LATIN AMERICA REVIEW 21 DECEMBER 1984[SANITIZED] - 1984/12/21

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05509061
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: December 21, 1984

Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509061--
MASTER FILE COPY
DO NOT GIVE OUT
OR MARK ON
Directorate of
Intelligence
A
_Ser
3.5(c)
ALA LAR 84-023
21 December 1984
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509061
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509061
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509061
3.5(c)
A
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509061
Latin America
Review
21 December 1984
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
--Srerr-
Page
Articles Argentina: Prospects for Leftist Terrorism
3.5(c)
NR
3.5(c)
We foresee little chance of a serious terrorist movement emerging
over the next six months, but growing social, economic, and political
pressures could ignite leftwing violence at a later date.
1
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509061
Se.CX4t--
ALA LAR 84-023
21 December 1984
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509061
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509061
NR
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509061
Articles
...Setirer
Argentina: Prospects for
Leftist Terrorism
3.5(c)
The recent extradition from Brazil to Buenos Aires of
Montonero terrorist leader Mario Firmenich has
again focused public attention on the danger of a
resurgence of leftist terrorism in Argentina.
Terrorism by the left has been a persistent source of
political instability in Argentina and has played a
central role in undermining the authority of both
military and civilian regimes. President Alfonsin's
response to the first inklings of terrorist
reorganization shows, in our view, that he understands
the gravity of the threat. 3.5(c)
We foresee little chance of a serious terrorist
movement emerging over the next six months.
Nevertheless, the political scene is volatile and the
Alfonsin government may not be able to contain the
social, economic, and political pressures that could
ignite leftwing violence at a later date.
Return of the Montoneros
The Montoneros, who first emerged in the late 1960s,
have long sought to convert Peronism into a
movement of the revolutionary left. After Juan
Peron's death in 1974, the Montoneros clashed openly
with the Peronist party's conservative leadership and
were expelled from the movement by his widow and
successor, Isabel. The Montoneros continued to
struggle for what they termed "authentic Peronism,"
becoming one of South America's largest, wealthiest,
and most deadly terrorist groups. Nevertheless, they
were crushed after the military coup of 1976. The few
Montoneros who were not killed or captured by the
armed forces were forced into exile, where they
launched a largely ineffectual propaganda campaign
against the military. In November 1983
1
Exiled Montonero at a press
conference: the movement's military
ethos endures.
3.5(c)
there were
approximately 300 Montoneros in the country and
some 500 abroad, although we believe these ficiiires
were somewhat inflated. 3.5(c)
Cam/,,o�
numerous Montoneros returned to Argentina in the
months following the election in October 1983 of the
new civilian government. Any expected lenience from
the authorities, however, did not materialize.
Alfonsin, who personally abhors terrorism and needs
to hold the left accountable for its crimes if he is to
3.3(b)(1)
ALA LAR 84-023
21 December 1984
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509061
3.5(c)
3.3(b)(1)
3.3(b)(1)
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509061
successfully prosecute the military for its excesses
during the antiterrorist campaigns of the late 1970s,
took a tough stance regarding the Montoneros. Two
top Montonero leaders, Ricardo Obregon and Oscar
Bidegain, were arrested soon after returning to
Buenos Aires in December 1983, and Firmenich has
remained in custody since his extradition from Brazil
in October 1984. Moreover, public statements by
government officials indicate that Alfonsin�despite
cutbacks in military spending�intends to preserve
the military's ability to monitor terrorist capabilities.
3.5(c)
Internal Divisions
These arrests, in our view, dealt a severe blow to the
Montonero movement and have hindered its efforts at
reorganization. With their most experienced leaders
in prison or in hiding, the Montoneros' once solid
chain of command has broken down.
two basic currents have emerged: a
relatively moderate majority faction loyal to
Firmenich, and more violence-prone groups whose
leadership is unclear.
3.3(b)(1)
The Firmenich faction has publicly abjured violence,
asserting that the Montoneros will now concentrate on
electoral politics. Before his arrest, Ricardo Obregon
announced the Montoneros' dissolution as an armed
force and their reconstitution as the Authentic
Peronist Party.
return to armed struggle under more favorable
circumstances. The Montoneros have pledged in the
past to work for peaceful change, but they quickly
reverted to violence when conditions shifted.
