CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/08/02

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02001998
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: April 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2019
• Publication Date: August 2, 1951

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2 August 1951
Copy No. Ci �
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
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DECLASSIFtED
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AUTH: HAI 0.
DATE
REVIEWER
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. Widespread opposition in NATO to US position on possible September
Council meeting (page 3).
FAR EAST
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3. Lack of success in suppressing Malaya's rebels reported (page 4).
SOUTH ASIA
Chinese Communists desire to open embassy in Nepal (page 4).
India rejects proposed Burmese-Indonesian mediation (page 5).
NEAR EAST- AFRICA
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6. Comment on Greek Field Marshal Papagos' entry into politics (page 6).
EASTERN EUROPE
Indictment of former Polish Army officers lays emphasis on national
deviation (page 7).
WESTERN EUROPE
90 Embassy Moscow believes USSR is showing restraint in Berlin (page 8).
33(h)(2)
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GENERAL 3.3(h)(2)
Widespread opposition in NATO to US position on possible September Coun-
cil meeting:
of tile other NATO members.
Further discussion in the NATO Deputies'
meetings of the proposal to hold. a Council
meeting at Ottawa on 15 September has led to
sharp disagreement between the US and most
Many members believe the presence of the,
Defense Ministers is essential for a decision on Greek and Turkish member-
ship in NATO. The UK, with Dutch, Norwegian and Danish support, insists
that a decision on the Middle East command structure be reached concurrent-
ly, The French are in general agreement with the US in opposing these
views and desiring definitive action on fundamental questions such as the
proposed European Defense Forces and agreements on Germany. The
French join the Norwegians and the Dutch, however, in preferring to aban-
don the proposal for a September meeting.
The majority of the members oppose any
serious consideration of the German question and favor giving primary at-
tention to the non-military aspects of NATO problems aside from the admis-
sion of Greece and Turkey.
FAR EAST
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Lack of success in suppressing Malaya's rebels reported:
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o end to the emergency is in s g so
ong as e ornmunist-led terrorists retain hope of eventual aid from outside
Malaya. The officials are hopeful, however, that efforts to cut off the rebels'
food supply and an increase in the home guard will decrease their numbers.
It is not expected that the now neutral mass of Malayan Chinese will turn
against the terrorists until it is quite clear that the West is winning the world
power struggle. 3.3(h)(2).
Comment: Lack of success by the British in
their campaign to destroy the 4, 000 to 5, 000 insurgents has been interpreted
by US officials in Malaya as the reason for the intended resignation of
Lt. General Sir Harold Briggs, Director of Operations. The General, who
devised the "Briggs Plan" to exterminate the rebels, was put in charge of its
execution. If the plan had been proceeding successfully, he might have been
expected to continue in command.
� SOUTH ASIA
� Chinese Communists desire to open embassy in Nepal:
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has expres-
sed his government's concern over the Chinese
Communists' desire to open an embassy in
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Katmandu. The Nepalese Government is faced with two choices: to display
no interest in the opening of an embassy and consequently expose itself, to a
possible Chinese revival of the debatable question of Nepalese sovereignty;
or to agree to establishment of an embassy, thereby obtaining Chinese recog-
nition of Nepal's independent status but at the same time enabling the Chinese
to make the embassy a center for subversive activities,
Comment: Regardless of the action taken,
Nepal probably will be unable to prevent the infiltration of Communist ele-
ments from Tibet and India. Both the nature of the terrain and the absence
of firm government control outside the capital make it difficult to detect and
limit the activities of undesirables, some of whom are already operating in
Nepal.
3.3(h)(2)
5. India rejects proposed Burmese-Indonesian mediation: 3.3(h)(2)
government's plan to propose that the Prime
Ministers of Burma and Indonesia jointly
visit New Delhi awl Karachi to offer their good offices toward easing the ten-
sion between India and Pakistan.
athough the Pakistanis and Indonesians were favorably
disposed toward the project, it had been rejected by Nehru. 3.3(h)(2)
Comment: Burmats concern over tension
between India and Pakistan was evidenced last week by the visit of the Bur-
mese Foreign Minister to New Delhi to inquire if his government could help
solve the impasse on Kashmir.
