THE POTENTIAL FOR POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN ARGENTINA, ETHIOPIA, AND THAILAND JANUARY 1975[SANITIZED] - 1975/01/01

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06628557
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: January 1, 1975

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Research Project
The Potential for Political Violence in
Argentina, Ethiopia, and Thailand:
A Progress Report on a Quantitative Analytical Model
ential
Conti !tag
January 1975
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3.5(c)
3.5(c)
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CO NTIAL
Progress Roport No. 1 January 1975
The Potential for Political Violence in Argentina, Ethiopia, and
Thailand: A Progress Report on a Quantitative Analytical Model
In this report we present the initial results of a series of tests of an analytical
model of political violence adapted from Ted Robert Gurr's frustration-aggression
theory (Why Men Rebel, Princeton University Press, 1970). The Gurr theory is
based on the proposition that political violence is the product of group frustrations
reinforced by the belief that violence is justified and by the capability to turn the
resulting politicized anger into collective aggression. The form of the ensuing
violence�turmoil ( riots or demonstrations), insurgency ( terrorist acts or small-
scale guerrilla operations), conspiracy ( attempted coups), or internal war (large-
scale revolutionary actions or civil war)�will depend upon the kinds of relation-
ships which are found to exist among various types of groups in the country under
examination. A complete description of the theory and of the procedures used to
apply the model is contained in the attached report of an experimental, ex post
facto test of the model in the Chilean situation of mid-1973 (OPR 502, Revised,
November 1974).
The purpose of this .second phase of the project is to test the value of the
Gurr model as a technique for assessing the nature and potential for political
violence in societies of varying stages of development and with quite different
cultural heritages and political institutions. The three countries chosen�Argen-
tina, Ethiopia, and Thailand�seem to meet our requirements: Each represents
a different stage of development in a distinct geographic area, and each is con-
fronted with growing domestic unrest or political conflict.
For each of the three countries, a panel of five CIA analysts assigns numerical
evaluations at regular intervals to the model's-key variables�relative deprivation
or collective frustration, belief in the justification for violence, coercive force, and
institutionalized support. The evaluations are made for each group or "actor"
which, in the panel's judgment, represents a significant political force in the
country. The country's actors are also assessed in terms of their identification with
four basic actor-categories: Pro-regime, mass-oriented (PR-M0); pro-regime,
elite-oriented (PR-E0); anti-regime, mass-oriented (AR-M0); and anti-regime,
elite-oriented (AR-EO). At each point of assessment during the test period, the
panel's evaluations are combined statistically, using computerized procedures
devised in the Office of Political Research, to produce overall evaluations of the
Potential for Political Violence (PPV) and of the conditions conducive to par-
ticular types of violence in the country under observation. The three panels' eval-
uations are made on a monthly schedule, and the entire test series is expected to
run until mid-1975.
NOTE: Comments or questions on this project will be welcomed by its author,
Office of Political Research, code 143, ext. 4091.
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C9b1R11 tr�AL
The summary and graphs on the following pages present the principal find-
ings from the first two assessments by the country panels. The first assessment
was made at different times by the three panels in the period from late November
through December 1974; the second assessment was made by all three panels at
the same time in mid-January 1975. Subsequent monthly progress reports, based
on evaluations made around the mid-point of each month, will indicate changes
over time in the panels' scoring patterns. In this way, the model's projections of
the potential and form of political violence can be tested against actual develop-
ments in each country during the test period.
Summary of Principal Findings
(NOTE: The data cited below and in the following graphs are keyed to
each country's Potential for Political Violence or PPV, as reflected by the
median PPV score of each five-member country panel. The figures should
not be regarded as representing absolute quantities; they should be In-
terpreted merely as indicating relative status or strength, compared to
other variables in the model assessed by the same country panel or to
corresponding variables assessed by the other two country panels.)
Argentina:
Of the three countries, Argentina was the only one to show a rise in potential
for political violence during the initial test period ( a relatively sharp jump to a
PPV score of 52). Within the limits of that expanded potential, conditions in
Argentina were judged to be most conducive to turmoil (17), somewhat less to
insurgency (15) and internal war (12), and least to conspiracy or an attempted
coup (8). The potential for both conspiracy and internal war, appeared, however,
to have grown during the period. Each of the four actor groups contributed in
roughly equal proportion to the rise in PPV ( ending at a low of 10 for pro-regime,
mass actors to a high of 16 for pro-regime, elite actors). Most of the increased
potential for violence was attributable to a rise in politicized frustration ( a sharp
jump to 34), with little apparent increase in either the coercive force (8) or
institutional support ( 10) needed to channel that frustration into violent action.
Despite the sharp rise in potential for violence, at the end of the test period
Argentina still ranked at an intermediate level between Ethiopia and Thailand
in both politicized frustration and total PPV. Of the three country panels, that
for Argentina showed the least variation among its members (range of 20 around
the median PPV score of 52).
Ethiopia:
Though its potential for political violence appeared to decrease somewhat
during the period, Ethiopia still ranked highest of the three countries in PPV
( score of 62). Within the limits of that potential, the pattern of ,conditions con-
ducive to particular types of violence in Ethiopia remained relatively unchanged
during the period; conditions were most favorable to internal war (19) and
conspiracy (18), less to insurgency (14), and least to turmoil (11). Anti-regime,
elite actors had considerably more potential for violence (28) than the other three
types of actors (16, 11, and 7). Both pro-regime, elite actors and pro-regime, mass
actors showed a decrease in PPV during the period (down to 11 and 7 respec-
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...cgiNF16�1TIAL
tively). Though declining somewhat during the period, politicized frustration
remained higher in-Ethiopia (42) than in either Argentina (34) or Thailand (28).
