CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/04/10

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02733113
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: March 18, 2019
• Document Release Date: March 28, 2019
• Publication Date: April 10, 1951

Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2733113
%moo 'tarrO
10 April 1951
Copy No.c�q
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE LLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
I DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANCED TO: TS
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HR 70-..�t9
DATErt4r elf 7111:V;7::ER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
y
TO
El'
Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2733113
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
or4p1J
proved for Release: 2011/03/14 CO2733113
SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. Embassy Moscow sees possibility of indirect Soviet inter-
vention in Korea under cover of Mongolian "volunteers' assis-
tance (page 3).
FAR EAST
2. Chinese Communists sponsoring a "Kachin State" (page 4).
WESTERN EUROPE
3. US Ambassador pessimistic about Spain's defense capabilities
(page 4).
4. Militancy waning in Italian Communist Party (page 5).
2
Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2733113
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2733113
GENERAL
I. Embassy Moscow sees possibility of indirect Soviet intervention
In Korea under cover of Mon olian "volunteer" assistance:
3.5(c)
ofr
Embassy Moscow believes that the USSR3.3(h)(2)
may attempt to bolster the Chinese Com-
munists and still avoid direct Soviet involve-
ment in the Korean war through the de-
vice of providing "volunteer" assistance from the Mongolian Peo-
ple's Republic to the North Korean and Chinese Communist forces.
Such an intervention would merely be a mechanism cloaking actual
Soviet participation in the Korean war, since the ostensibly Mongolian
units could in fact consist of Soviet army or air force units containing
nationals of various yellow races in the Soviet Far East and Central
Asia. This intervention would be welcomed by the Chinese and could
alleviate criticism of the USSR which has undoubtedly developed with-
in the Chinese Communist Party and among the Chinese people in
view of the heavy losses in Korea caused by Soviet failure to pro-
vide sufficient planes and equipment.
In the Embassy's opinion, inauguratira
of effective Communist air intervention:from across the border
should be recognized on the one hand as "final, and total abandon-
ment by the Chinese People's Republic of willingness for a nego-
tiated settlement," and on the other hand as an "unequivocal act
of war against the UN."
Comment: In response to questions
concerning the alleged Soviet plans to utilize a "volunteer army"
including Mongolians in Korea, the Department of the Army has
commented that (a) the Mongolian People's Republic has an army
of about 30,000, with some token mechanized elements and an air
arm of sorts; (b) this force could be increased to a strength of
100,000 by utilizing other Mongolian personnel; and (c) it is doubt-
ful that more than five well-trained divisions of Soviet Mongolians
could be formed at this time. No all-Mongolian units are known
to exist in the Soviet armed forces, and few of the Soviet Mongoloid
nationalities would be trained in technical skills (which the Chi-
nese Communists also lack).
-3
Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2733113
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: CO2733113
FAR EAST
2. Chinese Communists sponsorths a "Kachin State":
3.5(c)
Comment: The Peiping regime may be 3.3(h)(2)
contemplating the establishment of a Kachin "autonomous area"
in Chinese territory adjoining Burma, similar to nominally autono-
mous areas established for other minorities in southwest China.
'Recent Chinese Communist propaganda directed at the Kachins in
China has been stressing the "separate state" theme; furthermore,
It is known that the Chinese Communists are indoctrinating, train-
ing and equipping the followers of Naw Seng, the Kachin rebel
leader from Burma. A Kachin State in China, with minimum visi-
ble Communist controls, would appeal to Kachins residing in Burma
and Assam, and could be exploited to further Chinese Communist
imperialist ambitions with respect to these areas. Information
has been steadily accumulating from numerous sources indicating
Chinese Communist preparations for limited intervention in Burma.
WESTERN EUROPE
3. US Ambassador sessimistic about
The US Ambassador in Madrid has for-33(h)(2)
warded the following statements from a
report of his Air Attache: "The Spanish
Air Force possesses only two radar sets.
Anti-aircraft exists only in project form. Present flying equipment
- 4 -
TC,?$ECIIET
Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2733113
3.5(c)
T Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2733113
rA,n.e. I
would last only a few days. The majority of the Spanish Air Force
have never seen a jet." In the Ambassador's opinion, a comparable
situation exists in the Spanish Navy and, to a slightly lesser degree,
In the Army. He comments that it is becoming increasingly obvious
that Spain will be incapable of defending the Pyrenees or any other
line unless it is given military equipment and assistance.
Comment: The US Ambassador's com-
ments are believed to be completely accurate. For more than a
year; service attaches in Madrid have emphasized that Spain could
only briefly delay an attack by a strong, modern military force. In
March 1951, US Army Intelligence estimated that Spanish forces could
delay a ground attack through the Pyrenees for a maximum of two
weeks.
4. Militancy waning in Italian Communist Party:
3.5(c)
Italian Communist leader Secchia ad-
mitted at the party congress on 5 April
that insufficient zeal and a devotion to 3�3(h)(2)
sectarianism or opportunism on the part
of even the most active Italian Communist militants were hindering
the active development both of the party and of Communist-dominated
"front" organizationl such as the General Labor Confederation and
the Partisans of Peace. He also admitted that the party might have
to send militants from Communist strongholds in North Italy to the
southern districts in order to build up party prestige in those areas.
The US Embassy in Rome comments that
Secchia's admissions confirm its belief that the Italian Communist
Party has lost much of its momentum and that the decline in enthu-
siasm among the masses and even among party militants may pre-
vent the Communists from enlisting the support of the majority of
Italians in their campaign against the Atlantic Pact.
Comment: Secchia's statements confirm
the increasing lack of interest in Communist Party activities pre-
viously reported as prevalent among provincial elements of the
-5
Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2733113
3.5(c)
IN
J
Ell
Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2733113
z1/4.,nr. I
party. Party discipline, however, will probably ensure that these
elements, despite their lack of zeal, vote "correctly" at the forth-
coming municipal elections. The Communists will probably not be
able to remedy the lack of militancy confronting the party unless
economic conditions deteriorate.
6
Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2733113
3.5(c)
3.5(c)