SITUATION APPRAISAL: ANALYSIS OF VIETNAMESE ATTITUDES IN WAKE OF VIET CONG ATTACK ON SAIGON

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 00193265
• Document Creation Date: January 28, 2019

C ErApproved for Release: 2019/01/17 CO01932-65
Intelligence Information able
IN
PRIORI TY
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THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT. NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.
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060148Z *,
. DIST. '.9 FEBRUARY 1968.
� COUNTRY 5.SOUTH VI ETNAM-
;� DO( ':6 FEBRUARY: 1968..
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SUBJECT -SITUATION APPRAISAL: ANALYSIS OF VIETNAMESE ATTITUDES
ACO
SOURCE
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IN WAKE OF VI.ET CONG ATTACK.,ONSAIGON.
CUR.
VIETNAM, SAIGON (6 FEBRUARY 1968) - . FIELD NO.
� . � �� .
- STAFF OFFICER OF THIS ORGANIZATION. THIS IS AFIELD APPRAISAL
OF Tr RENT_
SITUATION.. . IT ,IS 'NOT AN OFFICIAL . JUDGMENT BY
THIS AGENCY OR ANY COMPONENT . . IT REPRESENTS THE OBSERVATIONS , �
AND INTERPRETATIONS OF A STAFF OFFICER BASED ON I NFORMAT I ON
"AVAILABLE TO )1IM.THEJIMEOF ITS PREPARATION. �
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SUtv'MARY: THE. MOST SI.GNI Fl CANT DEVELOPMENT AND ..PERHAPS.. THE .
DECISIVE FACTOR IN THE FAILURE OF THE VI ET CONG (VC) ASSAULT PLAN
� HAS BEEN THE ALMOST TOTAL LACK OF POPULAR SUPPORT FOR THE VC
� - �
t EFFORT. 'PEOPLE HAVE BEEN IMPRESSED WITH 11-1..THE. STRENGTH SHOWN BY THE
PI .
ki VC BUT .ENRAGED BY ItIE1 R VIOLATION OF THE TET. PERIOD. � TH.EY NOW SEEM
.. . : ..
fil TO. REALIZE THAT TOE VC ARE NOT 70 BE T.Ry7p. FOR MApY., IT WAS
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THEIR FIRST PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE VC TERROR ABOUT WHICH THEY HAD
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HEARD BUT TO WHICH THEY FELT IMMUNE. ,POPULAR ATTITUDES
T OW ARD THE GOVERNMENT (GVN) ARE MIXED. THE GVN -IS FAULTED FOR
. . ,
. _
HAVING BEEN CAUGHT UNPREPARED BUT ITS REACTION TO TH5. VC �ASSAULT
�
SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN WELL RECEIVED. THE THREAT OF A VC! TAKEOVER HAS
TENDED TO MUTE POLITICAL DIFFERENCES AND, FOR THE MOMENT AT LEAST
TO CREATE A SEMBLANCE OF UNITY. HOWEVER,:THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO DATE
THAT ANY IMPORTANT GROUP IS SUBLIMATING VITAL INTERESTS. THE ULTIMATE
REACT ION WILL PROBABLY DEPEND HEAVILY ON HOW THE GVN HANDLES THE
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS CAUSED BY THE ATTACK: VARIOUS bl./N
OFFICIALS ARE BEING CRITICIZED AND IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT THE
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY MAY UNDERTAKE AN INVESTIGATION TO AFFIX BLAME
FOR REAL OR ALLEGED SHORTCOMINGS ONCE THE .SITUATION HAS RETURNED TO ,
NORMAL. THE ATTACK HAS PROMOTED TEMPORARY UNITY AND OFFERS A CHANCE
TO CONSOLIDATE IT, BUT THE FORCES DIVIDING. VIETNAMESE STILL REMAIN
STRONG. OVERALL REACTIONS TO THE U.S. ROLE ARE FAVORABLE, BUT A
SURPRISINGLY LARGE NUMBER OF VIETNAMESE BELIEVE, OR PROFESS TO
BELIEVE, THAT THE U.S. SOMEHOW CONNIVED WITH THE VC.. VARIOUS AND
CONTRADICTORY REASONS ARE ADVANCED. ONE POSSIBLE EXPLANATION IS THAT
MANY VIETNAMESE ARE CONVINCED THAT NOTHING HAPPENS � IN
SOUTH VIETNAM
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UNLESS THE AMERICANS WANT IT TO HAPPEN. HOSTILITY TOWARD AMERICANS
COULD BECOME A SERIOUS PROBLEM IF CONTINUED VC ATTACKS IN SAIGON _
SHOULD REQUIRE STRONG U.S. COUNTERMEASURES IN HEAVILY POPULATED �
AREAS, WITH A RESULTING. HEAVY. TOLL IN CIVILIAN CASUALTIES AND PRO-
PERTY DAMAGE. ND SUMMARY.
