CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/03/24

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02733108
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: March 18, 2019
• Document Release Date: March 28, 2019
• Publication Date: March 24, 1951

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24 March 1951 
Copy No. CI -1 
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 
DOCUMENT NO. 
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DATE. tEVIEwER: 
Office of Current Intelligence 
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 
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SUMMARY 
GENERAL 
1. Deputy Foreign Ministers' meeting approaches crucial stage (page 3). 
2. Increase in Satellite military strength reported (page 3). 
FAR EAST 
4. Bao Dal resigns himself to French domination (page 4). 
NEAR EAST 
6. Egyptian Government concerned over Iranian developments (page 5). 
LATIN AMERICA 
7. Argentina's attitude makes Hemisphere Defense Plan unacceptable to 
Brazil (page 6). 
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GENERAL 
1. approaches crucial stage: 
During an informal discussion with the 3.3(h)(2) 
Western delegates on 22 March, Soviet Dele-
gate Gromyko plainly indicated that his present 
Instructions were definite on the necessity of 
emphasizing the reduction of armaments question and of including the 
German demilitarization point as a separate agenda item. (He indicated 
for the first time, however, that he might agree to including the latter 
point as the second rather than the first agenda item.) The Western 
delegates rejected the Soviet position regarding both of these items. 
Gromyko asked repeatect,whether the West would make any new proposals 
and, although the Westerri delegates replied negatively, the British and 
French delegates hinted at a possible new formula on the German demili-
tarization item. In US delegate Jessup's opinion, Gromyko has not yet 
said his final word but is holding fast in the expectation of some Western 
concessions. 3.3(h)(2) 
2. Increase in Satellite military strength r9orted: 
( 
The March Imminence of Hostilities Confes3tq(25-
ence of the US Military Forces in Europe 
has reached the conclusion that an analysis of 
all available factors does not indicate any 
Imminent hostilities on the part of the Soviet Union. The conferees agreed, 
however, that continuing increases in the strength of the Satellite armies 
and the appearance, for the first time, of jet aircraft in a Satellite air force 
(i.e. Poland) reveal that Satellite offensive capabilities are becoming a 
significant factor in the East-West power alignment. They pointed to the 
following significant increases in Soviet/Satellite military strength in 
Europe-. (a) an increase of 30,000 in Soviet Ground Forces in Germany 
between February 1950 and March 1951; (b) an estimated increase in 
Czech army strength from 116,000 to approximately. 160,000 during the 
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next two months', (c) the addition of a tank division to the Hungarian army; 
and (d) the growth of the Rumanian army from 190,0000 to 205,000. The 
conference noted that the reported arrival of 40 Soviet YAK45 jet fighters 
In Poland marks the first appearance of Russian-made jets in any European 
Satellite air force. 
FAR EAST 
3.3(h)(2)-
4. Bao Dai resigns himself to French domination: 
In an interview with US Minister He th, Ba3.3(h)(2)o 
Dai described General ee Lattre as a "neces-
sary evil," whose military leadership is 
indispensable but whose authority will not 
lead to a solution of French-Vietnamese problems. The Emperor believes 
that it would be useless to press for Vietnamese control over Vietnam's 
armed forces at this time and that De Lathe's conception of Bao Dal's 
role is that of a "protectorship sovereign," on the order of the Sultan of 
Morocco. Bao Dai observed that the arrangements being made for the 
defection of as many as 15,000 Viet Minh troops in a body will probably 
fail, because De Lathe is likely to insist that they surrender directly 
to French authorities rather than to Bao Dai � a condition that would 
be unacceptable to the potential defectors. The Emperor states that he 
must therefore "efface himself" and make no "compromising" public 
appearances at this time. 
Heath comments that, while Bao Dai is pro-
bably right in believing that he cannot successfully resist the tendency 
of De Lathe's advisors to maintain Vietnam as a closed preserve of the 
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French, the mperor's decision to withdraw to his hill-station head-
quarters at Dalat is "too easily arrived at." 
NEAR EAST 
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Comment: Hussein Ala was reluctant to 
become Prime Minister and the cabinet he has gathered together is a 
weak one, .with some of the critical posts still vacant. While the Com-
munists in Iran do not seem to have been implicated either in Razmara's 
death or in several subsequent acts of terrorism, they have begun to ex-
ploit the present situation by inciting pro-nationalization and anti-Western 
demonstrations and by spreading propaganda linking the US to Razmara's 
assassination, 
6, Egyptian Government concerned over Iranian developments: 
3.3(h)(2) 
According to US Ambassador Caffery in c4,iro, 
top political circles in Egypt re increasfingly 
concerned over developments in Iran. Caffery 
reports that, while government officials are 
inclined to blame the Britishtolt company, they and opposition leaders are 
genuinely alarmed at the possibility that the Moslem Brotherhood will re-
vive assassination-type politics, which, under the guidance of the Commu-
nists, it would direct against Egyptian leaders, Caffery adds that Egyptian 
political leaders do not know how to deal with this situation. 
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Comment. Recent events in Iran will hardly 
lead to public violence in Egypt. Nevertheless, the expanding activities 
of the Moslem Brotherhood during the past year, its increased dissatis-
faction with the government, and its long-term antipathy against foreign 
influence in Egypt furnish an adequate basis for concern that it might use 
this opportunity to resume its terrorist activities in Egypt. 
LATIN AMERICA 
7. Argentina's attitude makes Hemisphere Defense Plan unacceptable to 
Brazil  
3.3(h)(2) 
fr 
Comment: Argentine reluctance to send 
armed forces outside its own territory does not preclude some Argentine 
patrol activity along the South Atlantic sea lanes, although it could not 
extend so far from Argentina's coast as would be desired. Brazilian, 
and possibly Uruguayan, failure to go along with the proposed plans for 
inter-American defense would be an added deterrent to the speedy and 
successful conclusion of the coming Foreign Ministers Meeting�in which 
these plans will be discussed. It is possible, however, that Brazil is not 
contemplating such action and that the Brazilian Foreign Minister had 
adopted the above position in an attempt to get more US naval units for 
Brazil. 
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