WEEKLY SUMMARY JULY 9 1976[SANITIZED] - 1976/07/09

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03004435
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: July 9, 1976

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.........11--- 3.5(c)
Weekly Summary
s t
CI WS 76-028
No. 0028/76
July 9, 1976
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3.5(c)
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he WEEKLY SUMMARY, issued eiury Friday caning by the
Office of Current tntelIgeri re ott airanalyzes signifi-
cant develapmenh of the week th no ii Thursday. it
frequently includes material coordined wit.or prepared
by the Office of Economic Research, the f Strategic
Research, the Office of Geographic and Cartographic
Research, arid the Directorate et Science and Technology.
3.5(c)
lye Intellt
Warning
nce Sources and Methods involved
(WN INTEL)
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMAHON
Unauthorized Disclosure Subiect to Criminal Sanctions
9 Argentina: Tasks for the Junta
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5fierkrIT
Argentina's military junta, three months after taking over,
has made some gains, especially in the economic area. But
President Videla must soon demonstrate further economic
progress as well as to make inroads against terrorism.
Argentina's military junta has achieved
no dramatic breakthroughs on major
problems in the three months since it
seized power, but there have been en-
couraging signs, particularly on the
economic front. The next few months will
be decisive.
President Videla faces a formidable
public relations challenge, in addition to
the challenges posed by the economy and
continuing terrorist activity. He must, on
the one hand, deal quickly and firmly
enough with major problems to satisfy his
fellow officers. On the other hand, he
must avoid actions that will dissipate the
popular acceptance the junta has
painstakingly nurtured. For the moment,
the military as a whole seems disposed to
go along with Videla's low-key, gradualist
approach to governing. Some officers'
patience could be tried, however, if the
pace of progress does not quicken.
Popular resistance has not yet been a
factor, but political restrictions and
economic austerity measures could yet
lead to widespread public dissatisfaction.
President Videla is well suited for the
balancing act he must perform. He has
impeccable military credentials and the
respect of his fellow officers, even though
there has been some criticism of his style.
Civilians see him as a man with no thirst
for power and one who took the reins of
government reluctantly.
The President sets the tone of the
government; his appearance is austere and
he makes no promises, preferring to
repeat his call for hard work. Other of-
_
Argentina: Tasks for the Junta
ficials display the same attitude. Economy
Minister Martinez de Hoz, charged with
overseeing a fundamental overhaul of the
nation's economy, describes his job in
matter-of-fact terms and avoids the temp-
tation to make promises.
The government is not so much modest
as practical. Videla and his colleagues ful-
ly realize the danger of setting unrealistic
goals that would risk widespread aliena-
tion if they are not achieved. The public
statements of junta spokesmen are a con-
trast to the extravagant behavior and
lavish promises of the ousted Peronists.
So far, the President and his advisers
seem to have succeeded in impressing
their countrymen with the need for per-
sonal sacrifice in the interest of restoring
economic health to the nation.
From the outset, Videla has walked a
fine line between authoritarianism and
respect for civilian institutions. Congress
is dissolved, all political activity is
banned, and the media are restricted. The
President has stopped short of cutting
civilians out of the governing process en-
tirely, however. A number of key advisers
are civilians, and the principal political
parties remain intact, as does the huge
Peronist labor confederation. Videla is
Argentine shopper checks prices in Buenos Aires shop
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not squeamish about using authority, but
he does see limits to the amount of power
he needs.
Restoring the Economy
Restoration of the shattered economy is
the most pressing challenge facing the jun-
ta. Martinez de Hoz has had some success
in reducing the worst inflation in Argen-
tina's history and attracting badly needed
financial support from abroad, but there
is a long way to go.
The economic team has a far-reaching
program that envisions revitalization of
private business and aims to reduce the
government's role in some economic ac-
tivities, such as energy production. The
foreign investment law has been rewritten
to remove most of the restrictions on
foreign capital and profit remittances.
Agriculture, long neglected, has received
a package of new incentives.
