THE POTENTIAL FOR POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN ARGENTINA, ETHIOPIA, AND THAILAND FEBRUARY 1975[SANITIZED] - 1975/02/01

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06628558
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: February 1, 1975

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Research Project
The Potential for Political Violence in
Argentina, Ethiopia, and Thailand:
Report on a Quantitative Analytical Model
Progress Report No. 2
1/
Confikr
February 1975
'al
3.5(c)
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CONFIDENTIAL
Progress Report No. 2 February 1975
The Potential for Political Violence in Argentina, Ethiopia, and
Thailand: A Progress Report on a Quantitative Analytical Model
This is the second in a series of reports on the testing of an analytical model
of political violence adapted from Ted Robert Gun's frustration-aggression theory
(Why Men Rebel, Princeton University Press, 1970). The Gurr theory is based
on the proposition that political violence is the product of group frustrations
reinforced by the belief that violence is justified and by the capability to turn the
resulting politicized anger into collective aggression. The form of the ensuing
violence�turmoil (riots or demonstrations), insurgency ( terrorist acts or small-
scale guerrilla operations), cons-piracy (attempted coups), or internal war (large-
scale revolutionary actions or civil war )�will depend upon the kinds of relation-
ships which are found to exist among various types of groups in the country
under examination. A complete description of the theory and of the procedures
used to apply the model is contained in an earlier OPR report of an experimental,
ex post facto test of the model in the Chilean situation of mid-1973 (OPR 502,
Revised, November 1974).
The purpose of this second phase of the project is to test the value of the
GIRT model as a technique for assessing the nature and potential for political
violence in societies of varying stages of development and with quite different
cultural heritages and political institutions. The three countries chosen--Argen-
tina, Ethiopia, and Thailand�seem to meet our requirements: Each represents
a different stage of development in a distinct geographic area, and each is con-
fronted with domestic unrest or political conflict.
For each of the three countries, a panel of five CIA analysts assigns numerical
evaluations at regular intervals to the model's key variables�relative depriva-
tion or collective frustration, belief in the justification for violence, coercive
force, and institutionalized support. The evaluations are made for each group or
"actor" which, in the panel's judgment, represents a significant political force in
the country. The country's actors are also assessed in terms of their identifica-
tion with four basic actor-categories: Pro-regime, mass-oriented (PR-M0);
pro-regime, elite-oriented (PR-E0); anti-regime, mass-oriented (AR-M0); and
anti-regime, elite-oriented ( AR-EO). At each point of assessment during the
test period, the panel's evaluations are combined statistically, using comput-
erized procedures devised in the Office of Political Research, to produce over-
all evaluations of the Potential for Political Violence (PPV) and of the conditions
conducive to particular types of violence in the country under observation. The
three panels' evaluations are made on a monthly schedule, and the entire test
series is expected to run until mid-1975.
NOTE: Comments or questions on this project will be welcomed by its author
Office of Political Research, code 143, ext. 4091.
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COIWtNTIAL
The summary below presents the principal findings from the third set of
assessments made by the country panels in mid-February 1975. The graphs
on succeeding pages display trends based on the three sets of assessments made
to date. The first was made at different times by the three panels in the period
from late November through December 1974; the next two were made by all
three panels around the mid-points of January and February 1975. Subsequent
monthly progress reports, based in each case on mid-month evaluations, will
indicate trend changes in the panels' scoring patterns. In this way, the model's
projections of the potential and form of political violence can be tested against
actual developments in each country during the test period.
Summary of Principal Findings
( NOTE: The data cited below and in the following graphs are keyed to
each country's Potential for Political Violence or PPV, as reflected by the
median PPV score of each five-member country panel. The figures should
not be regarded as representing either probabilities or absolute quanti-
ties; they should be interpreted merely as indicating relative status or
strength, compared to other variables in the model assessed by the same
country panel or to corresponding variables assessed by the other two
country panels.)
General:
1. In the mid-February assessments by the three country panels, Ethiopia
showed by far the largest potential for violence�more than 65 percent higher
than the level in either Argentina or Thailand.
2. A marked contrast in the conditions conducive to particular types of
violence emerged between Ethiopia on the one hand and Argentina and Thailand
on the other. While, within the limits defined by their relatively low potential
for political violence, Argentina and Thailand both showed a slight tilt toward
turmoil and insurgency, Ethiopia, within the limits of its much larger potential,
displayed a strong tendency toward internal war and conspiracy.
3. The potential for political violence among specific types of actor groups
varied along similar lines: In Argentina and Thailand, pro-regime elite actors
showed the strongest potential, while in Ethiopia anti-regime elite actors dis-
played the largest potential.
4. The contrast between Argentina and Thailand on the one hand and
Ethiopia on the other also showed up in panel assessments of the motivation
and capability for political violence. Ethiopia was judged to have twice as
much politicized frustration as either Argentina or Thailand, even though the
coercive force and institutional support needed to turn that frustration into
political violence was judged to be about the same in all three countries.
5. Following the same general pattern, the range of variation in assessments
among members of the Ethiopian panel was approximately twice that of the
panels for Argentina and Thailand.
Argentina:
In the period January-February 1975, the potential for political violence
in Argentina showed a marked decline ( a drop in PPV score from 52 to 42).
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CON NTIAL
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CONF TIAL
Within limits of that reduced potential, conditions in Argentina were judged
in February, as in the previous month, to be most conducive to turmoil and
insurgency (each with a PPV component of 12), somewhat less to internal
war (10), and least to conspiracy or an attempted coup (8). Of the four
types of conditions, that for turmoil decreased the most during the period
(from 17 to 12). The potential for political violence declined for all four actor
categories, but the biggest drop was seen among anti-regime mass actors (15
to -9). The capability to launch and sustain political violence remained about
the same (8 for coercive force, 9 for institutional support), but the degree of
political frustration showed a marked decline (from 34 to 25). The variation
in assessments of individual panel members widened somewhat during the
period (to a range of 23 around the median PPV score of 42).
Ethiopia:
The potential for political violence in Ethiopia rose sharply in the January-
February period (an increase in PPV from 62 to 73). Within limits defined by
that expanded potential, conditions were judged to be most favorable for con-
spiracy (a relatively sharp increase from 18 in January to 23 in February),
only slightly less so for internal war (an increase from 19 to 22), and least
for insurgency (15) and turmoil (13). As in January, the greatest potential
for political violence was found among anti-regime elite actors (28), some-
what less among anti-regime mass actors (23), and least among pro-regime
elite and pro-regime mass actors (13 and 9, respectively). The largest increase
in PPV from the previous month was ,seen among anti-regime mass actors (16
to 23). Though the capability for violence (including that obtained from
external allies) remained relatively unchanged in the January-February period
(a February score of 11 for both coercive force and institutional support), the
level of politicized frustration in the country jumped sharply (from 42 to 51).
Variation among members of the Ethiopian panel, already relatively large in
January, increased even more in February (a range of 48 around the median
PPV score of 73).
Thailand:
In Thailand the potential for political violence showed a slight drop
during the January-February period (a decline in PPV from 47 to 44). Within
the limits of that potential, the pattern of conditions conducive to particular
types of political violence remained roughly the same during the period. Con-
ditions were viewed as most favorable for insurgency (17), somewhat less for
turmoil (14), and least for internal war (8) and conspiracy (5). Similarly,
the degree of PPV among specific actor groups remained relatively unchanged.
Pro-regime elite and anti-regime mass actors continued to show the most PPV
(16 and 12, respectively), while pro-regime mass and anti-regime elite actors
showed the least (both 8). Politicized frustration in the country dropped slightly
during the period (from 28 to 26), while the capability to translate that frus-
tration into political violence remained about the same (8 for coercive force,
10 for institutional support). Members of the Thai panel showed little change
in variation between the January and February assessments (a range of 24
around the February median PPV score of 44).
COyiKENTIAL
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Conditions Conducive to Particular Types of Political Violence
ARGENTINA
Dec 74
PPV
100
Jan 75
42
712
112
C
1W 10
Feb
Mar
May
ETHIOPIA
73
60
113
115
C23
20
1W 22
0
Dec 74. .
Jan 75
Feb
Mar,
Dec 74 Jan 75 Feb Mar Apr May Jun
Shaded areas represent, within thelimits of each country's potential
for PUlitical violence (PPV), - the degree to which that country panel's
median, scores on key variables fulfill the conditions hypothesized by
. ,
the Gurr theory as conducive to each type of political violence;
,
T - Turmoil
I Insurgency
C Conspiracy
1W- Internal War,
C01.4Ft:
CO NTIAL
. � . �
�� 565302 3-75 CIA.
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The Potential for Political Violence (PPV) for Each Type of Actor
42
PR-MO 9
PR-E0 14
AR-MO 9
0
0 AR-E0 1