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1. THIS REPORT ATTEMPTS TO COLLATE VIETNAMESE OPINIONS TOWARD THE REC
ENT ATTACKS BY VIET CONG (VC) FORCES ON THE CITY OF SAIGON. (PROVINCIAL
ATTITUDES WILL �BE COVERED IN A SEPARATE REPORT.) NATURALLY, IT IS DIFF-
ICULT TO GENERALIZE ABOUT POPULAR PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTIONS, ESPECIALLY
TO A STIMULUS OF SUCH SUDDENNESS, COMPLEXITY AND MAGNITUDE. EACH INDIVI-
DUAL HAS SEEN BUT A SMALL PART OF THE OVERALL PICTURE; HIS FIRST REAC-
TIONS HAVE BEEN SHAPED LARGELY BY THESE LIMITED PERSONAL EXPERIENCES,
OCCASIONALLY COLORED BY ESTABLISHED PREJUDICES.OR INTERESTS. THOSE
WHO HAVE SUFFERED HEAVY PERSONAL LOSSES UNDERSTANDABLY HAVE DIFFERENT
EXOTIONAL FEELINGS THAN THOSE WHO HAVE MET THE DANGER VICARIOUSLY.
FINALLY, IT IS NECESSARY TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN ATTITUDES WHICH ARE
SCRT RUN AND SUPERFICIAL AND THOSE WHICH WILL HAVE LONG-LASTING
EFFECT. MORE OVER, SOME ATTITUDES ARE CONDITIONED PRIMARILY BY THE
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DESIRE TO GAIN PERSONAL POLITICAL ADVANTAGE OR TO ADVANCE A .PET IDEA
OR PIQUE. IT WOULD BE UNREALISTIC TO.; EXPECT OTHERWISE.
2. OPINIONS, OF COURSE, ARE. BASED:.-ON WHAT,..PEOPLE THINK THE SITUA- -
TION IS, AND THIS. MAY BE �QUITE DIFFERENT FROM ACTUAL FACT. IN ANY
FAST MOVING AND LARGE-SCALE OPERATION RUMORS ARE ALWAYS RAMPANT, A
CONDITION WHICH CONTINUES PREVALENT N SAIVN .AT THIS TIME. THE
GENERAL LACK OF NEWSPAPERS DURING MUCH OF THIS PERIOD, AND THE PROBLEMS
-INCURRED BY RADIO SAIGON, HAVE ADDED TO THE ACUTE LACK OF FACTUAL IN-
FORMATION' AVAILABLE TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC AND, �INDEED; TO MOST, ELITE
GROUPS. ANY ANALYSIS ALSO SUFFERS FROM THE LIMITED SAMPLING -OF �
OPINIONS AVAILABLE. WHILE THERE HAS BEEN A SIGNIFICANT :AMOUNT-. OF
REPORTING, THERE ARE ALSO OBVIOUS' GAPS9 ALTHOUGH OPINIONS .HAVE
BEEN RECORDED FROM- A GOOD CROSS SECTION OF THE POPULATION, IT WOULD BE
DIFFICULT FOR EXAMPLE, TO COME .TO .DEFINITE,CONCLUSIONS AT THIS TIME
AS TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUP VIEWS, BETWEEN CATHOLICS AND BUDD-
HISTS, BETWEEN NORTHERNERS AND SOUTHERNERS, AND BETWEEN THE WEALTHY
AND THE POOR. DESPITE THESE AND OTHER LIMITATIONS IdE BELIEVE
IT IS POSSIBLE TO. MAKE CERTAIN GENERALIZATIONS AND 'HAZARD SOME INTER-
PRETATIONS.
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3. FOR THE PURPOSE OF ORDERLY ANALYSIS WE HAVE DIVIDED THE REPORT
INTO MAJOR SUB-SECTIONS: ATTITUDES OF THE VIETNAMESE TOWARD THE
VIET CONG ATTITUDES OF THE VIETNAMESE TOWARD THEIR GOVERNMENT, AND
ATTITUDES OF THE VIETNAMESE TOWARD THE AMERICAN PRESENCE.
