PRESENT POLITICAL SITUATION IN ARGENTINA - 1964/06/30

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06626795
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: June 30, 1964

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS: Jacob� =AMMAN. Director of Prirnera Plana
Ambassador Martin
Mr. Rabenold� Political Counselor
Mr. Peres, Embassy Press Officer (USIS)
DATE: June 30, 1964
PLACE: The Residence
SUBJECT: Present Political Situation in Argentina
Jacobo Timeraan called on the Ambaesador at the residence June
30. He is the Director of Primera Plana, an influential weekly news
review, and a close collaborator of FRONDIZI and FRIGERIO. He likes
to operate as a go-between on matters political.
Timentaa,remarluid that the Ambassador had arrived in Argentina
at an exciting time and that it would become more exciting. He asked for
the Ambassador's analysis of the present situation.
The Ambassador commented briefly on the various problems fazing
the country at the moment, such as the meat shortage, the sugar crisis,
the Plan de Lucha of the CGT. the nil contracts and the budget deficit.
He said that all of these problems, except perhaps the budget deficit
which is the most serious had been unnecessarily exaggerated in the
local press and that tensions had been built up out of proportion to what
was involved. He referred to the views of several reputable sources
that the Government had handled the CGT problem in a smart fashion.
He then asked for Timer-man' s opinion.
Tiroerman began by saying that he would not want to seem imperti-
nent but he dieagreed with the Ambassador's analysis. Before giving his
views on the current situation, however, he wished to relate an experience
which just ended an hour before his arrival at the residence. Last **chime
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day, he said, he met in his office with Bernardo SAS, former Minister of
Labor, and with Leopoldo SUAREZ, and drafted a compromise plan which
the COE might present to the Presiden.t. This plan included a proposal
that the President change some members of his Cabinet. The CGE
agreed to the plea and Suarez felt that he could get the support of the
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military for it. It was then decided to present it to the President to
see if he would agree provided the COT would come along. When the
CGE met with the President on Friday, June Z6 (after having their
interview postponed for 20 days), the President's reaction was that
In general it was a good idea but he did not quite see how he could in
tact put it through. However, he asked them to see Palmer* on
Monday. Palnaero also thought it was a goad proposal and that per-
haps it might be possible to put it through if the COT was prepared to
support it. Bas went to see Atoms* of the CGT. Alone� rejected the
suggestion of a change in the composition of the Cabinet, which in
effect reversed an earlier position of the CG T. while earlier CGT
spokesmen had thought Cabinet changes would do they were now con-
vhsced they would make no essential difference and there must be a
change in Government. This was then conveyed back to the military
with the inquiry whether they wanted to press ahead regardless, or
put pressure on the CGT. The military, on hearing the CGT position,
confessed that they thought it probably made sense.
Alonzo's reasoning was that a change in the Cabinet would not be
accepted by the President, and, even if it were, it would not result an
any basic change in attitude which is what was rewired. Furthermore,
it would place the CGT in the awkard position of having to wait and see
whether the changes resulted in anything substantive and then to decide
what to do next. The rank and file of the CGT might become impatient
Sad troublesome. At this point, Timmerman quoted an Argentine saying
that if labor leaders do not place themselves at the head of the rank and
file, the rank and file will walk away with their heads.
hen asked what the reaction of the military was to the pronosal
of a Cabinet change, Tin-german said that they agreed with Alonso.
Timerman then went on to say why he thought both were correct and
why the solution lay in another direction. He stated that, as the Ambas-
sador indicated, there were problems like the meat shortage, the sugar
crisis, the CGT Plan de Lu.cha and the oil contracts, and perhaps these
had been exaggerated in the press. The clirnate of tension in the country,
however, was not due so much to these problems which were transitory;
it was due basically to the ineptitude of the existing Government (meaning
the UCRP). Tirnerman would not speculate whether President Illia was
uninformed, or if informed, unable or unwilling to act. He merely said
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that the Government spoke same sort of language it might be French.
German or Swiss -- but it was not the language dictated by the situation
in the country. The Administration simply did not understand the
present difficulties and was so fixed in its ideology that it was incapable
of facing up to the problems realistically.
In TimermanIs estimation the only solution was not a change in the
Cabinet but a change in the Government. And the only vehicle for achiev-
ing this was the military. He had a high opinion of the present composi-
tion of the military, pointing out that it was composed of young officers,
all &ad...Peron from top to bottom and controlled by the most capable of
them, the aanlee. For the first time in many years, he said, the military
were united and, with the help of a new generation of young civilian experts,
were capable of constructive action. For example, the railroad problem
was critical and only the military could take drastic decisions necessary
to cut the railway deficit. Timerman did not think, however, that the
military would move at this time. He gave several reasons for this:
(1) Math the military has a general ideology which is anti'
communist and anti-Peron, it has not yet formulated a position
on specific current domestic issues;
(2) The constitutionalist sentiment is strong;
(3) The military would want the support of labor but do not
think they can work with the COT so long as Peron is using it for
his own political purposes (he added that no government can suc-
ceed without the support of labor);
(4) The military would not want to act immediately after
the YPF occupation of the oil fields since this might look like a
"golpe petrolero" for the purpose of protecting U. S. interests.
