OCI NOTES ON METHODOLOGY - 1975/10/09

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03185051
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: October 9, 1975

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NR
Notes on
'Method(*)
79-Eci4gfL-
. Newsletter No. 42
. October 9, 1975
Political violence is a characteristic of many
political systems and consequently has been the sub-
ject of extensive study by scholars as well as in-
telligence anaJysts.1 Interpretations of the causes
of political li.olence are varied. A ground-breaking
study published by the CIA in 1972 examined the role
of generational factors in political violence.2 A
test of an alternative approach, based on the psy-
chological theory that most human aggression occurs
as a response to frustration, was conducted by the
Agency in 1974.3
Very few attempts have been made, however, to
measure the political violence in a single nation
where the violence has not reached the level of in-
surgency or civil war. The intelligence analyst,
in assessing the patterns of violence in a given
nation, rarely has access to a quantified set of
data that lends itself to easy measurement. Nor-
mally, the analyst is confronted with information
that is too incomplete and too impressionistic.
This issue of the Notes describes an experi-
mental project conducted-IE-Ehe Office of Current
Intelligence to build and then analyze a systematic
data base of political violence in Argentina--using
the same imperfect information receivad by every
OCI analyst.
It illustrates the kind of approach which can
be made towerd the analysis of a similar problem
anywhere: the information available was no better
and no worse than that available to most OCI analysts.
This description shows that at the least an approach
of this type can be of considerable assistance in
clarifying some perceptions, in dispatching some
misconceptions, in narrowing some uncertainties,
and in detecting and defining trends before they
might otherwise be appreciated.
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CONSTRUCTION OF THE DATA BASE
The data covered a one-year period following
the death of Juan Peron on July 1, 1973. The in-
formation used was obtained from US embassy cables,
CIA reports, FBIS and wire service reports, and
NSA reports. The analyst identified 401 separate
incidents that occurred during the period. The
401 incidents dc not represent every terrorist act
that occurred during the period; the Argentine gov-
ernment censors news and not all incidents are re-
ported. Nevertheless, a wide variety of source
material was utilized and it is believed that the
401 incidents constitute a representative sample
for analysis.
Because the data was to be computerized, the
analyst's first step was to design a coding scheme.
For example, the analyst desired the capability of
isolating and printing out all incidents caused by
a certain terrorist group; this capability was
achieved by assigning a unique code to each terror-
ist group. The aralyst selected six such categories
of characteristics to classify each event:
1. Date of incident
2. Type of incident (assassination, bomb-
etc.)
3. Responsible group
4. Target of the attack (military, busi-
ness, etc.)
5. Casualties
6. Source of information
The analyst then reviewed the raw information (cables,
press reports, etc.) and coded each incident accord-
ing to the six categories. A detailed description
of the coding scheme can be found in the appendix.
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ANALYSIS OF THE DATA BASE
After coding, the data was transformed into a
computerized format5 and a computer program was
utilized to obtain printed listings needed for
analysis.6 For example, the analyst requested a
listing of the number of all terrorist incidents
on a week-by-week basis for the entire year. The
results were than plotted on a graph as one effort
to determine if there was an overall pattern to
the violence during the year. Figure 1 shows the
result.
The graph shows that the year was character-
ized by rather sharp fluctuations in the level of
violence. A week of intense violence is generally
followed by a week with little activity. There
are only two exceptions; the six-week period from
September to mid-October and the seven-week period
in March and April. The graph shows no general
upward or downward trend.
It is possible that the periods of September
through October (spring) and March through April
(fall) represent a seasonal variation characterize6
by higher levels of violence. This hypothesis,
however, cannot be tested without data for a period
of several years.7 A more promising hypothesis is
that variations in the level of violence are re-
lated to the political climate.
In order to test this hypothesis, the analyst
requested two listings; one showing the level of
left-wing violence and the second showing the level
of right-wing violence. The results of those two
listings are shown in Figure 2.* Major political
events of the year are superimposed upon the graph.
*The orange line represents the number of incidents
caused by the left wing; the brown Zine represents
the number of incidents caused by tite right wing.
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The
The graph suggests that the behavior of the
leftist groups is indeed related to the political
environment. For example, the quiet period imme-
diately after Peron's death reflects the agreement
of most leftist groups to refrain from political
activity during the ten-day mourning period.
When Mrs. Peron first assumed the presidency
the largest left-wing organization, the Montoneros,
declared their support for her. As her rightist
orientation became evident, the Montoneros became
disenchanted and by the end of August a Montonero
publication had tacitly endorsed armed struggle
against a government that was "no longer Peronist."
