[SANITIZED]LATIN AMERICAN TRENDS: STAFF NOTES JULY 7, 1976 - 1976/07/07

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06628135
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: July 7, 1976

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CI SNLA 76-029
No. 0709-76
July 7, 1976
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NR
SE RET
LATIN AMERICAN TRENDS
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Western Hemisphere Division. Office of Current Imelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
CONTENTS
Ju147. 1976
ANNEX
Argentina: Status of the Military Junta . . . 15
R E T
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Argentina: Status of the Military Junta
The military junta headed by President Videla
has achieved no dramatic breakthroughs on major
problems in the three months since it seized power,
but there have been encouraging signs, particularly,
on the crucial economic front. The next few months
will be decisive, as presidential critics and sup-
porters alike wait to see whether these indications
point toward real progress or eventual disappoint-
ment.
President Videla faces a formidable public re-
lations challenge, aside from the magnitude of the
economic and terrorist problems. He must, on the
one hand, proceed quickly and,firmly enough to sat-
isfy fellow officers,. On th4other hand, he cannot
push the country's highly politicized citizenry to
the point of dissipating theiPopular acceptance the
Junta has painstakingly nurtured. For the moment,
the military as a whole seemedisposed to go along
with Videla's low-key gradualist approach to govern-
ing. Some officers' patience could be tried, how-
ever, if the pace of progress does not quicken.
Popular resistance has not yet been a factor, but
political restrictions and economic austerity meas-
ures could yet lead to widespread dissatisfaction.
President Videla is well suited for the
balancing act he must perform. He has impeccable
military credentials and the respect of his fellow
officers, even though there has been criticism of
some aspects of his style. Civilians see him as a
man with no thirst for power, and one who took the
reins of government reluctantly.
Videla and the junta have made an obvious effort
to project a low-key public image. The president
sets the ltOrle;1U.S appearance is austere and he makes
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no promises, preferring to repeat his call for hard
work. Other officials display the same attitude.
Economy Minister Martinez de Hoz, for example, al-
though charged with overseeing the fundamental over-
haul of the nation's economy, describes his job in
matter-of-fact terms and also avoids the temptation
to make promises.
The government4is not 11,2�. much modest as practi-
cal. Videla and hiticolleagges fully realize the
danger of setting uhrealistib- goals that risk wide-
spread alienation iMprogreslis not made. The pub-
lic statements of junta spokesmen are a contrast to
the extravagant behavior and lavish promises made by
the ousted Peronists. So far, the President and his
advisers seem to have succeeded in impressing their
countrymen with the need for personal sacrifice in
the interest of restoring economic health to the
nation. Videla is banking on his continuing ability
to make such sacrifices palatable to a self-indulgent
citizenry.
From the outset, Videla has walked a fine line
between authoritarianism and respect for civilian
institutions. Congress is dissolved, all political
activity is banned, and the media are restricted.
The President has stopped short of cutting civilians
out of the governing process entirely, however. A
number of key advisers are civilians and the principal
political parties remain intact, as does the huge
Peronist labor confederation. Videla is not squeam-
ish about using authority toOccomplish the tasks
before him, but he does see ,limits to the amount of
power he needs.
Restoration of the shattered economy remains
the most pressing, if not the most spectacular, chal-
lenge facing the junta. Economy Minister Martinez
de Hoz has had some success in reducing the worst
inflation in Argentina's history and attracting badly
needed financial support from abroad, but there is
still a long way to go. The economic team has a
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far-reaching programiithat env4sions revitalization
of the private sectoriand aimitto reduce the govern-
ment's role in certtin econalc activities, such as
energy production. 1:the foreign investment law has
been rewritten to remove mosqof the restrictions
on foreign capital and profit remittances.
Agriculture, long neglected, has received a
package of new incentives. There has been no sig-
nificant popular resistance to the economic program,
but the prospect for continuing unquestioning ac-
ceptance of austerity measures by a society long ac-
customed to the "good life" cannot be considered
promising. Labor, in particular, has been severely
affected by the new economic program, a categorical
repudiation of Peronist policies that made urban
workers the most influential civilian sector. De-
prived suddenly of its predominance, the union
movement may be ripe for exploitation by leftist
infiltrators who will harp on the themes of rising
prices and lack of union autonomy.
