ARGENTINA: CURRENT PROSPECTS FOR LEFTIST TERRORISM - 1985/01/24

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05675669
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: January 24, 1985

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Argentina: Current Pros ects
for Leftist Terrorism
The recent extradition from Brazil to Buenos Aires of
Montonero terrorist leader Mario Firmenich has
again focused public attention on the danger of a
resurgence of leftist terrorism in Argentina.
Terrorism by the left has been a persistent source of
political instability in Argentina and has played a
central role in undermining the authority of both
military and civilian regimes. President Alfonsin's
tough response to the first inklings of terrorist
reorganization shows, in our view, that he understands
the gravity of the potential threat. For this reason�
and because most of the radical leftists doubt that the
current political climate is suitable�we foresee little
chance of serious terrorism emerging over the next six
months.
Return of the Montoneros
The Montoneros, who first emerged in the late 1960s,
have long sought to convert Peronism into a
movement of the revolutionary left. After Juan
Peron's death in 1974, the Montoneros clashed openly
with the Peronist Party's conservative leadership and
were expelled from the movement by his widow and
successor, Isabel. The Montoneros continued to
struggle for what they termed "authentic Peronism,"
becoming one of South America's largest, wealthiest,
and deadliest terrorist groups. Nevertheless, they
were crushed after the military coup of 1976. The few
Montoneros who were not killed or captured by the
armed forces were forced into exile, where they
launched a largely ineffectual propaganda campaign
against the military.
there were
approximately 300 Montoneros in the country and
some 500 abroad, although we believe these figures
were somewhat inflated.
numerous Montoneros returned to Argentina in the
months following the election in October 1983 of the
new civilian government. If they expected any
lenience from the authorities, however, it did not
15
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3.5(c)
materialize. Alfonsin, who personally abhors
terrorism and needs to hold the left accountable for its
crimes if he is to successfully prosecute the military
for its excesses during the antiterrorist campaigns of
the late 1970s, took a tough stance regarding the
Montoneros. Two top Montonero leaders, Ricardo
Obregon and Oscar Bidegain, were arrested soon after
they returned to Buenos Aires in December 1983, and
Firmenich has remained in custody since his
extradition from Brazil in October 1984. Moreover,
public statements by government officials indicate
that Alfonsin�despite cutbacks in military
spending�intends to preserve the military's ability to
monitor terrorist capabilities. 3.5(c)
Internal Divisions
In our view, these arrests dealt a severe blow to the
Montonero movement and have hindered its efforts at
reorganization. With their most experienced leaders
in prison or in hiding, the Montoneros' once-solid
chain of command has broken down. 3.3(b)(1)
two basic currents have emerged: a
relatively moderate majority faction loyal to
Firmenich and a number of splinter groups more
prone to violence. 3.5(c)
The Firmenich faction has publicly abjured violence,
asserting that the Montoneros will now concentrate on
electoral politics. Before his arrest, Ricardo Obregon
announced the dissolution of the Montoneros as an
armed force and their reconstitution as the Authentic
Peronist Party.
however, that instead of forming an independent 3 3(b)(1)
.
party, the Montoneros have attempted to infiltrate the
regular Peronist movement's radical left wing, the
Peronist Intransigence and Mobilization (IMP)
faction. The IMP is headed by Peronist Senator
Vicente Saadi, a well-known Montonero sympathizer
whose newspaper, La Voz, was formerly subsidized by
Montonero ransom money,
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We believe that the Montoneros'
current goal is to gain full control of the IMP and use
it to turn the entire Peronist movement toward the
revolutionary left. The Montoneros are supplementing
this strategy by infiltrating Peronist-controlled trade
unions and rural cooperatives
We believe that the Firmenich faction's rejection of
violence is only a tactical maneuver and that it would
return to armed struggle under more favorable
circumstances. The Montoneros have pledged in the
past to work for peaceful change, but they quickly
reverted to violence when conditions shifted.
Furthermore
members of the group are rearming and continuing to
train in terrorist tactics and guerrilla warfare. Recent
public statements by Roberto Perdia and Fernando
Vaca�the top Montonero leaders not in prison�have
hinted at a resumption of violence if Alfonsin
continues to "persecute" the movement.
The immediate danger, however, stems from those
Montoneros who question the leadership's cautious
stance. Although not divided among themselves about
other issues, such as leadership, they all doubt that
the Montoneros can ever dominate Peronism and are
eager to resume violence.
Reorganization of the ERP
Argentina's other significant leftist terrorist group is
the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP). In contrast
to the vague populism espoused by the Montoneros,
the ERP's ideology is rooted in Trotskyite Marxism-
Leninism and has drawn inspiration more from
Castro and Mao than from Peron. Emerging
concurrently with the Montoneros, the ERP was
smaller and was concentrated in Argentina's interior
Secret
provinces, where it conducted sporadic rural guerrilla
warfare until the late 1970s. Like the Montoneros, the
group was ravaged by the military's post-1976
crackdown
he ERP lost 85 percent of its cadre
and close to 95 percent of its weapons, safehouses, and
vehicles during that period
Press reports indicate that remnants of the ERP�
probably no more than 100 persons�returned to
Argentina in the wake of the election of Alfonsin. As
with the Montoneros, the group split into moderate
and radical factions. Unlike the Montoneros, however,
the ERP appears to be fairly well organized and
cohesive, and it follows the orders issued by exiled
leaders in Nicaragua.
the exiled ERP leaders�
chief of whom is Enrique Gorriaran�have declined to
return home because they believe that Alfonsin would
have them arrested just like the Montonero leaders.