On September 6, the leader of the Montonero organi-
zation declared that the government's policies had
forced his organization to return to the strategy
of armed struggle. Figure 2 shows that these ac-
tions were immediately followed by the most in-
tense period of leftist violence during the entire
year.
The government responded to the escalation
in terrorism by closing the University of Buenos
Aires and enacting an anti-subversion law with
sweeping arrest powers. At the same time, right-
wing death squads such as the AAA increased their
activity against the left. As a result the inten-
sity of leftist violence began to decline. In early
October, the ERP proposed a truce with the govern-
ment in return for legal recognition, a repeal of
"repressive legislation" and the release of polit-
ical prisoners.
President Peron rejected the truce, and as the
graph shows, the left responded immediately with a
new upsurge in violence. The increase in terrorism
caused the government to impose a state of siege on
November 6. In the ensuing weeks, the security
forces scored a number of major successes against
the terrorist organizations. The campaign was
temporarily effective--the level of violence re-
mained low until January 1975.
In January, the left initiated a new campaign
of violence. President Peron responded by giving
the Argentine army a major role in combating ter-
rorism--a role the army previously had sought to
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EL OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE
OVERALL LEVEL OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE
NUMBER OF INCIDENTS
22 -
1 1 1 1
AUGUST SEPTEMBER
1 1 1 1
OCTOBER
1 1 1 t
NOVEMBER
1 1 1
SEPTEMBER
OCTOBER
NOVEMBER
DECEMBER
JANUARY
1975
1 1 1
FEBRUARY
1 1 1 1 1
MARCH
I
APRIL MAY !
DECEMBER JANUARY FEBR
' 50/077 046 CIA
1974 1975
Figure 1
I L_L_
JUNE
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
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COMPARISON OF LEFT AND RIGHT WING VIOLENCE
NUMBER OF INCIDENTS
22
OF LEFT AND RIGHT WING VIOLENCE
Figure 2
Police and military
launch anti-guumila
campaign In
Catamarca Province.
il Montana= declare
/ armed oppositiai
to government
iiGovernmentdeclaros
state of seige.
1
i I
Montoneros
V
endorse
arrr.ed struggle
ERP
IxdPases
truce
Government arrests
A leftist labor loaders.
Arrny joins
anti-subversion
colnida'grt
And-subversion
law passed.
Government arrests
A leftist labor lea dots.
Army joins
anti-subversion
cornpa gn.
Montoneros declare
armed opposition
to government
Proposed visit by
Secretory of State
Kissinger
AAA onnounces a 90-day truce.
ERP
proposes
truce
Juan
Peron dies
SEPTEMBER OCTOBER
NOVEMBER DECEMBER
1974
JANUARY FEBRUARY MARCH
1975
Li
SEPTEMBER OCTOC1ER NOVEMBER DECEMBER JANUARY
1974 1975
FEBRUARY
MARCH
MAY JUNE
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
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avoid. The army immediately launched a massive
anti-guerrilla sweep in northern Argentina, but
achieved only minimal success. The terrorists re-
taliated by sharply increasing their activity in
Buenos Aires.
The next major surge of leftist violence oc-
curred in late March and early April, apparently in
response to the government's arrest of a group of
left-wing union leaders on March 20. The last
major upsurge in violence coincided with Secretary
Kissinger's proposed arrival in Buenos Aires on
April 24; after the trip was canceled, terrorist
incidents decreased. The period following the an-
nouncement of a 90-day truce by the AAA was rela-
tively quiet. No significant terrorist activity
was initiated by either side during the remaining
weeks.
Thus, the pattern of leftist violence shown in
Figure 2 does appear to indicate a relationship to
the political environment. The pattern of right
wing activity, however, is not easily explained by
examining the graph. It was therefore decided to
test the hypothesis that rightist groups tended to
react primarily to increases or decreases in leftist
violence.
An examination of Figure 2 does not provide a
definitive answer, although upsurges in leftist ter-
rorism are occasionally shown to be followed a week
later by an increase in rightist violence. A sta-
tistical technique known as hivariate correlation
was used in an effort to gain a better insight into
this relationship.8 The level of leftist terrorism
for each week was correlated with the level of
right-wing violence during the same week; the level
of right-wing violence one week later; and the level
of right-wing violence two weeks later. The results
are shown in the table below.