"ATTITUDES OF THE: VIETNAMESE TOWARD THE VIET CONG"
4. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENT AND PERHAPS THE DECISIVE
FACTOR IN THE FAILURE OF THE VC MASTER PLAN HAS BEEN THE ALMOST TOTAL
LACK OF POPULAR SUPPORT FOR THE VC.EFFORT.' PRACTICALLY ALL SOURCES
COMMENT ON THE REFUSAL OF THE POPULACE TO SUPPORT THE VC CALL FOR A
POPULAR UPRISING, EVEN IN THOSE PORTIONS OF THE CITY WHICH WERE
TEMPORARILY UNDER VC CONTROL. TO THE CONTRARY, THERE IS EVIDENCE
THAT INDIVIDUAL CITIZENS TOOK CONCRETE ACTIONS TO OPPOSE THE VC. SIG-
NIFICANTLY, MANY OF THESE ACTIONS WERE TAKEN BY VIETNAMESE FROM
THE LOW INCOME GROUPS, THE VERY CLASS THE VC WERE COUNTING ON FOR MAX-
IMUM SUPPORT. IN ONE CASE, THE VC TOOK REFUGE IN A CYCLO DRIVER'S
HOME IN GIA DINH. THE CYCLO DRIVER MANAGED TO ESCAPE, DIRECTED ARUN
FORCES TO HIS HOUSE AND TOLD THEM TO DESTROY IT IF NECESSARY TO GET
RID OF THE VC. A GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) POLICE REPORT STATES
THAT INDIVIDUALS IN. THE BAC HA DISTRICT DENOUNCED SUSPECTED VC MEMBERS
TO THE AUTHORITIES, AND IN HANG XANH DISTRICT, GIA DINH THE VILLAGERS
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ATTACKED SUSPECTED VC MEMBERS WITH STICKS..AND CAPTURED SIX OF THEM.
IN OTHER CASES CITIZENS REPORTED THE PRESENCE OF A VC UNIT ON A ROAD
LEADING TO THE QUANG TRUNG MILITARY TRAINING CENTER IN HOC MON DISTRICT,
GIA DINH, AND VILLAGERS IN. GIA DINH ALERTED POLICE THAT A COMPANY-
SIZED VC UNIT PROBABLY WOULD LAUNCH AN ATTACK ON A POLICE FIELD FORCE.
STILL ANOTHER SOURCE, A BUDDHIST, REPORTS.THAVINCIDENTS OF THIS SORT
HAVE BEEN FAIRLY COMMON IN THE CATHOLIC :AREAS OF THE CITY. FINALLY
A VIETNAMESE ARMY COMMANDER STATED THAT:..dN ALL HIS VISITS TO SUBORDI-
NATE UNITS HIS LIEUTENANTS HAD INFORMED HIM THAT THEY HAD SEEN NO
EVIDENCE OF POPULAR SUPPORT FOR THE VC..
5. SUCH DIFFERING POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS PERSONALITIES AS TRAN
VAN TUYEN, THICH TAM GIAC AND NGUEYN VAN NGAI FEEL THAT THE VC
SADLY MISREAD THE MOOD OF THE PEOPLE AND, CONSEQUENTLY WERE SORELY
DISAPPOINTED BY THE ALMOST TOT AL ,LACK OF SUPPORT AMONG ALL POLITICAL,
RELIGIOUS AND ECONOMIC GROUPINGS. SOME VIETNAMESE BELIEVE, AS DOES
NGAI, THAT WHILE THE VC MAY HAVE WON A PSYCHOLOGICAL VICTORY ON THE
INTERNATIONAL SCENE, IT HAS SUFFERED A NET PSYCHOLOGICAL LOSS IN ITS
01,4N BACKYARD.
6. THERE ARE SEVERAL CONTRIBUTING ELEMENTS IN THE "NET LOSS". THE
VC SURELY LOST CONSIDERABLE SYMPATHY BY VIOLATING THE SPIRIT OF TET.
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THIS VIEW IS WELL SUMMED UP IN THE STATEMENT OF A MIDDLE-AGED
VIETNAMESE NURSE WHO HAD PREVIOUSLY EXPRESSED TOLERANCE FOR VC ACTS
r--,ECAUSE. "THAT IS THE WAYAL SOLDIERS ACT." SHE SAID, "THE VC DELI-
BERATELY SPOILED TET BY KILLING INNOCENT CIVILIANS AND BURNING HOMES.
THEY DID IT AT A TIME WHEN ALL VIETNAMESE. WANT A FEW DAYS OF PEACE
AND CELEBRATION WITH THEIR FAMILIES. ALL THIS WOULD BE BAD AT ANY
TINE BUT IT IS VERY, VERY BAD TO DO SUCH THINGS AT TET. EVERYONE WITH
WHOM I HAVE TALKED IS VERY ANGRY AT THE VC AND FEELS IT WILL ALSO
BRING BAD LUCK FOR THE COMING YEAR. IT IS LIKE ,AN EVIL MAN BEING THE
FIRST GUEST OF A FAMILY ON TET, WHICH MEANS EVIL AND BAD LUCK. FOR
THE REST OF THE YEAR."
