CH 094 MEMORANDUM FROM THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS (SHLAUDEMAN) TO SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER. - 1976/08/03

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Keywords: 1973-1976
• Keywords: AMERICAN REPUBLICS
• Keywords: AMERICAN REPUBLICS
• Keywords: FRUS
• Keywords: FRUS
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05355650
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: August 3, 1976

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[Declassified copy attached]
IEO 13526
, 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
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Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Shlaudernan) to
Secretary of State Kissinger, Washington, August 3, 1976
Shlaudeman reported to Kissinger that the military regimes of the Southern Cone had
coordinated intelligence activities, including finding and killing subversives located in their
countries and Europe.
Sources: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P760138-0562. Secret; Noforn.
Drafted by Proper and Luers on August 2.
3.3(b)(1)
\In telegram 178852 to all
American Republic diplomatic posts, July 20, the Department transmitted an INR report on the
possibility of an intergovernmental assassination plot involving Southern Cone security forces;
the report concluded that "the evidence supporting such speculation is scanty." (National
Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files) (S)
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, 0,C. 20520
1;;v1
The Secretary
FROM:
ARA - Harry W. Shlaudeman
AA Monthly jjJul)
The "Third World War" and South America
The military regimes of the southern cone of South
America see themselves as embattled;
on one side-by international Marxism and its
terrorist exponents,. and
on the other by the hostility of the uncomprehending
industrial democracies misled by Marxist propaganda.
In response they are banding together in what may %ell
become a political bloc-of some cohesiveness. But, more .0
isignificantly, they are joining forces to eradicate "subversion",
word which increasingly translates into non-violent dissent
from the left and center left. The security forces of the
southern cone
4
now coordinate intelligence activities closely;
operate in the territory of one another's countrie.s_r:
in pursuit of "subversives";
have established Operation Condor to find and kill '
terrorists of the "Revolutionary Coordinating Committee"
in their own countries and in Europe. Brazil is coopera-
ting short of murder operations.
This siege mentality shading into paranoia is perhaps
he natural result of the convulsions of recent years in which
the societies of Chile, Uruguay and Argentina have been badly
Shaken by assault from the extreme left. But the military
-leaders, despite near decimation of the Marxist left in Chile
and Uruguay, along with accelerating progress toward that goal
in Argentina, insist that the threat remains and the war must
go on. Some talk of the "Third World War", with the countries
of the southern cone as the last bastion of Christian civiliza-
tion,
/KGDS-2
WARNING NOTICE: SENSIT 'INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS --
INVOLVED. DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED
BY ORIGINATOR.
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CLASSIFIED
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Somewhat more rationally,
-- they consider their counter-terrorism every bit as
justified as Israeli actions against Palestinian - --
terrorists; and
-- they believe that the criticism from democracies
of their war on terrorism reflects a double standard.
result of this mi-1 �u4_interna1lyr is to
magnify the isolation of the military institutions from
the civilian sector, thus narrowing the range of political
and economic options.
he broader imslicati ns und for .fitr trend
in the hemisp_ere are disturbing. The use or bloody counter-
terrorism by these regimes-UTEatens their increasing :isolation
from the West and the opening of deep ideologicai divisions
among the coUntries of the hemisphere. An outbreak of PLO-type
terrorism on a worldwide scale 1n responseis 4tso. a p6:1;sibilitv.
The.industrial-democracies would be the battlefield.
This month's trends paper attempts for the first
time to focus on long-term &wgers of a right-wing bloc.,;
Our initial policy reco-4vendations are:
-- To emphasize the differences between the six
countries at every opportunity,
-- To depoliticize human rights.
-,- To oppose rhetorical exaggerations of the '
''Third-World-War' type. �
7- To bring the potential bloc-members back�dnto
our cognitive uniye'rse-through systematic '
exchanges.
RED
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Security Cooperation is a Fact
There is extensive cooperation between the security/
intelligence operations of six governments: Argentina,
Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Their
intelligence services hold formal meetings to plan
"Operation Condor." It will include extensive FBI-type
exchanges of information on shady characters. There
are plans for a special communications network. These
details are still secret, but broad security cooperation
is not. Officials in Paraguay and Argentina have told
us that they find it necessary to cooperate with each
other and their neighbor.s against internationally-funded
terrorists and "subversives."