The coercive force and institutional support required to fuel the frustration into
violence remained at a relatively low level (both 10), however, paralleling that
in Argentina (8 and 10) and Thailand (9 and 10). Variation among members
of the Ethiopian panel increased sharply during the period (to a range of 43
around the median PPV score of 62). This was roughly twice the variation found
in the other two country panels.
Thailand:
Like Ethiopia, Thailand showed a small decrease in potential for violence
during the period ( a slight dip in PPV to 47). Within limits defined by that po-
tential, conditions in Thailand appeared considerably more conducive to turmoil
(17) and insurgency (16) than to either internal war (9) or conspiracy (5). The
degree to which the conditions were fulfilled for internal war and conspiracy
grew during the period, however, while the degree to which the conditions were
fulfilled for turmoil and insurgency declined. Pro-regime, elite actors and anti-
regime, mass actors had roughly equal PPV (15 and 14 respectively); while pro-
regime, mass actors and anti-regime, elite actors had somewhat less PPV (both
9). The only significant change in actors' potential for violence during the period
was the relatively sharp gain in PPV (to 9) for anti-regime, elite actors. Politicized
frustration in Thailand was judged to be lower (28) than in either Argentina or
Ethiopia, while the capability to wage violence (9 for coercive force, 10 for in-
stitutionalized support) approximated that in the other two countries. Variation
among members of the Thai panel narrowed significantly from the first to the
second assessment (down to a range of 23 around the median PPV score of 47).
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CONEbENTIAL
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PPV
100
ea
0
Dec 74
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Conditions Conducive to Particular Types of Political Violence
ARGENTINA
52
,7
A
I 15
_
m 12
Jan 75
Feb
Mar
Apr
,
$2
,
-----------
�- -,' ,-,..--z.
1'i
114
c 18
.-
IVi 19
20
0
Dec 74
Jan. 75
Feb
Mar
Apr
ay JU
THAILAND
47
-
.a
Ti?
1 1-6
$$ 9
'
an 75 �
Feb
Mar
Apr
Shaded areas represent, within the limits of each country's potential
for political violence (PPV), the degree to which that country panel's
median scores on key variables fulfill the conditions hypothesized by
the Gurr theory as conducive to each type of political violence.
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T- Turmoil
I - Insurgency
C- Conspiracy
IW- Internal War
565087 1-75 CIA
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The Potential for Political Violence (PPV) for
52
PR-610 10
tz,
PR-E0 16
'
AR-MO 15
AR-E0 11
,,,...._,.,z,..-.,A----,.,e,....%v.-
7i-14.-,t7..�----r.,,,,-'7"--,.,.-,..
7,:;;.1410:VO
PR-MO 7
PR-E0 11
AR-MO 16
RAI;60, .
,.
.
AR-E0 28
, .
PR-60 15
,
' -
AR-M0�14
AR-E0 9
.Sharlerl areakrepresent each country
panel's median scores for PPli, for
each actor ,catapory. ."
PR -MO -Pro-fieoirne Mass-Oriented Actors
PR -ED- Pro-Regime, Elite-Oriented Actors
AR-MO-Anti-Regime, Mass-Oriented Actors
AR-E07 Anti-Regime, ACtiirk:
, . ,
5
CONFIDP4TIAL
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The Potential for Political Violence (PPV) in Terms of Key Variables in the Guff Model
PPV
ARGENTINA �
100
so
� so
40
52
IS 10
CF 8
PF 34
Mar ,
:
62
IS 10 :
CF 10 �
.
.,
,
PF 42
".,'
I
Feb Mer Apr
May Jun
THAILAND
. .
,
47
IS in
VOZWALX:'
CF 9
KrfaVIVM
Dec 74 Jan 75 Feb Mar
Apr -
. . , . . .
,
'" �-�
May Jun
Shaded areas .reprosentlums.:.of:eaeh� country :i �:...IS institutional Support::: � ,
panels CoerciveForce�
� .�..., _ �..
all atur
.categories.�. .:� , �PF Politicized Frustration
f. ���, 0. 1.3PriYat!P! X
� ..�� . � ."... � .� �-� � .:'�:� � .�
.� �
CO7NF NTIAL
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CON TIAL
Individual Analysts' Assessments of the Potential for Political Violence (PPV)
ARGENTINA
uu
eo
BO
Ui
20
0
Dec 74
PPV
1
Jan 75
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun
ETHIOPIA
LIU
,,,,,, �
86
40
20
0
�.......67
....
�
50
43
Dec 74
PPV
1
Jan 75
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun
THAILAND
Ull
80
.....
60
66"4,,,,
.
56
2 ai'6"""m'wor.
52
40
-
47
�
Thu�
37
33
20
0
Dec 74
Jan 75
Feb
Colored lines represent the range of individual
analysts' scores for PPV around each country
panel's median score for PPV.
Mar
7
Apr
May
Jun
Analyst-A
Analyst-B
� � � Analyst-C
Analyst-D
Analyst-E
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