(5) The situation has not deteriorated enough. The mili-
tary would want to be SUMO of a clear mandate from the people
and not leap prematurely.
hen asked how long the alleged growing crisis would last. Timer-
man estimated a period of two or three months. By September or October
he thought that conditions would so verge on the chaotic that the military
would feel forced to act, especially as a result of increases in the cost
of living.
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with regard to the oil contracts. Tiroerman said that he could not
care less if U. 5. companies lost millions of dollars in their investments
In Argentina. What vitally concerned him and the country as a whole
was whether the Government's oil policy might result in oil importation.
This was the crux of the matter. The importation of oil would have
serious political as well as economic consequences. Turning to the
Government's economic policy as a whole, Timerman thought that Dna, a
approach was from the wrong end. Instead of trying to hold down prices,
the Government should be concentrating Its efforts on greater production
and higher wages. Timerman played down the importance of the efforts
of ELIZALDE and CARRANZA. He looked upon the five-year plan as
window dressing and unlikely to affect the ?resent crisis which was
essentially one of lack of confidence in the Government. Assuming the
five-year plan was adopted. the Government would be incapable of carry-
ing it out.
In addition to the above, Time:roan had a number of sharp com-
ments to make concerning various Argentine personalities wheats names
Caine up in the coarse of the conversation:
Ulla Timerman said that the President had a longs.tinte reputation
as a compromiser. In fact, he has the nickname of.XI Tatedo3ro (the
weaver). This made him especially effective in small-town politics but
has not served him particularly well when face to face with national
problems.
Fros,disi - Tifnerman's admiration of Frondizi was very evident.
rranditti, he said, knew how to operate. He not only moved in the right
direction but was particularly astute in ,,laying one pressure group off
against another. He was also able to attract and develop a competent
and disciplined Lady of young men in national politics. However, it was
a miracle that Frondizi lasted tour years in office, for the military was
against him no matter what be did. BeCat150 of the a-Alitary Timermarz
did not think that Frondizi had a political future. He might succeed in
building up the ZAP. as another factor in Argentine politics, but this
would probably take two years and Frondizi was unlikely to do very much
In the March elections, assuming these took place.
Perette Timermaa stated that ne knew Perette very well. He
obviously did not have a high opinion of hi Tn. He considered him
Incompetent, very ambitious, and prone to making the same *peach
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over and over again about the sacred flag and the national patrimony.
Timernan mimicked some of Perette's eccentricities and related
the episode of Perette reading the wrong statistics in a debate before
Congress.
Pagep Larrays: Timerman described this mast as crazy. Be
said that Pages was close to Perette and that he understood he had gone
to Madrid with some proposal from Perette to Peron.
General Villegas - Timerman mentioned the same of General
Villages several times. Evidently Villages has participated with Timer-
man in recent political discussions and obviously Timerman has a high
opinion of the General and his views.
Bernardo Bee In the course of describing Das' role in the CGE-CGT
discussions of the past week, Timerrnan said that Bae was greatly respect.
ed by labor elements. He is a union lawyer of twenty-years experience
and served as Mbtister of Labor Just prior to the coming to power of the
present Govertunent. Bas is working in Cordoba now.
Senator Caatoni � The Ambassador mentioned that Senator Canton'
of San Juan travelled on the same ship with him to Buenos Aires and
seemed to be a power in San Juan politics. Timerrnan remarked that at
the present time Cantoni does not have as much power in San Juan as the
Ambassador seemed to think.
Senatoy Stutag - The Ambassador also mentioned meeting Senator
Sapag of Ideuqtten. Timenran conceded that Sapag was very powerful in
his Province. He said that many of Sapag's constituents think that he is
the President. This may be due, as the story goes, to the confusion
arnong, some voters in Neuquen between Elfas (Sapag's first name) and
Tit:carman closed his exposition by adopting the Ambassador's use
of the phrase "political thermometer" and stating that the boiling point
In Argentina is vary law. In Chile this situation would probably seem
quite favorable; in Brasil the people would tolerate a lot more. In Argen-
tina, Timer:nen saw little hope for the future. He did not think there
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would be any Cabinet changes. A coalition would not work. The situation
was deteriorating and the military were not prepared to move. Be con-
sidered that the country was entering a political vacuum which might
only serve the purposes of undesirable militant elements. In his estima-
tion this was too bad sincelia could do a lot U he wanted to. He has the
basic good will of the Array which Frondizi never had, and the military
is unified as it has not been before. In spite of everythin� else he said.
Timerman, eaw no alternative for the moment but to support Iltia and
keep him In power. This seemed like a blatant contradiction after
Tircerrnants repeated insistence that the only solution was a change in
Government but was probably dictated by the need to wait until the
military were ready to move. At the end. Timerman revealed many
of the symptoms of acute frustration and, upon taking his departure,
cautioned that his statements were to be treated as "off the record. "
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