bases with full Egyptian cooperation in their
running at all times. Those British forces currently in Egypt not allocated
to the Command will be withdrawn immediately. 3.3(h)(2)
The Command, in agreement with the Egyptian
Government, would determine the number of allied troops to be stationed in
Egypt in peacetime. In an international emergency Egypt would grant all
necessary facilities to the Allied force.
Comment: These proposals have been worked
out primarily to secure the retention of the facilities built up by the British
in the Suez Canal area, which military authorities consider the important
strategic area for the defense of the Middle East.
Available evidence suggests that under any cir-
cumstances Egypt will view suspiciously any proposals concerning the
stationing of foreign troops on its territory.
USSR
Tass denies presence of Soviet troops in North Korea:
Tass states that it has been authorized to deny
that "Soviet forces of the white race, and the
like, are in North Korea, "according to a
broadcast from Radio Moscow,
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Comment: On 6 September, Radio Peiping also
denied that "Caucasian volunteers" were in Korea. Although there has been
no identification of Soviet units in North Korea, Soviet military assistance
does exist in the form of air force, anti-aircraft and air warning personnel.
This authoritative Soviet denial may indicate
that the USSR does not plan to expand its participation in the Korean war in
the near future or that it will not publicize the use of "international volun-
teers" as such.
FAR EAST
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NEAR EAST
5. Israeli Prime Minister still unable to form government:
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Israeli Prime Minister Beft Gurion, leader of
the moderate socialist M.APAI party, after six
weeks of negotiations, has not yet managed to
form a government. Ben Gurion, whose party
obtained only a plurality in the 30 July elections, has been trying to reach
accord with the next largest parties, the conservative General Zionist and
the extreme leftist MAPAM.
Failure to include the Zionists of MAPAM would
force the Prime Minister to form a coalition with five splinter groups or
admit his inability to form a government.
Comment: The Prime Minister disagrees
strongly with the General Zionists on many domestic issues. He disagrees
even more strongly with the MAPAM on major foreign policy issues.
Unless either, or both, of these parties con-
siderably modifies its position, Ben Gurion will have to turn to smaller par-
ties more in accord with his position. Such a coalition would give him only
a slim working majority and would leave him a strong opposition.
EASTERN EUROPE
6. Yugoslav actions further jeopardize Yugoslav-Italian relations:
Within three days after the postponement of the
Trieste elections, the Yugoslav Government has
taken a stand which will make bilateral nego-
tiations over Trieste more difficult. On
8 September the Yugoslav Foreign Office pro-
tested the anti-Yugoslav campaign being con-
ducted by Italian Government spokesmen and
propaganda organs. On 9 September, in a speech
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celebrating Yugoslav Navy Day, Marshal Tito denounced Italy's anti-Yugo-
slav campaign and Irredentist claims.
rpmment� These actions are another indication
that the Yugoslav Government has no desire to settle the Trieste issue at
this time. Prior to the postponement of the Trieste elections on 6 September,
Yugoslavia had maintained a relatively moderate tone regarding the anti-
Yugoslav campaign in Italy.
WESTERN EUROPE
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7. Long range adverse effect on Berlin economy seen:
�
Although truck traffic on the Berlin-West Ger-
many autobahn appears to have returned to nor-
mal, the recent Soviet move in imposing a pro-
hibitive road tax on this traffic is likely to re-
suit in the long run in further harm to the West Berlin economy. At the
present time, the tax has apparently been absorbed by the German firms
and, although imported commodities will probably continue to be available,
there is likely to be an increase in their cost. The possibility exists that
some Berlin industries will become less competitive through price increases.
Local US officials, in evaluating the possible
Soviet motives, believe that the tax, coming on top of other recent restric-
tions, is the latest in a series of steps possibly designed to lead progres-
sively to a new blockade, or at least to a situation equivalent in its effect
on the economy of West Berlin, with the ultimate goal of making the Allied
position in the city untenable. They feel that the move may also be de-
signed to force the conclusion of the interzonal trade pact, or to divide and
confuse the Western camp on the whole Berlin problem.
Comment: The precarious West Berlin econo-
my already requires extensive support from the Allies and West Germany.
Further impairment of this economy would increase unemployment, al-
ready serious) and require additional subsidies from the West German
Government, thus adding to current West German dissatisfaction with the
drain on the Federal budget.
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