Furthermore, members
of the group are rearming and continue to train in
terrorist tactics and guerrilla warfare. Recent public
statements by Roberto Perdia and Fernando Vaca
the top Montonero leaders not in prison have hinted
at a resumption of violence if Alfonsin continues to
"persecute" the movement. 3.5(c)
The immediate danger, however, stems from those
Montoneros who question the leadership's cautious
stance. Although not formally structured into an anti-
Firmenich group and divided among themselves, these
Montoneros doubt that they can ever dominate
Peronism and are eager to resume violence. According
some radical
eady to initiate
3.5(c)
nstead of forming an independent
party, the Montoneros have attempted to infiltrate the
regular Peronist movement's radical left wing, the
Peronist Intransigence and Mobilization (IMP)
faction. The IMP is headed by Peronist Senator
Vicente Saadi, a well-known Montonero sympathizer
whose newspaper, La Voz, was formerly subsidized by
Montonero ransom money,
We believe that the Montoneros'
current goal is to gain full control of the IMP and use
it to turn the entire Peronist movement toward the
revolutionary left. The Montoneros are supplementing
this strategy by infiltrating Peronist-controlled trade
unions and rural cooperatives 3.5(c)
3.3(b)(1)
We believe that the Firmenich faction's rejection of
violence is a tactical maneuver and that it would
refIr
Montoneros believe they are almost
limited armed operations.
Reorganization of the ERP
Argentina's other significant leftist terrorist group is
the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP). In contrast
to the vague populism espoused by the Montoneros,
the ERP is rooted in Trotskyite Marxism-Leninism
and has drawn inspiration more from Castro and Mao
than Peron. Emerging concurrently with the
Montoneros, the ERP was smaller and was
concentrated in Argentina's interior provinces, where
it conducted sporadic rural guerrilla warfare until the
late 1970s. Like the Montoneros, the group was
ravaged by the military's post-1976 crackdown.
ERP lost 85 percent of its cadre and close to 95
percent of its weapons, safehouses, and vehicles
during that period.
2
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509061
3.5(c)
the
3.3(b)(1)
3.3(b)(1)
3.3(b)(1)
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509061
S;e6t
Enrique Gorriaran Merlo
An Argentine of Basque origin, Enrique Gorriaran,
about 42, is the ranking leader of the People's
Revolutionary Army (ERP). A founder of the ERP in
1970, Gorriaran was arrested one year later and
imprisoned in southern Argentina. In 1972 he escaped
to Cuba, returning to Argentina the following year to
participate in the ERP's rural guerrilla campaign.
US diplomats report that, by the late 1970s,
Gorriaran led the ERP's military wing, which
attacked businessmen and labor leaders and
assassinated police and military personnel. Hefted
the country following the 1976 military coup and
resurfaced in Nicaragua, .fighting alongside the
Sandinistas. Gorriaran led the hit team that
assassinated former Nicaraguan ruler Somoza in
Paraguay in 1980
Managua.
Re currently lives In
3.5(c)
Mario Eduardo Firmenich
Mario Firmenich, 36, is on trial in Buenos Aires for
kidnaping and homicide. A founder of the
Montoneros, Firmenich gained notoriety in the early
1970s for his involvement in two bold terrorist acts:
the kidnap/murder of former Argentine President
Pedro Aramburu and the kidnaping of two Argentine
businessmen, which resulted in a record $60 million
ransom. After the 1976 military crackdown, he
moved abroad and tried to mobilize support for the
Montoneros in Latin America and Western Europe.
3.3(b)(1)
3
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509061
�..,,StfCret
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509061
Press reports indicate that remnants of the ERP
probably no more than 100 persons�returned to
Argentina in the wake of Alfonsin's election. As with
the Montoneros, the group split into moderate and
radical sectors. Unlike the Montoneros, however, the
ERP appears to be fairly cohesive and well organized,
with orders issued by exiled leaders in Managua,
Nicaragua.
3.3(b)(1) 3.5(c)
These leaders�chief of whom is Enrique Gorriaran�
evidently believe that the moment is not ripe for the
resumption of armed struggle in Argentina.
the
exiled ERP chiefs have justified their failure to return
home by alleging that Alfonsin wants to arrest them
to complement the Montoneros already imprisoned.
Gorriaran pledged at a press conference in Managua
earlier this year that, for the time being, ERP
members in Argentina �01 violence only in self-
defense. 3.5(c)
the ERP is seeking to
expand its political base by infiltrating the small but
influential far left Intransigent Party (PI). The ERP
has chosen the PI because the two groups are
ideologically compatible and,
because the ERP wants to
avoid competing with Montonero penetration of the
Peronists. The ERP has also been active in a handful
of leftist labor unions and some of Argentina's human
rights organizations. Its overall success in these
efforts is unclear, but
penetration of the Intransigents
has been extensive and that many ERP members hold
3.3(b)(1 important PI leadership posts. 3.5(c)
rMte�shal-e the judgment
that the ERP's long-term goal is to return to
armed struggle. In the meantime, however, the
group's more moderate sector has effectively reigned
in unruly elements who want to initiate violence
immediately.
exiled leaders recently denied
permission for an ERP cell to recover an arms cache
in Argentina dating from the late 1970s. While
reassuring as to the movement's short-term intentions,
3.3(b)(1)
this may indicate that the ERP has at least a
rudimentary capability to undertake terrorism if and
when it abandons its current policy of relying solely
on political infiltration.
