THE POTENTIAL FOR POLTICAL VIOLENCE IN ARGENTINA, ETHIOPIA, AND THAILAND MAY 1975[SANITIZED] - 1975/05/01

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06628556
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: May 1, 1975

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628556
Research Project
The Potential for Political Violence in
Argentina, Ethiopia, and Thailand:
Report on a Quantitative Analytical _Model
Progress Report No. 5
Confi I
SOgidelltrir
May 1975
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CO ENTIAL
Progress Report No. 5 May 1975
The Potential for Political Violence in Argentina, Ethiopia,
and Thailand: Report on a Quantitative Analytical Model
This is the fifth in a series of reports on the testing of an analytical model
of political violence adapted from Ted Robert Gurr's frustration-aggression theory
(Why Men Rebel, Princeton University Press, 1970). The Gun theory is based
on the proposition that political violence is the product of group frustrations
reinforced by the belief that violence is justified and by the capability to turn
the resulting politicized anger into collective aggression. The form of the ensuing
violence�turmoil (riots or demonstrations), insurgency (terrorist acts or small-
scale guerrilla operations), conspiracy ( attempted coups), or internal war ( large-
scale revolutionary actions or civil war)--will depend upon the kinds of relation-
ships which are found to exist among various types of groups in the country under
examination. A complete description of the theory and of the procedures devised
to operationalize it as an analytical tool is contained in an earlier OPR report of
an experimental, ex post facto test of the model in the Chilean situation of mid-
1973 (OPR 502, Revised, November 1974).
The purpose of this second phase of the project is to test the value of the
Gurr model as a technique for assessing the nature and potential for political
violence in societies of varying stages of development and with quite different
cultural heritages and political institutions. The three countries chosen�Argen-
tina, Ethiopia, and Thailand�seem to meet our requirements: Each represents
a different stage of development in a distinct geographic area, and each is con-
fronted with domestic unrest or political conflict.
For each of the three countries, a panel of five CIA analysts assigns numerical
evaluations at regular intervals to the model's key variables�relative deprivation
or collective frustration, belief in the justification for violence, coercive force, and
institutional support. The evaluations are made for each group or "actor"
which, in the panel's judgment, represents a significant political force in the
country. The country's actors are also assessed in terms of their identification with
four basic actor-categories: Pro-regime, mass-oriented (PR-M0); pro-regime,
elite-oriented (PR-E0); anti-regime, mass-oriented (AR-MO); and anti-regime,
elite-oriented (AR-EO). At each point of assessment during the test period, the
panel's evaluations are combined statistically, using computerized procedures
devised in the Office of Political Research, to produce overall evaluations of the
Potential for Political Violence (PPV) and of the conditions conducive to particu-
NOTE: Comments or questions on this project will be welcomed by its author
Office of Political Research,
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lar types of violence in the country under observation. The three panel's evalua-
tions are made on a monthly schedule, and the entire test series is expected to
run until mid-1975.
The summary below presents the principal findings from the sixth set of
assessments made by the country panels in mid-May 1975. The graphs on suc-
ceeding pages displays trends based on the six sets of assessments made to date.
A final progress report, based on mid-June evaluations, will complete the present
test phase. A subsequent wrap-up report will examine trend changes over time
in the panel's scoring patterns, and thus in the model's projections of the po-
tential and form of political violence, compared with actual developments in
each country during the test period.
Summary of Principal Findings
( NOTE: The data cited below and in the following graphs are keyed to
each country's Potential for Political Violence or PPV, as reflected by the
median PPV score of each five-member country panel. The figures should
not be regarded as representing either probabilities or absolute quanti-
ties; they should be interpreted merely as indicating relative status Of
strength, compared to other variables in the model assessed by the same
country panel or to corresponding variables assessed by the other two
country panels.)
General:
1. The country panels' mid-May assessments confirmed the marked shifts in
potential for political violence recorded for the three countries in April. Ethiopia
continued to display the greatest potential, followed closely by Thailand, while
Argentina showed a relatively lower potential.
2. Conditions conducive to particular types of political violence continued
to vary among the three countries. While all three showed tendencies toward
internal war, Thailand displayed an equal tendency toward insurgency and an
even stronger tendency toward turmoil. In Ethiopia, conditions favorable to
conspiracy appeared to equal those favorable to internal war.
3. In all three countries, anti-regime actors were judged to have a greater
potential for political violence than pro-regime actors. In Argentina and Thailand,
anti-regime mass actors seemed to have the largest potential; in Ethiopia anti-
regime elite actors showed the greatest potential.
4. Of the three countries, Ethiopia continued to display the greatest political
frustration, Argentina the least. In all three countries the capability to translate
this frustration into actual political violence remained stable, with Thailand and
Ethiopia displaying somewhat greater capability than Argentina.
5. In the April-May period, the range of variation in assessments decreased
among members of the Ethiopian panel but remained relatively constant among
members of the Argentine and Thai panels. In all three panels, divergencies be-
tween one or two outliers and other panel members were apparent.
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