Dec 74 - Jan 75 Feb Mar
PPV"
' ili0
Apr May .Jim
ETHIOPIA
PR-MO 9
PR-E0 19
AR-MO 23
AR-E0 28
Jan 75 : Feb Mat Apr May Jun
THAILAND
PB -MOB
PR-E0 18
AR-MO 12
AR-E0 8
0 , ..,.
.
Dcc 14 Jani-75 Feb 'Mar .- . ;- Apr - May - -JUR -
Shaded areas represent each country
,a median scores for !PV.;s. for - .P.0-0102Pro-Rogint_eimass-orientod Actors
pacer
',-PR-E0...Pro-Riiiitno
'';iiiiiiiirientiiiiit
_ors . -.
each actor :category: -.- AR -MO 4nii-Rigtme;:"Rtiii:Orietiteit:Aaers --
AR-I0- Anti-Regime, Epte.-orientetfictore -
,
5
0 ENTIAL
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CONIHNTIAL
The Potential for Political Violence (PPV) in Terms of Key Variables in the Burr Model
PPV
. 100
80
60
ARGENTINA
42
20
0
Dec 74
IS 9
CF 8
PF 25
Jan 75
Mar
0
Dec 74 Jan 75 Feb . Mar Apr May Jun
THAILAND
44
IS 10
CF 8
Shaded areas represent sums of each country
panel's median scores for each key variable for
all actor categories.
tititional ;1.1PPQrt-
14 PF - Politicized Frustration
ins
CFCoercive Force
JUStWICahOn
tari'v'ijilence)
CON
C,0 fV
}NTIAL
. . . .
5 5304 3-j5'CiA
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CONitOENTIAL
Individual Analysts' Assessments of the Potential for Political Violence (PPV)
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ColoredIines ,rep csent_the. ranja, of, Vutividual
analysts' Scotia, for: PPV around each . country
panel's median Scars for PPV..
Analyst a
Analyst U
7
CO �ENTIAL
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