7. SEVERAL SOURCES HAVE EXPRESSED THE VIEW. THAT THE VC BROKE A
MYTH WHEN THEY RENEGED ON THEIR PROMISE FOR A SEVEN-DAY TET TRUCE.
THESE SOURCES CLAIM TO HAVE TALKED WITH A NUMBER OF PEOPLE WHO PRE-
VIOUSLY BELIEVED VC STATEMENTS BUT NOW SAY THAT THE VC WILL NO LONGER
BE TRUSTED. IN SIMILAR VEIN, FOR THE FIRST TIME MANY PEOPLE IN
SAIGON WERE ABLE TO COMPARE STATEMENTS MADE ON THE NATIONAL LIBER -
AT ION FRONT (NFLSV) RADIO WITH NFLSV ACTION, AS EXEMPLIFIED IN THE
VICIOUSNESS OF THEIR ATTACK ON THE CITY. THE � CREDIBILITY OF NFLSV
RADIO BROADCASTS HAS SUFFERED. ONE SOURCE STATED THAT MANY OF HIS
FRIENDS WHO HAD LISTENED TO THESE BROADCASTS REALIZED THAT THE INFOR-
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MAT ION GIVEN WAS UNTRUE. INSTALLATIONS REPORTEDLY WIPED OUT HAD SUFF-
..
ERED ONLY SUPERFICIAL DAMAGE. PREDICTIONSilmADE�DID NOT COME TO 'PASS.
1
VIETNAMESE ALSO EXPRESSED ANGER THAT THE 'VC. SHOULD USE PAGODAS,
HOSPITALS, AND RESIDENTIAL AREAS .AS,SANCTUARIES�AND COMMAND POSTS. THE
NET EFFECT OF THE VC ATTACKS MAY BE TO PUSH MANY RESIDENT OF THE
CAPITAL WHO PREVIOUSLY STRADDLED THE FENCE INTO AN ANTI-VC POSTURE.
S. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE ATTACKS BROUGHT ANEW APPRECIATION OF
�/:
VC CAPABILITIES TO MANY URBAN DWELLERS WHO HERETOFORE HAD FELT RELA-
TIVELY L .fTLE PRESSURE FROM THE ENEMY. FOR THE FIRST TIME MANY
CITI-
::NS IN SAIGON CAME FACE TO FACE WITH THEENEMY AND EXPERIENCED FIRST
HAND THE TERRORISM AND DESTRUCTION FROM WHICH THEY HAD PREVIOUSLY
F71 T IMMUNE. RESPECT FOR VC CAPABILITY HAS GROWN AND WITH IT A LATENT
FEAR OF THE VC. MOST VIETNAMESE WERE SURPRISED THAT THE VC HAD THE
ABILITY TO LAUNCH WIDESPREAD SIMULTANEOUS ATTACKS OF SUCH INTENSITY9
COORDINATION AND AUDACITY.'
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HAS NOTED THE DIFFICULTY ,IN ASSESSING CURRENT ATTITUDES
SINCE MANY PEOPLE ARE STILL IN A STATE OF SHOCK. HIS USE OF THE WORD.
WAS NOT FIGURATIVE., HE BELIEVES THE EXTEJIT, TO WHICH THE VC HAS BEEN
. . .
ABLE TO DISRUPT THE LIFE OF SAIGON HAS IMPRESSED 'i:1OST PEOPLE. .IN
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THIS SENSE THERE IS NO QUESTION BUT THAT THE VC GAINED AN INITIAL
PSYCHOLOGICAL VICTORY. DESPITE THE ENHANCED CAPABILITY OF THE VC, A
NUMBER OF SOURCES HAVE STATED THAT THEY HAVE FOUND NO INCREASE IN
.*
SENTIMENT AMONG VIETNAMESE FOR A COALITIO.N GOVERMENT WITH THE VC.
9. INCREASED CONCERN OVER THE NEWLY REALIZED CAPABILITY OF THE VC
HAS A POSITIVE ASPECT SINCE IT COULD LEAD TO AN INCREASED UNDERSTANDING
OF THE NEED FOR STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND PERHAPS FOR MEASURES
NE.EDED TO ORGANIZE EFFECTIVE DEFENSE 'AGAINST THE NEWLY APPRECIATED
�
ENEMY...