The problem'begins'with the definition of'"subverSion"
-- never the most precise of terms. One reporter writes
that subversion "has grown to include nearlranyons who
opposes government policy." . In countries where everyone
knows that subversives can wind up dead or tortured,
educated people have an understandable concern about
the boundaries of dissent. The concern doubles when'
there is a chance of-yersecution by foreign police. 0
acting on �indirect, unknown information. Numerous
Uruguayan refugees have been murdered in Argentina,
and there are widespread accusations that Argentine
police are doing their Uraguayan colleagues a favor.
These accusations are at -least credible,whether or
not they are exact.
The Nature of the. Left-Extreme Threat:
"Third'Horld War"?
!Uruguayan Foreign Oinister Blanco -- one of the
brighter and normally steadier members of the. group
was the first to describe the campaign against terrorists
as a "Third World War." The description is interesting
for - two reasons:
It justifies harsh and sweeping "wartime"
measures.
-- It emphasizes' the international and institutional
aspect, thereby justifying the cz:creine of power
beyond national borders.
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if
The threat is not imaginary. It may be exaggdrated.
This is hard to suggest to a man like Blanco/ who believes
-- probably correctly -- that he and his family are
targeted. One must admire his personal courage.
Even by objective standards, the terrorists have
had substantial_ accomplishments over the years:
_
At one time or other, urban and rural
guerrillas have created severe problems
for almost every South American government,
including those where democracy is. still
surviving'.
717eyhave provoked -repressive reactions,
including torture and quasi-governmental
death squads. (The guerrillas typically
claimed to welcome repression, but Wonder
if they really like what they got.)
They still pose a serious threat in Argentina
and -- arguably -- a lesser problem in two �
or three other countries.
There is a terror-oriented "Revolutionary
Coordinating Junta", possibly headquartered _
in Paris, which is both. a counterpart of and
an incentive folF.Cooperation between governMents
Nevertheless, it is also 'true that, broadly
speaking; both terrorists and the Peaceful left have
This is true even in 'ale minds of studious'
revolutionaries. .Che Guevara's romantic fiasco crushed
hopes for rural revolution. Allende's fall is taken
(perhaps pessimistically) as proving that the electoral
route cannot work. Urban guerrillas collapsed-in-
Prazil with Carlos Marighela and in Uruguay with the
TupaMaros. The latter represented a high-water mark.
Their solid, efficient structure posed a reel wartime
threat. Probably the military believe that torture
was indispensable to crack this structure.
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UNIAititti
There is is still a major campaign in Argentina.
We expect the military to pull up their socks and win.
They have precedents to guide them, and the terrorists
' have no handy refuge in neighboring countries.
What will remain.is a chain of governments, started
by Brazil in 1964, whose origin was in battle against
the extreme left. It is important to their ego, their
salaries, and their equipment-budgets to believe in
a Third World War. At best, when Argentina stabilizes,
we can hope to convince them that they have already won. s,
The warriors will not like this, They already snicker
at us for being worried about kid stuff like drug-
smuggling when there is a real military campaign going
on. They accuse,, us of 'applauding the defeatp.f terrorism
In Entebbe but not in; Montevideo. Our differing
perceptions of the threat are raising suspicions about
our "reliability."
�
What the Right-Wing Regimes Have in Common
These governments are reactive: they derived their
Initial legitimacy ergm'a reaction against terrorism,
left-eNtremism, instability( and (as they see it)
Marxism, Thus, "anti-Marxism'is a moral and political
;force.
There is also an-ideology that is malLs_positive
in origin: that of national develo-sanent.
The vision of nation has been as effective
in South America as it was in Eux:ope (It may
yet turn out to be as destructive; this paper
looks only briefly at the potential for conflicts
between Latin nations and blocs.) Military
establishments, traditional protector's of
boundaries and national integrity, are in-
a position to profit from the new nationalism.
Economic development is'a pressing need and
a public demand. Disciplined military estab-
lishments can work with technocrats to produce
economic development. In the countries we
are considering, the military is always the
strongest national institution -- sometimes
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almost the only one. It has, typically,
saved the nations from civilian chao.s.