The ERP is reportedly seeking to expand its political
base by infiltrating the small but influential far-left
Intransigent Party (PI). The ERP has chosen the PI
because the two groups are ideologically compatible
and
because the ERP wants to avoid competing with the
Montonero penetration of the Peronists. The ERP has
also been active in a handful of leftist labor unions
and some of Argentina's human rights organizations.
Its overall success in these efforts is unclear,
We share the judgment
the ERP's long-term goal is to return to
armed struggle. In the meantime, however, the
group's more moderate sector has effectively reined in
unruly elements who want to initiate violence
immediately. Recently, for example, exiled leaders
reportedly denied permission for an ERP cell to
recover arms from a cache established in the late
1970s. While reassuring as to the movement's short-
term intentions, this may indicate that the ERP
retains at least a rudimentary capability to undertake
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Enrique Gorriaran Merlo
An Argentine of Basque origin, Enrique Gorriaran,
about 42, is the ranking leader of the People's
Revolutionary Army (ERP). One of the founders of
the ERP in 1970, Gorriaran was arrested one year
later and imprisoned in southern Argentina. In 1972
he escaped to Cuba, but the following year he
returned to Argentina to participate in the ERP's
rural guerrilla campaign. By the late 1970s
Gorriaran was the leader of the ERP 's military wing,
which attacked businessmen and labor leaders and
assassinated police and military personnel. Following
the 1976 military coup, he fled the country and
resurfaced in Nicaragua, where he fought alongside
the Sandinistas. Gorriaran led the hit team that
assassinated former Nicaraguan ruler Somoza in
Paraguay in 1980,
He currently lives in
3.5(c) Managua.
3.3(b)(1)
Mario Eduardo Firmenich
Mario Firmenich, 36, is on trial in Buenos Aires for
kidnaping and homicide. One of the founders cil- the
Montoneros, Firmenich gained notoriety in the early
1970s for his involvement in two bold terrorist acts:
the kidnap/murder of former Argentine President
Pedro Aramburu and the kidnaping of two Argentine
businessmen, which resulted in a record ransom of
$60 million. After the 1976 military crackdown, he
moved abroad and tried to mobilize support for the
Montoneros in Latin America and Western Europe.
Firmenich provided logistic support for the
Nicaraguan Sandinistas during the insurgency that
overthrew President Somoza and remains friendly
with Sandinista leaders. In 1981 was
involved in smuggling Cuban arms to El Salvador.
terrorism if it decides to abandon its current a a lic of
relying solely on political infiltration
ERP-Montonero Contacts
The ERP and the Montoneros have begun to set aside
longstanding ideological disputes and work together.
Representatives of the two groups held a meeting in
Cordoba Province in April 1984, according to press
3.5(c) 17
reports,
Gorriaran and Perdia met in July to discuss the
possibility of rescuing Firmenich.i
the two groups
have agreed to cooperate in infiltrating labor unions.
The political organizations with which the
Montoneros and the ERP are linked have also been
moving closer together:
the IMP and the PI are trying to coordinate efforts to
politicize and manipulate several human rights 3.3(b)(1)
groups.
.Secrer
3.3(b)(1)
3.3(b)(1)
3.5(c)
Foreign Support
Although ERP-Montonero collaboration may ease
logistical barriers�such as the lack of sufficient
weapons and funds�to a resumption of terrorism, in
our view, the radical left would still require
considerable foreign support before it presented a
serious threat to Argentine democracy. At preseni3.3(b)(1)
prospects for such aid are dim: 3.3(b)(1)
� The PLO, which previously trained and funded the
Montoneros, refused appeals for renewed aid in
mid-1983,
� Mexican officials are terminating safehaven
arrangements and government lobs they formerly
provided exiled Montoneros
�
The Cubans,
want to ingratiate themselves with Alfonsin and will
therefore use their considerable influence over the
Montoneros to discourage terrorist acts
the Cubans may be trying to
restrain the ERP in similar fashion.
� Remaining ERP and Montonero contacts with the
Sandinistas and with various South American
terrorist groups are not likely to compensate for the
lack of substantial Cuban and East Bloc backing.
Outlook
We believe that the ERP and the Montoneros will
concentrate on political activity for at least the next
few months. Both groups recognize that, in the wake
3.3(b)(1)
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of the terrorist bloodletting and military repression of
the 1970s, there is scant popular support in Argentina
for political violence. And the Alfonsin government's
arrest and prosecution of Montonero leaders has sent
a clear message to the left that a return to terrorism
will bring swift retribution
The Montoneros will not, in our view, succeed in
wresting control of the Peronist movement from the
center-right. Senator Saadi and the IMP faction have
recently suffered a series of setbacks and appear to be
losing status within the party. At best, the
Montoneros can hope to retain a voice in the Peronist
movement left via the IMP or, if the movement splits,
dominate a small independent radical Peronist
faction. The ERP has slightly better prospects for
expanding its political influence through the
Intransigent Party. The PI did well in recent student
elections, and polls show that it could become a
vehicle for the expression of leftist discontent with
Alfonsin. The party lacks a national structure and
following, however, and its radical ideology has
historically prevented it from attracting more than
5 to 10 percent of the electorate.
Although leaders of both the ERP and the
Montoneros are likely to be preoccupied with political
machinations over the coming months, the possibility
of violence by dissident elements of either
organization cannot be discounted. Such evidence is
more likely in the case of the Montoneros, where
discipline appears to be weaker. We believe that the
Montoneros' radical fringe does have the capability to
conduct kidnapings and assassinations. Such actions
could be triggered by further arrests of terrorist
leaders, a harsh verdict in the trial of Firmenich, or
provocation by rightwing terrorists. But we also
believe that, under present circumstances, such leftist
violence can be contained by the security forces.
3.5(c)
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