CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/11/17
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
02739312
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
8
Document Creation Date:
April 15, 2019
Document Release Date:
April 22, 2019
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
Publication Date:
November 17, 1951
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULL[15602907].pdf | 298.07 KB |
Body:
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SECURITY INFORMATION
1'7 November 1951
Copy NO.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO
NO CHANGE IN
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SECURITY INFORMATION
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SUMMARY
FAR EAST
1. Comment on Philippine elections (page 3).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
2. Lebanon's position toward Middle East Command hardens (page 4).
3. Comment on Egypt's compromise offer on the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan
(page 4).
4. Arab states tentatively offer to let Moroccan question rest (page 5).
5. Tunisians seek greater governmental responsibility (page 5).
EASTERN EUROPE
WESTERN EUROPE
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7. French accede to American proposal on Austrian treaty (page 7).
8. French Foreign Office seeks to tighten administration of export 3.3(h)(2)
controls (page 7) .
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FAR EAST
1. Comment on Philippine elections:
Incomplete returns from the Philippines indicate
that President Quirino's Liberal'Party has suffered a severe defeat in what
appears-to have been a surprisingly honest election. The latest unofficial
count shows all nine Nationalist candidates leading for the contested seats in
the Senate. Further returns from the provinces will almost certainly add to
the Liberal vote but the Nationalists seem to have won at least five seats.
Even if all the opposition candidates should win,
the Liberals will retain nominal leadership of the Senate. Factionalism
within their ranks, however, will limit their effectiveness and will probably
result in de faCto control by a coalition of Nationalists and anti-Quirino
Liberals. Such a combination may curtail the power of President Quirino
to make executive appointments.
The wartime puppet President, Jose Laurel, who
headed the Nationalist ticket, has apparently won a seat, and will exercise
considerable influence in the new Senate. His strongly anti-American attitude,
however, is not shared by other prominent Nationalist candidates, who as a
group are of a distinctly higher caliber than their Liberal opponents, and are
fully aware that their country's defense and economic welfare are dependent
on the US.
Quite as important as the political results of
the elections is the fact that they appear to have been a genuine expression
of the voters' will -- in marked contrast to the elections of 1949. The US
Embassy in Manila reports that the psychological effect of the apparent
Nationalist victory has been excellent, that faith in democratic processes has
been regenerated and that the ground has been cut out from under Communist
propaganda.
The widespread fear that the Huks would be able
seriously to disrupt the balloting did not materialize, which reflects their
reduced capabilities.
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NEAR. EAST - AFRICA
2. Lebanon' position toward Middle East Command ha:rdens:
Lebanon's position is hardening against the
Middle' East Command proposal. Lebanese opinion
is rapidly reaching a point where cooperation with
the 'West will be difficult to obtain pending settle-
ment of the Egyptian affair.
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The US Minister in Beirut voiced this opinion
after noting the government's unwillingness to oppose public opinion on the
Egyptian issue. The Minister felt that his general impressions were supported
by the statement of a Lebanese Parliamentary deputy, who said, "I think we
are now in a position to dictate terms to you, and if I were the responsible
government official I would make them hard,"
2.2!_n_t_.ntm : In the past weeks Lebanese officials
had not only privately expressed interest in the Middle East Command but
had urged other Arab leaders to assist them in a cautious promotion of Arab
consideration of Command proposals. If Lebanon, with its progressive and
relatively westernized population, is now inclined to go along with militant
nationalism, there is little chance that other more recalcitrant Arab states
will react favorably to the Command.
3. Comment on Egypt's compromise offer on the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan:
Egypt!s sudden offer in the UN General Assembly
to withdraw its troops and officials from the Anglo-,Egyptian Sudan if Britain
takes similar action, the joint withdrawal to be followed by a free election, is
less an actual compromise than a tactical move to gain support in the UN for
Egyptian claims on the Sudan.