National developmentalism is therefore real medicinec
closer to most citizens then. trendy left or rightl-t-ing
causes. To this extent, military eocr can find a
popular base.
National developmentalism has obvious and
bothersome parallels to National Socialism. Opponents
of the military regimes call them fascist It is an
effective pejorative, the more so because it can be
said to be technically accurate. But it is a pejorative.
These days, to call a man fascist is not primarily to
describe his economic views.
In.practice,.the military regimes tend ,�tto be
full .of the same inconsistencies, that characterize.
non-military,.. pragmatic, non-ideological regimes
Local political institutions are (reasonably)..
considered to have. been a failure, and it is.. _-
suggested thdt..democracy doesn't work for us."_
Leaders want to build more efficient institutionS;
to organize their �societies entirely -differently:
Yet there is, at some level of consciousness, -
an acceptance that democracy is the ideal '
eventually to be sought.
No other institution is allowed to challenge
military power, vet political parties and
courts,often exist and perform some valid
functions. Brazil's toothless parliament,
for example, does cautiously articUlate
'public opinion and provide a dormant alter-
native to military rule.
Insecure, repressive governments nevertheless
allow substantial "democratic" .freedoms,
including varying degrees of freedom of
expression. The ambiente is more like
Washington than MOSCOW�, You can buy -a good
newspaper, a pair of dec:atilently-flowered
blue jeans, a girlie magazine, or a modern
painting.
UNCLASSIFIED
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TrLe s e mlitar regimes do not epect to lat
forever. There ia no thought of .a Thousand.
Year Reich, no pretense of having arrived at
ultimate Marxist-style truth.
From the stahdooint of our policy, the most
ortantiongterm characteristic of these regimes
may be precisely that they are reversible, in both
theory and practice. They know it. But they do not
know what to do about it. -Political and social
development lag. Long after left-wing threats
are squashed, the regimes are still terrified of them.
Fighting the absent piffkos remains a central goal
of national security. Threats and plots are discovered.
Some "mistakes" are made by the torturers, who have
difficulty finding logical victims. Murder Squads
kill harMless people and petty thieves. When
elections are held, the perverse electoratehows
-a desire to put the military out of cower. Officers
see the trend ending.with their:own bodies on the
rack. -
No more electials..s for a while.
We do- not suggest that there is a hopelessly
vicious circle. Since some of these regimes are
producing really solid economic successes The
officers may eventually-txust Civilians to succeed
them and provide an honorable. e:.cit. So far, the
military has found it easier to ride the tiger than
to dismount, When an alternative government
eventually has to be found, it mightbe that the
only one available will be at thb. far left.
But .There Are Also Leading Differences.
In discussing the general characteristios of..
the southern military regimes, we have made some
indefensibly broad generalizations. The following
is an attempt to correCt the worst distortions,
country-by-country. It is important to be clear
about the differences because, for reasons we shall.
develop later, our *olioy should he t-o emphasize what
the countries do not have in common rather than what
they do. *
� The front-burner cases are Argentina, Chile,and
Uruguay. -
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Argentina. is the mot.interestingr-both-beaause.
it is important and because the directions of the new
regime are not clear, The Argentines are politically
sophisticated like the Brazilians, but unlike the
Brazilians, the Argentines lack social and even
military unity. To recover economically, they must
break the power of traditional structures, and especial-
ly of the labor movement. There is also a genuine
challenge from. left-wing terrorists and right-wing
counter-terror. The problem approaches civil-war
dimensions. We believe that the Brazilian model
will prevail. In the long run, thus, we think the
military will win, Videla -- or his successor .--- will
have more trouble with hard-line military officers
and right-wing terror than with the left.. Forces
probably Connected to the regihave already been
killing' exiles and priests, among others-.
Chile has been the subject of so much acticn
lately-that you probably. do not need to hear any
more. The Chileans have smashed the Left almost
as thoroughly as the,�prazilianf.,;( but the repressive
apparatus is much more.unrestrinEd. There is no
one at the to like Geisel who_even seems to wish � � �
to moderate human-rights abuses� The Santiago
regime provides the archetype of the reasoning
that criticism of torture can come only from
international Marxist plotters. The military
seem particularly insecure and isolated, even
with respect to the Chilean public.
