CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/04/15

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02003049
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: March 18, 2019
• Document Release Date: March 28, 2019
• Publication Date: April 15, 1951

Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003049
New
TO ET
15 April 1951
Copy No. cy
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
I DECLASSIFIED
CLAS,
DAT:TIt 91 r�171.
A
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
10
Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003049
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
-.Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003049
SUMMARY
GENERAL
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
3. Italian resentment mounting against exclusion from international
councils (page 4).
USSR
FAR EAST
6. US Embassy Rangoon considers Communist threat to Burma serious
(Page 6).
7. French Government continues to play down possibility of Chinese
intervention in Indochina (page 6).
NEAR EAST
8. Violence in Iranian oil fields assumes graver proportions (page 7).
9. Reaction of Egyptian officials to UK defense proposals (page 8).
Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003049
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
iv...Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003049
14.1r rtz
�
GENERAL.
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2
3 -
Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003049
3.5(c)
...Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003049
L;11..CA .L
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
3. Italian resentment mounting against exclusion from international councils:
The US Ambassador to Italy has noted
the exclusion of Italy from the list of
countries which the British propose to
invite to London to discuss joint economic
policy toward Yugoslavia. The Ambassador recommends that, in view
of mounting Italian resentment against exclusion from international
directing councils and the serious domestic political consequences re-
sulting therefrom, it would be wise to include Italy. He also points
out that, althought Italy is not in a position to furnish assistance to
Yugoslavia, her political interest and geographical position are im-
portant in carrying out any Yugoslav aid plans.
Comment: The Italians consider Yugo-
slavia to be an area important1 to their defense and are therefore favor-
able to any economic program which would strengthen Yugoslavia. How-
ever, since the Italians would be opposed to preferential military aid
for the Yugoslays, Italy will continue to seek representation on any
Western policy group dealing with aid to Yugoslavia.
3.3(h)(2)
USSR
Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003049
3.5(c)
4Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003049
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
FAR EAST
3.3(h)(2)
5
T C E E
Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003049
3.5(c)
-nr�
m /Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003049
I
6. US Embass Ra oon considers Communist threat to Burma serious:
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
US Embassy Rangoon reports that there
is no doubt that "positive and effective"
Chinese Communist assistance to insur-
gent Burmese Communists is imminent, if
it has not already begun. The Embassy believes this development poses
a threat to Burmese security which the government is unable or unwilling
to meet, and cites as reasons for its belief (I) the failure of the "dry
season" military campaign even to contain insurgent activities, (2) the
government's inability to enforce effective border controls, and (3) the
refusal of Burmese political leaders to relate Burma's domestic insur-
gency to international Communist expansionism. In view of these con-
siderations, the Chinese Communists appear to be capable of steadily
infiltrating northern Burma and smuggling guerrillas and supplies in
sufficient quantities to turn: the military tide in favor of the insurgents.
The Embassy concludes that such Chinese intervention in Burmese af-
fairs "bids fair to attain Communist objectives in Burma."
Comment: Recent reports clearly indi-
cate that the Chinese Communists intend to assist the Burmese Com-
munists, and that such assistance may already have been made avail-
able. Burmese forces are so heavily engaged and dispersed in lower
Burma that only a relatively small effort would be necessary to bring
most of Burma north of Mandalay under de facto Communist control in
a short period of time. These reports also mention plans of the Com-
munists to establish a "liberated area" in the north, from which they
intend to mount a political and military offensive against the rest of Burma.
7. French Government continues to play down possibility of Chinese inter-
vention In Indochina: 3.3(h)(2)
In commenting on the recently reported
incursion of a Chinese force into the north-
west region of Vietnam, the French Foreign
Ministry and the Associated States Minister
have stated that the French military in Indochina have neither reported
any contact with this force nor confirmed that it is Chinese Communist.
Furthermore, these French officials believe that if the Chinese Communists
Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003049
3.5(c)
TApproved for Release: 201i/03/14 CO2003049
3.5(c)
intended to enter Indochina "in any force," they would probably do so
In the Langson area (northeast of Hanoi). Embassy Paris concludes
from these observations that the French Foreign Ministry "hopes and
expects" that the incident will be passed over as a local matter, and
does not plan to make an issue of it.
Comment: US Legation Saigon reported
its belief in late March that French policy was to play down any reference
to Chinese Communist assistance for the Viet Minh and to ignore the
issue of Chinese intervention as long as possible. The same report indi-
cated that De Lattre hoped the impro ed military situation would make
It possible for him to negotiate with the Chinese Communists 'for cessation
of aid to the Viet Minh. Recently the US Consul in Hanoi expressed the
conviction that De Lattre would continue his efforts to keep US observers
"on the margin of events" from fear of what he considers US "Chinese-
baiting" impulses.
NEAR EAST
8. Violence in Iranian oil fields assumes graver proportions:
3.3(h)(2)
With reference to the recent rioting in the
southern oil fields, Iranian Army Chief of
Staff Garzan has informed U. Counselor of
Embassy Middleton that four brigades of
about 400 men each have been rushed to
Abadan. However, Middleton estimates
that the situation is worsening and that
the�
Iranian security forces are inadequate.
Meanwhile, Embassy London has reported that UK Foreign Secretary
Morrison has been even more forthright privately than he was in his
House of Commons statement abtut taking whatever action is necessary
to protect UK lives and property in Abadan. The UK is sending the
cruiser Gambia from Aden to Bahrein and the two frigates previously
at Bahrein are being moved closer to Abadan. The Embassy believes
that the UK will not hesitate to employ its warships if there is a complete
breakdown of law and order in the oil fields.
Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003049
3.5(c)
'Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003049
11.CA
9. Reaction of Egyptian officials to UK defense proposals:
3.3(h)(2)
According to US Ambassador Caffery in
Cairo, Egyptian Foreign Minister Sala-
heddin has informed
that, while it would be necessary
to consult the Egyptian Cabinet regarding the new UK defense proposals
presented on 11 April, the proposals were unacceptable to him personal-
ly. Meanwhile, the Egyptian Government has imposed a strict censor-
ship over press coverage of the issue, and King Farouk has instructed
top government officials to take no action without consulting him. Am-
bassador Caffery was informed
that Egypt's leaders are aware now as never betore oi tne -reali-
ties of the international situation" and are determined to avoid, if pos-
sible, a clash with the UK; however, they face a difficult problem as to
how far they can go with the Egyptian public.
that, from the standpoint of the Egyptian leaders, no agreement might be
preferable to a bad agreement, and that the Anglo-Egyptian discussions
might therefore be prolonged indefinitely.
Comment: Domestic political considera-
tions within Egypt, as well as in the UK, seem to preclude any hope for
an Anglo-Egyptian defense agreement for some time to come. The pro-
spect for the immediate future is that both sides may tacitly agree to
stalling tactics in order to avoid the repercussions which migitrif result,
particularly in Egypt, if a complete breakdown in the talks occurred.
8
Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003049
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)