THE ROOTS OF VIOLENCE: THE URBAN GUERRILLA IN ARGENTINA - 1975/06/09

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03004986
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: June 9, 1975

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Intelligence Memorandum
The Roots of Violence: The Urban Guerrilla in Argentina
June 9, 1975
No. 0737/75
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June 9, 1975
THE ROOTS OF VIOLENCE: THE URBAN GUERRILLA IN ARGENTINA
A Climate of Violence
Violence is undermining democratic institutions in Argentina. The causes of
this violence go far beyond the conflicts between the political right and left that
have given rise to groups such as the People's Revolutionary Army, Montoneros, and
Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance. These groups operate within a milieu that has
shown a high tolerance for political violence during the past 40 years.
Argentina is not in the throes of a civil war, nor is it trying to shake free of
authoritarian controls. Instead, the frequent recourse to illegal tactics, both by
legitimate organizations and by guerrilla groups, appears to stem from the dashed
hopes of a once optimistic society that has suffered from prolonged economic and
political stagnation and a decline in its ability to influence hemispheric events. The
failure to achieve a great destiny despite an abundance of natural resources and
human talent has produced a pervasive crisis of national confidence. As one observer
has written, "The Argentine people are unsure not only of their capacity for
achievement, but even of their ability to confront the issues dividing them." Since
1930 the inability of national leaders to cope with major social and economic
problems has resulted in seven military coups, recurrent bloody labor disputes, and
recently a high level of terrorism and counterterrorism�perhaps the inevitable
consequence of more than two generations of political drift.
The overthrow of President Yrigoyen in 1930 ended more than a half century
of constitutionally elected governments and gave army leaders a new sense of
identification as rightful guardians of the republic. This "revolution of 1930" also
inaugurated a period of frequent recourse to the use or threat of violence to
manipulate the governmental system through coercion rather than by constitutional
procedures.
Violence has been a recurrent theme in a labor movement that was organized
by socialist and anarchist immigrants in the late 19th century. During the early
1940s Juan Peron quashed dissent by whatever means were necessary for him to gain
control of the unions. In the process of imposing unity, Peron succeeded in making
the labor movement the most powerful political force after the military.
This memorandum has been discussed with the Office of Political Research and the Directorate of
Operations. Comments and queries on the contents of this publication are welcome. They may be
directed to Office of Current Intelligence, code 143, extension 5121.
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A massive Peronist rally in government square. Many of
the groups have since turned against the government of Mrs. Peron.
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During his 18-year exile, however, personal rivalries between union
leaders and policy quarrels began a new cycle of divisive internal strife. The
wave of strikes that started in the heavily industrialized provincial city of
Cordoba in May 1969 was a dramatic manifestation of both resentment
toward the government of General Ongania and tensions within Peronism. Its
high level of violence created a new word�"cordobazo"�and spawned some
of the leftist guerrilla groups operating today, primarily the Montoneros. At
the height of the agitation, the murder of labor leader Augusto Vandor
sparked a continuing series of assassinations that give union conflicts the
, appearance of gang warfare.
Before his return to power in 1973, Peron did not openly encourage
violent opposition to the presidents who succeeded him, but he was reluc-
tant to condemn those who acted against the military governments of
Ongania, Levingston, and Lanusse. He condoned�and may even have
ordered�the abduction and assassination of Pedro Aramburu, the general
who had ousted him in 1955. As political opposition and violence began to
force President Lanusse to become more conciliatory toward the Peronists
during 1971 and 1972, Peron came under increasing pressure from the
government to denounce terrorist assassinations. His usual reaction was to
express shock or disapproval of the particular incident, but to couple this
with a statement charging the government with creating a climate that
fostered violence. On one occasion he commented that if he were 50 years
younger, he too probably would be throwing bombs.
Until recently, Argentina was barren soil for leftist extremists. The
stereotype Argentine was a basically conservative, family-oriented individual
who enjoyed the good life of wine and steak and viewed most political
developments with a mixture of detached cynicism and contempt. Anar-
chism was short lived; socialists and communists were nonviolent. In the
early 1960s Fidel Castro was unable to organize a viable paramilitary force in
northern Argentina.
