NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY MONDAY JANUARY 31, 1977[SANITIZED] - 1977/01/31

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03008332
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: January 31, 1977

MONDAY JANUARY 31,1977
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The
National Intelligence
_AaaP-sec-FrET
3.5(c)
Published by the Director of Central Intelligence for Named Principals Only
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VOLUME 4, NUMBER 024
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TOP-SECRET
THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY
3.5(c)
MONDAY JANUARY 31, 1977 3
c)
Argentina: Junta Changes Debated 35
Argentines in and out of government
are actively debating the question of
whether the structure of national authori-
ty should be altered; a number of substan-
tive points on the matter have been raised
in the press.
To a large extent, the debate mirrors
the irrepressible tendency of the highly
politicized Argentines to have their say
despite government bans on political ac-
tivity and discussion. There is, however,
genuine concern that power should be
wielded differently in succeeding phases of
the "revolution." In addition, some see in
the debate a chance to influence events in
their own favor.
The politics of Argentina, where formal
institutions even in normal circumstances
play only a secondary role, are generally
played out in behind-the-scenes fashion.
Thus the debate is far from an irrelevant
exercise, despite its lack of official sanc-
tion. Many participants are military men
or have contact with influential officers.
Virtually all the current speculation
presupposes the continuing existence of
the three-man military junta, but it seems
a foregone conclusion to most Argentines
that the formal power structure will even-
tually be modified. Debate centers on
whether the presidency should continue to
be held by a member of the junta or
should go to a fourth man.
Many believe that the current structure,
which has worked well during the initial
crisis and consolidation of the military's
authority, does not give the presidency the
necessary power to direct longer term
policies and plans. Indeed, some commen-
tators have opined that leaving the
presidency within the junta actually
worsens the potential for crippling in-
terservice rivalries.
The particular facets of this administra-
tion that are causing concern are its
perceived lack of dynamism�at times
outright clumsiness�and President
Videla's mild, some say indecisive,
manner. To many, the junta seems to have
"run out of steam." There has been no
General Diaz Bessone
resolution of the most pressing political
problem, the uncertain status of the
powerful labor movement, despite fre-
quent announcements that a new
regulating law s about to be presented.
Moreover, the statements of cabinet
members have sometimes contradicted
those of other top officials or have been at
variance with subsequent policy. Hun-
dreds of complicated, confusing directives
are still being sorted out and interpreted.
Because he eschews personal power and
has advocated a relatively moderate line,
President Videla seems to many inade-
quate to the task of bringing order to this
situation. The conciliatory approach he
believes is necessary to bring badly
divided Argentines together is viewed as
weakness by his detractors.
All Argentine political sectors have a
strong interest in the outcome of the de-
bate, and politicians, journalists, union-
ists and others are probably joining in
as much to test and challenge the regime
as to express real concern. The unions in
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particular see an opportunity to con-
tribute to a weakening of the junta's
power. Labor leaders, more than any
other group, have been engaged in a test
of wills with the junta and are seeking
ways to demonstrate their strength.
The debate is likely to provide in-
creasing problems for Videla, chiefly
because it appears to have the backing of
at least some highly placed individuals in
the government. Videla thus can hardly
afford to continue ignoring the situation,
as he has seemingly done so far.
Within the regime, one of the men most
likely to take a strong interest in effecting
change is navy commander and junta
member Admiral Massera. Another is
Planning Minister General Diaz Bessone,
who last year out-maneuvered Videla to
engineer changes that gave him his
cabinet post and placed him next in line
for the presidency. Both are highly am-
bitious and apparently regard Videla as
politically vulnerable.
The two will not necessarily be able
easily to profit from the debate. Massera
has tried in the past to unsettle the jun-
ta�and Videla. The President, for all the
complaints that are heard, continues to
have substantial support in and out of the
military. Moreover, any alliance between
Massera and Diaz Bessone will be sorely
tested by the inevitable rivalry between
the two power seekers.
The debate and the machinations of
men like the navy chief and planning
minister will not necessarily undo the
President, even if that is intended. It
seems clear, however, that Videla will in-
creasingly need to be on guard lest he be
caught unaware and will have to divert
his attention from policy matters he wants
to address as chief executive. Ironically, in
attempting to protect himself from his
critics, Videla may become still more
vulnerable to the charge that he is ineffec-
tive. This in turn could strengthen the
hand of his political rivals and lend
further weight to the argument that
changes in the power structure are indeed
needed.
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