OPENING STATEMENT BY THE HONORABLE ROBERT A. FEAREY, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY AND COORDINATOR FOR COMBATTING TERRORISM DEPARTMENT OF STATE BEFORE THE SENATE INTERNAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE - 1975/05/14

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02221671
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: May 14, 1975

Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2221671
>197/Lk
OPENING STATEMENT BY THE HONORABLE
ROBERT A. FEAREY, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY
AND COORDINATOR FOR COMBATTING TERRORISM
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BEFORE THE SENATE INTERNAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE
MAY 14, 1975
It is a privilege, Mr. Chairman, to meet with this
Committee, particularly since I am included in the same
hearing with our distinguished visitor from abroad, Brian
Crozier. His name is of course well known to me and the
fact that he is appearing today spurred me to reacquaint
myself with his excellent writings.
I believe this is the first time that my office has been
represented before this Committee, so a brief description of
my functions may be in order. I wear two hats. As Special
Assistant to the Secretary of State, I am Coordinator for
Combatting Terrorism as it may affect our Department of State
activity and responsibilities in foreign affairs throughout
the world. My other capacity is as Chairman of the Working
Group under the Cabinet Committee for Combatting Terrorism.
In both capacities, I am essentially a coordinator.
I am acconipanied by my Deputy, Mr. John N. Catch, who
is a Foreign Service Officer with extensive experience in
the Middle East. His two most recent assignments abroad
were as Deputy Chief of Mission in Kuwait from 1964 to 1968
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2221671
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2221671
2
and as Charge d'Affaires of our Embassy in Manama, Bahrain
from 1971 to 1973. He joined this office shortly after it
was established and worked with my two distinguished
predecessors, Ambassador Armin Meyer and Ambassador Lewis
Hoffacker.
I am also Foreign Service Officer with varied service
abroad, most recently in the Far East where I had two
Presidential apPointments -- one as Political Adviser to the
Commander-in-Chief Pacific and the other as Civil Administra-
tor of the Ryukyu Islands, or Okinawa. My immediately
preceding assignment was as Chairman of the Department of
International Relations and Area Studies at the National War
College here in Washington.
First a word about the formal structure of our inter-
agency activity to combat terrorism. This structure was
established in September, 1972, when the President asked the
Secretary of State to chair a Cabinet Committee to consider,
in the President's words, "the most effective means to
prevent terrorism here and abroad." The President took this
action following,the tragedy at the Munich Olympics, a tragedy
which illustrated dramatically that international terrorism
had reached the point where innocent people anywhere can be
victimized. This incident and others throughout the world
bear witness to the terrible potential of a disturbed or
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2221671
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2221671
- 3 -
determined person or group to terrorize the international
community. This capability to disrupt society has expanded
With the increasing technological and economic complexity of
our society and with the added incentive of wide and rapid -
publicity.
' The Cabinet Committee does not meet on a regular basis,
only as the situation may demand.- The Working Group, com-
posed of senior representatives. of Department or Agency heads,
is in constant contact as issues arise and incidents occur
and meets on a bi-weekly basis. Over the past two years and
eight months, this interagency effort has been extremely
active. It has, I believe., made us � as a Government more
effective in responding to the continuing threat from
of organizations and individuals seeking to strike at
home and abroad. This is not to. say that
the problems facing us. But we are using
resources to better advantage and have at
a variety
us at
we have solved all
Government-wide
least reduced the
risk to our people and to our foreign guests.
The Cabinet Committee/Working Group has, as a matter of
practice, concentrated on protection of Americans abroad and
of foreigners, particularly internationally protected persons,
Cabinet Committee: Secretary of State (Chairman);
Secretaries of Treasury, Defense, and Transportation; the
Attorney General; the US Ambassador to the UN; the Director
of the .FBI; the Director of Central Intelligence; and the
President's Assistants for National Security and Domestic
Affairs
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 002221671
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2221671
- 4 -
in this country. For Americans at home, there are the
customary agencies, local and federal, which continue with
their traditional responsibilities. Since the terrorism
which concerns our Government-wide anti-terrorism structure
is of international scope, threatening to strike Within our
borders, the FBI is invaluable in keeping the Cabinet Com-
mittee/Working Group apprised of international potentialities
or implications in domestic situations. Here again, the
Cabinet Committee/Working Group is a useful instrument to
surveil the global terrorist picture, to ensure effective
collaboration among agencies and departments with domestic
and foreign responsibilities, and to recommend counter-measures
to close gaps in the security screen around individuals whom
we protect. For example, we monitor the implementation of
Public Law 92-539, which confers federal jurisdiction in
protection of foreign officials and official guests. If in
the light of experience, there is room for improvement in the
dove-tailing of local and federal protection in this regard,
modification of practice or legislation would be a matter of
concern to the Cabinet Committee/Working Group.
