THE POTENTIAL FOR POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN ARGENTINA, ETHIOPIA, AND THAILAND MARCH 1975[SANITIZED] - 1975/03/01

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06628559
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: March 1, 1975

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628559
Research Project
The Potential for Political Violence in
Argentina, Ethiopia, and Thailand:
Report on a Quantitative Analytical Model
Progress Report No. 3
ential
�
March 1975
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628559
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628559
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628559
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628559
CONIR1ENTIA1
Progress Report No. 3 March 1975
The Potential for Political Violence in Argentina, Ethiopia,
and Thailand: Report on a Quantitative Analytical Model
This is the third in a series of reports on the testing of an analytical model
of political violence adapted from Ted Robert Gurr's frustration-aggression theory
(Why Men Rebel, Princeton University Press, 1970). The Gurr theory is based
on the proposition that political violence is the product of group frustrations
reinforced by the belief that violence is justified and by the capability to turn
the resulting politicized anger into collective aggression. The form of the ensuing
violence�turmoil (riots or demonstrations), insurgency (terrorist acts or small-
scale guerrilla operations), conspiracy (attempted coups), or internal war (large-
scale revolutionary actions or civil war)�will depend upon the kinds of relation-
ships which are found to exist among various types of groups in the country under
examination. A complete description of the theory and of the procedures devised
operationalize it as an analytical tool is contained in an earlier OPR report of
an experimental, ex post facto test of the model in the Chilean situation of mid-
1973 (OPR 502, Revised, November 1974).
The purpose of this second phase of the project is to test the value of the
Gurr model as a technique for assessing the nature and potential for political
violence in societies of varying stages of development and with quite different
cultural heritages and political institutions. The three countries chosen�Argen-
tina, Ethiopia, and Thailand�seem to meet our requirements: Each represents
a different stage of development in a distinct geographic area, and each is con-
fronted with domestic unrest or political conflict.
For each of the three countries, a panel of five CIA analysts assigns numerical
evaluations at regular intervals to the model's key variables�relative deprivation
or collective frustration, belief in the justification for violence, coercive force, and
institutionalized support. The evaluations are made for each group or "actor"
which, in the panel's judgment, represents a significant political force in the
country. The country's actors are also assessed in terms of their identification with
four basic actor-categories: Pro-regime, mass-oriented ( PR-MO ); pro-regime,
elite-oriented (PR-E0); anti-regime, mass-oriented (AR-M0); and anti-regime,
elite-oriented (AR-EO). At each point of assessment during the test period, the
panel's evaluations are combined statistically, using computerized procedures
devised in the Office of Political Research, to produce overall evaluations of the
Potential for Political Violence (PPV) and of the conditions conducive to particu-
NOTE: Comments or questions on this project will be welcomed by its author
Dffice of Political Researc.
1
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628559
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628559
...59164PIAL
lar types of violence in the country under observation. The three panels' evalua-
tions are made on a monthly schedule, and the entire test series is expected to
run until mid-1975.
The summary below presents the principal findings from the fourth set of
assessments made by the country panels in mid-March 1975. The graphs on suc-
ceeding pages display trends based on the four sets of assessments made to date.
Subequent monthly progress reports, based in each case on mid-month evalua-
tions, will indicate trend changes in the panels' scoring patterns. In this way, the
model's projections of the potential and form of political violence can be tested
against actual developments in each country during the test period.
Summary of Principal Findings
(NOTE: The data cited below and in the following graphs are keyed to
each country's Potential for Political Violence or PPV, as reflected by the
median PPV score of each five-member country panel. The figures should
not be regarded as representing either probabilities or absolute quanti-
ties; they should be- interpreted merely as indicating relative status or
strength, compared to other variables in. the model assessed by the same
country panel or to corresponding variables assessed by the other two
country panels.)
General:
1. The mid-March assessments of the three country panels confirmed the
sharp contrast between Ethiopia on the one hand and Argentina and Thailand
on the other. While the potential for political violence in Ethiopia continued to
grow, reaching a level about double that of the other two countries, the potential
in Argentina and Thailand remained relatively low and stable.
2. Conditions defined by the model as conducive to particular types of vio-
lence varied among the three countries. Within the limits of their relatively low
potential for violence, Argentina showed a slight tendency toward insurgency,
while Thailand displayed a tendency toward turmoil. On the other hand, Ethiopia,
within the limits of a much greater potential for violence, showed d clear tilt
toward internal war.
3. In Ethiopia, anti-regime actors far outweighed pro-regime actors in po-
tential for political violence. In the other two countries, actor groups were more
evenly matched: in Thailand, pro-regime elite actors had somewhat more po-
tential than the other three types of actors, while in Argentina pro-regime elite
and anti-regime elite actors had a slight edge in potential for violence.
4. Following the same general pattern, actor groups in Ethiopia were judged
to be more than twice as politically frustrated as actor groups in either Argentina
or Thailand. The capability ( coercive force and institutionalized support) to turn
this frustration into political violence, however, remained about the same for all
three countries.
5. The range of variation in assessments among the participating analysts
was greatest for the Argentina panel, slightly less for the Ethiopian panel, and
least for the Thai panel.
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628559
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628559
C9W41:5