CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/03/16

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02682866
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: March 18, 2019
• Document Release Date: March 28, 2019
• Publication Date: March 16, 1951

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16 March 1951 
Copy No. I - 
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 
RIP 
DOCUMENT NO.   
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.X � 
DECLASSIFIED 
CLASS. CHAI TO: TS S Spa 
NEXT REVIEW nisi E: 
AUTIA 7 ' 2 
DATE/ 
Office of Current Intelligence 
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 
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SUMMARY 
GENERAL 
I. Indiaii Prime Minister takes personal interest in Moroccan 
situation (page 3). 
FAR EAST 
3. French obstructing ECA program in Indochina (page 4). 
WESTERN EUROPE 
4. Communist strength in Austrian police force revealed (page 5). 
CRET 
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GENERAL 
1. Indian Prime Minister takes personal interest in Moroccan situation: 
On 12 March, an official of the Indian Min-
istry of External Affairs read to US Ambas-
sador Henderson portions of a private 
message from Prime Minister Nehru to the 
French Government in which Nehru expressed the hope that France 
would take appropriate steps to ensure the eventual independence of 
Morocco. The official stated that the Syrian Minister and the Indian 
Charge in Baghdad had suggested the move and that the governments 
of the Arab countries had been confidentially informed of Nehru's 
action. According to Ambassador Henderson, Nehru wrote in most 
friendly terms, although he displayed sympathy for the Moroccans 
and other North African nationals. The Ambassador believes that 
Nehru's new interest in North Africa has been stimulated by a de-
sire to strengthen his influence in Arab countries of the Middle East. 
Comment: It is doubtful that Nehru's mes-
sage will have much effect on the French in view of French sensitivity 
to external interference and the antagonism raised by Nehru's earlier 
outspoken criticisms of colonialism in Indochina. On the other hand, 
the message may improve India's position in the eyes of those Arab 
nations which opposed Indian recognition of the state of Israel last 
September. 
FAR EAST 
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3, 
obstruct ECA ram in Inc 
After more than a month's study, French Economic 3.3(h)(2) 
Counselor Penavaire, an old-line "colonialist" in 
General de Lattre's High Commissariat who re-
portedly holds a narrow concept of Vietnamese in-
dependence and is suspicious of US aims in Indochina, is delaying the 
conclusion of bilateral aid agreements between the US and the three 
Associated States of Indochina. Acting under authority based on the 
Franco-Vietnamese agreements of 8 March 1949, Penavaire has pro-
posed amendments to the text worked out by US and Vietnamese repre-
sentatives that are in almost every case identical with those previously 
either deleted or rejected by US negotiators. In reporting this French 
action, Indochina ECA Chief Blum observes that such French intran-
sigence can only reinforce the Asian belief that the Associated States 
are far from being independent of France. 
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Comment: The fact that General de Lattre himself 
has recently expressed suspicions of ECA activities in Indochina sug-
gests that Penavaire's attitude reflects more than the private view of 
one isolated French official. 
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ea 
WESTERN EUROPE 
4. Commtinst strength in Austrian police force revealed: 
An investigation of Communist strength in 
the Austrian police force, 
as revealed that the Interior Minister's policy 
o gra ua y wee mg out Communists (appointed in large numbers 
under Austria's provisional government in 1945) has been much less 
effective than responsible police officials have suggested. 
Comment: This investigation will afford, 
for the first time, a comprehensive picture of the composition of the 
police. According to an unofficial press report, 50% of the adminis-
trative police, 33% of the secret police and 20% of the regular police 
voted the Communist ticket in the police union elections. Discontent 
with economic conditions and with the government can only in small 
part explain this unexpectedly large pro-Communist vote. Although 
the investigation may result in forcing Austrian officials to make 
greater efforts to remove or counteract Communist influence in the 
police, civil service laws and the fear of Soviet retaliation will con-
tinue to hamper these efforts. 
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