GAO DRAFT REPORT ON TERRORISM - 1978/12/21

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03250248
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 91
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: December 21, 1978

UNCLASSIFIED
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EUSE ONLY ULuraluENTIAL
fl SECREP
_
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
3.5(c)
�
EXTENSION
NO
FROM:
IAD/TG 3.5(c)
DATE
21 December 1978
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
1 .
Chief, IAD/TG
3.5(c)
�
3.5(c)
.
Assistant Legislature
4. Counsel
.
.
7.
8.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
FORM
3-62
610 USE PREVIOUS
EDITIONS
SECRET CONFIDENTIAL IUNSTEERMY
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El UNCLASSIFIED
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
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36,03 /
21 December 1978
3.5(c)
Assistant Legislative Counsel
3.5(c)
IAD/TG
GAO Draft Report on Terrorism
1. Our initial look at GAO's draft report indicates
several areas concerning intelligence collection activity in
which we believe the writers to be misinformed. For example,
the points made on pages vi, 63, and 74 concerning constraints
on collection on foreign domestic terrorist groups are
clearly misleading. Part of this is the result of GAO's
confusing of "covert operations," and their special require-
ments, with collection activity. Another such example is
the comment on page 72 on differences in CIA and Defense
collection. CIA's requirements procedure is indeed different,
given our unique clandestine collection programs, but it is
no less valid (or "formal") than DIA's.
3.5(c)
2. NFAC/ORPA/IID has been in
touch with us and dropped off his annotated copy of the
study. He indicated his office has a number of problems
with the study, and certainly the NFAC copy is replete with
questioning notes.
3. Also of special note, the subject of a coordinated
Executive Branch response was raised by the Department of
Defense member at the 12 December session of the NSC/SCC
Executive Committee on Terrorism. The Chairman, Ambassador
Tony Quainton, has agreed to address this following the
holidays. We understand that DOD, State, and others will
probably postpone their response to the GAO until after that
get-together.
4. In sum, both IAD/TG and NFAC/ORPA have problems
with the paper which we would like to discuss with the GAO
3.5(c)
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authors. However, we would like to postpone that session
until after the NSC/SCC Executive Committee addresses the
matter.
2
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3.5(c)
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- INTERNAL CONFIDENTIAL
USE ONLY
ROUTING AND RECORD- SHEET
'3.5(c)
RECEIVED " -1-3,12cVAIDED
OFFICER'S
tNTIAiS
�
_
-
Chi f: _
_
IAD/TG
21 December:4978
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom-
to whom. Draw a line across column after. eactr-commen1.)l
Assistant Legislature '
11.1; ..�����141.011.1�
3-62 *.? L j SECRFT rramFInFmTi El INTERNAL
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ri UNCLASSIFIED
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BEST COPY
Available
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
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a
21 December 1978
3.5(c)
Assistant Legislative Counsel
3.5(c)
IAD/TG
GAO Draft Report on Terrorism
1. Our initial look at GAO's draft report indicates
several areas concerning intelligence collection activity in
which we believe the writers to be misinformed. For example,
the points made on pages vi, 63, and 74 concerning constraints
on collection on foreign domestic terrorist groups are
clearly misleading. Part of this is the result of GAO's
confusing of "covert operations," and their special require-
ments, with collection activity. Another such example is
the comment on page 72 on differences in CIA and Defense
collection. CIA's requirements procedure is indeed different,
given our unique clandestine collection programs, but it is
no less valid (or "formal") than DIA's.
3.5(c)
2. NFAC/ORPA/IID has been in
touch with us and dropped off his annotated copy of the
study. He indicated his office has a number of problems
with the study, and certainly the NFAC coliy is replete with
questioning notes.
3. Also of special note, the subject of a coordinated
Executive Branch response was raised by the Department of
Defense member at the 12 December session of the NSC/SCC
Executive Committee on Terrorism. The Chairman, Ambassador
Tony Quainton, has agreed to address this following the
holidays. We understand that DOD, State, and others will
probably postpone their response to the GAO until after that
get-together.
4. In sum, both IAD/TG and NFAC/ORPA have problems
with the paper which we would like to discuss with the GAO
8
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:
authors.- However, we would like to postpone that session
until after the NSC/SCC Executive Committee addresses the
matter.
. .
