INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN 1976 - 1977/07/01

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02064822
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: July 1, 1977

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Foreword
Politically motivated terrorism is a particularly complex and con-
troversial phenomenon. Hence, it must be emphasized at the outset that the
approach adopted and the judgments advanced in this brief monograph are
those of the author and do not represent a CIA position.
The present paper draws upon and updates an earlier and more
comprehensive study by the same analyst, International and Transnational
Terrorism: Diagnosis and Prognosis (PR 76 10030, April 1976). Unlike the
latter work, however, it makes no definitional distinction between terrorist
acts that were carried out under governmental direction and those that were
not.
Comments or questions concerning this paper will be welcomed. They
should be addressed to the Assistant for Public Affairs to the Director.
Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C. 20505, code 143, extension
7676.
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International Terrorism in 1976
Central Intelligence Agency
Directorate of Intelligence
July 1977
Introduction
The objectives of this summary overview of international terrorism
during the past year are threefold! The first is to set the scope and nature of
this activity into historical perspective. The second is to draw attention to
those trends and developments which would seem to be of particular import
with respect to both the likely future dimensions of the problem and its
impact on US interests. The third is to apply these judgments and
observations to a brief assessment of what may lie ahead during the
remainder of 1977.
The last-mentioned goal can, of course, be met in only very general
terms. Political violence is a phenomenon that rarely lends itself to firm and
detailed prediction. Nonetheless, the problem of international terrorism not
only will be with us for years to come, but is likely to evolve in ways that
could pose a more serious threat to US interests than in the recent past. And
it is also clear that for a host of reasons�countervailing interests and values
among them�the development of more effective national and international
countermeasures will remain an exceptionally demanding task.
With two exceptions, the charts and tables that accompany this
analytical survey juxtapose terrorist statistics for 1976 against those
compiled for a number of earlier years. In general, this technique serves the
objective of historical perspective quite well. It must be emphasized at the
outset, however, that these figures�and the inferences that can be drawn
from them�should be viewed with caution. The criteria employed for
selecting and classifying the incidents that have been included in these tallies
For the purposes of this discussion, international terrorism is defined as the threat or use of violence
for political purposes when (1) such action is intended to influence the attitude and behavior of a
target group wider than its immediate victims, and (2) its ramifications transcend national boundaries
(as the result, for example, of the nationality or foreign ties of its perpetrators, its locale, the identity
of its institutional or human victims, its declared objectives, or the mechanics of its resolution).
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are unavoidably arbitrary. Then, too, the number of incidents under review
is so small that unintended omissions (of which there are undoubtedly
many) or erroneous classification of borderline events could have a
statistically significant impact. Finally, there is no way of telling how much
of the sharp rise in recorded terrorist incidents over the past decade reflects a
real increase in such activity and how much is attributable to more
comprehensive and systematic reporting.
General Observations
Regarding international terrorism, 1976 was a year in which:
� More incidents were recorded than ever before.
� The hijacking of commercial aircraft (which had been becoming
increasingly rare) experienced a modest revival.
� Risky and demanding kidnaping and barricade-and-hostage
operations declined, while the safest and simplest types of terrorist
action (bombing, assassination, armed assault, and incendiary
attack) registered sharp increases.
� The overall proportion of international terrorist incidents that
were directed against US citizens or property dropped to a record
low (25.5 percent); but in both relative and absolute terms, the
burden born by US commercial facilities and their employees
abroad increased markedly over 1975.
� Cuban exile formations emerged among the most active and
most disruptive terrorist groups on the international stage.
� Latin American terrorist activity was extended to European soil.
� The majority of the terrorist operations mounted by Palestinian
groups were, for the first time since 1971, directed against Arab
targets.
� Renewed efforts to develop more effective international coun-
termeasures against terrorist activity were launched in the Council
of Europe and the United Nations General Assembly.
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Last year was also notable for two things that did not happen. Despite
threats that such action would be forthcoming, members of the Japanese
Red Army mounted no new operations. And with very few exceptions, there
was no noticeable increase in the sophistication of terrorist tactics, targeting,
or weaponry.
In the latter regard, however, it must be added that the potential threat
posed by terrorist acquisition of sophisticated man-portable weaponry was
brought home on at least two occasions. The first was the attempt,
apparently nipped in the bud, of a Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PFLP) team to shoot down an El Al aircraft with "heat seeking"
missiles in late January. (The incident has been widely reported in the press,
but so far the Israelis have issued no official statement with respect to its
location or the origin of the missiles.) The second was the theft of 15
high-explosive light antitank weapons (LAWs) from a US army maneuver
area in southern Germany later in the year.
