CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/06/27

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02733141
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: March 18, 2019
• Document Release Date: March 28, 2019
• Publication Date: June 27, 1951

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/ I kir rill 1
27 June 1951
Copy No. 0 1- -1
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
,q.346131/-'
�1101�
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
DECI A-S3IfrIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO:
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NEXT REVIF W DATE: ___
AUT H: HR 70_
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U:V!EWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
WS Embassies in Moscow and London comment on Malik proposals
(page 3).
FAR EAST
2. �stantial Communist defense construction noted on northwest flanlk
til'Korea (page 4).
3. -US representative in Tokyo expresses concern over Japanese reaction
to revised trtiaty draft (page 4).
4. British plan to defend Malaya (page 5).
� SOUTH ASIA
� 5 India restricts the dissemination of military information (page 5).
6. Soviet-Afghan trade pact fails in its fulfillment (page 6).
NEAR EAST
AIO&s position in Iran deteriorating rapidly (page 7).
WESTERN EUROPE
8. West Germany to begin training 10, 000 border police in July (page 8)0
LATIN AMERICA
9. Argentine revolution rumored prior to 9 July (page 8).
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GENERAL
1. US Embassies in Moscow and London comment on Malik proposalw,
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3.3(h)(2)
The US Embassy in Moscow considers that
Malik's cease-fire proposal represents a signif-
icant change in the USSR's attitude, for it
abandons as immediate conditions for settlement
talitsilbe withdrawal of foreign troops, discussion
of Chinese Communist membership in the UN,
and the disposition of Formosa. The Embassy
comments that because of increasing difficulties
in the Far liastithe USSR and Chinese People's Republic may be willing to
settle-on ld'ss than their previously announced terms. However, the Em-
bassy also notes that this maneuver could be primarily designed to enhance
the alleged role of the USSR as peacemaker and, shoikid the offer result in
talks, would provide a suitable forum for Soviet propaganda themes. While
Mal=ikis talk does not constitute an actual proposal or suggest machinery
for implementation, the Embassy feels it is desirable to investigate any pos-
sible element of sincerity. The Embassy concludes that if the proposal is
genuine, it is possible that the USSR, unwilling to extend the present Cc39-
munist commitment in order to eject the UN forces, intends either W*011 �
off the Korean war as a bad job that can be renewed later under more
orable circumstances or to use a short cease-fire period to improve the
military situation.
The US Embassy in London considers that the
endorsements of the Malik broadcast by the People's Daily, the official
organ of the Chinese Communist Party, indicate prior consultation with the
Chinese and careful preparation in advanceoethe broadcast. .The chief UK
Delegate to the UN has informed the Foreign Office of his belief that the
statement was meant seriously and that, if a meeting is arranged between
the US and USSR, efforts will then be made to bring in the Chinese Commun-
ist Government,
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FAR EAST
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Substantial Communist defense construction noted on northwest flan.
Korea:
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The US Far East Command, in analyzing the
location and nature of recent enemy field work
construction, notes an accent on heavy defen-
sive works opposite the VN northwest flank.
Most of the substantial defensive installations completed or under con-
struction during the past two weeks have been located in the area between
the mouth of theigt."� River and the southwest corner of the "Iron Triangle"
in the vicinity of C. won, and have included sizeable tank traps reinforced
with road-blocks and mine fields, as well as the usual infantry emplace-
ments. The possibility that this line may be used as a holding position in
the next offensive is supported by the absence of significant vehicle move-
ments, troop concentrations or supply build-ups in its rear. Furthermore,
evidence of the concentration and regrouping of forces east and west of
Kumhwa and the enemy's determined defense of his routes of access to the
"triangle's" vital road net point to the central sector as the target of the
main effort when the enemy resumes the offensive.
Coniment: The enemy's preparation of anti-
tank barriers across the approaches to the Pyongyang area is advisable
with the approach of drier weather, which will favor the employment of
superior UN mechanized forces.
3. US representative in Tokyo expresses concern over iapanese reaction to
revised treaty raft: 3.3(h)(2)
The US Political Advisor. in Tokyo states that,
while the revised US-UK draft of the Japanese
peace treaty "does not do undue violence" to the
publicly announced "treaty of reconciliation,"
it nevertheless appears unfriendly in tone and somewhat arbitrary. He
anticipates it will give considerable shock to the Japanese Government and
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people, especially since they/have been led to believe that the only really
onerous provisions of the treaty would be those relating to the former ter-
rictories.He.also notes that any resultant dissatisfaction will primarily be
-directefidjgainst the British and/secondarily, against the US, since the
U? draft that was published in Japan will provide a basis for corn-
parism arid will reveal where and how the US gave way to British pressure.
Comment: In view of the Conservative majority
in both iouses f the Diet, Japanese ratification of any reasonable treaty
seems assured. It is conceivable, however, that a treaty containing unex-
pectedly unfavorable terms might react in the post-treaty period against the
government respousible for the signing, thus paving the way for a return to
power of elements less friendly to the US.
4. laritish plan to defend Mala a:
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3.3(h)(2)
During a recent conference of US and UK of-
ficials in Bangkok, the British Military At-
tache stated that in the event Thailand were at-
tacked by the Chinese Communists, his govern-
ment intended to move British troops into southern Thailand from Malaya
and take up defensive positions across the Kra Isthmus, the narrowest point
of the. Malay Oninsula.
Comment: This is the first indication of Brit-
ish plans for the defense of Malaya in the event of a Chinese Communist in-
-v,aslinn of Southeast Asia.
