MEMORANDUM: TERRORISM IN SOUTH AMERICA AUGUST 9, 1976[SANITIZED] - 1976/08/09

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Keywords: CHILE-I
• Keywords: HUMAN RIGHTS
• Keywords: PINOCHET
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 00201532
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: August 9, 1976

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C00201532
� I A/ c���
. CC
4.
E013526 3.5(c).
/ 76.4- /91/ 4 r-Y\
� CX�44 10145/76:
0751/76
August 9, 1976
35(c)
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Terrorism in South America'
�
Terrorism flourishes on the bones of politics.
It is the delusion of those who lave lost the
capacity to distinguish between hope and death.
Irving Howe "The Ultimate Price
of Random Terror"
MICRO
Modern terrorism invites repression. The guer-
rilla is intent on. provoking his enemy--the govern- rlit4Ly
ment--into acts of counter-terrorism so widespread
and so brutal that the general public becomes alien-
ated from the government and sympathetic to the sub-
versive cause. . The imme:liate goal, according to
Carlos Marighela, the slain Brazilian apostle of urban
'guerrilla warfare, is that "the political situation of
the country will become a military situation, and the
acts of violence, the mistakes and various calamities
that fall upon the people will be put down to 'errors'
by the government bodyguards."
'
, As violence begets violence, according to this wo�
doctrine, the fabric of society is torn apart, demo-
cratic institutions give way to authoritarian decrees, i
and armed repression supplants political freedom.
The aim of terrorism is to make life unbearable for k
ordinary people, in the hope that they will eventually\--
I
This paper was prepared bit the Office of Current
Intelligence, of the Central
Intelligince Agency. All comments and Queries should be
addressed to the author,
�
*4 -
!
Approved for Release: 2018/10/024'600201532
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
3.5(c) .
4!
JJ . 3iimilizigo;irtair utt,,,,,t;t. . , .-
pproved for Release: 2018/10/02 C00201 532 I
. � ,�;
(
' ::';!, ;
. A
become embittered and exasperated with their government
and clamor for change. Such a situation, Marighela
argued, could lead to the seizure of power by the i guerril-
las in what he described as "a climate of collapse."
Employed against colonial regimes, such tactics have
proven successful, as in British-mandated Palestine and
in Cyprus. This hope has not been fulfilled, however,
in any Latin AmIrican nation. Yet, it is precisely in
those countries where political violence has become the
major policy preoccupation--Uruguay and Argentina--that
terrorism has been the strongest single catalytic force
�
in recent military coups d'etat.
As a political weapon modern terrorism dates from
the French Revolution where it was employed by the in-
surrectionary government to instill fear and respect
for new authority in the general populace. Then, as
now, terror consisted of symbolic acts designed to in-
fluence political behavior by extraordinary means, en-
tailing the use or threat of violence. For example,
in Guatemala, Uruguay, and Argentina, leftist guerrillas
placed heavy emphasis on the symbolic nature of their
violent acts--kidnaping and killing military officers
and police chiefs, foreign diplomats, and wealthy busi-
nessmen--both domestic rnd foreign.
;
' The concept of terror may be old, but its effects
are magnified by modern technology. The modern terror-
ist's arsenal includes itcendiary devices, sophisticated
bombs, /Ind hand-held missiles. Modern psychological
studies have provided new techniques of interrogation
and intimidation. More important, the conditions of
contemporary living and space-age communications systems
have facilitated the growth and the impact of urban
political violence. Today terrorists feed on the frus-
trations generated by crowded living conditions domi-
nated by and dependent on technology, and thrive on in-
stantaneous dramatic communication of their acts by the
electronic media.
Television and, to a lesser extent, radio have
given new meaning to the 19th Century anarchist view of
terrorism as propaganda by deed. Now guerrilla groups
can attract national or even world attention to their
cause. The term "guerrilla theater" is an apt descrip-
tion aince terrorism is often drama consisting of:
CONF
TIAL
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C00201532
pproved for Release: 2018/10/02 C00201532,
6 5.�
/51
CONI
*- Carefully staged kidnapings, as in the abduction
of the Born brothers, two wealthy Argentine in-
dustrialists whose seizure by Montonero guerril-
las consisted of an elaborate maneuver designed
to divert their automobile from most of their
bodyguards, in which the terrorists masqueraded
as street construction workers and policemen.
Ritual trials and executions, such as the now
famous killing of US AID official Daniel Mitrione
�
by the Tupamaros in Uruguay, or the "capital pun-
ishment" of US honorary consul John Egan, after
Argentine authorities failed to meet terrorist
demands to show several captured guerrillas "alive
and well" on television.