"ATTITUDES OF THE VIETNAMESE TOWARD � THEIR GOVERNMENT" �
10. AS MIGHT BE EXPECTED, THE ATTITUDE OF THE VIETNAMESE TOWARD
� .
THEIR GOVERNMENT SEEMS MIXED. ' ON TE ONE HAND THE GVN IS FAULTED FOR
HAVING BEEN CAUGHT UNPREPARED, FOR NOT HAVING ADEQUATE INTELLIGENCE OF
VC PLANS, INTENT IONS AND CAPABILITIES.. A VIETNAMESE
COMMENTED THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD LOST MUCH POPULAR SUPPORT BECAUSE
IT HAD NOT MOVED MORE FORCEFULLY, AGAINST THE VC WHILE THEY WERE �ENR CUT TO SAIGON". CLAIMS THE ATTACKS "REVEALED WEAKNESS AND 13Z6
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INEFFECTIVENESS" OF THE GOVERNMENT SECURITY APPARATUS.
11. IN CONTRAST, A NUMBER OF SOURCES ABSOLVE THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
CHARGE OF INEFFECTIVENESS AND PRAISE THE REACT IDN OF. THE ARVN FORCES.
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WHO WITNESSED THE VIET CONG ARRIVING IN SAIGON
ON T: NIGHT OF 30 JANUARY OVER THE BEN HOA BRIDGE, AT FIRST
THOU:-E. THEY WERE ARVN TROOPS STAGING A COUP.' HE SAID THAT ALTHOUGH
AT FIRST HE WAS ANGRY AT THE GOVERNMENT FOR ITS INABIL IT Y TO PREVENT
THE VC FROM ENTERING SAIGON HIS. ANGER VANISHED WHEN HE LEARNED HOW
WIDESPREAD THE VC ATTACKS WERE.
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';IS SATISFIED WITH THE
ACT IONS OF THE.GVN AND THE AVN IN REACTING TO THE VC OFFENSIVE.
. � ,
THAT THIS FEELING IS SHARED BY 1"1Y OF HIS .COLLEAG.UES.
ALSO HAD EXPRESSED HIS SATISFACTION WITH 'THE ARVN
REACTION. OM A FORMER OFFICER,SPENT ONE. NIGHT 'DURING THE
ATTACK AT THE JOINT GENERAL. STAFF OPERAT IONS CENTER. . LOWER HOUSE
NEN3ERS
'ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE GVN SO FAR.
HAVE SPOKEN APPROVINGLY OF
A NORTHERN
CATHOLIC, AGREES. ALT HOUGH HE 'FAULTS THE GVN FOR POOR CONTINGENCY
HE SUPPORTS MOST OF ITS ACT IONS TAKEN � IN RESPONSE-. T 0 THE VC
MREAT
12. THE SPECTRE OF � A COMMUNIST TAKEOVER HAS AFFORDED
CERTAIN PROMISING DEVELOPMENTS . IT HAS CLEARLY TENDED TO MUTE MINOR
POI IT I CAL DIFFERENCES AND. GENERATE 'A SEMBLANCE OF SUPPORT FOR THE
GOVERNMENT. ANGER AT VC PERF IDY � WILL NOT, HOWEVER AUTOMATICALLY BE
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NsFORMED INTO ACTIVE AND POSITIVE SUPPORT FOR fHETHIEU/KY ADMIN-
ISTRATION, NOR WILL. THE PRESENT COMMENDABLE INTERACTION AND SUPPORT
FOR THE GOVERNMENT BY THE VARIOUS RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL GROUPINGS
NECESSANLY LEAD TO LONG-TERM COOPERATION OR THE. DIMINUTION OF FACTION-
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ALIS M.. ONE EXAMPLE: ALTHOUGH MILITANT BUDDHIST LEADER 14(0X1)
41111111HAs ALREADY INDICATED HIS WILLINGNESS TO SUPPORT THE GVN TO THE
EXTENT OF ESTABLISHING RECEPTION CENTERS FOR REFUGEES, HE HAS REFUSED
TO MAKE A PUBLIC STATEMENT DENOUNCING THE VC FOR THEIR WIDESPREAD
ATTACKS. OR URGE HIS FOLLOWERS NOT TO SUPPORT THE VC. HIS REFUSAL .3
ISSUE SUCH A STATEMENT IS PROBABLY RELATED TO HIS DESIRE TO AVOID ANY
COY.PROMISE OF HIS TRADITIONAL OPPOSITION TO THE PRESENT THIEU-KY REGIME.
