NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY WEDNESDAY OCTOBER 6, 1976[SANITIZED] - 1976/10/06

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03005496
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: October 6, 1976

NR
Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 C03005496
The
National Intliigence
Daily
3.5(c)
Published by the Director of Central Intelligence for Named Principals Only
Copy No. 261
E0 13526
3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
E0 13526
3.5(c)
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WEDNESDAY OCTOBER 6, 1976
VOLUME 3, NUMBER 235
3.5(c)
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...TAW-51EGRET
2 WEDNESDAY OCTOBER 6, 1976
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
..FAM 44WOVISWg
THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY
Latin America: Cooperation Among Southern Cone Countries
Circumstance and mutual interest are
drawing leaders of the southern cone
countries of Argentina, Chile, Uruguay,
and Paraguay into closer political and
economic cooperation. The army-con-
trolled governments of these countries
share a ubiquitous fear of communist sub-
version, a growing feeling of isolation
from the rest of the world, and a concern
that they are being abandoned by the US.
Brazil and Bolivia are beginning to par-
ticipate in the relationship, but have reser-
vations for one reason or another. A
close-knit alliance of these countries could
have important implications for the US.
The southern ctnie regimes purport to
be "democratic," but are clearly
authoritarian. The men in power do not
get their support from political groups,
but from the military.
The system is "democratic" in that
"law" determines the proper distribution
of individual, social, and political rights.
There is no question, however, that the
military determines the limit of those
rights.
Most of the military leaders are con-
vinced they can exert a modernizing in-
fluence on government through increased
efficiency and rationality. Most believe
they are better qualified to govern than
civilian politicians.
The views of these military leaders
seem to be coalescing into a still-unfor-
mulated philosophy of military ad-
ministration in which an abhorrence of
disorder, distrust of the old politics, and
dedication to social and economic
progress are the driving forces.
Fear of Subversion
The military leaders believe the
primary national concern should be
security. The principal enemies are leftist
terrorism and international communism.
Preserving the nation, in their view, must
take precedence over personal well-being
and individual freedom.
The preoccupation with security may
seem excessive, but for the countries that
have participated in a struggle against
terrorists, the fight is real. One often-
quoted statistic, for instance, is that
political violence in Argentina took more
lives last year than the total killed in
Northern Ireland during the past five
years. All of the southern cone countries,
to one extent or another, feel threatened
by subversion.
Isolation
Most of the countries suffer from a
poor image in the world press and in inter-
national forums. The military
governments are variously described as
"totalitarian" and "fascist." One
Brazilian government official lamented to
US embassy officers that the Israelis are
praised for staging a raid into Africa
against terrorists, but similar
counterterrorist activities in Brazil are
called excessive and cruel in the world
press.
Leaders in the southern cone also
believe that investigations by unofficial
and official bodies such as Amnesty Inter-
national and the UN Commission on
Human Rights are over-zealous and mis-
guided. The leaders think they should
ARGENTINA
Counterinsurgency Effort
Rightist repression by Argentine police
and security services is reportedly an in-
tegral part of the government's overall
counterinsurgency effort. Earlier, it had
appeared that abuses had been caused by
over-zealous security officials operating
independently from the government.
all securi-
ty and military services are involved and
are cooperating more effectively now than
before. Leftist terrorists are the principal
targets, but countersubversive units also
operate against leftist sympathizers and
others who might give aid to the
terrorists.
Presi-
dent Videla and other senior military of-
ficers apparently condone these activities.
Not all authorized operations are legal,
even under the broad state of siege
provisions in force, but senior officers
believe reining in those involved would
dangerously disrupt the success of the
counterinsurgency effort.
even the non-
official rightist groups now operating in
the country belong to authorized counter-
insurgency units and have a "clearly ap-
proved mission from higher authority."
all counterin-
surgency efforts by the federal police have
approval from higher authority and that
no records are kept on detained in-
dividuals.
The killing in August of 30 suspected
subversives and the subsequent public dis-
play of their bodies was reportedly ap-
proved by the commanding general of the
Buenos Aires regional army corps, the
chief of the federal police, and the police
force's top security officer. President
Videla was said to be disturbed not so
much by the killing of the supposed sub-
versives, but by the publicity it was given.
Advocates of such harsh tactics view
the success the security forces have had
President Videla pins a medal on soldier
wounded in combat against leftist
guerrillas in Tucuman Province
against the left in recent months as
justification for their methods. The
hard-liners will probably take the ap-
parent terrorist attempt to assassinate
Videla last weekend as proof of the need
for further strong measures.
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have the right to eliminate terrorists
without foreign interference.
Chilean leaders in particular are weary
of "international interference," and
profess to see the recent murder in
Washington of former ambassador
Letelier as part of a plot to discredit the
nation. All of these countries believe they
are the victims of an international cam-
paign led by the communists.