, Uruquay is'tht third pressihg case (with
Argentina and Chile). Foreign Minister Blanco was
the first to talk about the "Third World War," and-
he stilXinsists that the threat continues high
in his country. Given this picture, Uruguay is,
of course, eager to cooperate with its neighbors
in defensive measures. Nevertheless, unlike the
Chileans, the Uruguayans have maintained some
sense of proportion about human rights and inter-
national public opinion0 Civilians are up front
in the government, give the military substantial
Support, and interact relatively well.
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Brazil: We can and should relate to Brazil as
an emerging world power rather than as a trouble-spot. Yet
I its 1964 "revolution" is the basic =de1 for its -
neighbors. The biggest problem is that, despite re-
markable successes, the Brazilian -armed services still
cannot find a way to relax their hold on power. On.% .
the other hand, they are not much worried about it. .
They have been able to tap civilian talent for economic
purposes. The Left is smashed, but it iS not clear.
. whether the President can control the zeal of his
security forces. Attempts at political distensID
have largely flopped. (The word carries both the
English sense of "distending", or enlarging authority
from a narrow miliEary base, and the French sense of
"relaxing". Better than detente?) Brazil, like the
other large countries, does see itself as a world
actor, and this inhibies extremism.
Bolivia is an interesting case but nota hot
problem. This is the scene of one of the tfiree
genuine social revolutions in Latin America -- which
makes it all the more puzzling that Che Guevara
thought -he had a contribution to make. Despite his
failure, he left lasting worries. The. Bolivians still
consider that Che's daath makes them a target of
revenge for international terrorists. We cannot
quite perceive the same menace. In Bolivian terms,
the government is notably stable and economically
successful. It has been moderate on human rights.
; Paraguay is marching to the same tune as its
neighbors but is a mile behind. This is the kind of
nineteenth-coutury military regime that looks good on
the cartoon page. Paraguay, however, has eminently
sound reasons for being backward 'and is not in the -
least apologetic. The Paraguayans remember that,
in the Chaco War, they fought off the massively -
superior armed forces of three neighbors for a
ridiculously long time. ,Pride was saved, if nothing
else. There is no democratic tradition whatever.
The government has reacted to fear of the left rather
than the kind of specific challoage posed in the other
countries. �
XCIASSIFIEll
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A Political Bloc In Formation?
-----rf-boTrEe-type cdoperation evolves into -formatf6E
of a political bloc, our interests will be involved in
wars that are new for South America. such a bloc is
not here vet. The conditions for its formation are
largely present:
-- The conviction that an international leftist.
threat ,amounts to a:rWorld War" and hence
requires an alliance.
-- Highly compatib],e philosophies and political
� objectives in other respects.
Improved.transpOrtand communication between
neighboring countries,-which previously had
.better links with the US. and Europa than
with each other.
A suspicion that even the U.S. has "lost its
will" to stand firm against communism because
of Viet-Nam, detente, and social decay,
Resentment of human-rights criticism, which
is often taken as just one more sign of the'
commie encirclement,
-- Exclusion by the military of the Civilian,
democratic. interplay Which helps to maintain
a sense of proportion.
' There are a few inhibitions on formation of .
a bloc. Nationalistic thinking is the obvious one
Traditional feuds have largely shaped the sense of
nation. With the exception of the Peru/Chile:tension,
however, border disputes -are no longer an overriding
factor in the southern cone;
To predict a political bloc would still be
speculative. Commonsense could assert itself There
is plenty of it available in these countries and even
some in their armies cqe do, think that tne trend
toward bloc thinking is present, clear, and trouble-
some.
xvforireedeo,
CASSIA
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If a Bloc. Does Form. .
In the early stages, we will be a "casual bene-
ficiary" (as one reporter puts it) for reasons that
are too obvious to need elaboration here. On the main
East-Nest stage, .right-wing regimes can hardly tilt
toward the Soviets and Cubans. The fact that we are
:an apparent beneficiary can easily lull us into trouble,
as has historically been the case in this hemisphere.
But we would expect a range of growing problems,
Some are already with LIG. Internationally, the Latin
generals look like our guys. Fe are especially iden-
tified with Chile. It ,cannot do Us any good__ Europeans,
certainly, hate Pinochet 4 Co: with a passion that
rubs off on us.