13. IN SHORT, WHILE THERE ARE A NUMBER OF EXAMPLES OF TEMPORARY
BACKING FOR THE GOVERNMENT DURING THIS DIFFICULT PERIOD, THERE IS NO �
EVIDENCE TO DATE THAT ANY IMPORTANT INDIVIDUAL OR GROUP IS SUBLIMATING
VITAL INTERESTS. NEVERTHELESS, THERE AS THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE
SHOCK AND CHALLENGE PRESENTED BY THE VC ATTACKS MAY GALVANIZE THE
GOvERNMENT TO ACTION AND PROVIDE SUFFICIENT POPULAR ENTHUSIASM
TO MAINTAIN FORWARD MOMENTUM AFTER THE IMMEDIATE CRISIS HAS PASSED.
14. THE ULTIMATE REACTION OF THE PEOPLE WILL DEPEND HEAVILY ON THE
qAY THE GOVERNMENT HANDLES THE CRISIS FROM NOW ON. QUICK RESTORATION
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OF THE STATUS QUO ANTEBELLUM WOULD BE A.::MAJOR :ACHIEVEMENT FOR THE
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GVN AND COULD RESTORE LOST CONF. IDENCE�.'�;:LTHER.E IS POPULAR .AGREEMENT
AMONG VIETNAMESE THAT THE GOVERNMENT.MUSTADDRESS7ITSELVIMMEDIATELY
TO A NUMBER OF SERIOUS OR POTENTIALLYSERI.OUS.:PROBLEMS:*., SHORTAGES OF
- - � � '
FOOD IN CERTAIN AREAS AND RESULTANT 'R'ISIWPRICESA�SERIOUS.NEW
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REFUGEE PROBLEM, THE SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF. CIVILIAN 'CASUALTIES,' CON-
; .
SIDERABLE PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION AND DAMAgE,1. AND THE RESTORATION OF
UT IL IT IES AND OTHER VITAL SERVICES, SUCH AS GARBAGE COLLECTION.
�
15. A NUMBER OF SOURCES HAVE .01PHASIZED. THAT THE MAIN CONCERN OF
,:(:)ST PEOPLE NOW IS THE SATISFACTION OF -1AIR IMMEDIATE NEEDS. THE
FACT THAT THE PRICE OF BREAD HAS RISEN FROM 10. TO 70 PIASTRES OVER-
NIC::.T AND THE PRICE OF A LITER CF RICE HAS RISEN FROM 15 TO 50 OR MORE
PIASTRES CAUSES GENERAL CONCERN, EVEN THOUGH MOST OBSERVERS FEEL THE .
DISRUPTION IS ONLY 'TEMPORARY.. TO MANY OF THE REFUGEES THE PROBLEM
,
IS MUCH MORE SERIOUS, HAVING LOST THEIR .H.OMES9' THEIR .I.VEL1HOOD9 AND
POSSISLY THE BREAD WINNER � IN THEIR FAMILY...
16. MEMBERS OFT XE UPPER AND LOWER HOUSES, ALMOST WITHOUT EXCEP-
T ION , HAVE SUPPORTED PRESIDENT THIEU7S DECLARATION OF MART IAL LAW AND
THE OT HER MEASURES HE HAS TAKEN. AT THE �SA-ME. TIME ,:.MOST MEMBERS HAVE
STRESSED THEIR' CONCERN FOR CONSTITUTIONALITY AND THE RULE OF LAW.
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HOWEVER, AS INDICATED ABOVE,-UP TO THIS MOMENT IT WOULD BE FAIR TO SAY
THAT THEY HAVE GIVEN THE GOVERNMENT .FULL SUPPORT AND HAVE AVOIDED
�
STEPS WHICH MIGHT INDIRECTLY AID :THE,
17 . AS THE SITUATION STABILIZES, AND THE VC THREAT DIMINISHES,
�-� �
INDICATIONS ARE THAT THIS .POSTURE,. OF UNQUESTIONED SUPPORT AND LIMITED,
CAUTIOUS CRITICISM WILL CHANGE. THE ASSEMBLY MAY. UNDERTAKE TO
INVESTIGATE GOVERNMENT "UNPREPAREDNESS" AND TO AFF IX BLAME FOR REAL
OR ALLEGED SHORTCOMINGS.� SENATOR NGUYEN VAN NGAI IS URGING FELLOW
SENATORS TO ENGAGE :IN, A FULL INVESTIGATION AFTER �THE CRISIS IS PAST.