� ' ,
3.5(c)
2
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DE/Fi
DRAFT OF A
PROPOSED REPORT
WHAT'S BEING DONE TO PROTECT THE 1L$.
DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM?
NOTICE�THIS DRAFT RESTRICTED TO OFFICIAL USE
This document is a draft of a proposed report of the General Accounting Office. It was
prepared by GAO's staff as a basis for obtaining advance review and comment by those having
responsibilities concerning the subjects discussed in the draft. It has not been fully reviewed
within GAO and is, therefore, subject to revision.
Recipients of this draft must not show or release its contents for purposes other than official
review and comment under any circumstances. At all times it must be safeguarded to prevent
publication or other improper disclosure of the information contained therein. This draft and
all copies thereof remain the property of, and must be returned on demand to, the General
Accounting Office.
PREPARED
BY THE STAFF
OF THE
U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
ID- 79-3
GAO Form 515 (1/77)
Replaces GAO Forms 331, 332, and 333
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DRAFT
C o.ntents
Page
DIGEST
CHAPTER
1 INTRODUCTION 1
Nature and level of terrorist
activity 2
Terrorist groups and their
characteristics 4
Scope of review 11
2 HOST-GOVERNMENT POLICY TO COUNTER TERRORISM 14
Law enforcement capabilities 14
Kidnapping and hostage policies 22
Legislative Actions 25
Conclusion 31
3 ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES TO
PROTECT AMERICAN PERSONNEL 33
Crisis management 34
Conclusions 42
Security measures 45
Conclusions 51
Legislative actions 53
Conclusions 61
DRAFT
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4 THE COLLECTION, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING
OF INTELLIGENCE 63
Difficulty in obtaining information 64
Intelligence�sharing between governments 67
Cooperation among U.S. agencies 71
Conclusions 74
ABBREVIATIONS
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
DCM Deputy Chief of Missions
GAO General Accounting Office
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DRAFT UNCLASSIFIED
COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS
DIGEST
WHAT'S BEING DONE TO
PROTECT THE U.S. DIP-
LOMATIC COMMUNITY
FROM TERRORISM?
In recent years, increased terrorism has
become the focus of world attention.
Although extensive publicity has been given
to individual terrorist incidents during
the last decade, there has been a slight
decline in the number of kidnapping-
hostage situations or bombings against the
U.S. diplomatic community.
GAO reviewed terrorist attacks on American
diplomats serving abroad. The study in-
cludes analyses of terrorism and counter-
terrorist programs in Germany, Italy, Greece
Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, Malaysia,
Indonesia, and the Philippines.
DRAFT UNCLASSIFIED
ID-79-3
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,AFT
diCIASSIREll
The decline in attacks against U.S. tar-
gets may be attributed to:
--Improved law enforcement capa-
bilities by countries that have
experienced substantial levels
of violence in the late 1960s
and early 1970s.
--Improved security measures adopted
by U.S. Embassies and consulate
posts.
--The absence of the Vietnam War issue,
which helped the terrorists to gain
popular support.
--Host-government adoption of hard-
line, no negotiation, no concession
policies for kidnapping and hostage
incidents.
Current groups that carry out acts of inter-
national terrorism fall into three broad
categories.
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UNCLASSIFIED
1. Ethnic separatist or refugee
groups, dedicated to achieving and
protecting greater local automony
or total independence or to recovering
lost homelands. These groups have
been responsible for assaults, bomb-
ings, and barricade incidents against
their declared enemies.
2. Revolutionary groups, dedicated
to bringing about fundamental polit-
ical, social, and economic change
in their own countries. These groups
particularly in South America, are
responsible for the majority of
kidnappings of American diplomats.
3. Transnational terrorist groups,
whose political concepts transcend
national borders. These groups in-
clude the Palestinians and the
Japanese Red Army, which are respon-
sible for incidents against American
diplomats in Sudan, Jordan, and
Malaysia.
UNCLASSIFIED 111
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.7\ UNCLASSIFIED
HARD-LINE AND SOFT-LINE POLICIES
Few governments have specific hard-line, no-
concession policies. Analyses of various
incidents shows that government reaction to
an incident largely depends on the circum-
stances surrounding the incident. More
governments have adopted hard-line policies
toward negotiating with domestic revolutionary
groups than toward the transnational terror-
ists. Italy, Colombia, Germany, Argentina,
and Mexico have at one time or another re-
fused to negotiate with domestic terrorists
and the kidnap victims were eventually
murdered. On the other hand, governments
which have been faced with Palestinian
or Japanese Red Army terrorists are in-
clined to bargain, allowing the terrorists
to achieve their operational objectives
or to leave the country.
