[SANITIZED]WEEKLY SITUATION REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM DECEMBER 1975 - 1975/12/02

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02630601
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 108
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: December 2, 1975

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Weekly Situation Report
on
International Terrorism
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WEEKLY SITUATION REPORT
CONTENTS
Articles:
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2 December 1975
Argentine Police Discover ERP Report on U.S. Embassy (Page 3)
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Argentine Police Discover ERP Report on U.S. Embassy
On 12 November Argentine police raided a People's Revolu-
tionary Army (ERP) safesite apartment in Buenos Aires, which
had been used by two members of the ERP general staff. The
police confiscated a large quantity of ERP documents, including
a report of some 20 pages inEnglish entitled "The U.S. Embassy
in Argentina." The document was not dated but appeared to have
been written in about April 1974. The report refers to several
U.S. Embassy officials, including the Ambassador. It includes
biographic data on some officers, which appears to come mainly
from the official U.S. diplomatic Biographic Register, and in
some cases attempts to analyze the responsibilities of a par-
ticular officer and the reason for his assignment to Argentina.
The report also analyzes various embassy functions, especially
in the political, labor and intelligence areas. It asserts
that the embassy exists primarily to formulate and implement
policies to complement the efforts of the right, the local
oligarchy and wealthy bourgeoisie, in order to preserve im-
perialist domination and exploitation.
There was no indication in the document as to whether the
ERP had intended to take any sort of action as a result of this
report. Among the U.S. personnel named in the document, how�
ever, was Alfred A. Laun, director of the USIS center in Cor-
doba, who was kidnapped by the ERP on 12 April 1974.
I There has been previous reporting
that the ERP was collecting information on the U.S. Embassy,
and several other plans for terrorist attacks on the emb
and its personnel have been reported.
the ERP believed the U.S. Embassy was supporting tie rgentine
Anti-Communist Alliance, and therefore the ERP planned to
undertake an assassination campaign_a_g_ainst embassy personnel.
/ the ERP was planning to
kidnap a U.S. diplomat and had assembled a list of all U.S.
personnel at the embassy. It is possible that the above docu-
ment was related to these aborted terrorist plans, as well as
the Laun kidnapping. As the ERP apparently compiled the
report well over a year ago and has not undertaken any terrorist
attack against embassy personnel since early 1974, the recent
discovery of the document probably does not indicate any unusual
current danger to U.S. diplomats.
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Weekly Situation Report
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WEEKLY SITUATION REPORT
CONTENTS
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9 December 1975
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TAB A - Chronology of Significant International Terrorist Acts
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CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ACTS
Date:
Place:
8 December 1975
Argentina,
Buenos Aires
Mexican Consulate Bombed
A bomb exploded at the Mexican
Consulate in Buenos Aires on
8 December, causing property
damage. No one was injured.
A caller to the Associated
Press said the bomb was "re-
pudiation against that traitor
Luis Echeverria (Mexican Presi-
dent) who embraced Fidel
Castro." Cuban exiles prob-
ably were responsible for the
bombing. j
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WEEKLY SITUATION REPORT
CONTENTS
Articles:
16 December 1975
Bolivians Arrest ELN Leader and Foil Possible JCR Plot
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Bolivians Arrest Arrest ELN Leader and Foil Possible JCR Plot
In late November or early December, Bolivian authorities
arrested Antonio Peredo, the leader of the Bolivian National
Liberation Army (ELN), in Cochabamba, Bolivia. Arrested along
with Peredo were two Chileans, two Argentinians and a Bolivian.
The terrorists were apprehended after Bolivian authorities
raided three safe houses in Cochabamba. A number of submachine
guns, pistols, and rifles plus a duplicating machine and con-
siderable communist propaganda were also seized.
At an 11 December press conference, Bolivian Minister of
the Interior Juan Pereda announced that the captured terrorists
were all members of a group known as the Revolutionary Workers
Party of Bolivia (PTR-B), which operated under the aegis of the
Revolutionary Coordinating Junta (JCR). The PTR-B was formed
at a mid-summer meeting in Lima, Peru, which was attended by
representatives of the Argentine People's Revolutionary Army
(ERP), the Bolivian ELN, and the Chilean Movement of the
Revolutionary Left (MIR)--all members of the JCR, plus repre-
sentatives of the Argentine Revolutionary Workers Party (PRT)
and the Peruvian Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN).
Pereda said the objective of the meeting was to coordinate
revolutionary activities in the Southern Hemisphere and to
form a mass party which would appeal to the working classes.
Pereda further stated that the PTR-B was planning to carry
out strikes, sabotage, terrorism and other subversive acts and
had organized cells in various industrial and mining areas
around Cochabamba. The group planned to destabilize the Boliv-
ian government by creating a lack of confidence in the govern-
ment among the workers. Pereda also said the group carried
false documents which originated, in part, from an unspecified
organization in Paris.