Indeed, despit4political,controls, Argentine
labor remains the most importOt source of potential
opposition to themilitaryiS policies. Although
the government has not yet faced a major challenge
from workers, there have beerC'sporadic work stoppages
and slowdowns in major industrial plants. Such
activity alarms the junta, both as a challenge to
its authority and a threat to economic productivity.
Thus far, the regime has faced down such protests by
furloughing the ringleaders. It has made clear,
however, its willingness to use force if necessary.
The activities of leftwing terrorists are the
junta's other major preoccupation. The terrorism
problem is dramatic and virulent and has plagued
civilian and military governments alike since the
late 1960s. The guerrillas do not pose a direct
threat to government stability. Nonetheless, the
military is committed to rooting them out and Videla's
handling of the situation is one criterion on which
he will be judged, particularly by fellow officers.
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The army appears to have made inroads against rural
and urban insurgents. In the remote province of
Tucuman, government forces are reportedly killing or
capturing greatly increased numbers of Peoples Rev-
olutionary Army combatants, while destroying more
and more safesites and sources of supplies.
The urban terrorism mounted by the Peoples Army
and more importantly by the leftist Montoneros is
more difficult to handle. The insurgents' hit and
run tactics are extremely effective in the metropol-
itan sprawl of Buenos AiresiVand even now the appeal
of the terrorist groups for youthful Argentines--the
main source of recruits--is not entirely dissipated
despite increasing reports of government successes
against them. Still, it wilkbe some time before
the success of the military's;:aggressive campaign
can be judged, because bombings and guerrilla at-
tacks on officials are continuing. During the past
two weeks, for example, terrorists murdered several
military officers, including the second federal
police chief in two years.
Videla may eventually have serious difficulty
with military critics who urge him to take a much
tougher approach to the problem. The thrust of
their argument is that in order to eradicate the
guerrillas, who hide among and draw some support
from the populace, the government must impose stronger
controls on the whole population to deny the ter-
rorists all hiding places and means of support. The
durability of the insurgent movement seems to
strengthen this argument. In addition, the so-called
"hardline" officers want ven4eance against the former
civilian leaders whose corruption and incompetence,
they feel, led Argentina to near chaos. The advocates
of repression, therefore, arqpressing for virtually
unlimited arrest pollers, dissolution of all political
groupings, and the dismember8gnt of the entire labor
movement.
The President is no less committed to a "fight
to the finish" with terrorism, but he sees the
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"hardline" approach as counterproductive. Videla
wants to avoid the sort of international opprobrium
that has been aimed at ChileApecause Of human rights
violations. Such disapprovathas hurt the Chileans.
and could have a similar effect on Argentina at a
time when its economic planning depends in large
part on further infusions of foreign financial sup-
port. Videla is also mindful of the significant
political divisions within his country, which would
almost certainly be intensified by vindictive govern-
ment measures.
Videla, unlike the "hardliners," clearly sees
some role for civilians in governing, even if the
military remains in power indefinitely. The Presi-
dent's public attitude toward civilians is concilia-
tory and his advisers are engaged in an ongoing
dialogue with certain untainted politicians and labor
leaders. This approach has drawn the fire of the
President's critics. As yet, however, they appear
undecided as to what, if anything, to do about it.
Although Videla is not now in any serious trouble,
the "hardline" is already a factor, and its appeal
may widen, especially if progress on major national
problems is judged to be too slow. The rightwing
abductions and murders of known and suspected left-
ists, although not sanctioned by the regime, clearly
have the sympathy of a number of military officers,
some in key positions. The President's efforts to end
the right wing abuses have had limited success at
best, and there are practical limits to how far he
can go. To challenge the right wing too strenuously
could conceivably be counter productive.
Military rule has come to stay for the foresee-
able future. How repres'Ave it becomes depends on
Videla's ability to deai with the problems that
prompted military intervention in the first place.
It is not inevitable that the "hardline" will win
out and oblige the President to do things its way
or replace him. Indeed, in the next few months it
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seems likely that if Videla can produce additional
results, he will weaken the arguments of his critics.
For this very reason, of course, some "hardliners"
will want to press the President even harder, lest
he gain the time he needs to vindicate his approach.
It is also true, however, that Videla would
sooner resort to harsher military rule--in the event
of serious popular resistance--than consider an
early return to civilian rule. The President, no
less than the "hardliners," believes that no indivi-
dual civilian political figure or movement could 1ef-
fectively govern. 4 Videla' and his supporters have
i
their way, civilians'can look forward to at least
a limited input into government. If Videla loses
out, they will not have even this.
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