VIEWS OF BRIGADIER GENERALS OF THE ARGENTINE ARMY ON THE ERRORS MADE BY FORMER PRESIDENT LEOPOLDO GALTIERI - 1982/06/25

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06698575
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: June 25, 1982

pproved for Release. 2018/10/01 C06698575
-SFCRET--WNINTEL7-
82 8913653 MSR
TOT: 252014Z JUN 82 CIA 261480
-SFC2E1NOFORN
.252014Z CIA 26148
LL1 �
EZ2:
DIST:
WNINTEL
25 JUNE 1982
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATM TN
REPORT CLASS -SECPET--WNINTEL--
COUNTRY: ARGLNTINA/INTERNATIONAL
SUBJECT: VIEWS OF BRIGADIER GENERALS OF THE ARGENTINE
ARMY ON THE ERRORS MADE BY FORMER PRESTIVNT
LEOPILDO GALTIERI
FLLIGENCE.
1. ON 18 JUNE 1982, THE DAY AFTER THE ARGENTINE ARMY
ANNOUNCED ITS INTENTION TO REMOVE PRESIDENT LEOPOLDO IIGALTIERIII.
THE ARMY'S BRIGADIER GENERALS MET AND DISCUSSED THE FOLLOWING
ERRORS MADE BY GALTIERI'S GOVERNMENT:
A. GALTIERI DID NOT CONSULT WITH THE ARMY LEADERSHIP
PRIOR TO MAKING THE DECISION TO ATTACK THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.
THIS, BY ITSELF, NECESSITATED HIS REMOVAL, BUT HE OBVIOUSLY
COULD NOT BE REMOVED WHILE COMBAT WAS UNDERWAY. WITHIN THE ARMY.
GALTIERI'S SUPPORT DROPPED DAILY WHILE THE FIGHTING CONTINUED:
-SECRET�WNINTEL-
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C06698575
3:5(c
3.5(c
3.5(
3.5(c)
3.5
c)
(c)
3.5
3.3(b)
(c)
5(c)
1)
5(c)
5(c)
pproved for Release: 2018/10/01 C06698575
-SFCRET--WNINTEL--
HIS REFUSAL TO FACE THE FACTS ABOUT ARGENTINA'S DEFEAT IN THE
LAST DAYS OF HIS PRESIDENCY SWAYED THE OPINIONS OF THOSE ARMY
OFFICERS WHO HAD NOT MADE UP THEIR MINDS ABOUT HIM AND LED TO
HIS REMOVAL. THE BRIGADIER GENERALS WERE ESPECIALLY OPPOSED TO
HIS CONTINUING IN OFFICE.
B. GALTIERI DEMONSTRATED VERY POOR JUDGMENT BY HAVING
DECEIVED THE PEOPLE WITH THE GOVERNMENT'S PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENTS
DURING THE RAR: THE ABRUPT SHIFT FROM "GREAT ARGENTINE VICTORIES"
TO "TOTAL DEFEAT- COULD HAVE PROVOKED MASSIVE RIOTING BUT
FORTUNATELY DID NOT. '
C. GALTIERI'S ADVISORS DECEIVED SENIOR MEMBERS OF
THE ARMED FORCES REGARDING THE REALITIES OF THE WAR.
THIS WAS INEXCUSABLE.
D. THE GOVERNMENT'S TALK ABOUT POSSIBLE ALLIANCES WITH
CUBA AND THE SOVIET UNION SCARED THE MODERATES AND EVEN SOME
OF THE HARD-LINE ELEMENTS IN THE ARMED FORCES, THOUGH SOME OF
THE MOST HARD-LINE NATIONALISTS STILL SUPPORT THIS OPTION.
THIS TALK WAS VIEWED BY THE BRIGADIER GENERALS AS IMPULSIVE
BEHAVIOR BASED ON IDEAS THAT HAD NOT BEEN STAFFED OUT AND WERE .
POTENTIALLY CAPABLE OF MOVING ARGENTINA OUT OF THE FREE WORLD
AND INTO THE COMMUNIST ORBIT. -
E. GALTIERI WAS MUCH TOO QUICK IN HIS ATTACKS
ON THE UNITED STATES, ESPECIALLY SINCE HE WAS VIEWED
AS THE PRESIDENT WHO HAD DONE THE MOST TO IMPROVE
RELATIONS WITH THAT COUNTRY. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREE-
MENT THAT RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES HAD TO SUFFER
BECAUSE OF U.S. SUPPORT FOR BRITAIN, BUT GALTIERI
ACTED FOOLISHLY TO MOVE SO FAST IN DESTROYING SO MANY
LINKS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. THE MODERATES WERE
EXTREMELY DISTURBED BY THE JOINT COMMAND'S COMMUNIQUE
NUMBER 166. WHICH SAID THAT THE LAST MINUTE INFUSION
OF U.S. TECHNICAL AID HAD ALLOWED THE UNITED KINGDOM
TO WIN; THIS WAS SEEN AS NEEDLESSLY BAITING THE UNITED
'STATES. THE MODERATES ALSO BELIEVED THAT GALTIERI WAS
OFFENSIVE TO THE U.S. PRESIDENT DURING THE LATTER'S
PHONE CALL ON THE NIGHT OF 1 APRIL. AND THIS RUDENESS
LED THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO BE LESS SYMPATHETIC TO
ARGENTINA. THE MODERATES ALSO BELIEVED THAT THE "GOOD
OFFICES- OF THE U.S. SECRATARY OF STATE NEVER HAD A
CHANCE TO SUCCEED BECAUSE OF GALTIERI'S STUBBORN
INSISTENCE THAT HE COULD RETAKE THE ISLANDS WITH MAXIMUM
GLORY FOR ARGENTINA.
2. THE BRIGADIER GENERALS AGREED THAT THE ABOVE ERRORS MUST
BE RECTIFIED. BUT THEY DISAGREED ON HOW THIS COULD BEST BE DONE.
THEY WERE UNITED. HOWEVER. IN THE BELIEF THAT THE ARMY MUST NOT
COME OUT OF THIS WHOLE AFFAIR LOOKING AS IF IT HAS BEEN WEAKENED
AS AN INSTITUTION.
-SErRET--WNINIEL--
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C06698575
5(c)
�'!-!
3.3(b)(1)
3.
5(c)
(c)
3.5(c)
pproved for Release. 2018/10/01 C06698575 �
-SErnET�WNTNTEL--
HLPUHT CLASS--S F C . c --WARNING NOTICE�INTELLIGENCE cnuRrEs
AND METHODS INVOLVED-
-SECRET�WM:WEL--
3.3(b)(1)
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C06698575