There is little doubt that the PTR-B was a bona fide
terrorist group. There is a good possibility that the PTR-B
was operating with the support and guidance of the JCR. There
is documentary evidence that the JCR has close contacts with
Peruvian leftists, specifically the Peruvian Movement of the
Revolutionary Left (MIR), and that JCR representatives visit
Lima from time to time. The Peruvian FALN was a guerrilla
group which was active during the middle and late 1960's but
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was presumed to be moribund since that time. The JCR also is
in contact with the Venezuelan FALN, which could cause con-
siderable confusion in terminology. There has been no previous
reporting on a JCR meeting in Lima; however, the JCR is be-
lieved to hold meetings in various Latin American cities. The
actions and goals of the PTR-B are not inconsistent with pre-
viously known JCR goals. In the tangled web of Latin American
revolutionary politics, however, there are other groups such
as the Trotskyist Fourth International which have similar aims
and use similar methods. Thus the driving force behind the
PTR-B will not be known until further information is received.
American officials on the scene do not have any evidence
that the PTR-B had widespread support or even sympathetic con-
tacts in the Cochabamba area and feel that the Minister of the
Interior may have been exaggerating the threat for political
reasons. They also feel that the details of ,ithe supposed cells
in the mining and manufacturing areas were vague, which sug-
gests that they were only in the planning stage when the group
was wrapped up.
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Weekly Situation Report
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WEEKLY SITUATION REPORT
CONTENTS
3.5(c)
22 December 1975
Background Article:
The JCR: Is Latin American Terrorism Going Transcontinental?
(Page 11)
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BACKGROUND ARTICLE
The JCR: Is Latin American Terrorism Going Transcontinental?
The Revolutionary Coordinating Junta (JCR) was formed in
November 1972 by representatives of the Argentine People's
Revolutionary Army (ERP), the Chilean Movement of the Revolu-
tionary Left (MIR), and the Uruguayan Tupamaros. The organiza-
tion was finally formalized on 13 February 1974, when the above
three components plus the Bolivian National Liberation Army
(ELN) issued a joint communique proclaiming that the JCR would
form a central operational command over all the Latin American
liberation movements, composed of representatives of the various
member organizations. This command would coordinate guerrilla
actions, logistics and financing at a continental level. On 20
February the JCR declared war on the government of Juan Peron
and announced that it would "struggle against the allies of
imperialism and establish a nationalist third position rejecting
United States and Soviet imperialism."
The JCR remained an enigma until the spring of 1975 when
Argentine authorities began uncovering evidence of its activi-
ties. It began making public statements in Europe, and documen-
tary evidence concerning previously unknown JCR activities was
obtained through the arrest of two JCR couriers in Paraguay.
These documents revealed that JCR activities had spread far
beyond the cone of South America and that the organization
maintained contact with a large number of Latin American terrorist
groups and had established offices in Europe. Since that time,
other information has come to light through various sources
which indicates that the scope of JCR activities was much
greater than previously suspected.
The single dominating force in the JCR is the ERP. Using
the millions of dollars obtained from four years of terrorist
activity, the ERP has made itself the driving force behind the
JCR, and all other member organizations have taken subordinate
positions.
The JCR has been moving to expand its membership and con-
tacts among Latin American terrorist groups. On 17 March 1975
it announced that the Paraguayan National Liberation Front
(FREPALINA) had been admitted to the JCR. The JCR is known to
have contact with the Venezuelan Armed Forces of National
Liberation (FALN); the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the
pro-Soviet Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC); and
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the Peruvian Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) and
Revolutionary Vanguard (VR)', as well as groups in the Dominican
Republic, Guatemala, El Salvador and Ecuador. These contacts
range anywhere from the exchange of letters to attendance at
JCR-sponsored conferences, visits by JCR delegations, and
training at JCR camps. The details of most of these contacts
are still cloudy, and the extent to which each group is aligned
with the JCR has not yet been fully determined. "
JCR activities in Europe also have been much more exten-
sive than previously believed. The JCR has or has had offices
in Paris, Lisbon and Geneva, plus contacts in Italy and Sweden.
It is believed that the JCR may be in contact with certain
European extremist organizations, but the detail's of these
contacts are unknown. It now appears that the J"CR may be con-
centrating its European forces in Lisbon.
As far as is known, the JCR itself has never claimed
responsibility for a terrorist act. Rather, it has concen-
trated its activities in four main areas--funding, propaganda,
operational support and training.
a. Funding: Money is the glue that hclds the JCR
together and makes it a viable force. AccOrding to one
source, 70 per cent of all money collected by member
organizations goes to the JCR. It is belived that the
ERP obtained over US $30 million in ransom and extortion
money in recent years. Just how much of this money the
JCR has and funnels back into member and other organi-
zations is not known. Concrete evidence that the JCR is
supporting at least one of its member organizations was
found in captured JCR documents. According to these
documents the ERP sent the Chilean MIR US 300,000 in
September 1974, and followed this payment � ith monthly
contributions of US $60,000. It is believed these con-
tributions were kept up at least until the spring of 1975.