Newspapers have also been exploited by Latin American
guerrillas. One of the conditions for, the release of the
Born brothers was the publication of a Montonero adver-
tisement in prominent newspapers all over the world.
Roberto Santucho, the recently slain leader of the Ar-
gentine Peoples Revolutionary Army, invited correspond-
ents to guerrilla press conferences. One spectacular
operation in 1973 saw guerrillas seize the editor of a
prominent Buenos Aires newspaper, and insist that the
paper print terrorist advertisements--indirect violation
of a recently enacted ban on news of guerrilla activities.
The newspaper complied with the demands to secure the safe
return of its editor, and in retaliation right-wing omn-
' ter-terrorists sabotaged the printing presses. Farther
afield, the terrorist attack at the Munich Olympic Games
gained its perpetrators the services of satellite-relayed
international television.
' Such events dramatically illustrate the fact that
terrorist tactics are aimed primarily at the people
watching and only incidentally at the victims--who often
are innocent bystanders. The random quality of the vio-
lence heightens the terror and often exaggerates the
actual threat posed by the guerrilla. , In reality, quer-
rilla groups in South America have never posed a direct
challenge to any government. Most of the groups have
! been too small and weak to engage security forces directly,
and in the battles that have occurred, as in Argentina,
!
the guerrillas have taken most of the blows. As one
.scholar has observed, "terror may be the weapon of lonely �
!fanatics or aHhuddle of conspirators intent upon forcing
'history through their own self-sacrifice and other peo-
:pld's blood, but rarely is it the weapon of mass movements
!
CONFI IAL H
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 532
Lialantlhfilft!,
'''--Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C00201532
� .
engaged in public politics."
4
:A
1
A
The two most preminent examples of South American
nations where terrorism currently exists--Colombia and
Argentina--support this viewpoint. Terrorism in Colom-
bia still has many of the characteristics of banditry.
Four leftist groups, most of them based in rural areas,
commit robberies; armed assaults on police outposts and
smalliarmy patrols, and kidnapings--occasionally of
wealthy Colombians or foreigners who are held for ransom
or exploitation. i The guerrilla bands do not constitute
a serious subversive threat, but they are a continuing
source of irritation and concern for security officials.
In Argentin, the Peoples Revolutionary Army (ERP)
has lost it:, image of invincibility after more than a
year of haras3ment by military forces. Hundreds of
guerrillas have been killed--including the leader,
Roberto Santucho--and even more are in prison. The or-
ganization's treasury, once estimated in millions of
dollars, is said to have dwindled to about $100,000.
In addition, the ERP has lost hideouts, weapons, ammu-
nition, and documents containing valuable operational in-
formation. It is doubtful that the ERP will ever regain
its former prominence.
The other major Argentine group, the Montoneros, has
suffered as well. More than seven months have elapsed
since Montonero chieftain Roberto Quieto was captured by
,security forces. During that period the guerrillas have
made no known attempt to free him or to secure his re-
lease. One of the reasons for their failure to respond
may be that Quieto has cooperated with the security of
We cannot determine how much the information pro-
videdby Quieto has hurt the organization, but lack of
,recent violent activity suggests that the leftist Peron-
ist guerrillas are on the defensive.
' The serious reverses suffered by the ERP may force
the remnants of the group to try to link up with the
,Montoneros, who have long advocated a broad-based "Na-
tional Liberation Front." Efforts to form such an alli-
ance in the past failed. The Montoneros, in fact, now
imay be reluctant to affiliate with the survivors because
' they fear the ERP has been penetrated by the police.
Another possibility that is being taken seriously by
South American security forces is that several guerrilla
groups are forging operative alliances to engage in trans-
national or international terrorist activities.
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C00201532
: ! thl 13 9 qtrIti .r.'"1 It 1414,104111112111111141'.10111114461ibakialkillitiq , ,.1*,
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C00201532'-,
rf,-T! I �
.0 .
NT/AL
Official concern has been fueled by recent confirma-
tion of the existence of an organization known as the
Revolutionary Coordinating Junta, consisting of guerrilla
representatives from Bolivia, Uruguay, Chile, Argentina,
and possibly Paraguay. The Coordinating Junta was orig-
inally organized under the leadership of the Peoples Rev-
olutionary Army, however, and despite reports of repre-
sentatives based in several European countries, available
evidence indicates that its headquarters is still in Ar-
gentina and that most of its funds, and probably its mem-
bers, come from the ERP. If it is indeed a creature of
Argentine terrorists, it has probably suffered with the
decline in their activity and strength. On the other
hand the fact that the Junta has not taken credit for
any terrorist operations--as is the customary practice
of individual guerrillaorganizations--does not mean that
it has been inactive. It would appear from captured
guerrilla documents that the organization takes its co-
ordinating function seriously and exists for that purpose
and to provide logistical support to member groups.