While our official personnel abroad have been frequent
targets for a wide variety of terrorists, we are mindful that
our mandate covers all Americans. American businessmen have been
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 002221671
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2221671
- 5 -
particular targets in Latin America and have therefore
received our special attention. There have been so many
requests for advice from companies with overseas interests
that the Department of State prepared a brochure containing
.general security tips for such businessmen. This brochure
is not for general distribution, for obvious security reasons,
but J am pleased to supply copies for the use of the Com-
mittee.- When briefing American businessmen on dangers they
may face abroad, we emphasize the importance of continuing
contact with our embassy or consulate in the area of assign-
ment. The full resources of the US Government, including
information, official contacts with the host government, and.
our expertise in counter-terrorism, are at the disposal of
American businessmen or other non-officials abroad-. While
the foreign government has the primary. responsibility for
protection of foreigners within its territory, the US Govern-
ment complements that protection in such matters as the
protection of our official establishments. We may not always
agree with the company or individual concerned on tactics,
such as the advisability of paying ransom. But it is impor-
tant that we stick together in tight situations such as
Argentina, where despite the efforts of the Argentine Govern-
ment terrorists have kidnapped a number of American business-
men for very high ransons.
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2221671
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2221671
6
We conscientiously emphasize the preventive aspect of
our mandate. Therefore, our main efforts are in the field
of improving procedures in this country and abroad to detect
and deter terrorists. We have been in the forefront of those
who have sought tightened international air security. We
continue to press for additional ratifications of three
important multilateral conventions dealing with hijacking:
the 1963 Tokyo Convention, which in effect requires countries
to return a hijacked plane, passengers and crew; the 1.970
Hague Convention, which requires countries either to extra-
dite or prosecute skyjackers; and the 1971 Montreal Convention,
which proscribes any kind of sabotage of aviation, including
destruction of aircraft on the ground, and requires prosecu-
tion or extradition of the offenders. At Rome in September
of 1973 we were unsuccessful in our efforts to develop an
international consensus to put enforcement teeth in these
conventions. Nevertheless, we are encouraged by continued,
admittedly slow, progress elsewhere in the ICAO forum,
including adoption of a Security Annex by the ICAO Council
to further improve security of airports abroad.
Al: the UN in 1972 we sought to prohibit the export of
violence to innocent persons who are many countries, some-
times continents, removed from the scene of a conflict. This
approach became bogged down in debate over so-called
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2221671
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2221671
- 7 -
justifiable, as opposed to illegal, violence. We accordingly
narrowed our proposals to more specific categories of offenses
which, because of their grave and inhuman effect on innocent
individuals, or because of their serious interference with
the vital machinery of international life, should be condemned.
by states of every ideology and alignment. Under this nar-
rowed approach we supported in the 1973 General Assembly a
convention for the protection of diplomats. The Assembly
agreed to this measure, which requires that parsons who attach
or kidnap diplomats of foreign governments or international
organizations be extradited or prosecuted.
In INTERPOL, in the Organization of American States, and
in other appropriate forums, we achieve what is feasible in
the way of multilateral discouragement of international ter-
rorists. Simultaneously, we maintain quiet liaison with
individual governments which share our abhorrence of terrorism.
We are pleased, for example, to assist others when they suffer
hijackings, by providing communications and other services
even though the affected plane may not be over or in our
country.
When in spite of all our efforts an act of terrorism
occurs, we are prepared to deal with it swiftly and effec-
tively. Within the Department of State, task forces can be
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2221671
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2221671
8 -
assembled on short notice to manage critical events. Such
task forces are composed of selected specialists who can call
on the full resources of the US Government to rescue, or at
least to monitor, the beleaguered parties. With the advice
and concurrence of the Working Group, our office as pre-
pared detailed operating procedures for handling terrorist
incidents involving Americans abroad and involving foreign
officials in this country. These documents are of course
classified, but T would be pleased to discuss generally their
contents with this Committee.