Level of
Left Wing
Violence
TABLE i
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LEFT-WING AND RIGHT-WING VIOLENCE
Right-wing Violence
During Same Week
Right-wing V1,olence
One Week Later
.262
�5�
V.reritEl
Right-wing Violence
Two Weeks Later
.006
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TACTICS OF LEFT WING TERRORISTS'
First Quarter
Second Quarter
45,3
Figure 3
4,9
Third Quarter
I 12(,4/
Fourth Quarter
8,4
28.7 AELLM
7.3
TACTICS OF RIGHT WING TERRORISTS
First Quarter
; fg.4::+7,�aj.4
Second Quarter
ftiMIMMIO12;5:111i1�11
1,,43,80TAM,
Third Quarter
joha)-g
Fourth Quarter
6.7
,ER-74
41.4w.11
.4,04M
Assent- Armed
nations Attacks Bombings kidnapings Other
In Percent
567079 845 CIA
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A correlation coefficient greater than .280 is
required to obtain statistical significance.9 As
seen in the table, this was achieved only in those
instances when violence perpetrated by both groups
occurred during the same week. The value of the
other two coefficients is too low to indicate a
right-wing response to increases and decreases in
left-wing violence. Even the coefficient of .354
is a very weak relationship, indicating that in-
creases or decreases in the frequency of leftist
activity are not consistently associated with in-
creases or decreases in rightist activity. Thus,
it appears that the behavior patterns of the two
groups are caused by other factors.
The analyst then examined the differences in
the kinds of violence initiated by the left and
right. The results of listings produced by the
computer are shown in Table 2. It is apparent that
the right clearly preferred the tactic of assassina-
tion.
TABLE 2
TACTICS OF RIGHT WING AND LEFT WI 5 TERRORISTS
TYPE OF INCIDENT ASSASSINATIONS ARMED BOMBIN6S KIDNAPINGS OTHER TOTAL
Responsible Group ATTACKS
RIGHT WING 62.7
LEFT WING 25.5
10.5
13.4
11.9
1.5
100%
30.5
30.1
9.2
4.7
100%
The left utilized armed attacks, bombings, and
assassinations almost equally while kidnaping was
seldom employed. Despite the extensive attention
given to kidnapings by the media, the results in
Table 2 show that kidnaping in fact was a rarely
used tactic.
The tactics of both major groups were examined
on a quarterly basis to determine what changes, if
any, occurred. Figure 3 shows several definite
shifts in tactics by the left during the year.
During the first quarter (July through September),
the left utilized bombing as its primary tactic
(45.3%). Assassination was rarely used during
this period. The second quarter was marked by a
shift to assassination as the primary method (46.3%),
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TACTICS-OF LEFT WING TERRORIST GROUPS
50 ���
Montoneros
7,7
Armed Attacks
Bombings
Kidnapings
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while the third quarter showed a virtual balance
between assassinations, armed attacks and bombings.
The fourth quarter was marked by a shift to armed
attacks (51.2%). During the entire period the
left rarely employed kidnaping. The right wing
consistently employed assassination as a tactic
throughout the year.
Comparative analysis of the tactics employed
by the two major lef.e..st groups, the ERP and the
Montoneros, shows significant differences. Figure
4 shows that the ERP clearly preferred assassina-
tion as its major tactic with armed attacks a
second choice. The ERP used bombing on occasion
but almost never tried kidnaping, The Montoneros,
on the other hand, seemed to specialize in bombing.
The Montoneros also employed assassination but
rarely undertook armed attacks. This group was
apparently responsible for most of the kidnapings
initiated by the left.
The targets selected by the terrorists were
then analyzed. Table 3 reveals that the rightists
concentrated almost completely upon targets de-
scribed as "leftist." This category should be
treated with some caution, however; since the right
wing was frequently unable to get at true members
of leftist terrorist groups, it often resorted to
attacking individuals whose political philosophy
was known to be left of center.
TABLE 3
TARGETS OF RIGHT WING AND LEFT WING TERRORISTS
TARGET GOVERNMENT MILITARY POLICE BUSINESS RIGHT LEFT US GOVT UNIVER- OTHER TOTAL
WING WING
Res . G
SITIES
RIGHT
WING
3.0
3.0
>4�:
77.6
6.0
10.4
100%
LEFT
WING
11.3
15.9
24.7 '
32,3
4.2
:><
3.8
1.2
6.7
100%
Leftist terrorists, however, went after a
broad range of targets. Commercial establishments
were an important target of the left (32.2%) with
the police a close second (24.7%). By combining
the military and police categories, it can be seen
that the security forces were the main target of
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the left (40.6%). Other targets received scant
attention from the left. Surprising enough, em-
pl,)yees and property of the US government served
rarely as targets of the leftist groups.
A comparative examination of the victims of
the two main leftist groups shows that their tar-
get selection is relatively similar even though
their tactics have been shown to be very different.