� There is no convenient explanation for the emergence of guerrilla
movements in the late 1960s. One plausible rationale is that while popular
expectations have apparently remained the same, the ability to satisfy these
desires has dropped because of rampant inflation which inhibits productive
growth and discourages savings. The failure of governments to muster suf-
ficient political support or attract the administrative talent necessary to
engage in effective planning has resulted in justifiable public disillusionment
and dissatisfaction.
The rapid escalation of terrorist violence precipitated a counterterrorist
reaction, as the government of Alejandro Lanusse recognized its inability to
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handle the problem by legal means. Publicly Lanusse denounced the use of
torture, but privately he allowed security forces considerable freedom of
action. Ultimately it was urban terrorism combined with growing labor
unrest, as well as a realization that the army could not govern, that led
Lanusse to conciliate the Peronists and return Argentina to electoral politics
in 1973.
The Urban Guerrilla
The difficulties of operating in a rural environment, dramatized by the
death of Che Guevara in Bolivia, impressed other guerrilla movements in
Latin America. The shift of the guerrillas' activities to the cities was also an
attempt to take advantage of changing social conditions. The rapid growth of
Buenos Aires in the past 40 years has produced a sprawling megalopolis of
approximately 600 square miles. Its vastness not only allows criminals and
revolutionaries to find easy refuge but also absorbs isolated terrorist activ-
ities. This physical climate enables guerrillas to stage numerous terrorist
events simultaneously with relative impunity.
Because Argentine guerrillas commit random acts of violence and abjure
theories of revolutionary "stages" as developed by Mao Tse-tung or Che
Guevara, the government frequently labels them wanton terrorists. In fact,
however, they are skilled propagandists and political tacticians who employ
terror as a psychological and military weapon. This is an important distinc-
tion, since it is their success in winning converts and gaining at least tacit
support from the public that makes them a serious threat to the government.
As violence has increased, two leftist groups have emerged as particu-
larly significant: the People's Revolutionary Army, which has supplanted the
Armed Forces of Liberation as the major Marxist-oriented guerrilla organiza-
tion; and the Montoneros, who have eclipsed two rival Peronist bands.
Specific data on the leadership structure and size of these guerrilla groups are
fragmentary, but current estimates place the strength of the ERP at 500-700,
while the Montoneros are believed to have approximately 1,500 militants in
the Buenos Aires area alone, and at least 15,000 sympathizers nationally.
Despite its comparative smallness, the ERP is the most widely feared
leftist-extremist group. Created in July 1970 as the military arm of the
Trotskyite Revolutionary Workers Party, it has since broken formally with
the Fourth International but retains a strong Marxist-Leninist orientation. Its
leader, Roberto Santucho, confers occasionally with Montonero chiefs, but
he publicly rejects both Juan Peron and Peronism as "bourgeois."
In contrast, the Montoneros identify themselves as Marxist-Peronists.
While they lack the ideological and organizational cohesiveness of the ERP,
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they are stronger politically, having devoted as much of their energies to
proselytizing and legitimate reform as to guerrilla tactics. Unlike Santucho,
Montonero spokesmen Roberto Quieto and Mario Firmenich do not identify
the army as their principal enemy. Apparently, however, they share Santu-
cho's desire to force a military coup, which would allow them to return to
their earlier role as the vanguard of popular opposition to the government.
ERP and Montenero leaders have met occasionally, but the lack of any
known joint operations suggests that their conferences have not been pro-
ductive. In fact, available evidence indicates that the groups are strong rivals
and that the ERP decided to abandon recent efforts to build a rural base, on
the grounds that it had failed to achieve major success and had lost a
psychological advantage to the Montoneros in the cities.
Beyond the fact that individual ERP members have traveled to Cuba,
little is known about the international contacts of the Argentine guerrilla.
Specific information is also lacking on foreign training; it is possible that
none has been required.
To Destroy Is To Create?
The popular view of the urban guerrilla as a romantic nihilist may be an
accurate appraisal, but it does not accord with the way the Argentine leftist
sees himself. Despite the absence of profound theoretical writing and the
apparent lack of ideological sophistication, both major guerrilla groups have
shown exceptional talent and esprit de corps in terrorist operations. It is
their demonstrated expertise, rather than their ill-defined, long-term objec-
tives, that makes them important subjects of study.