Tactics vary in each crisis situation, hut one consistent
factor should be understood by all parties concerned: the US
Government will not pay ransom to kidnappers, nor will it
release prisoners to satisfy blackmail demands. We"advise
other governments, individuals, and companies to adopt similar
positions because we believe to do otherwise would multiply
terrorist attacks. But I hasten to underline the importance
which we attach to human life. We do not glibly sacrifice
hostages for the sake of this firm policy. We believe that
firmness, if applied with the best diplomacy we can muster,
can save lives in the long run and probably in the short run
as well.
The Foreign Service has had more than a few terrorist
experiences in the past ten years: 61 of our officials
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2221671
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2221671
- 9 -
abroad were subjected to terrorist attack during that period,
including 28 who were kidnapped. 15 of these individuals
were murdered. We have learned to take reasonable precautions.
But we do not want our embassies and consulates tO be for-
tresses or armed camps. We use ingenuity to reduce risks.
Very importantly, we remind the host government of its
special responsibility to protect diplomatic and consular
personnel, and of its general duty to protect all foreigners
in its territory.
Sometimes, however, that foreign protection must be
reinforced. The State Department's Office of Security is
responsible for ensuring that our Foreign Service posts are
doing their best, with necessary equipment, to supplement
such local protection as may be available. After the tragic
murder of our diplomats and a Belgian colleague in Khartoum
in March of 1973, we concluded that this effort should be
strengthened. The Congress was requested to
funds, and all of us in the Foreign Service are most
grateful for the $19.6 million which was made available.
The Office of Security is managing the disbursement of these
funds, based on highest priority needs of our posts throughout
the world.
The US has attempted to show leadership in stimulating
global attention to the apparently growing international
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2221671
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2221671
-- 10 -
terrorist threat. We have not achieved all we sought in
international cooperation. But our multilateral, bilateral,
and unilateral efforts must and will continue with all possible
drive and persuasiveness. There seems to be increased
collaboration among terrorist groups Of different nationalities
Such groups seem to be moving farther and farther afield,
including toward North America. There is evidence of ample'
financial sources for some terrorist groups, not only from
ransoms collected but also from governments which, for one
reason or another, are sympathetic toward certain groups.
And, last but not least, there seems to be no shortage of
political-economic-social frustrations to spawn terrorists on
all continents. The global terrorist epidemic threatens the
very fabric of international order.
I would like to conclude this statement with, first, a
very brief assessment of trends in international terrorism
over the past year, and then with a broad look at what the
future may hold.
As for the recent trends in terrorism, these have been
mi);ed.
On the favorable side, the relatively moderate, pro-
peaceful settlement members of the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) leadership, supported by key Arab govern-
ments, have brought about a significant reduction in Arab
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2221671
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2221671
- -
terrorism against non-Israeli targets. Arab governments have
one after the other closed their airports to hijackers and
other terrorists seeking safe haven after attacks against
non-Israeli targets. Even the Popular Front for the Libera-
tion of Palestine (PFLP), which conducted so many of the
dramatic hijacking, massacre and barricade/hostage incidents
of the 1970-73 period, appears to have at least temporarily
abandoned these tactics. There has been a world-wide trend
of nations no longer being willing to provide safe haven to
known terrorists or otherwise openly support terrorist
activities.
On the negative side, however, there has been no diminu-
tion of terrorist violence against Israel and in most countries
that have domestic terrorism problems, such as Argentina,
Nicaragua, Northern Ireland, Mexico, Spain and Germany. Some
of the more sensational incidents have been by the Baader-
Meinhof gang in Germany, in pursuit of its anarchist, anti-
establishment objectives and the release of imprisoned com-
rades. You will recall the recent Lorenz kidnapping in
Berlin and the subsequent seizure of the German Embassy in
Stockholm. The Japanese Red Army, with objectives similar to
those of the Baader-Meinhof gang plus a world revolution
theme, has been active, initiating incidents abroad on its
own as well as in collaboration with the PFLP. Cooperation
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 002221671
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2221671
- 12 -
among terrorist groups has strengthened, particularly the
PFLP with the Japanese Red Army, the Baader-Meinhof group
and the IRA.
What of the future? Brian Jenkins of the RAND Corpora-
tion recently wrote a provocative article which will be
reflected in my effort to respond to that question.
