NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY MONDAY AUGUST 2, 1976[SANITIZED] - 1975/08/02

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03005480
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: August 2, 1975

Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 C03005480
The
National Intelligence
Daily
--T-01P-SECR-0'
3.5(c)
Published by the Director of Central Intelligence for Named Principals Only Copy No.
MONDAY AUGUST 2, 1976
VOLUME 3, NUMBER 180
EO 13526
3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 13526
3.5(c)
NR
3.5(c) TOCRET
Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 C03005480
Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 C03005480
�TOP-SECIRET- 3.5(c)
2 MONDAY AUGUST 2, 1976
WESTIERN HEMISPHERE
THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY
South America: Possibility of Cooperation Against Leftist Exiles
by Jim Buchanan, INR
and Bill Lofstrom, INR
Recent attacks on leftist exiles in
Argentina raise questions about the
security practices of the southern cone
nations: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Paraguay, and Uruguay.
� What degree of cooperation exists
among southern cone security forces?
� Do these security forces actively par-
ticipate or passively acquiesce in a
program to execute political exiles who
oppose any of the governments involved?
The fact that southern cone
governments are all conservative military
regimes and that none has an exemplary
record of human rights invites specula-
tion that there is an intergovernmental
assassination plot. The evidence support-
ing such speculation is scanty, however,
and it is equally possible that at least
some of the exiles' problems are traceable
to exclusively Argentine factors.
In recent months, Argentina has
become a less attractive haven for leftist
exiles than it was before the March 24
military coup that elevated General
Videla to the presidency. After the
Peronists resumed power in May 1973,
opponents of the conservative military
governments on Argentina's borders, and
especially pro-Allende Chileans, swelled
the refugee population in Argentina.
Since the coup, Argentina has been
governed by conservative officers bent
upon eradicating the subversive threat,
and exiles have been victimized by a tri-
cornered battle among security personnel,
leftists, and right-wing assassins. In the
most publicized incidents:
� On May 21, Zelmar Michelini and
Luis Hector Gutierrez Ruiz, ex-
legislators from Uruguay, were found
murdered.
� On June 4, the body of Bolivian ex-
president Juan Jose Torres was discovered.
� On June 11, 24 Chilean and
Uruguayan refugees were kidnaped en
masse and later released after in-
terrogations accompanied by beatings and
threats. On July 12, three more refugees
received similar treatment, and 30
Uruguayan refugees have reportedly been
missing since July 13.
Near panic swept the exile community
in the wake of these incidents,
\ stated thaTno
refugee now considers Argentina a safe
place of residence.
The fact that these events are occurring
in Argentina and not elsewhere in the
southern cone supports the contention
that they are uniquely Argentine in origin
rather than part of an elaborate inter-
national conspiracy. Given the tense and
volatile security environment that has ex-
isted since the coup, exiles can become
victims for a number of reasons:
� They may have been involved in one
of Argentina's terrorist groups.
� They may have been associated in the
past with foreign and/or Argentine leftist
groups, which is sufficient cause for death
in the eyes of fanatical Argentine
right-wingers.
� They may be victims of efforts by
rightist extremists to frighten leftist exiles
into fleeing Argentina.
� They may have run afoul of attempts
by so-called hard-liners to intensify the
anti-subversive campaign, which they
believe the Videla government is not pur-
suing vigorously enough. Far those who
hold this view, the assassination of exiles
would serve a dual purpose--eliminating
alleged security threats and undermining
the Videla government by exposing it to
pressure on the human rights issue.
Official Argentine security personnel
are clearly involved in the anti-exile ac-
tivities, although it is impossible to assess
in what numbers or at what level of com-
mand. An operation like the mass kid-
naping of refugees could not have been ex-
ecuted without police and/or military
connivance. Videla does not condone
or encourage these actions, but neither
does he appear capable of halting them.
Security forces in southern cone coun-
tries undoubtedly coordinate their
counterterrorist efforts insofar as infor-
mation exchanges are concerned, and
Argentina and Brazil may provide limited
training and advisory service to their
smaller neighbors.
Over two years ago, security officials
from all the southern cone countries ex-
cept Brazil met in Buenos Aires and
reportedly formalized arrangements to
facilitate information exchanges and the
movement of security officials. on govern-
ment business.
Cooperation of this nature makes
sense:
� All the southern cone governments
consider themselves targets of inter-
national leftist subversion.
� Irrefutable evidence shows that
terrorists move back and forth across
southern cone borders.
� Terrorists based in Bolivia, Uruguay,
Chile, and Argentina are formally, if
somewhat ineffectually, organized in the
Revolutionary Coordinating Junta. The
Coordinating Junta is primarily a
creature of terrorists in Argentina and,
according to available information, it has
not sponsored any major southern cone
operations. Junta representatives in
Western Europe provide assistance to
terrorists temporarily residing there and
publish propaganda against southern cone
governments.
I cooperation
among southern cone governments to
combat subversion has intensified in re-
cent months.
In early June, representatives of the in-
telligence services of Argentina, Bolivia,
Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay met again,
in Santiago, with Brazilian observers
present, to further organize long-range
cooperation among the participating
countries. The following decisions were
made:
� An intergovernmental computerized
data bank of information on known and
suspected subversives will be established
in Santiago.
� Brazil will become a full-fledged
member of the group.
� Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay will
cooperate covertly against the activities of
the Revolutionary Coordinating Junta in
Paris.
Evidence that cooperation among the
security forces extends beyond legal, in-
stitutionalized methods to some sort of
"Murder, Inc." is inconclusive.
� The 24 exiles kidnaped on June 11 in-
sist that they recognized Chilean and
Uruguayan nationals among their in-
terrogators.
� Edgardo Enriquez, a high-level
Chilean terrorist who reportedly was cap-
tured in Argentina in late March or early
April, may have been turned over to and
subse uentl killed b Chileans.
�
a Brazil-Argentina agreement
under which the two countries hunt and
eliminate terrorists attempting to flee
Argentina for Brazil. Brazilian and
Argentine military units reportedly have
operated jointly and inside each other's
borders when necessary.
� Several reports indicate fairly exten-
sive personnel exchanges between in-
telligence services in Argentina, Uruguay
and Chile.
� Despite Argentine denials, published
charges persist to the effect that Argen-
tine authorities are forcibly repatriating
political exiles.
On balance, the evidence confirms the
existence of extensive cooperation among
southern cone intelligence and security
forces that has intensified over recent
months, and suggests illicit cooperation
against terrorist targets in some instances.
The facts do not conclusively establish
the existence of formal, high-level
cooperation for the express purpose of
eliminating exiles. Nonetheless, given the
common threat perception shared by the
area's military governments, the possibili-
ty that a wider conspiracy exists cannot be
dismissed.
rop SECRET
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