HE IS ESPECIALLY CRITICAL OF MINISTER OF INTERIOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL
LINH QUANG VIEN AND DIRECTOR GENERAL OF NATIONAL POLICE BRIGADIER
GENERAL NGUYEN NGOC LOAN. �� SENATOR TRAN NGOC NHUAN IS ALSO PUSHING
FOR AN INVESTIGATION OF III CORPS COMMANDER LIEUTENANT GENERAL LE
NGUEYN KHANG AND � CAPITAL MILITARY DISTRICT COMMANDER COLONEL NGUYEN
VAN GIAM . IT IS DIFFICULT TO SAY, WHETHER THEY ARE MOTIVATED BY
PATRIOTIC OR PERSONAL REASONS OR HOW tRaous THEY ARE IN CARRYING OUT
T HE PROPOSED JINVEST IGATIONS.
� .
����
16: CRI4Ci.S.1. OF. GOVERNMENT LEADERS IS NOT LIMITED,HOWEVER, TO
MEMBERS OF THE LEGISLATURE. THE.CRISIS GENERATED BY THE VC ATTACKS
MAY HAVE ATTENUATED, BUT CERTAINLY HAS NOT ELIMINATED, A FAVORITE
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vIETNANESE PASTIME, , CRITICISM OF OTHER VIETNAMESE.' HARDLY ANY SENOR
VIETNAMESE LEADER HAS ESCAPED UNSCATHED. .IN ADDITION TO THOSE CRI-
TICIZED ABOVE, COMPLAINTS HAVE BEEN REGISTERED AGAINsIt PRESIDENT TEIEj,
r
CHIEF OF THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF. GENERAL CAO VAN VIEN AND A STABLE
OF LESSER LUMINARIES. PROBABLY THE SENIOR. OFFICIAL WHO HAS RECEIVED
THE MOST CRITICISM IS PRIME MINISTER NGUYEN VAN LOC. HIGH-LEVEL
'
COLLEAGUES IN THE GOVERNMENT.HAVE.FOUND LOC�SOMEWHAT BEWILDERED BY THE
CRISIS. MINISTER OF FINANCE TRINH.HAS'BEEN CRITICAL OF LOC'S ROLE.
VICE PRESIDENT KY IS KNOWN TO BE*DISAPPOINTED. WITH LOC..
IN SHORT, WHILE THE VC ATTACK HAS_PROMOTED.MOMENTARY. UNITY
AND OFFERS A PROMISING CHANCE TO CONSOLIDATE IT, THE FORCES THAT
DIVIDE. VIETNAMESE AND IMPAIR THEIR ABILITY TO COOPERATE WITH EACH
OTHER REMAIN STRONG.
"ATTITUDES OF THE VIETNAMESE TOWARD AMERICANS"
ALTHOUGH THE OVERALL REACTION OF THE VIETNAMESE IS FAVORABLE
TO THE ROLE PLAYED BY THE UNITED STATES FORCES DURING THE RECENT VC
ATTACKS, A SURPRISING NUMBER OF VIETNAMESE APPARENTLY BELIEVE, OR PRE-
TEND TO BELIEVE, THAT. THERE MAY HAVE BEEN COLLUSION BETWEEN THE US. AND
THE VC. ON 3 FEBRUARY A MEMBER OF THE LOWER HOUSE STATED ON THE FLOOR
OF THE ASSEMBLY THAT PERHAPS THEW WAS HELPED BY "WESTERN FRIENDS',
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'�IMPLYING THE AMERICANS. A NUMBER OF. SOURCES HAVE STATED THAT MANY
VIETNAMESE BELIEVE THAT THE U.S. SUPPORTED THE VC AND PERM ITTED THEM
TO COME INTO SAIGON IN ORDER T.0 FORCE THE PRESENT 'GOVERNMENT INTO AN
UNWANTED COALITION WITH THE NFLSV � SURPRISINGLY, THESE VIEWS ARE
'HELD BY A NUMBER OF...VIETNAMESE WITH RESPCiNSIBLE POSITIONS � AT THE
MIDDLE LEVEL OF THE GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY HIERARCHY.
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2 ' . TELLS OFA NUMBER OF VIETNAMESE WHO HAVE CALLED 3.4(b)(1)
AT HIS HOME TO ASK HIM ABOUT THE .AMERICAN ROLE IN. THE VC ATTACKS ON
SAIGON. SOME OF THEM HAD HEARD THAT THE AMERICANS HAD PROVIDED THE VC
. .
WITH TRANSPORTATION TO BRING .THEIR TROOPS INTO SAIGON, PRESUMABLY TO
PRESSURE THE GVN INTO AGREEING TO A COALIT ION GOVERNMENT . OTHERS
AEONG THE VIETNAMESE VISITORS HAD HEARD THAT THE "HAWKS" IN THE U,; S.