There has been no significant popu-
lar resistance to the economic program,
but the likelihood of continuing accep-
tance of austerity measures by a society
long accustomed to living well seems
small. Labor, in particular, has been
severely affected by the new economic
program. Deprived suddenly of its po-
litical and economic predominance, or-
ganized labor may be ripe for leftist
influence.
Although the military has put controls
on the labor movement, labor remains
potentially the most important source of
opposition to the government. There have
already been a few sporadic work stop-
pages and slowdowns in major industrial
plants. This alarms the junta, both
because it is a challenge to government
authority and because it threatens
economic productivity. Thus far, the
regime has overcome labor protests by
furloughing the ringleaders, but it has
made clear it is willing to use force if
necessary.
The Terrorist Problem
The problem of leftist terrorism has
plagued civilian and military govern-
ments alike since the late 1960s. The
guerrillas do not pose a direct threat to
government stability, but the military
is committed to rooting them out, and
Videla's handling of the situation is
one criterion on which he will be
judged, particularly by his fellow
officers.
The army appears to have made some
inroads against insurgents both in the
countryside and in the cities. In the
remote province of Tucuman, government
forces are reportedly killing and capturing
a growing number of members of the
People's Revolutionary Army and de-
stroying more and more safesites and
sources of supplies.
The urban terrorism carried out by the
Argentine troops on an
operation
against insurgents in Tucuman ProvineP
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People's Army and by the Montoneros is
more difficult to handle. The insurgents'
hit-and-run tactics are effective in the
metropolitan sprawl of Buenos Aires, and
the appeal the terrorists have for youth-
ful Argentines�the main source of
recruits�continues despite increasing
reports of government anti-terrorist
successes.
It will be some time before the
military's aggressive campaign can be
judged a success; bombings and guerrilla
attacks on officials are continuing. During
the past two weeks, for example, terrorists
murdered several military officers, in-
cluding the second federal police chief in
two years.
Videla may ultimately face serious
..12116"
trouble from critics in the military who
urge him to take a much tougher ap-
proach to the problem. The thrust of the
argument is that, in order to eradicate the
guerrillas who hide among and draw some
support from the populace, the govern-
ment must impose stronger controls on
the population as a whole.
The so-called "hard-line" officers also
want vengeance against the former
civilian leaders whose corruption and in-
competence, they argue, led Argentina to
near chaos. The advocates of repression
are, in short, pressing for almost un-
limited arrest powers, dissolution of all
political groupings, and the dismember-
ment of the entire labor movement.
The President, too, is committed to a
"fight to the finish" with terrorism, but he
believes the "hard-line" approach would
do more harm than good. Videla wants to
avoid the sort of international oppro-
brium that has been aimed at Chile be-
cause of human rights violations and
that has made it difficult for Chile to ob-
tain needed foreign financial aid. Argen-
tina is depending on further infusions of
foreign financial support.
Videla is also mindful of the significant
political divisions within his country,
which would amost certainly be inten-
sified by repressive government measures.
A Role for Civilians
Videla, unlike the "hard-liners," sees
some role for civilians in the government.
The President's public attitude toward
civilians is conciliatory, and his advisers
are engaged in a dialogue with certain
politicians and labor leaders. This ap-
proach has drawn the fire of the
President's critics.
Although Videla is not now in any
serious trouble, the appeal of the
"hard-line" may widen, especially if the
military judges that progress on ma-
jor national problems is too slow.
Recent abductions and murders of known
and suspected leftists by rightist vig-
ilantes, although not approved by the
regime, clearly have the sympathy of a
number of military officers, some in
key positions. The President's efforts
to end these abuses have had little if
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any success, and there are practical
limits to how far he can go.
Military rule has come to stay for the
foreseeable future; how repressive it be-
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comes depends depends on Videla's ability to
deal with the problems that prompted
military intervention in the first place. If
the President and his supporters have
their way, civilians can look forward to at
least a limited role in government; if
Videla loses out, they will not have even
this.
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