LATIN AMERICA WEEKLY REVIEW 25 NOVEMBER 1977[SANITIZED] - 1977/11/25

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03016869
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: November 25, 1977

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National
Foreign
Assessment
Center
Latin America
Weekly Review
25 November 1977
cret
3.5(c)
EO 13526
3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 13526
3.5(c)
NR
RP ALA 77-067
25 November 1977
Copy
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3.5(c)
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�SECItEr
LATIN AMERICA WEEKLY REVIEW
25 November 1977
CONTENTS
3.5(c)
Argentina
12
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by
the Latin America Division, Office of Regional and Political Analysis, with occa-
sional contributions from other offices within the National Foreign Assessment
Center and from other agencies within the Intelligence Community. Comments and
queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual
articles.
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swIrE-r"
INSURGENCY AND
TERRORISM IN LATIN
AMERICA
3.5(c)
This special edi-
tion of the LATIN AMER-
ICA WEEKLY REVIEW is de-
voted entirely to the
question of leftist
terrorism and insur-
gency in the hemisphere.
It was prepared for regional
specialists in the Washing-
ton community by the Latin
America Division, Office of
Regional and Political
Analysis.
,reitrf
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Introduction
Historically, Latin American Governments have fre-
quently been troubled by some form of insurgency and ter-
rorism. During the colonial period, there were sporadic
Indian uprisings undertaken in the name of human and po-
litical rights against the various local governments.
Following independence, the factionalism and inherent
personalistic approach to government spawned numerous
revolts. Personalism� and the consequent authoritarianism
of the regimes excluded many potentially politically active
people from the governmental process. This situation was
exacerbated by the traditional Latin reluctance to com-
promise on any issue. Vehement vocal opposition to govern-
ment policies in many cases became personal vendettas and
took the form of armed resistance. As a result, armed
struggle became almost a legitimate means to power.
Until recently, the level of opposition to a given
government was cyclical in nature: it began at a low
level when a new government was formed and intensified
the longer that government stayed in power. Following
the government's overthrow, the whole process was re-
peated. Now, however, the various Latin American military
governments seem to have broken this pattern by force of
arms, made more effective by the overall unity and sense
of purpose of the armed forces and the lack of a large,
united, and coherent opposition. The success of the
military seems, ironically, to have resulted from the
increased amount of US assistance to combat insurgency
during the 1960s and the decision by Cuba to limit its
financing and support of insurgent groups after the de-
feat of Che Guevara in Bolivia.
Despite the generally low level of insurgency and
terrorism in Latin America, there are still groups that
can cause problems for or embarrass a number of govern-
ments. In addition to the well-publicized violence in
Argentina, there has been a marked surge in terrorist
activity during the past year in El Salvador and Nica-
ragua, and an increase in Venezuela that is embarrassing
politically to the government there. These activities
so far seem to be locally spawned manifestations con-
ducted with little or no foielgn assistance. Cuba is
continuing to provide limited support to the terrorists,
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but the amount of assistance appears to be negligible
compared to Castro's revolutionary offensive of the
1960s.
Meanwhile, the Revolutionary Coordinating Junta (JCR),
a group formed in 1974 by revolutionaries from Argentina,
Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguary, has taken up the
banner of guerrilla leadership and provides, at least on
paper, a unifying element for the Latin American revolu-
tionary movements. Most JCR representatives are based
outside of Latin America--principally in Paris--and con-
fine their activities to the publication of propaganda
attacks on the military governments. JCR personnel, how-
ever, may have been involved in the series of operations
against Latin American targets in Europe (including the
murder of the Bolivian Ambassador to France) that the
Che Guevara International Brigade conducted last year.
Most of the guerrilla groups seem to have limited contact
with the local Communist parties and, except for periodic
consultation with JCR activists, appear to be operating at
random in their own urban or rural world.
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yrC6T
In contrast to the unruly days of the 1960s, when
the guerrillas expected to challenge the various govern-
ments for power, most of the insurgent groups have now
adopted the more realistic ambition of embarrassing
the governments or forming a nucleus around which other
disaffected, but nonviolent groups could attach them-
selves. This policy, for example, is being followed in
Nicaragua in an effort to wear down the Somoza government
and in Argentina, where the terrorists have long been
trying to gain a following from Peronists, Communists,
and the labor unions.