The ERP has demonstrated a high degree of coordination in kidnapings
of business executives and commando raids on small towns and military
garrisons. Two of the most impressive operations, however, have been
attributed to the Montoneros:
� The spectacular assassination of the police chief of Buenos Aires,
Alberto Villar, one of the most heavily guarded public officials, in which
only he and his wife were killed in an explosion as they boarded a yacht
near Buenos Aires last November;
� The smoothly executed kidnaping of two wealthy industrialists,
also closely protected. Their automobile was cut off from most of their
bodyguards�a maneuver in which the guerrillas masqueraded as street
construction workers and policemen.
These technically expert operations provide strong evidence for the
view that guerrillas see violence as creative acts rather than as a last resort.
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The philosophy of Franz Fanon often has been echoed in Latin America:
"Violence frees the (individual) from his inferiority complex and makes him
fearless and restores his self-respect.... Terrorism is an act of growing up, not
of adolescent nihilism." If this is an accurate explanation of the attitudes of
Argentine guerrillas, then political labels mean less than psychological
impulses.
Propaganda by Deed
Tile concept of propaganda by deed�which first appeared among
militant populists in 19th century Russia�has been adopted by the extreme
left in Argentina. The underground press conferences and the diatribes
against specific enemy targets in speeches and pamphlets suggest a para-
mount concern with attracting immediate public attention to the cause.
Unlike their rural counterparts, individual urban guerrillas often rely more
on the anonymity of the big cities for survival than on direct support or
complicity of the population. Nevertheless, their actions show that Argen-
tine leftists have great concern for their public image and a desire to win at
least tacit approval for their activities.
The ERP first attracted public notice in the same "Robin Hood"
manner as the Tupamaros in neighboring Uruguay�hijacking trucks and
delivering cargoes of food and milk to the poor. On January 6, 1971�the
Twelfth Night of the Christmas season�the ERP joined with the Armed
Forces of Liberation to distribute stolen toys to children in a Buenos Aires
slum. This particular operation was especially effective, since the police,
acting on behalf of the vandalized company, subsequently had to take the
toys away from many of the children.
Although more violent activities have long been its hallmark, the ERP is
still attentive to public opinion. Several months ago a systematic campaign
of assassinations of army officers was halted as a result of public outrage
over the killing of a major and his three-year-old daughter.
The Montoneros burst upon the scene in May 1970 with the abduction,
"trial," and "execution" of former President Pedro Aramburu�the general
who had sent Peron into exile in 1955. This revolutionary action defined
them immediately as young Peronist militants. Since then, Montonero
leaders have insisted that they are the "true" Peronists, even though they
staged a walkout during one of Juan Peron's last public appearances and have
since formally declared war on Mrs. Peron's government.
By their very nature, urban guerrilla movements are vulnerable to
exploitation by criminal elements. Terrorist groups that resort to kidnapings
for ransom and reprisal killings cannot avoid the danger that some of their
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members will use political labels merely for their own nefarious purposes (or
that common criminals will pose as revolutionaries). To protect their revolu-
tionary image, the guerrilla organizations have been highly selective in taking
public credit for terrorist operations. Spokesmen Santucho, Firmenich, and
Quieto have also sought to avoid being branded as mere murderers and
ruffians, stating that they do not relish violence�an obvious attempt to
justify their use of terror and reassert their ideological motives.
It would be unrealistic to dismiss these statements as simply rhetorical
flourishes, for there is a concerted effort by the guerrillas to link actions and
ideology. The overriding focus on tactics and operations, however, seems to
imply a psychological tendency to become involved in "terrorism for ter-
rorism's sake." The Argentine guerrillas are not known to have developed
any new theories of revolution and apparently look for guidance to Carlos
Marighella, slain Brazilian guerrilla tactician, rather than to Lenin, Mao, or
Guevara. One astute observer of terrorist behavior, Edward Hyams, has
noted that "terror as an attention-drawing tantrum can easily develop into a
way of life. Power of any kind�legitimate or criminal�very soon ceases to
be a means to some good end and becomes an end in itself."