3.5(c)
ERP-Montonero Contacts
One of the more disquieting developments is a trend
towqrd ERP-Montonero cooperation; the two
movements recently have set aside longstanding
ideological disputes and have begun to work together.
An ERP-Montonero meeting was held in Cordoba
Province in April 1984, according to press reports,
and
Gorriaran and Perdia met in July to discuss the
possibility of rescuing Firmenich
the two groups
have agreed to cooperate in order to infiltrate labor
unions. The political organizations with which the
Montoneros and the ERP are linked have also been
moving closer together:
the IMP and the PI are trying to coordinate efforts to
politicize and manipulate several human rights
groups.
3.5(c)
Foreign Support
Although ERP-Montonero collaboration may ease
logistic barriers�such as lack of sufficient weapons
and funds to a resumption of terrorism, in our view,
the radical left would require considerable foreign
support to mount a serious threat to Argentine
democracy. At present, prospects for such aid are
dim: 3.3(b)(1)
� The PLO, which previously trained and funded the
Montoneros, refused appeals for renewed aid in
mid-1983,
� Mexican officials are terminating safehaven
arrangements and government jobs they formerly
provided for exiled Montoneros,
� The Cubans,
want to ingratiate themselves with Alfonsin and will
therefore use their considerable influence over the
cret 4
3.3(b)(1)
3.3(b)(1)
3.3(b)(1)
3.3(b)(1)
3.3(b)(1)
3.3(b)(1)
3.3(b)(1)
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509061
3.3(b)(1)
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509061
3.3(b)(1)
Montoneros to discourage terrorist acts.
the ERP may be similarly
constrained by the Cubans.
Remaining ERP and Montonero contacts with the
Sandinistas, Chilean M IR, and the remnants of the
Uruguayan Tupamaros are highly unlikely to
compensate for the lack of substantial Cuban and
East Bloc backing.
3.5(c)
Outlook
We believe that the ERP and the Montoneros will
concentrate on political activity over the medium
term. Both groups recognize that, in the wake of the
terrorist bloodletting and military repression of the
1970s, there is scant popular support in Argentina for
political violence. And the Alfonsin government's
arrest and prosecution of Montonero leaders has sent
a clear message to the left that a return to terrorism
will bring swift retribution. 3.5(c)
The Montoneros will not, in our view, succeed in
wresting control of the Peronist movement from the
center right. Senator Saadi and the IMP faction have
recently suffered a series of setbacks and appear to be
losing status within the party. At best, the
Montoneros can hope to retain a voice on the Peronist
left via the IMP or, if the movement splits, dominate a
small independent radical Peronist faction. The ERP
has slightly better prospects for expanding its political
influence through the Intransigent Party. The PI did
well in recent student elections, and polls show that it
could become a vehicle for the expression of leftist
discontent with Alfonsin. The party, however, lacks a
national structure and following, and its radical
ideology has historically precluded it from attracting
more than 5 to 10 percent of the electorate
Although leaders of both the ERP and the
Montoneros are likely to be preoccupied with political
machinations over the coming months, violence by
dissident elements of both organizations cannot be
discounted. This is especially true in the case of the
Montoneros, where discipline appears to be weakest.
We believe that the Montoneros' radical fringe does
have some capability to conduct kidnapings and
assassinations. Such actions could be triggered by
5
further arrests of terrorist leaders, a harsh verdict in
the trial of Firmenich, or provocations by rightwing
terrorists. But we also believe that, under present
circumstances, isolated acts of leftist violence can be
effectively contained by the security forces.
Over the long run, however, there is a danger that the
radical left could resume full-scale terrorism.
Argentina's new democracy remains fragile and has
not yet been fully tested. Severe and prolonged
economic pressures, or a power vacuum stemming
from the assassination or incapacitation of Alfonsin,
could jeopardize political stability. Such a scenario
would probably include militant labor unrest,
widespread social disorder, and a growing disaffection
with democratic institutions on both the right and the
left. Under these conditions the ERP and the
Montoneros might be tempted to take up arms once
again. The press reports that rightwing terrorists are
also reorganizing and were responsible for several
recent bombings of leftist and government targets;
further attacks could spur a response from the radical
left. The consequences of such developments are
uncertain, but the stage would then be set for
escalating left-right violence, growing political
polarization, and a possible reentry by the military
into the political system. 3.5(c)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509061
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509061
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509061
NR
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509061
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509061
NR
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509061
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509061
NR
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509061
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509061
NR
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509061
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509061
NR
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509061
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509061
NR
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509061
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509061
NR
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509061
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509061
NR
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509061
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509061
NR
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509061
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509061
NR
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509061
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509061
NR
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509061
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509061
NR
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509061
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509061
NR
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509061
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509061
NR
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509061
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509061
NR
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509061
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509061
NR
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509061
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509061
NR
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509061
NR
' Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509061
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509061
NR
' Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509061
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509061
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509061
NR
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509061
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509061
NR