More P-roblems are on the schedule:
-- Human rights abuses, as you know, are creating
more. and more problems of conscience, laT:;, and-
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diplomacy..
Chile's black-sheep status, has already made-
troUble for its economic recovery. The farther
to the right, the drift goes in other-countries
the more difficultias. we can expect in our
economic links with them.
We would like to share, with, say, the Brazilians,
a perception that we are. natural allies. .
Brazilian participation in a right-wing bloc
would make this unlikely.
-- Eventually, we could even see serious' strains
with the democracies farther north. Orfila has
told us that he thinks a confrontation is
possible. Uruguay and Venezuela have just
broken relations over el. incident involving
political asylum. A precedent?
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Over the horizon/ there is a chance of serious
world-Scale trouble. This is speculative:put .n.9-11.0.Ager-'_...
ridiculous. The Revolutionary ..Coordinating Junta now
seems to have its headquarters in Paris, plus consicler-
able activity in other European capitals. With terrorist&
being forced out of Argentina, their concentration in
Europa (and-possiblv the U.S.) will increase.
The South American regimes know about this.
are planning their own counter -terror oneratIons in
Europe. Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay are in the lead;
Brazil is wary but is providing some technical support.
They
The next step might be for the terrorists to under-
take a worldwide-attack' on embassie.,;.and interests of
the six hated regimes. The PLO has shown the.way. Ue
can picture South American activities on a eenparable
scale, again Using the industrial democracies as a
battlefield. The impossibility of peaceful change
will, radicalize exile's who might, in earlier days,
.have looked forward to returning home peacefully.
Our Response; How to end- Third World Uar
Till now, though we have tried to exercise a
moderating influencs, we have not taken a longterm
strateaic view of the problems that a right-wing bloc '
would create. This paper has 'tried for a sharper focus. �
Fe shall have more recommendations in mouths to come,
but the following are a fair start:
4.
1) Distinguish between counries with special
card If we treat them as a whole, we will be encouraging.
them to view themselves as an embattled bloc. In our
dealings with each country and in Congressional testimony,
we should, for example, reflect recognition tat:
Argentina, with its virtual civil war, face
a problem much different from its neighbors.
Uruguay, with its substantial remnants of
military/civilian interplay, is not comparable
to cniie.
Brazil has the weight, sot!histication, and
world- perspective to share many of our concerns.
UNCLASSIFIED
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Our military sales programs may also:provide an
opportunity for distinction. Aid no longer provides -
significant.leverage. Thereis vast interest in overall
economic relations -- but not much freedom of movement.
2) Try to get the politics and ideologY out Of
human rights. This objective will be hard to reconcile
with the equally pressing need to multilateralize our
concern To. avoid charges of "intervention," we
must increasingly work through the Inter-American Human
Rights Commission. The countries that support us
there, however, will tend to be democracies (and perhaps
one or two radical Caribbean governments). .Right-wing
regimes will feel besieged. Ideally, we should keen
one or more of them with Qs. If that is impossible
Cas now seems likely), We should take special -care to
make clear that authoritariE.a regimes of the right
have no monooly on ebuses. (Your Santiagoeech
had the rght balance).
3) Oppose Rhetorical exaggerations --J:here and her.
-- Make clear in...,our South Americzn dealings
that the "Third World War" idea is overdrawn
.and leads to dangerous.consences,
-- In Congressional testimony here, stress that
the threat is real for, a country like-Argentina.
4) Bring them back to our cognitive universe, Bui-
how? Our 3r,rabassv in La Paz hasrscomMended that we
exchange intelligence briefings with the Bolivians,
This might provide a way to reach suspicious military
officers and work on their "Third world ar" syndrdte.
But there are hazards. We would fail to produce infor-
mation sustaining their theais, and they might-conclude
that we were badly informed or uncooperative. Instead,
we think we should work on systematic mid-level exchanges
�.something more than exchanges of infonnation on
terrorists. We need to achieve a perception that neither
detente nor distensgo is 'a threat to the legitimacy of
friendly regjrn.e5;
DUCUSSIFIEU
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In time, perhaps we-can convince them that a Third
World War is undesirable.
e'S
ARA/PLC: DeProper/WHLuers,
8/2/76 x-99192
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