India's rejection of the mediation offer un-
doubtedly derives partly from a fear of losing face through mediation by two
nations it looks upon as "satellites." More importantly, however, India's
refusal reflects a confidence in its ability to maintain independently its
present power position vis-a-vis Pakistan and the United Nations, as well as
a belief that its current actions will not lead to open warfare with Pakistan.
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA.
6. Comment on Greek Field Marshal Papagos's entry into politics:
Greek Field Marshal Papagos formally
entered the political arena on 30 July with an announcement of his intention
to participate in the general elections scheduled for 9 September. His deci-
sion to enter politics was probably prompted by the seeming impossibility
of a reconciliation with the King and a return to his former position as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces,
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If Papagos attracts the best men of all par-
ties, as is his announced intention, he could give Greece a stronger and more
stable government. There is some danger, however, that Papagos' strong
convictions and his military background might eventually lead him to attempt
a dictatorship. In any event, established Greek politicians will not welcome
a newcomer, particularly of the stature of Papagos, and considerable poli-
tical maneuvering may be expected. The King, who is strongly opposed to
Papagos' emergence into politics, will undoubtedly be tempted to meddle in
political affairs.
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EASTERN EUROPE
8. Indictment of former Polish Array Officers lays emphasis on
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ational deviation:
The indictment of nine former senior Polish
Army officers on trial in Warsaw emphasizes
their alleged efforts to created a "Taoist
Fascist regime" in Poland and to a lesser
extent their "criminal, subversive and es-
pionage activities for the US and UK.."
The indictment accuses former Polish Commu-
nist Party Secretary Gomulka and ex-Minister of National Defense General
Spychalski of protecting these officers. It also ties in the defendants with
other Polish national elements, including former Socialists, the Mikolajczyk
Peasant Party, and the wartime partisans who have been brought to trial in
recent years.
US Embassy Moscow reports that the Soviet
press has given the indictment a build-up comparable to that accorded the
Rajk trial in Hungary in 1949. The Embassy points out that the trial may be
intended to underline Molotov's recent warning against national deviation.
Comment: Although the majority of the de-
fendants were arrested or disappeared during 1949 and 1950 when the Polish
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Army underwent extensive purging of politically suspect officers, this is
the first public trial of Polish Army officers. It is the first time since the
fall of 1949, when Poland's leading deviationists Gomulka and Spychalski
were publicly denounced by the Party for Titoism, that national deviation
has been attacked with such vehemence. The extent of play given the prob-
lem of national deviation suggests again, as did Molotov's recent speech,
the strong Soviet preoccupation with this weakness on its strategic Euro-
pean periphery.
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9. Embassy Moscow believes USSR i s showing restraint in Berlin:
US Embassy Moscow, commenting on the
Berlin trade impasse, considers that the
USSR is anxious to avoid showing itself in an
openly provocative attitude at a time when
"the-peaceful coexistence repertoire is
playing in other theaters of operation. The
Embassy bases this judgment on the cautious
Soviet approach to the Berlin issue, the spo-
radic willingness to negotiate with the Allies, and the lack of Soviet propa-
ganda emphasis on the situation. The Embassy feels, however, that the
Kremlin hopes to profit even from soft-pedalled tactics in Berlin, so long as
the West refrains from provoking Soviet pressure on some larger issue.
Embassy officials endorse the plan for a limited Allied airlift, including
military planes, as a_practical means of easing the present West Berlin -
export backlog and demonstration� the - Politburo tht TextVnt and fleXibillty.cf
Allied, air --power.
The State Department meanwhile recommends
a considerable extension of the present partial embargo on West German
shipments to East Germany. Although conceding that French objections might
preclude the complete termination by the Allies of interzonal trade, the
Department urges that at least shipments of all essential and strategic goods
to East Germany should be halted, in an attempt to damage the East German
economy and force Soviet capitulation.
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LATIN AMERICA
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