SOUTH ASIA
India restricts the dissemination of military information:
3.3(h)(2)
The Indian Ministry of External Affairs has ad-
dressed a circular to the heads of diplomatic
missions in India directing service attaches and
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advisors to submit in writing to the Director of Intelligence at their re-
spective service headquarters all requests for military information. Sim-
ilar procedure is required in order to secure permission to visit military
statins units and installations. Attaches are also to inform the Director
of Intelligence whenever they wish to leave New Delhi for any reason, giv-
ing he purpose of their journey, their proposed itinerary and the date of
their return., The circular stressed the necessity for giving adequate
notir of intentions in all cases.
Comment; This directive is in accordance with
other measures being taken by the Government of India to restrict the flow
of military and economic information. It is becoming increasing4 difficult
for US diplomatic and military representatives to obtain required data
6. Sov4et-Afghan ttddie pact fails in its fulfillment;
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_According_ to the US Embassy in Kabul, only
80p, 000 of The 3, 000-�0001gailari Of ganCeRd-"-
uled for shipment by the USSR to .Afghanista,n
before 30 ;Tune. 610.ifideelnelltr-rms of the Soviet-
Afghan f of 150*erL actually delivered by 1 June.
Comment; The exchange of other commodities
covered by this agreement has also lagged. It is believed that by 30 June,
watternithe current Alg.han-Soviet pact officially expires, neither country will
have-fulfilled its commitments under the terms of the pact -- the USSR pre-
sumably because of heavy internal and Chinese demands for its gasoline and
the Afghan Government because of the difficulties of acquiring and assemb-
ling the agreed commodities for shipment to the USSR. Neither country ap-
pears to have made special efforts to ingratiate itself with the other, and no
attempt to extend the life of the pact or to negotiate a new one for 1951-52
has been observed. Accordingly, earlier fears that the pact would result
in the economic d political orientation of Afghanistan toward the USSR
seem to have been unfounded0
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NEAR EAST
AMC" s position in Iran deteriorating rapidit
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The US Embassy in London has been informed
by the UK Foreign Office that, as a result of
the Iranian oil commission's letter to Abadan
Refinery Manager Drake accusing him of sab-
otage, Drake was flown out of Iran on 25 June.
The Foreign Office is perturbed over this news
and fears fit will have grave repercussions on
other Anglo-Iranian Oil Company personnel who
Will feel that they should leave as well. Over the week end, the British Man-
agertof the small AIOC installations at Kermanshah (western-central Iran)
was Ptotiled that he was no longer in authority " cause of non-cooperation,"
Comment� UK Foreign Secretary Morrison tolu
Parliament on 26 Tune thit all tankers have been instructed to leave immed-
iately, if necessary, after unloabling any oil they have taken aboard. Mean-
while� he also announced that the British cruiser "Mauritius" had been
ordered to proceed immediatelir;t0 . the Abadan area, Although the UK is
probably not surprised by the raga detertoratiOn of AIOC's position, it is
now planning on a day-to-day basis.
� Drake's departure and the order recalling all
tankers are direct results of two Iranian moves�, (a) the announcement that
a law would be enacted shortly unei� r which any .L'rson accused of sabotag-
ing oil production was liable to trial by a military court, and (b) the Iranian
refusal to permit any loaded oil tankers to leave without a receipt, signed
by the ship's master, in effect acknowledging Iranian ownership of the oil
transperted. Although Mossadeq has invited the AIOC staff to stay, the con-
ditien6 under which they would operate and the general attitude of the Iran-
ians make it virtually certain that a mass exodus will take place in the next
few days. The result of this will be: (a) the unemployment of approximately
80, 000 Iranian oil workers, (b) a cut of approximately 40 percent in govern-
ment, revenues, (c) the suspension of virtually all oil exports from Iran due
to Iran's lack in tanker shipping, and (d) a complete shutdown of the refinery
due to Iranian inability to manage and run such a complex installation.
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WESTERN EUROPE
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West Germany _to begin training 10, 000 border police in July: 3.3(h)(2)
West German officials take a more optimistic
view of the country's internal security, since
the task of organizing a border police of 10, 000
is now almost completed. They expect that the
establishment of this force will do much to raise both public morale and the
prestige of the Federal Government, and comment that they have already
noted a favorable public reaction. Organization of this force, which will
begin training by 15 July 51, has caused the Interior Ministry to abandon at-
tempts to amend the basic law to permit the formation of a federal emergency
police. The Ministry states that if an augmentation of the security force is
ever required, it would prefer to increase the size of the border police,
rather than establish a new force.
Comment: The attempt to organize a federal
emergency police, which was originally authorized by the Western Foreign
Ministers, foundered on the op oosition of the German states to centralized
contr 1 of the police. As a result, federal officials secured parliamentary
approval in March 1951 for the formation of this new federal border police,
which is also designed to serve as the main federal force for mai taining
internal_ security.
LATIN AMERICA
9. Argentine revolution rumored prior to 9 July:
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ports that: (a) there are many rumors of a
"blowup coming prior to 9 Lily," (b) Domingo
Mercante, retired army colonel and Governor
f the important Province of Buenos Aires, re-
port dly has the strong backing of several top generals, and (c) the bulk of
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the army is against Peron. He comments that all signs indicate that a
critical situation is rapidly building up, and that "tension is mounting over
the- Peron-Evita election.
Commetite This confirms previous reports of
the tense political situation in Argentina. Mercante is known to have some
support among high-ranking officers, but there has been no indication that
non-commissioned officers and enlisted men would support a revolt against
the Perons at this time. Peron, however, has recognized the threat to his
regime, and has taken precautionary measures,, such as increased surveil-
lance over top-level army officers, the replacement of the police chief of
the Province of Buenos Aires, and numerous arrests of civilians.
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