ARGENTINA: INCREASING MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN GOVERNMENT - 1975/09/19

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02891001
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: September 19, 1975

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Intelligence Memorandum
Argentina: Increasing Military Involvement in Government
Cant
118
September 19, 1975
No. 0761/75
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3.5(c)
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I: 11jN I 11-1La
Argentina: Increasing Military
Involvement in Government
September 19, 1975
President Peron's departure for the month's vacation on September 14 has
increased speculation that the way is being paved for her quiet removal from office.
Although she clearly needs the rest, her leave of absence may be designed to test
public reaction and even to accustom Argentines to a government without an active
president. Her vacation will also be a testing period for Acting President Italo Luder,
for the able new economy minister, Antonio Cafiero, and especially for the leaders
of the armed forces, who last month reluctantly but firmly intervened in the
essentially political process of forming the cabinet. The armed forces have also
accepted direct responsibility for reducing the incidence and impact of organized
terrorism. How well Luder, Cafiero, and the military perform in attacking
Argentina's political, economic, and security problems will determine in large part
whether the country will muddle through to an orderly presidential election in 1977
or come under increasing military control.
In August the military high command went a long way toward reassuming an
overt political role with the almost unanimous decision to retire Vicente Damasco
from his active duty military status shortly after his appointment as interior
minister. Damasco's chief supporter, army commander General Numa Laplane, was
replaced as well. These moves were led by a small group of early opponents of the
Damasco appointment, who were joined by colleagues from all three services. Even
though the officers acknowledged the President's legal right to name an active duty
officer to the cabinet, they believed that Damasco's presence in the government
would saddle the armed forces with responsibility for what the high command
regarded as a faltering Peronist administration.
The aftermath of the Damasco showdown brought a number of anti-Peronist
officers into key positions, notably the posts of commander of the army and of the
important regional corps in Buenos Aires. The officers who all along have favored a
stronger, behind the scenes role in government have now won out. Chief among
these is General Videla, the new head of the army. Videla reportedly opposes open
military intervention in politics, but aims to influence and manipulate the chief of
state, whether it be President Peron or Italo Luder.
To some degree, the accession of Videla and his colleagues to the highest
commands is a repudiation of the tenuous alliance with labor that had resulted in
Comments and queries on the contents of this publication are welcome. They may be directed to
)f the Office of Current Intelligence, code 143, extension 5121.
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military-labor joint efforts to oust welfare minister and presidential adviser
Lopez Rega several months ago. Indeed, some of the opposition to Damasco
was based on the belief that he was too close to several top labor leaders and
would involve the military in a compromising relationship with opportunistic
unionists. Prospects for a solid military-labor alliance have been further
weakened by labor's divided state and its failure to play a constructive
political or social role since Lopez Rega's removal. The disintegration within
the labor movement has convinced many that the military has no alternative
but to assume a greater political role, since no other individual or institution
seems capable of assuming national leadership.
With presidential elections scheduled for the first half of 1977, the
armed forces have another reason for increasing, rather than lessening, their
influence in national politics. Senior officers are convinced that neither the
administration nor the political parties have the ability to prevent the left
from mounting a serious electoral campaign of its own or from greatly
disrupting the succession process. Indeed, the fact that Damasco as minister
of interior would have been responsible for conducting elections, may have
been another reason for military opposition to him. He has since been
replaced by Foreign Minister Angel Robledo, a capable leader widely
respected within the armed forces.
In one area at least, the armed forces have already signaled their
intention to act vigorously. The Montonero guerrillas, who claim to be
dissident "pure" Peronists, have been outlawed, and there are many
indications that the anti-subversive effort will be stepped up. Army chief
Videla has mentioned the possibility of extending the army's narrowly
focused anti-guerrilla campaign throughout the country and of reviving the
concept of a federal organization to coordinate the actions of all security
forces. Acting president Luder recently told a US embassy officer that he
expects a number of "positive actions" soon by the armed forces and police
to combat the terrorists. In this area, at least, many Argentines will welcome
arm ed forces action to check the decline in public security.
A period of relative political calm and an improved economic outlook
would reduce the chances of an open military intervention in the
government by bolstering the position of those who still favor a
constitutional solution. Many officers, still loathe to assume full, undisguised
responsibility for running the country, would like to give the civilian
administrators�particularly Luder and Economy Minister Cafiero�a chance
to succeed. During the coming weeks Luder's performance as acting
president will be under close scrutiny. Luder comes into office with few
political liabilities or powerful enemies. He is not linked to the past failures
of the Peron administration, and he has no close personal ties with President
Peron. Luder has been careful to avoid being drawn into major political
disputes, in spite of his attendance at cabinet meetings before President
Peron's vacation. One observer has characterized Luder as a "formal, correct,
and ambitious" man.
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The performance of Cafiero in the economy ministry will be no less
important in determining how far the armed forces feel their intervention
need go. If he is able to muster political support for needed economic
measures, prospects for the continuation of a purely civilian government will
be enhanced. Cafiero is in a better position than his predecessor to reconcile
economic prudence with political reality. A trained economist with an
international reputation, he was a long-time adviser to the Peronist labor
confederation. Military leaders apparently feel comfortable with his
even-handed approach to his new job. Aware of the hazards, Cafiero thus far
has moved cautiously. He has, for example, emphasized that the period of
"shock treatment" for the economy is over and has publicly ruled out
further sizable devaluations in favor of more frequent Small devaluations. His
public statements have been characterized by expressions of sympathy for
the problems of all sectors, an optimistic tone, and avoidance of major
policy shifts. He scored an early success by negotiating a sizable financial aid
package to deal with the country's serious balance of payments situation.
Despite the economy minister's labor ties, however, the unions could provide
his first serious challenge. The workers, who have been unwilling to accept
past austerity measures, are likely to balk if and when such measures are
again implemented.
The Luder-Cafiero-Robledo team has filled, at least for a time, a
political vacuum that threatened to attract either a Peronist strongman or
more direct military intervention in the government. Military leaders should
be able to work well with the new civilian leaders, who will be careful to
consult with the high command before making major decisions. We believe
that only under conditions such as continuing economic deterioration and
massive labor violence, or the eruption of a terrorist campaign of
unprecedented magnitude would the military feel compelled to take a
stronger, more open hand in the government.
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Confideiltial
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