Looking at Table 4, the most significant difference
is the emphasis placed upon the security forces
by the two groups. The military and police are the
most important target of the ERP (41.7%). The
Montoneros, however, attacked the security forces
much less frequently (23.8%) than business (47.7%).
A similar table for the right wing would be mean-
ingless since virtually all right-wing incidents
were initiated by one group, the AAA.
TABLE 4
TARGETS OF LEFT WING TERRORISTS
TARGET
RESPONSIBLE
GROUP
GOVERN-
WENT
MILITARY
POLICE
BUSINESS
RIGHT
WING
US GOUT
UNIVER-
SITIES
OTHER
TOTAL
ERP
12.5
27.1
14.6
31.3
8.3
0.0
0.0
6.2
100.0%
MONTONEROS
9.5
9.5
14.3
47.7
7.1
7.1
4.8
0.0
100.0%
ALL LEFT
WING
11.3
15.9
24.7
3.:.2
4.2
3.8
1.2
6.7
100.0%
An analysis of changes in the selection of
the victims by the terrorists over time produces
a trend. Table 5 portrays the targets of the left
wing for each quarter of the year. The figures
clearly show that the left shifted its emphasis
during the year. Business establishments were tar-
getted heavily during the first quarter (46.5%),
but received much less attention during the next
three quarters. The armed forces became the pri-
mary target during the second quarter (36.6%). In
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the third quarter the left shifted its attention
to the police (35.2%) and virtually ignored the
military (7.0%). The police remained the main tar-
get during the last quarter (36.6%), but the mili-
tary again became an important target (17.1%). A
similar analysis for the right wing, however,
shows a different pattern. Table 6 shows that
throughout the year the right focused almost ex-
clusively upon leftist targets.
TABLE 5
TARGETS OF LEFT WING TERRORISTS BY QUARTER
TARGET
---
PERIOD
GOVERN-
MENT
MILITARY-
POLICE
BUSINESSUS
j
UNIVER-
SITIES
RIGHT
WING
OTHER
TOTAL
1st QUARTER
16.3
12.8
15.1
46.5
8.1
100.0%
2nd QUARTER
7.3
36.6
14.6
22.0
4.9
2.4
7.3
4.9
100.09
3rd QUARTER
8.4
7.0
35.2
29.6
8.4
7.0
4.2
100.0%
4th QUARTER
9.7
17.1
36.6
17.1
4.9
4.9
9.8
100.0%
TABLE 6
TARGETS OF RIGHT WING TERRORISTS BY QUARTER
TARGET
PERIOD
GOVERN-
MENT
MILITARY
POLICE
BUSINLSS
US
LEFT
WING
UNIVER-
SITIES
OTHER
TOTAL
1st QUARTER 6.2
75.0
12.5
6.3
100.0%
2nd QUARTER
88.2
11.8
100.61.
3rd QUARTER
5.3
10.5
57.9
26.3
100.0%
4th QUARTER
93.3
6.7
100.0%
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CONCLUSIONS
Conduct of the study demonstrated that simple
quantitative techniques can be applied to the kind
of information received by OCI analysts, irregular
or fragmentary as it may be. In the case of Argen-
tina, by utilizing these techniques, the analyst
was able to make statements of greater precision
than before about the behavior patterns of the var-
ious terrorist organizations and to test the valid-
ity of many "conventional wisdoms" concerning vio-
lence in Argentina, cutting through some of the
fogging of perceptions effected by the media�e.g.,
the wide publicity given what was actually a rela-
tively limited number of kidnapings.
These techniques could be applied to the prob-
lem of international terrorism as well. In this
Argentine study, considerable time was required to
collect the source material and code the data. The
study was made a year after the fact, but could
have been carried on during ongoing screening of
current material. The eventual arrival of SAFE,
with its powerful search capabilities, will make
data gathering simpler.
Further information concerning this project or
techni ues utilized can be obtained from
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FOOTNOTES
1 Examples of academic studies on this subjtlot
include Harry Eckstein (ed.), Internal War; Douglas
A. Hibbs, Mass Political Violence; Ted Gurr, Why Men
Rebel; Brian Jenkins, International Terrorism;
Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change; and Paul
Wilkinson, Political Terrorism.
2 "An Interpretation of Generational Politics:
The Uruguayan Model" Intelligence Memorandum No.
2056/76, 26 July 1972.
3 "An Analytical Model for Assessing the Causes
and Consequences of Political Violence" Research
Project No. OPR-502, August 1974.
4 The information was collected and organized
by Andrea Starr.
