WEEKLY SITUATION REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 22 DECEMBER 1975[SANITIZED] - 1975/12/22

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02698096
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: December 22, 1975

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Weekly Situation Report
on
International Terrorism
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22 December 1975
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WEEKLY SITUATION REPORT
CONTENTS
22 December 1975
The JCR: Is Latin American Terrorism Going Transcontinental?
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BACKGROUND ARTICLE
The JCR: Is LW.in American Terrorism Going Transcontinental?
The Revolutionary Coordinating Junta (JCR) was formed in
November 1972 by representatives of the Argentin People's
Revolutionary Army (ERP), the Chilean Movement of the Revolu-
tionary Left (MIR), and the Uruguayan Tupamaros. The organiza-
tion was finally formalized on 13 February 1974, when the above
three components plus the Bolivian National Liberation Army
(ELN) issued a joint communique proclaiming that the JCR would
form a central operational command over all the Latin American
liberation movements, composed of representatives of the various
member organizations. This command would coordinate gurrilla
actions, logistics and financing at a continental level. On 20
February the JCR declared war on the government of Juan Peron
and announced that it would "struggle against the allies of
imperialism and establish a nationalist third position rejecting
United States and Soviet imperialism." 3.3(b)(1)
The JCR remained an enigma until the spring of 1975 when
Argentine authorities began uncovering evidence of its activi-
ties. It began making public statements in Europe, and
/documents revealed that JCR activities had spread far
beyond the cone of South America and that the organization
maintained contact with a large number of Latin American terrorist
groups and had established offices in Europe.
other information has come to light through various sources
which indicates that the scope of JCR activities was much 3.3(b)(1)
greater than previously suspected.
The single dominating force in the JCR is the ERP. Using
the millions of dollars obtained from four years of terrorist
activity, the ERP has made itself the driving force behind the
JCR, and all other member organizations have taken subordinate
positions.
The JCR has been moving to expand its membership and con-
tacts among Latin American terrorist groups. On 17 March 1975
it announced that the Paraguayan National Liberation Front
(FREPALINA) had been admitted to the JCR. The JCR is known to
have contact with the Venezuelan Armed Forces of National
Liberation (FALN); the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the
pro-Soviet Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC); and
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the Peruvian Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) and
Revolutionary Vanguard (VR)�, as well as groups in the Dominican
Republic, Guatemala, El Salvador and Ecuador. These contacts
range anywhere from the exchange of letters to attendance at
JCR-sponsored conferences, visits by JCR delegations, and
training at JCR camps. The details of most of these contacts
are still cloudy, and the extent to which each group is aligned
with the JCR has not yet been fully determined.
JCR activities in Europe also have been much more exten-
sive than previously believed. The JCR has or has had offices
in Paris, Lisbon and Geneva, plus contacts in Italy and Sweden.
It is believed that the JCR may be in contact with certain
European extremist organizations, but the details of these
contacts are unknown. It now appears that the JCR may be con-
centrating its European forces in Lisbon.
As far as is known, the JCR itself has never claimed
responsibility for a terrorist act. Rather, it has concen-
trated its activities in four main areas--funding, propaganda,
operational support and training.
a. Funding: Money is the glue that holds the JCR
o ether and makes it a viable force.
70 per cent of all money collected by member
organizations goes to the JCR. It is believed that the
ERP obtained over US $30 million in ransom and extortion
money in recent years. Just how much of this money the
JCR has and funnels back into member and other organi-
zations is not known.
