CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/05/01

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02003055
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: March 18, 2019
• Document Release Date: March 28, 2019
• Publication Date: May 1, 1951

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1 May 1951
Copy No.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
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I I DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 106 43.
AUTH: HFI 70;.2
DATE, A 11).._ REVIEWER
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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GENERAL
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1. Western delegates consider Soviet agreement at Foreign Ministers
Conference unlikely (page 2).
FAR EAST
2. Current lack of Communist aggressiveness in Korea deceptive
(page 2).
3. Communists may be saving air� arm for strategic reasons (page 3).
4. Comment on Chinese Communists' seizure of British Asiatic
Petroleum Company Properties (page 3).
NEAR EAST
5. Shah of Iran appoints new Prime Minister (page 4).
EASTERN EUROPE
WESTERN EUROPE
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GENERAL
1. Western delegates consider Soviet agreement at Ministers Conference
unllkeI (-25'
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The three Western delegates at the Deputy Foreign
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Ministers' Conference have expressed their personal v$
views that the Soviet performance in Paris renders
unlikely agreement with the USSR at a Foreign
Ministers' meeting, should one be held. French delegate Parodi believes that
all the USSR sees in a meeting now is its propaganda value and the opportunity
It presents to "split" the West, upset plans for a German military contribution,
hinder Western rearmament, and prevent any Italo-Yugoslab settlement of the
Trieste question. Parodi suggests that under present circumstances a Foreign
Ministers' meeting might be dangerous. British delegate Davies questions
whether the USSR still wants a Foreign Ministers' meeting except for propaganda
purposes, since the USSR now knows that it cannot stop a German military con-
tribution and the rearmament of the West. The British delegate suggests that
the USSR may be using Four Power negotiations to determine whether to shift
to a full war economy and to play for time while awaiting the possible effects of
the Korean offensive and the political situation in the UK and France. Davies
adds that the UK definitely wants a Foreign Ministers' meeting, since British
public opinion insists that a meeting be held and because the UK believes there
is a faint chance of agreement with the USSR at such a meeting. The delegates
have tentatively discussed a direct approach to Moscow in an atte1.914 to reach
agreement on a Foreign Ministers' agenda. The US delegate adds4he Communist
propaganda indicates a possible Soviet proposal for a Five Pow' conference.
FAR EAST
2. Current lack of CommuniseSireneastiinteaide.QOPLitie:
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The Intelligence Staff of the US Far Eastern Command,
in an estimate of the enemy's capabilities, warns that
the enemy's "quiescent attitude" of the past 48 hours
"must not be construed as an indication he has spent
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his offensive effort." The estimate adds that all evi-
dence points to an early resumption,of the offensive
and cites the extremely heavy southward movement of
vehicles in the enemy's rear (over 2, 800 during the
night of 29-30 April) as an indication of such intentions.
Communists may be saving air arm for strate ic reasons:
CINCFE Telecon The Intelligence Staff of the US Far Eastern Command,
30 Apr 51 speculating on the enemy's "surprising failure to
utilize his air arm in coordination with the current
ground offensive, "believes that, while intensive UN
bombing of North Korean airfields and adverse weather conditions may have in-
fluenced the enemy's decision, the present enemy air inactivity over:Korea
could be a "deliberate stand-down for mechanical preparation." If this be the
case, the enemy may be readying his air arm for "commitment when the forward
drive of his present ground offensive fails" or for employment "in defense of
supply lines as they are automatically extended thus countering what in the past
has roved his foremost vulnerability.
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Clammerat: Less than 50 Soviet-type MEG jet aircraft
were encountered over northwestern Korea during the period of the current
Communist offensive.
4. Comment on Chinese Communists' seizure of British Asiatic Petroleum
company Properties:
The wording of Peiping's announcement requisitioning
the properties in China of the British Asiatic Petroleum Company indidates that
the Communists are retaliating against the British for their seizure of the tanker
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Yung Hao in Hong Kong on 7 April.
This 15, 000-ton tanker, after being repaired in Hong
Kong for the Chinese Nationalists, was taken over by a Communist crew.
British authorities seized the vessel with great reluctance and only after strong
US representations that the tanker would be militarily useful to the Communists.
With Hong Kong businessmen and officials already nettled as a result of US
controls on trade with the colony, the present consequences of yielding to
pressure in the Yung Hao case may further embitter feeling in Hong Kong toward
the US. Hong Kong is also concerned over the future consequences of its action
in a parallel easef�pe disputed ownership of 71 formerly Nationalist aircraft now ,
claimed by the Chinese Communists. The vigor of Peiping's reaction to the
Yung Hao seizure may weaken the effect of US pressure on Hong Kong to deny
the aircraft to the Communists.
NEAR EAST
5. Shah of Iran appoints new Prime Minister:
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The Shah has appointed Dr. Mohammed Mossadeq
Prime Minister following the recommendation of the
Senate and Lower House. Mossadeq, leader of the
National Front, has crusaded for natipnalization of the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and his appointment came immediately after the
Majlis (Lower House) had voted for the company's expropriation. He has
started to form a cabinet and draft a party program, and has instructed police
to permit May Day demonstrations.
Comment: The appointment of Dr. Mossadeq, the
champitin of oil nationalito be Iran's next Prime Minister illustrates
the strength which the desire to nationalize Iran's oil has attained in Iran.
Prime Minister Mossadeq gives little promise of bringing stability to Iran, even
though he is apparently the only candidate who can obtain sufficient support from
the Majlis at this time. The Shah was virtually forced to appoint him, and the
Majlis, which is normally disunited, will probably not continue to support him for
long. Mossadeq, an idealist, is devoted to the principle of non-intervention by
foreigners in Iran and to freedom of expression.
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T%.RET
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EASTERN EUROPE
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WESTERN EUROPE
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