Close Cooperation
The original impetus for cooperation
among the southern cone countries
probably came from Chile. Following the
coup in 1973, the Chilean regime was anx-
ious to acquire friends and military equip-
ment for protection against a perceived
threat from Peru.
The Chileans first approached Brazil
and came away with the belief that
Brasilia at least would help indirectly if
Chile were invaded. Santiago then ap-
proached Bolivia and proposed renewed
talks on an outlet to the sea. Diplomatic
relations between the two countries were
re-established in February 1975.
The military coup in Argentina last
March brought Buenos Aires into step
with its neighbors. The Argentines in-
creasingly began talking of "new
realities" in hemisphere affairs and
cooperation among all of the southern
cone countries including Brazil.
After a period of concentration on the
internal security situation and the
economy, the Argentine government
finally felt secure enough early this
summer to implement some new foreign
policy initiatives. In June, the Foreign
Ministry sent carefully selected am-
bassadors to Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and
Paraguay. High Argentine officials also
began visiting around the continent to dis-
cuss topics of mutual interest.
The security organizations of the
southern cone countries were already
cooperating in actions against political
refugees and terrorists. This program ap-
parently began in 1974 when security of-
ficials from Argentina, Chile, Uruguay,
Paraguay, and Bolivia agreed to establish
liaison channels and to facilitate the
movement of security officers to and from
each country.
The campaign against subversion was
intensified in June when the group met to
plan further cooperation. Brazil par-
ticipated in these discussions and
reportedly agreed to become a member.
The extent of security cooperation was
evident this summer during several in-
cidents in which joint countersubversive
operations were mounted against refugees
and terrorists.
Security cooperation reportedly now
has been augmented by an agreement
among the governments of Argentina,
Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay to
coordinate positions on international
political matters, particularly the threat
posed by terrorism and communism. The
coordination will be conducted secretly so
that each country will appear to be
operating in an independent manner. The
group hopes to bring Brazil into the
arrangement.
Current Status of Cooperation
Diplomatic activity in the southern
cone has continued. Argentina and Brazil
reportedly have had discussions on
creating a "South Atlantic Treaty
Organization." This naval alliance is en-
visaged as a defense of the South Atlantic
against the Soviet-Cuban presence in
southern Africa. The Brazilians, so far,
have dismissed talk of an alliance as non-
sense, but rumors persist.
Argentina and Paraguay agreed this
month to increase trade by eliminating
customs barriers. They also said they
would stimulate complementary joint in-
dustrial projects. President Videla met
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with Uruguayan President Mendez and
agreed to increase cooperation between
the two governments in all bilateral fields.
Videla is scheduled to visit Chile and
Bolivia at the end of this month.
Chilean diplomacy continues to be
directed against Peru, but improved
relations between Lima and Santiago
have diminished the urgency of the
Chilean effort. Santiago is continuing to
talk with Bolivia about an outlet to the
sea. Chilean willingness to discuss the
problem and Peruvian intransigence have
improved relations between Santiago and
La Paz.
Chile is working to increase trade
relations with Paraguay and Uruguay. It
is already involved in a Joint Integration
Commission with Argentina and also
hopes to increase trade with Buenos
Aires. Santiago has concluded that the
Andean Pact restricts development and
that there is a better market for Chilean
products in the southern cone.
Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay also
have been discussing trade and coopera-
tion. Brazil and Paraguay already are in-
volved in the construction of the Itaipu
hydroelectric project on the Parana River.
Paraguay and Uruguay have just
launched a joint commission whose first
task is to eliminate customs restrictions
between the two countries.
Many intangibles will affect the extent
of southern cone cooperation. There are
many reasons why these countries would
be drawn together in some sort of an
alliance, but there are also old an-
tagonisms.
The great imponderable is Brazil�the
only country in the area with true global
aspirations. Until now, Brasilia has been
lukewarm toward an extensive alliance
with neighboring countries. Whether or
not Brazil can be enticed into joining the
group may be one key factor in the extent
and direction of southern cone coopera-
tion. A lasting improvement in relations
between Argentina and Brazil would be a
difficult hurdle under any conditions, but
the leaders of both nations may now be
prepared to embark on the task.
Continued perception of mutual in-
terest among all of these countries is the
most important element in the future of
an alliance. A prolongation of terrorist
activities in the southern cone, obviously,
will drive these countries into further
cooperation.
Continued US criticism for human
rights violations will heighten the sense of
abandonment already prevailing in the
area and intensify the feeling of isolation
and frustration. This could foster closer
cooperation and increasing protests
against US interference in internal affairs.
Chilean and Uruguayan leaders have
already suggested publicly that their con-
tinued swallowing of criticism from the
US on human rights issues is not worth
the limited assistance they now get from
Washington.
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