The United States has a stated no-ransom,
no negotiation policy toward terrorists.
However, demands are rarely placed on the
United States, and so this policy is rarely
iv
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critical in terrorist incidents involving
American diplomats.
CAPABILITIES OF HOST GOVERNMENTS
A number of countries covered -7 in GAO's
review do not have the capacity to control
terrorism because of poor law enforcement
capabilities. Many countries lack adequate
manpower, training, equipment, and intelli-
gence coordination to combat terrorism.
Countries that have experienced some degree
of success have done so at a tremendous
cost in civil liberties, particularly in
South America and Asia.
LIMITED INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION
UNCLASSIFIED
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The intelligence that has been received
by the various agencies having collection
and reporting requirements is apparently
being freely shared among U.S. agencies.
Also, cooperation and sharing of intelli-
gence during and after major incidents
is generally excellent.
ADDITIONAL SECURITY MEASURES
Over the last few years, the United States
has upgraded physical security at many of
its overseas missions. The effect of the
security measures is difficult to measure,
but they have reduced the vulnerability
of these missions to attacks and improved
the protection provided to Ambassadors and
other high-level officials. Nevertheless,
most members of the U.S. diplomatic corps
remain highly vulnerable to personal attack
and some Embassies and consulate posts have
not attained minimum security standards.
vi
71; FIG1
AssIccn
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2:01 A
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One Officer kidnapped and one slain
in Cordoba, Argentina, in 1974 and 1975
Alfred A. Laun III, chief of the United States Informa-
tion Service in Cordoba was kidnapped on April 12, 1974, by
a terrorist probably belonging to the People's Revolutionary
Army. Laun, who had been beaten and shot by his abductors,
was released 15 hours later when the seriousness of his
wounds became evident.
U.S. consular agent John Patrick Egan was kidnapped
on February 26, 1975, by a group of armed men who reportedly
were members of the left wing Montoneros guerrilla organiza-
tion; 48 hours later, when their demands to present safe and
sound four imprisoned Montoneros were not met, they murdered
Egan.
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iAll other E:11=L-fa this
Ipage is UNCLASSIFIED.
CONFIDENTIAL
Argentina
By early 1976, the intensity of political violence
in Argentina had come near that thin line which separates
terrorist violence from civil war. The two major urban
guerrilla groups, the Peoples Revolutionary Army and the
Montoneros, each had an estimated 2,500 combatants, and
had each attracted the active support of some of some
12,000 sympathizers. Both groups had demonstrated a high
degree of coordination in kidnapping business executives
and making commando raids on small towns and military
garrisons.
The most serious effort to combat the terrorists
was probably the establishment of the Argentine Anti-
Communist Alliance, organized by the social welfare minister
in August 1974. The Alliance engaged in the liquidation
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of leftists with the tacit concurrence of the police. The
army also was given a major role in the counter-terrorist
campaign and conducted sweeps against the terrorists in the
provinces.
By mid-1977, the combined military and police counter-
terrorists forces had effectively crippled the two guerrilla
groups, neutralizing their former capabilities to carry out
large-scale military terrorist operations. In late 1977
the military war against the subversives was rapidly
3.3(b)(1)
coming to an end and that 1978 terrorist activity should be
! limited to action
fronts.
on the labor, student, and religious
3.5(c)
3.3(b)(1)
3.3(b)(1)
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Argentina has adopted some of the most stringent pro-
cedures to deal with political subversion. In June 1976,
Argentina's military government ordered death by firing
squad or life imprisonment for anyone found guilty of kill-
ing a government official or a member of the security
forces. Persons sentenced to death would be shot within
27
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4.8 hours of sentencing. The new penal code also authorized
perpetual deprivation of all civil and political rights
for anyone convicted of subversion. Irritated with the
lengthy and often unsuccessful attempts to prosecute the
terroristsi-through civil courts, the government decreed
in November 1976, that the administration of justice to
"subversives" would be handled entirely by the armed
forces, from the collection of evidence to prosecution
and sentencing by special military tribunals.
�Ji
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