Since the January missile operation was thwarted in time to escape
classification as a full-fledged terrorist incident, it is not reflected in the
statistics presented at the end of this paper. Nonetheless, because of the
nationally mixed character of the PFLP terrorist team and of the support
this group reportedly received from sympathetic states, this aborted attack
draws attention to the first two of the several specific problem areas that
are treated briefly below.
Transnational Cooperation
The El Al missile affair, the Entebbe hijacking, and the sporadic efforts
of European-based representatives of Latin America's Revolutionary Coordi-
nating Junta (JCR) to publicize the goals and activities of their transnational
organization all document the trend toward greater cooperation among
terrorists of different nationalities that has been observable for several
years.' Indeed, it seems likely that a number of factors, including the limited
human resources now at the disposal of some active terrorist groups in
Europe and the increasing difficulties that have been encountered by a
number of Latin American formations, made such cooperation appear
increasingly advantageous as the year progressed. The initiation of more
2The JCR is composed of Argentina's Revolutionary People's Army (ERP), Bolivia's National
Liberation Army (ELN), Chile's Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), Paraguay's National
Liberation Front (FREPALINA), and the remnants of Uruguay's National Liberation Movement
(MLN/Tupamaros). Established in 1974 to facilitate joint planning, funding, coordination, and
support, the organization has so far been dependent on the ERP for most of its financial and material
resources.
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vigorous local countermeasures may also account in part for the spillover of
Latin American terrorist activity into Western Europe.3
Government Support to Terrorists
As in 1975, direct governmental support of terrorist groups was most
evident and most extensive with respect to small Palestinian splinter
formations associated with the rejectionist wing of the fedayeen movement.
Libya remained at the forefront of such activity, but as perhaps most
dramatically demonstrated by the Entebbe affair, a number of other African
and Middle Eastern countries were involved as well. In fact, dissatisfaction
with the consequences of Syrian intervention in the Lebanese crisis brought
Iraq into somewhat greater prominence on the terrorist scene than in the
past as the principal patron of the Black June Movement�a small Palestinian
group that is believed to have been responsible for at least nine attacks on
Syrian or Jordanian targets during the last three months of 1976.
In general, such governmental support as was rendered to terrorist
groups in the Western Hemisphere was relatively discreet. Nonetheless, it
would appear that despite Castro's recent espousal of a Soviet-endorsed via
pacifica strategy in Latin America, Cuba continued to maintain contact with
a number of terrorism-prone revolutionary groups in that area.
The Vulnerability of the Overseas Installations
and Employees of US Firms
In 1975, two out of every five terrorist incidents that were directed
against US citizens or facilities abroad victimized US firms or their
employees. In 1976, this ratio was three out of five. The increase was partly
due to the operation of such local factors as the re-emergence of Mexico's
23rd of September Communist League as an active terrorist group. But
because of the tighter security measures that have been introduced at US
military and diplomatic installations, the continuing lure of potentially
lucrative ransom or extortion payments, and the symbolic value of US firms
(e.g., as "capitalistic foreign exploiters" of the local working class), there is a
real danger that terrorist attacks on the US business community abroad will
become even more frequent in the future.
Two developments during 1976 bear special note. First, the defensive
measures taken by US firms contributed to a shift in terrorist tactics. Thus,
3A group calling itself the Che Guevara Internationalist Brigade claimed credit for assassinating the
Bolivian ambassador to France in May, the bombing of the Argentine embassy in Rome in July, and
three more bombings in Rome in September (the US Information Service and Brazilian Airlines offices
and the Chilean embassy to the Vatican).
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the number of assassinations and armed assaults have increased, while
kidnapings have declined. And as American executives have gradually been
withdrawn, their foreign-born replacements have been victimized in in-
creasing numbers.
The second development stems from a single event: the assassination by
local terrorists of the three Rockwell International executives in Tehran on
28 August 1976. The number of victims was small. But the terrorists were
eminently successful in drawing attention to the inviting target posed by the
burgeoning community of American civilian advisers and technicians.
Indeed, despite the fact that so far there have been no further attacks on
non-official Americans in Iran, the waves that the August incident created
within US business and governmental circles have yet to subside.
Cuban Exiles, Croatian Extremists,
and the Jewish Defense League
An upsurge in international terrorist attacks mounted by groups that
are either based in the US or that have strong organizational links to certain
segments of the US population caused considerable difficulty and embarrass-
ment for the US government during 1976. The furor caused by the hijacking
of a TWA passenger plane to Paris by Croatian extremists in September�the
most spectacular of the eight terrorist incidents attributed to Yugoslav
expatriates last year�provides a case in point.4 For their part, militants
believed to be associated with the Jewish Defense League staged at least
seven attacks against Soviet, East European, Arab, and UN-connected targets
in the US. (They also struck at Pan American Airlines property on two
occasions: the first time to discourage that company from serving as cargo
agent for Aeroflot, the second to protest its regularly scheduled flights to
Syria and Iraq.)
