VISITING HEMISPHERE LEADERS PERSONALITY STUDIES AND BILATERAL ISSUES - 1977/09/02

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06626711
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: September 2, 1977

Approved for Release: 2018/10/26 006626711
Visiting Hemisphere Leaders
L. 3.3(b)(1)
3.5(c) )
EO 13526
3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
E013526
3.3(b)(6)>25Yrs
EO 13526
3.5(c)
NR
3.3(b)(1)
3.3(b)(6)
3.3(b)(1)
3.5(c)
RP 77-10231
September 2, 1977
Copy
Approved for Release: 2018/10/26 006626711
Approved for Release: 2018/10/26 006626711
Approved for Release: 2018/10/26 006626711
 Approved for Release: 2018/10/26 006626711
Visiting Hemisphere Leaders
Central Intelligence Agency
1?ireclmate of Intelligence
'September 2, 1977
Introduction 1
Argentina
3
Approved for Release: 2018/10/26 006626711
Approved for Release: 2018/10/26 006626711
1-t
INTRODUCTION
Most of the Latin American chiefs of state
will seize the opportunity of next week's bi-
lateral discussions to speak forcefully and
candidly on a number of issues. The southern
cone leaders--Argentina and Chile, especially--
will be quick to point out that they do not
believe they are being given credit in Washington
for the progress they have made on the human rights
front during the past year. These leaders will
be somewhat strident in proclaiming that they
have been engaged in a virtual civil war with
leftist extremists and will plead for the US to
be "understanding" and "realistic" in pursuing
its human rights policies.
Approved for Release: 2018/10/26 006626711
 Approved for Release: 2018/10/26 006626711
Approved for Release: 2018/10/26 006626711
 Approved for Release: 2018/10/26 006626711
ARGENTINA
3
Approved for Release: 2018/10/26 006626711
Approved for Release: 2018/10/26 006626711
President Jorge Rafael VIDELA
(phonetic: veeDEHla)
4
Approved for Release: 2018/10/26 006626711
ARGENTINA
Approved for Release: 2018/10/26 006626711
President Jorge Rafael VIDELA (pronounced
veeDEHla), a political moderate, has success-
fully held off elements within the Argentine
military who have urged a more vigorous attack
against subversives. Videla--sophisticated,
urbane, but overly methodical--is acutely aware
that human rights violations have occurred since
the March 1976 coup that deposed the government
of President Peron. In recent months, excesses
against the terrorists have diminished, but il-
legal activities not sanctioned by the govern-
ment continue to occur. The regime is now
trying to bring these actions under control.
President Videla appears to be sincere in
his efforts to remove the human rights problem
as an issue of contention with the US. He does,
however, have to contend with a belief among
the military as a whole that Argentine society
was on the brink of destruction at the hands
of leftist insurgents. Often referred to as
a moralist, Videla is a man of great integrity.
tie has correctness, honesty
and puritanism elevated to extreme limits."
He loathes corruption and is a deeply religious
man.
The son of an infantry colonel, Videla
rose through the ranks to become commanding
general of the army in August 1975.
Videla is very
polite and, though he sometimes appears timid,
seems always to have a big smile and a ready
handshake. Videla does not like to hear off-
color stories and does not like to discuss his
job, the infantry, or his children. He speaks
English poorly.
His physical ap-
pearance has earned him the nickname of "El
Hueso" (the bone).
5
Approved for Release: 2018/10/26 006626711
Approved for Release: 2018/10/26 006626711
Although Videla is chief of state, the
supreme governing authority belongs to a
three-man military junta representing the
three services. Videla, �as the army's rep-
resentative, is the most powerful member of
the triumvirate; the two other service chiefs
are Navy Commander Admiral Emilio Massera and
Air Force Chief Brigadier General Orlando
Agosti.
Videla has not proved to be a strong and
dynamic President. His style is to proceed
cautiously and avoid confrontations if pos-
sible. The President has been criticized both
for his lack of assertiveness and for his ad-
ministrative failure to centralize authority.
There are no indications of an immediate
threat to his government, but conservative
elements within the armed forces are not
pleased with his moderate, go-slow approach.
Partly because of differences of opinion,
but primarily because Videla has not given an
appearance of being firmly in command, since
late 1976, there has been considerable inter-
service rivalry and resulting tension within
the junta and the government. Admiral Massera,
the most politically ambitious and astute of
the triumvirate, was quick to challenge Videla's
authority and has been a disruptive influence
within the executive branch.
Since the March 1976 coup, Videla's govern-
ment has had considerable success in controlling
leftist terrorism and reviving the ailing economy.
Grave problems remain, however, in both of these
priority areas.
With Videla's strong backing, Minister of
Economy Jose Martinez de Hoz has had signifi-
cant success in reviving the economy. The
inflation rate, which was nearly 400 percent
during the first half of 1976, was down to little
more than 100 percent in the second half, without
a sharp rise in unemployment. Because of the
Videla government's high degree of political
credibility at the time �of the coup, $1 billion
was available in foreign loans to alleviate a
severe balance-of-payments crisis. The excWange
Approved for Release: 2018/10/26 006626711
 Approved for Release: 2018/10/26 006626711
rate was adjusted to maintain export competitive-
ness, foreign exchange reserves were replenished,
and a significant trade surplus replaced the
large deficit of 1975.
Argentina still has a fiscal deficit, and
Videla has been personally criticized for fail-
ing to decrease the swollen public payroll. A
more immediate concern, however, is the grow-
ing restiveness of labor, which is paying through
a decline in real wages for the government's
stabilization program.
In bilateral discussions, Videla will
stress that the human rights situation in
Argentina is beginning to improve. He prob-
ably will state that Argentina's democratic
institutions were in jeopardy and that a
heavy hand was necessary to correct this sit-
uation. Videla probably will recall the
recent visits of Human Rights Coordinator
Derien and Assistant Secretary Todman and the
fact that they were able to talk to a wide
spectrum of Argentines. He will also note
that the Argentine military has no preten-
sions of remaining in power indefinitely.
Another issue that he may bring up is
Argentina's problem with US foreign military
sales assistance. The government's decision
on 31 August to cancel participation in the
UNITAS XVIII fleet exercise no doubt reflects
in large part dismay over US policies,
particularly the provisions of the Humphrey-Kennedy
amendment denying all military cooperation
after 30 -September 1978. Government officials
are also upset over interruptions in the flow
of spare parts for equipment already purchased,
the closing of the US military group in Argentina
while one remains in Brazil, and the con-
ditions imposed on the prospective Argen-
tine purchase of helicopters.
Domestic politics also enter into the
UNITAS decision. Videla has been under severe
criticism from military hard-liners for being
too accommodating to recent US official visitors.
The hard-liners' arguments questioned Videla's
7
3.3(b)(1)
3.5(c)
3.3(b)(1)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2018/10/26 006626711
 Approved for Release: 2018/10/26 006626711
prestige and linked the UNITAS-US arms policies
issue with Argentine nationalism and pride.
Timing of the announcement probably is de-
liberately related to the President's US trip.
Cancellation after the visit would have been
viewed as an admission that the trip was a
failure and inaction seen as another example
of accommodation.
3.3(b)(1)
3.5(c)
3.3(b)(1)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2018/10/26 006626711