An Aura of Legitimacy
The Montoneros' political orientation and strength have enabled them
to play an effective legitimate role as well as an illegal one. Leftist Peronists,
with Montonero support, fielded candidates in the recent Misiones provincial
elections under the banner of the "Authentic Party." The Montoneros have
also devoted much of their energy to supporting the wage demands of
Peronist laborers through the surface organization of the Peronist Working
Youth. Guerrilla support for these demands, and their related agitation,
produced a widening cleavage between many of the rank and file and the
union leaders who have tried to cooperate with the policies of Mrs. Peron's
government.
While participation in legal activities makes a guerrilla group vulnerable
to charges of "bourgeois softness" and organizational laxity, it is not
uncommon for extremists to try to work within the system. Even the ERP
publicly agreed to a tentative "truce" with the government of Peron's
surrogate, Hector Campora. Such an approach lends an aura of reasonable-
ness to the guerrilla cause and provides extremists with opportunities for
recruitment among disillusioned adherents to ill-fated reformist causes.
Excesses of Counterterrorism
For almost six years, terrorist violence has been a major source of
embarrassment for Argentine governments. Under President Lanusse, the
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failure of security forces ta maintain order in the streets resulted in the
formation of right-wing death squads whose extralegal operations were
officially sponsored or at least countenanced by the military government.
The Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance (AAA), which emerged in August
1974, has achieved greater notoriety than its predecessors, but it represents
merely a continuation of para-police activities against leftists that began as
early as 1970.
The Peronists continue to deny any association with the AAA, even
though Lopez Rega, the power behind Mrs. Peron, is widely believed by the
Argentine public to be its head. In fact, the AAA may not be a unified group
but a collection of several uncoordinated terrorist bands consisting of off-
duty policemen, retired military officers, labor union "goons," and even
criminals. An image of unity has been created, however, because all com-
muniques are issued in the name of the AAA.
The frequent linking of Lopez Rega's name to the AAA has caused
many observers to wonder why he has not been assassinated by the leftist
extremists. Ironically, however, the overreactive nature of the AAA makes
the leftists look good by comparison. In fact, because Lopez Rega is
generally viewed as "someone to hate," he is probably more vulnerable to an
attack from Peronists or another politically respectable group that would
want to get rid of this right-wing strong man who continually thwarts efforts
to create national stability.
Argentine leftist guerrillas are not indiscriminate in their use of ter-
rorism. They have always restricted their targets to identified political
enemies: policemen, army officers, business leaders, and foreign diplomats.
Even the kidnaping and assassination of honorary US Consul John Egan
could be justified in terms of terrorist propaganda, on the grounds that the
Argentine government was unable to secure Egan's release because it had
murdered or disfigured by torture the individuals demanded as ransom.
En contrast, the counterterrorists have threatened or murdered several
prominent liberal members of society not linked in any known way to the
guerrillas. Popular singers, actors, writers, university professors, and even
congressmen have been placed on AAA death lists for supposedly being
intellectual purveyors of Marxism. The use of such lists, coupled with
sadistic ritual assassinations, is effective in cowing many who might con-
ceivably support leftist activities, but it has also dissipated popular support
for the government and threatens to undermine the President's constitu-
tional authority. Moreover, the administration's inability to cope with major
economic and social issues makes the guerrillas important and dangerous
political actors.
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Prospects
Sustained violence has already had a corrosive effect on Mrs. Peron's
government. The preoccupation with terrorism and the left-right splits
within the Peronist labor movement have prevented government officials
from focusing effectively on economic and political problems. Military
leaders have condoned Lopez Rega's meddling in security affairs, despite
their stated objections to his influence, largely because of his hard-line
position toward the left. Ironically, it is Lopez Rega who has handicapped
efforts to improve the efficiency of the police force by promoting incom-
petent sycophants to positions of authority. The failure of Mrs. Peron and
Lopez Rega to conciliate militants within the Peronist labor movement has
enabled the Montoneros to exploit union unrest.
Argentina is probably destined for an army coup sooner rather than
later. And when it comes, the terrorists will escalate their attacks to cause as
much disorder as possible. During the past year, force increasingly has
supplanted reasoned debate in the political arena, and armed confrontation
has taken the place of efforts to reconcile dissenters. The Peronists and other
political parties have once again failed to lead the nation.
In Argentina today, terrorism is a political catalyst that initiates a
vicious cycle of terror and counterterror. Repression rarely produces revolu-
tion, but it can lead to the collapse of consensus and a loss of faith in
democratic ideals.
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