5 The coded information was keypunched by OJCS
and the cards were read into the VM interactive
system. The data could then be accessed with a
computer terminal.
7 OCI has recently obtained a data set from
the Inter University Consortium for Political Re-
search (ICPR) containing information on political
violence in Argentina from 1955-1972. The data is
being processed and will be available for analysis
within 4-6 weeks.
8 Bivariate correlation describes the degree
to which two variables are related. The relation-
ship under study is the degree to which a given
change in the value of one variable is always accom-
panied by a certain change in the value of the other.
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For example, if every increase of two units in vari-
able A (such as left wing incidents) is always ac-
companied by an increase of one unit in variable B
(such as right wing incidents) a perfect positive
relationship would exist and the correlation coef-
ficient would equal +1.000. In the same way, if
every increase of two units in variable A is always
accompanied by a decrease of one unit in variable B,
a perfect negative relationship would exist and the
correlation coefficient would equal -1.000. If
absolutely no relationship existed between the two
variables, the correlation coefficient would equal
0.000. A detailed explanation of correlation can
be found in Hubert M. Blalock, Social Statistics,
pp. 273-299.
9 Statistical significance in this case related
to the likelihood that a correlation coefficient
found in our sample of 401 incidents represents the
true relationship that exists between the behavior
patterns of the left and right wing terrorists in
Argentina.
When there is a high correlation coefficient
one can be confident that a relationship actually
does exist. On the other hand, when the coefficient
is below a certain level, one can no longer be sure
that it accurately represents reality. It is pos-
sible that a relatively low correlation coefficient
indicating a weak relationship could be obtained by
sheer change. In this case, the "cut-off point"
is .280.
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APPENDIX
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The data for this study consists of 401 terror-
ist incidents that occurred between July 1, 1974 and
June 30, 1975. The information was collected from
CIA reports, embassy cables, FBIS reports, and open
press material. The information was classified ac-
cording to six major categories:
1. Date of Incident: The period covered by
the analysis--one calendar year--was subdkvided into
52 sequential weeks. Each incident was dated ac-
cording to the appropriate week. An event which oc-
curred on 10 July 1.974 would be grouped with all
other incidents in the second sequential week, that
is the period from 8-14 July 1974.
2. Actor: The political group or organization
responsible for causing the incident. There were
eight categories of actors:
--The People's Revolutionary Army (ERP)
--Monteneros
--Left Wing; this category was utilized
when the specific name of a leftist actor
could not be determined.
--AAA
--Right Wing; this category was utilized
when the specific name of a rightist actor
could not be determined.
--Police
--Military
--Unknown
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3. Type of Incident: The nature of a terrorist
incident. There were five categories:
--Assassination; an incident initiated for
the express purpose of killing a specific in-
dividual, or group of individuals.
--Bombing; an incident involving the use of
explosive device to destroy a building or
facility, or to kill and wound random persons.
--Kidnaping; an incident involving the
abduction of one or more persons.
--Armed Attack; incidents involving shoot-
ings, sniper incidents, small or large unit at-
tacks against an installation, facility, or
persons.
--Other; any incident not falling into one
of the four categories above. For example, a
verbal threat of violence against an individual.
4. Target: The nature of the group or organiza-
tion attacked. There were 16 categories:
--Military; personnel or facilities be-
longing to the Argentine armed forces, includes
retired personnel.
--Police; personnel or facilities belong-
ing to Argentine police forces.
--Government; personnel or facilities be-
longing to local or national government, ex-
cluding police and military. Includes members
of political parties who support the national
government.
--Argentine business; any business establish-
ment owned by Argentine nationals.
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--Foreign business; any business establish-
ment owned by US or other foreign nationals.
--Business, general; any business establish-
ment with nationality of ownership unknown.
--Newspaper; any newspaper publishing firm.
--US, official; any US government employee
on any facility operated by US government.
--ERP
--Montoneros
--Left Wing; specific group unknown.
--University; employees of a university or
buildings belonging to a university.
--Labor; members of a labor union or
facilities owned by a labor union.
--AAA
--Right Wing; specific group unknown.
--Unknown or other; nature of target un-
known. Includes targets not falling into any
of categories described above.
5. Casualties: The number of casualties that
resulted from each incident were classified into 5
separate categories:
--Number of actors killed.
--Number of actors wounded.
--Number of targets killed.
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--Number of targets wounded.
--Number of targets kidnaped.
6. Source: The primary source of information
for each incident. There were five categories:
--FBIS
--Wire Services (Reuters, AP, etc.)
--State Department Cables
--CIA reports
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