Up to now the toll of terrorism in dead, wounded and
property damage has been relatively small -- notwithstanding
all I have said about terrorism's political impact and
importance. This is true of all forms of terror:1Sn' compared
with the casualties and property losses of even the most
limited conventional wars. But it is particularly true of
international terrorism. Only a little over 500 people were
killed, including terrorists, and some 800 injured, in all
international terrorist incidents from 1968 through 1974.
This is less than the homicide rate of a single major
American city.
In the years ahead this may change. New weapons are con-
stantly enlarging terrorists' destructive capabilities. Par-
ticularly rapid-advances are being made in individual weapons
development. With the benefit of miniaturization, a new range
of small, portable, easy to operate, highly accurate and
highly destructive weapons are coming into .existence. Such
weapons, if they should become available to terrorists, could be
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 002221671
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2221671
- 13 -
employed as effectively against civil aircraft, supertankers,
motorcades and speakers podiums as against military targets.
The Soviet SA-7 heat-seeking, man-portable missile, the
equivalent of our REDEYE, has already been found in the hands
of terrorists, fortunately before it could be used.
And of course there are even more serious hazards. As
nuclear power facilities proliferate, the quantity and
geographical dispersion of plutonium and other fissionable
materials in the world will increase greatly. The pos-
sibility of plausible nuclear terrorist threats based on
illicitly constructed atomic bombs, stolen nuclear weapons
or sabotage of nuclear power installations can be expected
to grow. Even more plausible will be threats based on more
readily and economically produced chemical and biological
materials, such as nerve gas and germ concentrates.
Would terrorists actually use such weapons? Probably
not. They could already have contaminated water supplies,
killing thousands, but have not done so. There are practical
arguments against mass murder, which would not necessarily
promote the terPorist's objectives and could provoke a
damaging backlash. But the possibility of plausible nuclear,
CW and BW threats is real. And though the chances of such
threats being carried out are small, the risk will be there
and will have to be mot.
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2221671
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2221671
- 14 -
There is a further danger. Conventional war is becoming
increasingly impractical. It is too destructive, it is too
expensive, and it usually requires big-power backers which,
fearing direct involvement, tend to force a quick ceasefire,
before the attacker's purposes can be fully achieved. To
avoid these disadvantages, a nation could employ terrorist
groups in surrogate warfare against another nation. A govern-
ment could subsidize an existing terrorist group, or create
one of its own, to disrupt, alarm and subvert a target country.
Only a small investment of men and material would be required,
far less than for a conventional attack; the venture would be
deniable; and the results achieved in the target state might
be fully as effective as through a military action.
We are in nn era in which people are increasingly unwilling
to accept authority, and increasing willing to challenge
authority. The atmosphere is similar to the period from 1775
to the mid-Nineteenth century. That era too was marked by
widespread revolution in Europe and the Americas directed
against existing political and social institutions. Like the
last two decades, at saw the dissolution of several empires
and the creation of many now states.
But there are important differences between that period'
and the one on which we now seem to be embarking. One such
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2221671
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2221671
- 15 -
difference, just noted and most welcome, is the reduced
prospect of open warfare, with its high casualties. But
another is a prospect of a high level of internal insecurity
and political violence by dissatisfied groups using, or
threatening to use, against our vulnerable modern societies,
the frightening small, or mass effect weapons, I have cited.
A world of many Ulsters, plus threatened nuclear, chemical
or biological terrorist attacks, Could be statistically
safer for the average man than the world of 150 years ago
or, particularly, the world of repeated major conflicts of
the past 60 years. But it seems likely also to be a more
nerve-wracking and unsettled world or continuing 16w- level
violence amd threatened mass weapons terrorist attack.
In conclusion, modern terrorism obviously presents
complex and serious problems. There are no easy answers.
If there is a Middle East settlement the aspects of the
problem originating there may diminish. But in various forms
not now clear terrorism seems likely to be a growing problem
for the world and. for the US. It could become an extremely
frightening problem with radiological, biological and
chemical weapons in the hands of international terrorists
convinced that the highest morality is the advancement of
their cause and quite prepared to die for that cause. A.
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2221671
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2221671
- 16 -
broad international consensus on the seriousness of the
problem, and on the necessity for effective action in such
matters as the safeguarding. of fissionable materials, is
essential. We do not want such effective international
action to come as a result of some terrible shocks. Our
Government is pursuing its efforts, with all the energy and.
imagination it can muster, both to combat the existing
terrorist threat and to avert worse dangers that may lie
ahead.
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2221671