CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/08/08

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02001999
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: April 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2019
• Publication Date: August 8, 1951

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8 August 1951
Copy No.c I - 7
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
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1. Comment on resolution of Supreme Soviet Presidium of the USSR (page 3).
2. Anglo-American disagreement over Far East policy seen as probable in
event of Korean armistice (page 3).
WESTERN EUROPE
4. Further progress is made on East-West export controls (page 5).
5. French fear aviation gasoline shortage is imminent (page 6).
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GENERAL
1. Comment on resolution of Supreme Soviet Presidium of the USSR:
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The stereotyped nature of the proposals con-
tained in the Soviet reply to the US Congressional resolution transmitted on
7 July suggests that the answer sprang primarily from a necessity to refute
the previous, well-publicized US communication. Even though the resolution
contributes to the campaign to portray the USSR as cooperative and non-
agressiv it contains no indication of any forthcoming Soviet concessions which
could add substance to the peace campaign.
The resolution follows the standard two-pronged
argumentation of Soviet propaganda. The denunciation of US policy centers on
allegedly discriminatory practices such as the export control system, but con-
tains only relatively mild criticisms of US-initiated policies such as rearma-
ment and the creation of NATO. The "peace" policy of the USSR is buttressed
with references to proposals like the Five-Power pact twice put forward in the
UN since 1949, but the UN is not mentioned by name. This evasion may result
from a Soviet wish to identify objectives such as disarmament with Communist
"peace" organizations rather than with the UN, which has rejected Soviet pro-
posals for prohibiting atomic weapons, for arms limitation and for a Five-
Power peace pact.
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. An lo-American dis reement over Far East polic seen as robable in event
of Eorun armistice:
The US Embassy in London predicts that British
differences with the US over Far East policy,
now held in check in order to preserve a united
UN front in Korea, will probably revive if a
orean armistice is achieved.
The embassy indicates that the British see an
armistice as the first phase in "step-by-step" negotiations leading eventually
to a general settlement in the Far East, and expect the Chinese Communists
to demand admission to the UN as a pre-requisite to an over-all Korean
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settlement. The embassy estimates that the present government would find
great difficulty in trying to dodge such a demand in the face of UK public
opinion on the issue.
On the Formosa issue, the embassy reports the
increasing conviction of many senior military and civil �facials, including
�Foreign Secretary Morrison, that the island would be of strategic importance
to a hostile power, but estimates that the Cabinet nevertheless might be led
to over-rule Foreign Office support of Formosa's continued neutralization
should it appear expedient to promote a general Far .Eastern settlement.
Regarding the future of Korea once a cease-fire
had been negotiated, the embassy forsees that Britain might for a time resist
pressure for a total withdrawal of UN forces, but probably would eventually
prove willing to accept some face-saving solution. This would relieve the UK
of unwelcome responsibilities in Korea and, though it might leave South Korea
vulnerable to eventual political absorption by the North Korean Communist
regime, Foreign Office circles regard such a development as probable in any
event.
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WESTERN EUROPE
4. Further progress is made on East-West export controls:
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Recent meetings of Western powers participating
in East-West trade controls have, in the opinion
of the US delegation, led to "significant further
progress toward parallel action" among all
countries represented. More than 60 per cent of the critical items on which
the US had previously been unable to obtain agreement for a strict embargo
.whave now been accepted. In addition, "advantageous" proposals for handling
quantitative controls and exceptions have been adopted, and further progress
is likely to be made by obtaining at least partial controls over the remaining
items proposed by the US for strict embargo.
On the other hand, the American delegates were
impressed with the "very firm position" taken particularly by Britain and
France against a further extension of the embargo on basic industrial exports.
These countries showed "grave concern" with their domestic political problems
and rejected what they probably viewed as a US effort to impose its will on
export controls.
Comment: Further substantial progress toward a
general embargo on critical items is not indicated. Furthermore, the other
participating countries have accepted less than 40 per cent of the 250 items that
were proposed for quantitive restrictions only, although in practice the US
denies these items totally to the Soviet Orbit.
The Western European countries are increasingly
apprehensive over inflationary pressures, which some leaders want to combat
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in part by encouraging imports. These countries insist that they can obtain
urgently needed Eastern products, such as coal, only by offering some cri-
tical items in exchange. Furthermore, the Western European countries
are increasingly resentful of US leadership.
. French fear aviation gasoline shortage is imminent:
A severe aviation gas shortage is expected in
France by October if the Abadan refinery
shutdown continues. The French� Government
is trying to borrow enough gas from SHAPE to
over, they fear that they will not be successful once the freight
airlift from Berlin is in full swing.
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A French official believes that the new Soviet
blockade of Berlin is timed to take the greatest possible advantage of the
growing Western European shortage of aviation gas resulting from the
Iranian dispute.
Comment: The Abadan shutdown has deprived
Western Europe of 31 per cent of its processed petroleum. imports. Iran
supplied only a slight portion of total French petroleum imports, but a
relatively high proportion of this was aviation gasoline, and current stocks
cannot be entirely replenished from domestic plants.
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