Cuban exile groups operating under the aegis of a new alliance called
the Coordination of United Revolutionary Organizations were particularly
active during the second half of the year. They were responsible for no less
than 17 acts of international terrorism (at least three of which took place in
the US). Statistically, this matches the record compiled by the various
Palestinian terrorist groups during the same period. But largely because the
Cuban exile operations included the October bombing of a Cubana Airlines
passenger aircraft, their consequences were far more bloody. Moreover, the
latter incident prompted Fidel Castro to renounce the 1973 US-Cuban
Since its perpetrators faced almost certain capture, the TWA hijacking also illustrates the overriding
importance that terrorists often attach to gaining publicity for their cause.
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memorandum of understanding concerning hijackers of aircraft and vessels�
an action which took effect on 15 April 1977 upon expiration of the
required six-month grace period.5
Efforts to Develop New and
More Effective Countermeasures
Together with the Carlos-led raid on the OPEC ministerial meeting in
Vienna in December 1975, the Entebbe hijacking played a key role in
inspiring both the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism
that was adopted by the Council of Europe on 10 November 19766 and the
proposal for an international convention against the taking of hostages that
West Germany had placed before the UN General Assembly some six weeks
earlier. But despite the attention that these initiatives have received, it
remains to be seen whether either of them will result in a significantly more
effective international regime for controlling terrorism.
The European convention purports to make extradition or prosecution
mandatory for individuals responsible for a wide variety of terrorist acts. But
at least as far as extradition is concerned, the room allowed for discretionary
exceptions makes the treaty little more than a declaration of good intent.
Moreover, some Council members have made it clear from the outset that
they view the convention with considerable reserve.
On 9 December the Legal Committee of the UN General Assembly
passed a resolution directing a 35-member ad hoc committee to draft a
convention against the taking of hostages along lines proposed by West
Germany. The echoes of the old controversy over justifiable versus illegal
political violence that emerged during the debates that preceded the voting
suggest that this will be no easy task. The Germans have sought to minimize
the grounds for conflict by scrupulously avoiding any mention of the word
terrorism in the draft text that they have prepared for the committee's
consideration. Even so, it is not certain that the group will have an agreed
draft in hand by the time the next General Assembly session opens in
September 1977.
5Seventy-three people were killed when the Cubans plane went down. Most of the victims were
Cubans, but 11 were Guyanese. Because of this, and because Prime Minister Forbes Burnham publicly
accused the US of complicity, the incident also precipitated a period of increased tensions in
US-Guyanese relations.
6Passed unanimously by the 19-member Council the convention was opened for signature on 27
January 1977. Two member states, Malta and Ireland, have so far refused to sign it. In any event, the
convention will not come into force until at least three Council members have ratified it. Thereafter, it
will be binding on only those countries and such others as may subsequently complete the ratification
process. It is not open to accession by nations that are not members of the Council of Europe.
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The Implications for 1977
It is evident from casting last year's experience with international
terrorism into historical perspective that while a few broad trends can be
identified, these have been accompanied and conditioned by relatively wide
fluctuations in the nature and intensity of the violence involved. Similarly,
the roster of groups engaged in international terrorist activity has been in
constant flux.7
These oscillations in the pattern and level of terrorist activity�which
are attributable to the operation of a multitude of factors�render specific
predictions about the future dimensions of this threat, even over the short
term, hazardous at best. Nonetheless, it is clear that the problem will persist.
And while it is not possible to forecast the precise level and composition of
international terrorist activity in 1977, the foregoing analysis does provide a
rough guide as to its likely general contours.
First as suggested in earlier discussion, the carryover of the trends and
problem areas that were associated with the problem of international
terrorism last year will probably be extensive. Specifically:
� It seems likely that terrorist attacks on the overseas facilities and
employees of US corporations and their foreign subsidiaries will
continue to pose a particularly troublesome problem.
� Continuation of vigorous antiterrorist campaigns in Argentina
and other Latin American countries may well result in a further
"export" of Latin American terrorism to Europe.