It is the fear that individual guerrilla groups
throughout SouthiAmerica will unite that has motivated
the recent intensification in cooperation among security
officials in thelSouthern Cone. At present intelligence
services in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay,
and Uruguay share information on terrorist targets, and
there are reports of plans to cooperate more extensively.
I Despite theifact that guerrillas seem to be losing
the battle in Argentina and are only a minor threat
elsewhere in South America, it is unlikely that terrorism
will disappear. 1Few terrorist groups anywhere have a-
chieved any of their long range objectives, but the use
of (terrorist tactics always attracts publicity and fre-
quently wins concessions.
, In South America, therefore, political extremists
will probably continue to establish links, and form al-
liances, if only for the sake of convenience in particular
operations. The development and deployment of sophisti-
cated small arms and precision-guided munitions and their
likely acquisition by terrorists is a serious new threat.
On the other hand, the fear that terrorists will obtain
and explode nuclear weapons seems to be exaggerated. The
survival of any guerrilla movement is contingent on some
tacit public support. Mass murder would be counterpro-
ductive. Nevertheless, the possibility that guerrillas
will threaten to use nuclear weapons in order to take
'CONF TIAL
41�111,
. . I . .
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C00201532
I
(
(.1 .-� 1 l'itIllr 31( iiii::: .: AlaklittZCItglgight flak:414141 Itif - !!;;;...,. ! i ,
pproved for Release: 2018/10/02 C00201532c,.
i
4
'..,....,,
' ...,..:: !.. ' ! � " r'.� �t;i: ', ..r.',',,", ' `L;;�t';' -�
� :!' �' '' ' -,, . . ' ' 1 ' ;;;;'11' ( t� '�:... rili:','-'!".''' :
',:i, . � ,;.,�
�
TIAL
(,
advantage of a mass hostage situation cannot be ruled
out. (
Until now leftist guerrillas in South America have
not been completely indiscriminate in their use of ter-
rorist tactics, but have restricted their targets to
identified political enemies. In contrast, counterter-
roriats and in some cases government forces have threat-
ened or murdered prominent liberal members of society
not linked in any known way to the guerrillas. This is
of course the response that the guerrillas seek. Yet
some repressive measures are officially justified and
accepted by a frightened population on the grounds that
they reduce the effectiveness and attractiveness of ter-
rorism. Greater government controls over the news media
with regard to reporting terrorist incidents would di-
minish the publicity that terrorists apparently crave.
A tougher official stance on granting political asylum
is already evident in Argentina and Uruguay, and South
American countries in general have taken an increasingly
tougher stance on yielding to terrorist demands.
' Terrorism poses a continuing threat to human lib-
erties and to human life. Last year more people died
in Argentina as a result of political violence than have
been killed in Northern Ireland in the past five years.
In all strategies of terror, there is an inherent tend-
ency toga beyond the limits previously accepted, formally
or informally, by both rulers and ruled. It is just this
"one step further" that makes terror momentarily effec-
tive and, to some people, exciting. Except, perhaps, in
the most disciplined kinds of actions against precisely
selected individual targets, the strategy of terror can
succeed only through a steady abandonment of moral re-
straints. Regardless of the intentions the ter=rists
bring to their act, it tends, out of desperation and
through repetition, to become increasingly unselective.
Indeed it is precisely the increasing unsolectivity that
makes terrorism so frightening.
, There are, however, political limits to the ef-
fectiveness of terrorism. Over forty years ago, one
scholar, J. D. Hardman, defined those limits:
"As a complete revolutionary tactic terrorism has
never attained real success. Governments, whether con-
servative or revolutionary, are not inclined to retreat
before acts of terror directed against key persons. The
will to power is not weakened by the exercise of power,
1
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C00201532
� Aoid?.;i! 4.:20ettlit4AlthPi 'fAt'1.111:1W
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C00201532J
1AL
and positions made :vacant through the explosion of
bombs are readily filled. On the other hand, the will
to revolution requires a stronger fo,7c#, than the heroism
of isolated individuals or even of small, well-organized
groups. The art of revolution must be sustained by the
interested will of (a large proportion of the population
and by concerted mass operations.�
CON ENTIAL
Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C00201532