Since Egypt has a relatively small number of
troops -- possibly a thousand -- and officials in the Sudan, it would have little
to lose should the offer be accepted. Even though the Sudan is technically an
Anglo-Egyptian responsibility, it has been under almost exclusive British
administration.
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Egypt's offer regarding the Sudan may also have
been designed to counter the effect of the recent British announcement that
the Sudan was "moving rapidly in the direction of self-governmtnt" and that
the region would become self-governing probably by the end of 1952. British
officials have stated they would study such an Egyptian plan but that the terms
for a plebiscite would have to be agreeable to Sudanese leaders.
4:Fab states tentatively offer to let Moroccan question rest:
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The Iraqi and Syrian delegates to the UN General
Assembly have indicated that they are not anxious
to embarrass France by a discussion of the
Moroccan situation. If France will agree to the
nc usion o e i em on e agenda for this session, the Arabs will not press
for its consideration. The Iraqi delegate also implied that, if France would
assure the Arabs of its good intentions and plans to improve conditions in
Morocco, the Arab states might let the matter rest.
Comment: Iraq, together with Egypt, has led
the attack on France's activitTiTarirpolicies in Morocco; official Iraqi
opinion has not, however, been convinced of the merits of discussing the case
at this time.
Regardless of the Arab position, France may not.
be faced with a UN discussion of Morocco at this session because sufficient
support is not presently available to overrule the UN General Committee's
postponement of a discussion.
5. Tunisians seek greater governmental responsibility:
A formal Tunisian request for additional native
participation in the government of Tunisia is under
study by the French Foreign Office. Demands
include election of a Tunisian legislative assembly,
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temporarily with limited powers, creation of an all Tunisian cabinet, and
replacement of all French civil employees in the Tunisian Government. The
French are unlikely to make such sweeping concessions to native demands.
Comment: The Tunisian delegation, including
the Prime Minister and MinisteTThstice, has been in Paris for almost a
month in connection with this petition. The natives generally are dissatis-
fied with the ineffectual French reform program initiated last spring, and
are increasingly inSiStent that they share in the country's administration.
Vested French interests in Tunisia, however,
strongly oppose even the present reforms, and are exerting pressure upon
the French Government not to alter the status quo. French failure to make
any compromise might cause the resignation of the Tunisian cabinet members
and would set off anti-French demonstrations and disorders.
EASTERN EUROPE
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WESTERN EUROPE
French accede to American proposal on Austrian treaty: 3.3(h)(2)
The French Foreign Office is reported to have
substptially modified its attitude with respect
to the Austrian treaty and is now prepared to
accept the eventual introduction of an abbreviated
treaty draft. The French feel, however, that the text proposed by the US is
still open to discussion. They also feel that the West should make one more
attempt to reach agreement on the old treaty, and show its good faith by con-
sidering further concessions to the Soviet Union,
Comment: Inasmuch as the objections of the
French to the proposed shorter treaty reflected fundamental concern that
the mechanism of treaty discussions might thereby be disrupted, their con-
cession on this point is a considerable one. US preference for immediate
presentation of the abbreviated treaty upon reconvening the treaty deputies,
however, has not been shared by the British, French and Austrian Govern-
ments.
French Foreign Office seeks to tighten administration of export controls:
The French Fcreign Office has expressed serious
concern over a recent "startling" example of
maladministration in the Finance and Economic
Affairs Ministry, which permitted strategic
o be exported on an "obviously fraudulent" export
license application and without a destination control check. The US Embassy
in Paris has proposed that an official note be sent to the Foreign Office ex-
pressing US concern over such negligence. Foreign Office officials have
privately indicated that such a note would support their efforts to improve the
regulation of exports.
3.3(h)(2)
Comment: Although the French have insisted
upon their right to export lii ted quantities of critical commodities to the
Orbit in exchange for "vital" imports such as grain and coal, their attitude
has been increasingly favorable to US policy and legislation on East-West
trade regulation. In view, however, of the developing crisis in French
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dollar resources, French resistance to tempting offers from Eastern
Europe is likely to be lowered. 3.3(h)(2)
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