3.3(b)(1)
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the ERP sent the Chilean MIR US $300,000 in
September 1974, and followed tais payment with monthly
contributions of US $60,000. It is believed these con-
tributions were kept UD at least turtil the spring of 1975.
the Chilean MIR had
receivee between US $1.5 million and US $2.5 million
and Oat US $4 million was earmarked for the purchase
of arms in the United States.
b. Propaganda: Ever since its founding the JCR has
been attempting to set up a propaganda mechanism. Its
Paris office was responsible for the creation of a JCR
press agency, the Agencia de Prensa America Latina
(APAL), in December 1974. APAL published a magazine,
Boletin APAL, some 20 editions of which were distributed
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in France, Italy and Argentina. There have also been
proposals to distribute Boletin APAL in other European
countries, the U.S., MexTECT�a-ria Venezuela. The JCR has
also made a propaganda movie to be used in fund-raising
activities and has joined with the Group of Solidarity
with the People in Argentina, which is active in the
Bertrand Russell Tribunal. The JCR contact
with representatives of sevpral international
organizations dealing with human rights and political
refugees, to inspire them to conduct an investigation
of human rights in Argentina, financed the
travel to Argentina of two members of the International
Commission of Jurists.
c. Operational Support: The JCR has provided ex-
tensive operational support to member groups. The JCR
has assisted the MIR in establishing bases Rlnna thp
Chilean border
I The JCR also furnishes
weapons and ammunition to member groups.
Argentine police uncovered a cache of weapons which was
supplying Tupamaros infiltrating back into Uruguay. The
cache contained at least 250 submachine guns, ten 357-
mvgnum revolvers, and an unknown rilinntity nf hanrlavpr1^
alid shotguns.
3.3(b)(1)
The
OUM U150 proviaes travel documentation to member groups.
d. Training: The JCR has provided both political
and guerrilla training to individuals belonging to both
member groups and nonmember groups. Training has con-
sisted of political -:.ndoctrination as well as guerrilla
techniques. One training camp established by the JCR
was located on a tobacco plantation,
Individuals being
trained at the camp included members of all of the group
belon:in to the JCR
3.3(b)(1)
3.3(b)(1)
The extent of Cuba's involvement in the JCR is not known.
There have been reports that the JCR was organized at the
behest of the Cubans. Many of the individuals belonging to the
JCR were trained in Cuba, and JCR representatives travel
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regularly to and from Cuba. On the other hand, JCR repre-
sentatives meeting in March 1975 in Portugal all subscribed to
the Pact of Lisbon, part of which stated that Cuba should no
longer serve as the only model or source of support for revolu-
tionary activity in Latin America and that the direct responsi-
bility for the development and progress of the Latin American
revolutionary movement lies with each individual revolutionary
organization. Whether this statement is so much propaganda
window dressing to hide Cuban involvement in the JCR, or whether
the JCR has shut out the Cubans is not known.
The extent of the threat posed by the JCR is difficult to
gauge. Although more is known about thr JCR now than in the
past, many areas of JCR activity are still nebulous. A
concerted effort is being made to find out more about this
organization. From what is known so far, however, it is safe
tG conclude that the JCR could become one of the most active
and dangerous forces in international terrorism. It is evident
now that the JCR is fairly well organized and its members are
well trained. Most importantly, the JCR has money and exten-
sive contacts.
The JCR has weaknesses too. It has not yet enjoyed any
conspicuous successes outside Argentina despite vast amounts of
money and technical assistance. Secondly, because it is so
dominated by the ERP, the JCR will, in all probability, fold up
if the ERP goes under.
There are three possible routes that the JCR could take
during the next few years. First of all, it could continue
expanding its contacts and giving aid and comfort to terrorist
groups all over Latin America. This would tend to stabilize
rather unstable groups and make them more effective. Secondly,
it could contract its forces and concentrate on its primary
enemies--governments in the cone of South America--thus cutting
the risk of spreading itself too thin. Finally, it could take
the Palestinian road, and escalate its activities into a world-
wide campaign of terror against its enemies. As it is pres-
ently organized, the JCR is capable of all three options or
combinations of the three. Although the first two options seem
the most likely, it is conceivable that circumstances could
drive the JCR leaders to feel that the third is the only option
they could take. As it is currently constituted, the JCR could
carry out a very effective international terrorist campaign,
particularly if it obtained the support of other terrorist
groups outside Latin America. 3.5(c)
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