I Ironically, the United States' espousal of human
rights in Latin America has been coopted by all of the
insurgents to show, first, that the existence of guerrillas
is an indication that at least a segment of the population
does not have human rights and, second, that governments
will reply to any opposition with massive retaliation and
consequent human rights violations. Government repression
of the guerrillas, therefore, has turned into a "damned
if they do, damned if they don't" situation.
Insurgency has been present on the Latin American
scene for centuries and probably will not go away as long
as one violence-prone opposition figure remains. The
military governments have been fairly effective in con-
trolling recent outbreaks, but isolated incidents are
difficult to prevent. The real danger is that some
governments, bedeviled by rampant terrorism, will overreact
with massive repression and human rights violations. This
would further spur both opposition terrorism and govern-
ment retaliation--an endless cycle.
V,ZRET
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3.3(b)(1)
3.3(b)(1)
3.3(b)(1)
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Argentina
In Argentina, the Cubans used their diplomatic pres-
ence--at least until mid-1976--to maintain contact with
several domestic terrorist groups, as well as representa-
tives of the Chilean MIR. 3.3(b)(1)
the Cubans met regularly with representatives ot the
Argentine People's Army (ERP) and the Montoneros during
1974-76. the Cubans provided
funds and propaganda guidance for newspapers published
by the Revolutionary Workers' Party, the political arm
of the ERP. the Argentine security
forces arrested Patricio Biedma, a representative of the
Chilean MIR, in August 1976. Biedma reportedly revealed
that in addition to the $75,000 given to him, the Cubans
had also provided funds to the ERP and to the Montoneros.
3.3(b)(1)
An ERP member
also in August 1976--confirmed that Cuba had given finan-
cial assistance to his group.
The Cubans, however, may have reduced or suspended
their contacts with Argentine subversives since mid-
1976. The confessions of several arrested terrorists
prompted a closer surveillance of Cuban Embassy personnel
by the Argentine security forces. In August 1976 two
Cuban Embassy employees were kidnaped and never found.
the Cubans suspected
that they were killed by rightist elements in the Argen-
tine Government. There have been no reports of Cuban
involvement with Argentine revolutionaries since September
1976. The Argentine Ambassador was assured earlier this
year by Carlos Rafael Rodriguez that Cuba is totally
removed from "current guerrilla and terrorist efforts in
Argentina."
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ARGENTINA
A year and a half ago, the unfettered activities of
terrorist extremists brought Argentina to the brink of
anarchy. The inability of former President Peron to
control the subversives, as well as the chaotic economic
situation, prompted the military takeover in March 1976.
The armed forces so far have inflicted serious losses on
the terrorists, but no Argentine official believes the
war against leftist subversion is over.
The Peoples' Revolutionary Army (ERP), once the most
effective terrorist organization in Argentina, has been
all but destroyed. Its membership has been reduced to
100 activists. The urban-based Montonero organization
has also been seriously hurt by the government's counter-
terrorist campaign--only about 800 members remain--but
it retains the ability to carry out small-scale opera-
tions.
The Montoneros group was formed in 1970 as a Peron-
1st organization with a membership mainly of students,
professionals and, to a limited extent, workers. The
ideology of the Montoneros has tilted gradually to the
left. The group now considers it is engaged in a "popular
war" against "the forces of repression and imperialism."
Most of the top leaders of both the ERP and the Mon-
toneros have been killed, captured, or forced to leave
the country. The loss of leaders and increased official
countersubversive activity directed at eliminating the
Montoneros' ability to work in joint and coordinated
operations have resulted in major organizational changes.
The group has moved away from its past elitist pol-
icies and is now trying to exert influence at the grass-
roots level, particularly among the workers. In this way,
the terrorists hope to take advantage of labor restive-
ness over the government's economic policies. The
Montoneros are trying to take credit for any improvement
offered by the government to the workers. Labor tradition-
ally has been unwilling to cooperate with the terrorists.
Moreover, the current labor difficulties in Argentina
probably have little to do with the Montoneros. Unless
worker unrest subsides, however, the terrorists could en-
joy more fertile recruiting ground and better conditions
for expanding their influence within the unions.
12
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