CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/03/21

Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
02733107
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
U
Document Page Count: 
6
Document Creation Date: 
March 18, 2019
Document Release Date: 
March 28, 2019
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
March 21, 1951
File: 
Body: 
Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2733107 TO ET 21 March 1951 Copy No. c/-9 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN DOCUMNY NO HO CHANGE IN CLASS. I DECLASSIFIED c cHt.,NGED TO: DATE TS S Cliperf REV;::'.,^.1 : AUTH: HR 70..;2 ant, DATE. )2�_,' Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY TO ET Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2733107 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c), 3.5(c) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 20i19/03/14 CO2733107 frci SUMMARY GENERAL 1. Possible Soviet diplomatic "feeler" regarding Korea (page 3). FAR EAST 4. US B-29 encounters night attack (page 5). 5. Indonesian Prime Minister resigns (page 5). LATIN AMERICA Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2733107 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) 3.3(h)(2) 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) 3.5(c) IOW Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2733107 Tqd.1) uitir GENERAL 1. Possible Soviet diplomatic "feeler" regarding Korea: � According to the Israeli delegatio3.3(h)(2) at the UN, at an Israeli reception on 14 March Soviet delegate Malik twice took the initiative in raising the Korean question. Malik reportedly asked an Israeli delegate for his views regarding the possibility of a settlement of the Korean war and appeared to be interested in the en-. suing conversation, although no specific suggestions were made by either participant. The Israeli delegation was struck by Malik's re- peated references to the current Paris meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers and thought Malik showed "great awareness" of the con- nection between the Korean problem and the Paris conference� 3.5(c) Comment: This is the only Available report of a Soviet "feeler" at the UN regarding Korea in recer0 months. Since the Israelis were active during the January attempt at mediation between the US and Communist China, the USSR may well have approached the Israeli delegation in order to gain information as to how firmly the UN is behind its Korean objectives. British UN Delegate Jebb has suggested that Gromyko be approached in Pais concerning a possible Korean settlement, but the US, British and French deputies recently agreed that it was not advantageous to do SO. 3.3(h)(2) Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2733107 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2733107 T rim I 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) 3.3(h)(2) FAR EAST Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2733107 3.5(c) el OM Tioke itigyfooved for Releile.:L9/03/14 CO2733107 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) 4. Us B-29 encounters night attack: 3.3(h)(2) A US medium bomber flying a night harassing mission over northwestern Korea on 17 March was attacked by from three to five enemy aircraft at 16,000 feet. The engagement began northwest of Pyongyang at midnight, with the enemy breaking contact ten minutes later just north of the 3.3(h)(2) 38th Parallel. The bomber's air crew reported that the enemy air- craft displayed aggressiveness and flew at a high rate of sueesIL Comment: This is the first in- stance of night interception of a UN aircraft. The tactics and speed demonstrated by the attackers suggest that the enemy fliers involved possessed an advanced degree of training and that jet aircraft were employed. Enemy use of radar may have been involved, or this may have been a chance interception by some kind of special night patrol. The incident is another indication of a current step-up in enemy air efforts. 5. Indonesian Prime Minister resigns: TOP On 20 March Prime Minister Mohammed Natsir tendered his resignation to President Sukarno. ET Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2733107 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) � II TrApproved for Release: 2019%03/14 CO2733107 %,,,��er 1/4....nz 3.5(c) Comment: The fall of the Natsir Cabinet presages the probable emergence of a coalition government that will include representatives of Natsir's Masjumi Party and the Indonesian National Party. The latter party is highly nationalistic and has been increasingly supported by Communist-oriented groups. As a result of its influence, the government will probably move towards the left and display a less cooperative attitude toward the i3.3(h)(2) LATIN AMERICA Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2733107 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c)