CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/06/15

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02003071
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: March 18, 2019
• Document Release Date: March 28, 2019
• Publication Date: June 15, 1951

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15 June 1951 
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 
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'DOCUMENT NO. 
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 
; DECLASSIFIED 
NEXT REV:EDN DATE: 
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ALITH: HR 
REVIEWER: 
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Office of Current Intelligence 
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 
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SU140-AR 
GENERAL 
FAR EAST 
4. Viet Minh admits discontent within its ranks (page 4). 
EASTERN EUROPE 
5. Rankovic visiting Western European countries (page 5). 
6. US warns Yugoslavia of dangers in establishment of Albanian refugee 
committee (page 6). 
WESTERN EUROPE 
7. Franco's present position believed secure (page 6). 
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GENERAL 
FAR EAST 
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4. Viet Minh admits discontent within its ranks  
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A official broadcast of 6 ,Tune by the Demo-
cratic Republic of Vietnam (DR V) reproved its 
military "cadres" for not appreciating the ob- 3.3(h)(2) 
sta,cles to victory and for net-understanding 
their close alliance with the world communist 
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movement for peace against the "imperialist warmongers. In the case of 
rank-and-file troops, a cert4in lack of combativeness was criticized. 
Comment: On previous occasions the central 
authorities of the DV have indulged in "criticism and self-criticism." 
However, they have never Wore come so close to admitting the existence 
of discontent and war-weariness at the lower echelons and among the rank-
The admission that the source of discontent is the implementation of inter - 
national Communist as opposed to nationalist policies is especially sig-
nificant. Probably only a continuing suspicion of French intransigence on 
the issue of independence prevents large-scale defections from the Viet 
Minh. 
EASTERN EUROPE 
5. Rankovic visiting Western European countries:  
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� Yugoslav Minister of Interior Rankovic has 
left Belgrade on a vacation trip of, several weeks 
to Switzerland, France, Belgium, Holland and 
the UK. Ambassador Allen in Belgrade had been 
informed that Rankovic was urged to make the trip by leading Politburo mem-
bers in the belief that he should become better acquainted with western life. 
Since Rankovic is generally regarded as responsible for the repressive 
measures of the regime, Allen believes that Tito also felt the visit would en-
able Western officials to form a better impression by meeting him, since he 
is personally affable and mild-mannered. Allen notes that Rankovic has been 
endeavoring recently td overcome the security police stigma. 
Comment: 
Since the beginning of 1951 there have been 
numerous visits to the West by high-ranking Yugoslav visitors. These visits 
probably have several objectives: (I) to gain internal IsuppOrt for the regime 
among non-Communists by demonstrating the close association of the West 
with the present leadership; (2) to make the regime more palatable to the 
West by bringing Yugoslav leaders into direct contact with Western officials; 
and (3) to promote closer ties between Yugoslav Communism and Western 
Socialism. 
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US warns y'ug9slav,ia,oteziagger4s esta.Plishment of A 
mittee; 
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anian refugee  
The Department of State has informed Ambas-
sador Allen in Belgrade that the recent estab-
lishment of an Albanian refugee committee in 
Yugoslavia runs counter to basic US interests 
in the area. The Department fears that this action may lead to a direct 
conflict of interests between Yugoslavia and the US. Ambassador Allen is 
instructed to point out to the Yugoslav Government that, if the activities 
of Albanian exiles in the West; as alleged by Yugoslavia, are likely to pro-
voke a Soviet move against Yugoslavia, the danger is obviousl/ much great-
er when such activity JO Sponsored by the Yugoslays themselves. The US 
Government is therefore concerned over the possibility that Yugoslav 
creation of an Albanian exile organization may heighten tensions in the area. 
cont: As late as 12 June a Yugoslav For-
eign Office iesiteittl reiterated to Ambassador Allen his government's con-
cern regarding Western support of resistance activities in Albania on the 
grounds that disturbances there would give Bulgaria an excuse to intervene 
under the Bulgarian-Albanian Mutual Assistance Pact. 
WESTERN EUROPE 
7. Frano'srs� pqston believed secure: 
The UK Foreign Office concurs in an estimate 3.5(c) 
from the British Embassy in Madrid that Franco 
Will remain in power much longer than his-crle-. 
mies predict and that if he is overthrown it will 
more likely be by a militarYr junta than by his 
"ineffectual political opponents." The US Am-
bassador in Madrid agrees with this estimate 
and states that the diminution of the strike move-
ment, along with the virtual certainty of good harvests and the hope of an ad-. 
ditional Export-Import Bank loan for wheat, makes Franco's position seem 
firm. 
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Cuoiguat4 Continuation of Army support would 
enable Franco to remain in power indefinitely. The principal non-Commun-
ist opposition forces) aware that the peaceful change of regime they desire 
can be effected on/Y by the Army, hope that the strike movement can be con-
tinued and that it can be made sufficiently effective to convince the Army 
that a change is essential. The net effect of strike movement on Franco's 
political position is not clear at this time, but there is considerable evidence 
that the Church is becoming increasingly outspoken in its criticism of the 
regime, especially of its press and labor controls. 
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