� The development and implementation of more effective interna-
tional countermeasures will continue to be impeded by differing
moral perspectives, a broad resistance to any such infringement of
sovereignty as would be implied in an inflexible curtailment of the
right to grant political asylum, and a natural reluctance on the part
of many states to commit themselves to any course of action that
7Instability and a distinct ephemeral quality have been characteristic of most of the I40-odd
organizations that have been linked to international terrorist incidents over the past ten years. Indeed,
some of these groups never existed at all, having been conjured up as fictional entities in order to
shield the true identity of the perpetrators of particularly shocking or politically sensitive acts. A far
larger number have either succumbed to local counterterrorist campaigns or fragmented under the
impact of personal rivalries or growing disagreements over goals and tactics. The net growth in the
number of active international terrorist formations has, in fact, been as much attributable to the
splintering of old groups as to the emergence of entirely new ones.
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might invite retribution�either by terrorist groups or by states
sympathetic to the terrorists' cause.8
� Despite the sobering impact of the Entebbe affair, there would
seem to be a good chance that the incidence of hijackings will
match or exceed the level recorded in 1976.9
� Governmental assistance to�and cooperation among�terrorist
groups will continue to enhance the capabilities of such ultra-
militant organizations as the PFLP.
At the same time, however, 1977 is likely to be characterized by some
discontinuities and new developments as well. The odds are, for example,
that Cuban exile activity will taper off somewhat." On the other hand,
regional conflicts outside the Middle East or contentious issues of many sorts
could spawn new campaigns of international terrorism.
81ronically:the obvious discomfiture displayed by both Paris and Bonn in their handling of the highly
publicized Abu Daud affair served to document the persistence and force of these inhibiting factors
just days before the new European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism was opened for
signature.
9
In this regard, it should be noted that PFLP leader George Habbash told a correspondent from West
Germany's Der Stern magazine in early February 1977 that while his organization planned no such
action, he personally expected other embittered Palestinian formations to launch a new wave of
hijackings.
10The record suggests that no group can long sustain a high intensity campaign of terror without
running up against some very serious practical problems in terms of (I) depletion of resources, (2)
factional divisions, (3) erosion of international sympathy or support, or (4) more vigorous
countermeasures (at least at the national level). In short, while the internal dynamics of a campaign of
terrorist violence tend to create pressures for escalation, the process would appear to be to some
degree self-limiting.
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Annual Totals
250
200
150
100
50
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0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
76
1965 70
Figure 1
International Terrorist Incidents, 1965-76*
Geographic Distribution
Total: 1,190
Transregional
Pacific and Australia
USSR/Eastern Europe
Sub-Saharan Africa
Asia
Middle East and
North Africa
�The statistics presented here and in the charts and tables that
follow exclude terrorist attacks on US and allied personnel and
installations in Indochina. They also exclude most of the
mutual assassination efforts and cross-border operations asso-
ciated with the Arab-Israeli conflict. (The only exceptions in
this regard are incidents that either victimized noncombatant
nationals of state located outside the principal arena of conflict
or were of such a nature that they became the subject of
widespread international concern and controversy.) On the
North America
Latin America
Western and
NATO Europe
457
other hand, related but separately targeted actions undertaken
by a single terrorist group were counted as individual incidents,
even when they were staged on the same day and in close
proximity to one another. Similarly, terrorist operations that
aborted during execution (as opposed to those that were aban-
doned or countered during the planning or staging phases) were
also counted. Obviously, the employment of other selection
criteria could yield far different results. Hence it must be
emphasized that this data should be viewed as proximate.
572176 2-77
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100 �
Kidnapping
Total: 137
75 �
50
25
0
1968
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100
75
50
Barricade and
Hostage
Total: 35
25
100
75
50
25
0
1968
126
Bombing
Total: 501
100
75
50
25
Ii
1968 70 72
70
72
Assassination
Total: 63
74
76
572178 2-77
100
75
50
25
0
1968
70
72
74
Armed Assault or
Ambush
Total: 119
76
100
75
50
25
0
1968
70
72
74
Incendiary Attack or
Arson
Total: 103
76
70
72
11
74
76
Figure 2
International Terrorist
Incidents by Category,
1968-76
Total: 1,152
100
75
50
25
Hijacking
(Air and Non-Air)
Total: 146
1968
100
75
50
25
0
1968
70
Other
Total: 48
72
74
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70
72 74
*Includes 2 non-air hijackings.