These same documents stated that the Chilean MIR had
received between US $1.5 million and US $25 million
and that US $4 million was earmarked for the purchase
of arms in the United States.
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b. Propaganda: Ever since its founding the JCR has
been attempting to set up a propaganda mec:aanism. Its
Paris office was responsible for the creation of a JCR
press agency, the Agencia de Prensa America Latina
(APAL), in December 1974. APAL published 4 magazine,
Boletin APAL, some 20 editions of which were distributed
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in France, Italy and Argentina. There have also been
proposals to distribute Boletin APAL in other European
countries, the U.S., Mexico and Venezuela. The JCR has
also made a propaganda movie to be used in fund-raising
activities and has joined with the Group of Solidarity
with the People in Argentina, which is active in the
Bertrand Russell Tribunal. The JCR made covert contact
in Geneva with representatives of several international
organizations dealing with human rights and political
refugees, to inspire them to conduct an investigation
of human rights in Argentina, and covertly financed the
travel to Argentina of two members of the International
Commission of Jurists.
c. Operational Support: The JCR has provided ex-
tensive operational support to member groups. The JCR
has assisted the MIR in establishing bases along the
Chilean border from which MIR cadre can operate, and
safesites, border-crossing points and logistical support
bases also have been provided. The JCR also furnishes
weapons and ammunition to member groups. In June 1974
Argentine police uncovered a cache of weapons which was
supplying Tupamaros infiltrating back into Uruguay. The
cache contained at least 250 submachine guns, ten 357-
magnum revolvers, and an unknown quantity of handgrenades
and shotguns. In April 1975, Argentine authorities
raided a JCR weapons factory which manufactured the or-
ganization's own submachine guns, the JCR model 1. The
JCR also provides travel documentation to member groups.
d. Training: The JCR has provided both political
and guerrilla training to individuals belonging to both
member groups and nonmember groups. Training has con-
sisted of political indoctrination as well as guerrilla
techniques. One training camp established by the JCR
was located on a tobacco plantation between Salta and
Jujuy in Argentina. The camp included complete training
facilities plus a clandestine airstrip for the trans-
portation of some of the trainees. Individuals being
trained at the camp included members of all of the groups
belonging to the JCR plus two members of the Colombian
FARC.
The extent of Cuba's involvement in the JCR is not known.
There have been reports that the JCR was organized at the
behest of the Cubans. Many of the individuals belonging to the
JCR were trained in Cuba, and JCR representatives travel
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regularly to and from Cuba. On the other hand, 'JCR repre-
sentatives meeting in March 1975 in Portugal all. subscribed to
the Pact of Lisbon, part of which stated that Cuba should no
longer serve as the only model or source of support for revolu-
tionary activity in Latin America and that the direct responsi-
bility for the development and progress of the Latin American
revolutionary movement lies with each individual revolutionary
organization. Whether this statement is so much propaganda
window dressing to �hide Cuban involvement in the JCR, or whether
the JCR has shut out the Cubans isnot known.
The extent of the threat posed by the JCR iS difficult to
gauge. Although more is known about the JCR now than in the
past, many areas of JCR activity are still nebulous. A
concerted effort is being made to find out more about this
organization. From what is known so far, however, it is safe
to conclude that the JCR could become one of the most active
and dangerous forces in international terrorism. It is evident
now that the JCR is fairly well organized and its members are
well trained. Most importantly, the JCR has money and exten-
sive contacts.
The JCR has weaknesses too. It has not yet enjoyed any
conspicuous successes outside Argentina despite vast amounts of
money and technical assistance. Secondly, because it is so
dominated by the ERP, the JCR will, in all probability, fold up
if the ERP goes under. Although the Argentine authorities have
enjoyed some success against the ERP in recent months, the
effect of this suppression on the ERP structure and the JCR
cannot be judged at present.
There are three possible routes that the JCR could take
during the next few years. First of all, it could continue
expanding its contacts and giving aid and comfort to terrorist
groups all over Latin America. This would tend to stabilize
rather unstable groups and make them more effective. Secondly,
it could contract its forces and concentrate on its primary
enemies--governments in the cone of South America--thus cutting
the risk of spreading itself too thin. Finally, it could take
the Palestinian road, and escalate its activities into a world-
wide campaign of terror against its enemies. As it is pres-
ently organized, the JCR is capable of all three options or
combinations of the three. Although the first two options seem
the most likely, it is conceivable that circumstances could
drive the JCR leaders to feel that the third is the only option
they could take. As it is currently constituted, the JCR could
carry out a very effective international terrorist campaign,
particularly if it obtained the support of other terrorist
groups outside Latin America.
14
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TAB A�Chronology of Significant
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