76
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Geographic Distribution
of International Terrorist Incidents by Category, 1968-76
81
North America
Total: 131
22
310
I I 1
10
I
Figure 3
III
255
Western and
NATO Europe
Total: 451
14 15
37
21
22
67
20
Middle East and
46
North Africa
Total: 132
9 9
I I
26 21
10
1
10
Sub-Saharan Africa Total: 41
17
I ILl I 6
1
7 6
I I
I
Asia Total. 54
7 8
I I 2
17
9
4
I
7
i
Latin America Total: 317 98
87
6
I I
I
44
28
I I I I
23
I
17
14
USSR/Eastern Europe Total: 19
2
I I I I
15
1
1
I
I
Pacific and Australia Total: 6
4
I I i I
I
I 1 I I
I
I
Transregional Total: 1
I I I I I 1*
I
I I I I
I I
I I
I
I
Kidnaping Barricade and Bombing
Hostage
Armed Assault Hijacking
or Ambush (Air and Non-Air)
Assassination
Incendiary Attack
or Arson
Other
572177 2-77
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'Mass letter bomb mailing.
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INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS DIRECTED
AGAINST US CITIZENS OR PROPERTY'
1968-1976
KIDNAP
B & H
BOMB
ASS'LT
HIJACK'
ASSASS
INCEND
OTHER
TOTAL
Total incidents
137
35
501
119
146
63
103
48
1,152
US citizens or
property victimized
64
5
166
40
30
22
45
19
391
1968
Total incidents
1
0
24
2
6
4
0
0
37
US citizens or
property victimized
1
0
1
0
0
3
0
0
5
1969
Total incidents
3
0
17
5
25
2
2
1
55
US citizens or
property victimized
2
0
9
1
1
1
1
1
16
1970
Total incidents
26
1
17
6
47
6
2
9
114
US citizens or
property victimized
15
0
12
4
16
3
1
5
56
1971
Total incidents
10
1
15
8
14
3
6
6
63
US citizens or
property victimized
4
0
12
4
7
0
5
6
38
1972
Total incidents
11
3
38
6
16
4
3
5
86
US citizens or
property victimized
1
0
18
2
3
0
1
1
26
1973
Total incidents
34
8
81
29
15
12
20
12
211
US citizens or
property victimized
18
/
34
14
0
3
12
2
85
1974
Total incidents
12
9
95
/4
9
8
11
11
179
US citizens or
property victimized
5
1
32
6
2
2
7
2
57
1975
Total incidents
26
9
88
15
5
9
15
1
168
US citizens or
property victimized
13
1
18
6
0
3
6
0
47
1976
Total incidents
14
4
126
24
9
15
44
3
239
US citizens or
property victimized
5
1
30
3
1
7
12
2
61
I. For the most part, incidents in which American citizens or property were victimized by chance have been excluded from these statistics.
Examples from 1976 include the 27 June hijacking of an Air France plane (the Entebbe affair), the II August assault on El Al passengers at
the Isianbul airport, and the 21 September bombing of the former Chilean ambassador to the United States' personal auto.
2. Excludes numerous non-terrorist skyjackings, many of which victimized US aircraft.
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BREAKDOWN OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ATTACKS ON US CITIZENS
OR PROPERTY IN 1976, BY CATEGORY OF TARGET
TARGET NUMBER OF INCIDENTS
US officials (civilian or military) or 7
their property
US installations or property 15
US businessmen 3
US business facilities or commercial 21
aircraft
Foreign employees of US firms 12
US private citizens 3
Total 61
INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS ATTRIBUTED
TO CUBAN EXILE GROUPS
KIDNAP B & H BOMB ASS'LT HIJACK ASSASS INCEND OTHER TOTAL
1968-1975
0
0
34
4
0
1
0
0
39
1976'
0
0
12
3
0
1
0
1
17
1. All but two of these incidents were staged during the second half of the year. The statistics presented exclude a few
cloudy cases, e.g., the Letelier affair in September, in which Cuban exile complicity is strongly suspected.
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FEDAYEEN OR FEDAYEEN-RELATED INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST
INCIDENTS, BY CATEGORY
1968-1975
KIDNAP
B & H
BOMB
ASS'LT
HIJACK
ASSASS
INCEND
OTHER
TOTAL
Total incidents
123
31
375
95
137
48
59
45
913
Fedayeen or
Fedayeen-related
8
18
48
35
19
13
3
15
159
1976
Total incidents
14
4
126
/4
9
15
44
3
239
Fedayeen or
Fedayeen-related
0
3
3
4
/
1
4
0
17
FEDAYEEN OR FEDAYEEN-RELATED INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST
INCIDENTS, BY YEAR
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
TOTAL
Total incidents
37
55
114
63
86
211
179
168
239
1,152
Fedayeen or
3
10
21
10
19
46
33
17
17
176
Fedayeen-related
TARGETS OF FEDAYEEN OR FEDAYEEN-RELATED INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST
INCIDENTS IN 1976, BY NATIONALITY
ARAB: 12 ISRAELI: 2
19
US: 1 OTHER: 2
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