HAD MANEUVERED THE VC INTO MAKING THE ATTACK ON SAIGON �SO THAT THEY
COULD GAIN SUPPORT FOR ESCALATING THE WAR. SOME HAD THE OPPOSITE
V IE'J ; IT WAS THE "DOVES" WHO INSTIGATED THE ATTACK SO THAT THEY
COULD CAPITALIZE ON THE ENEMY SHOW OF STRENGTH AND RESULTANT CASUALTIES
TO ARGUE FOR AN EARLY SETTLEMENT OF THE WAR.
22. SIMILAR FLIGHTS INTO FANTASY WERE DESCRIBED� TO OTHER SOURCES BY
A WIDE CROSS SECT ION OF VIETNAMESE. ONE SOURCE STATES THAT HE HAS
TALKED WITH AT LEAST TEN OFFICERS IN THE ARVN WHO. BELIEVE THAT THERE
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'4.AY HAVE BEEN COLLUSION BETWEEN U.S. AND 'VC _FORCES. ANOTHER SOURCE
. .
'
HAS TALKED WITH SEVERAL NORTHERN REFUGEE .CATHOLIC PRIESTS WHO AC: CON�
....
VINOED THAT THERE WAS COLLU:):0:; BETWEEN THE U.S. AND VC.
. . .
, � -
2. IT IS DIFFICULT TO ISOLATE CLEAR�CUT REASONS FOR THESE ATTI�
. .
T UDES. EXPLANATIONS ADVANCED BY THE VIETNAMESE IN 'SUPPORT OF THEIR
�
ARGUMENTS ARE EITHER BASED ON M ISINFORMATION., HARE CLEARLY ILLOGICAL
�
%..-1INCONSISTENT, OR BO/H.,. AT LEAST TO THE WESTERN MIND. IN SOME CASES
T'SE VIETNAMESE APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN INFLUENCED BY'NFLSV RADIO BROA.)�
CASTS OR BY RUMORS PASSED BY VC CADRES. MANY CASES THE BELIEFS �
APPEAR TO SPRING FROM A GENERAL. SUSPICION OF U.S..INTENTIONS AND
OBJECTIVES. THE RECENT' SPATE OF STORIES-IN'THE PRESS ABOUT SECRET
NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE NFLSV/VTHE' STRONG U.S.
�� "
DESIRE TO SET UP A COALITION GOVERNMENT WITH THE NFI....SV;HAVE APPARENT-
LY IMPRESSED MANY VIETNAMESE AND MADE THEMSUSCEPTIBLE TO ALLEGATIONS
�
.� � - �7..�
(RUMORS) OF COLLUSION.'
2 . MANY VIETNAMESE WHO ORIGINALLY SHARED THE VIEW THAT THERE
WAS COLLUSION BETWEEN THE U.S. AND� VC GAVE UP SUCH yiEWS WHEN CON-
7RONTED WITH OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE TO THE 'CONTRARY. . A VIETNAMESE PARA�
TROOP OFF ICE.R SAID HE FELT, AS MANY OTHERS DID .THAT THE AMERICANS WERE
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SUPPORTING THE �VC. THE RECENT FLURRY ,OF NEWSPAPER COMMENTS ON PEACE
. � TO �
NEGOTIATIONS WERE REPONSIBLE FOR. THIS .yiEw-. AFTER 'LISTENING /THE NFLSV
RADIO., HOWEVER, THIS NOTION .HAS. DISPELLED AS THE .RADIO CLAIMED THE ATT-
ACK WAS A REVOLT OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE. A VIETNAMESE HOUSEWIFE
SAID SHE .ACCEPTED THE VIEW THAT .THE AMERICANS HAD SUPPORTED THE VC UNTIL
SHL
/WITNESSED AMERICAN. FORCES FIGHTING IW,THE STREETS AGAINST THE VC.
HOWEVER, OTHER VIETNAMESE CONTINUE TO HOLD THEIR VIEWS ABOUT U.S.
COLLUSION DESPITE THE EVIDENCE.
27. A POSSIBLE EXPLANATION FOR THESE BELIEFS IS THAT MANy.VIET-
NANIESE HAVE BECOME CONDITIONED ,TO THINK THAT NOTHING HAPPENS IN VIET-
NAM UNLESS THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WANTS IT TO HAPPEN. WHEN
EVENTS TAKE PLACE THAT ARE CLEARLY COUNTER TO OUR BEST INTERESTS,
INSTEAD OF ADMITTING THAT THEY WERE WRONG, THE VIETNAMESE OFTEN PUT
FORTH BIZARRE EXPLANATIONS TO EXPLAIN WHY THE U.S. WANTED DEVELOPMENTS
TO TAKE SUCH A SEEMINGLY UNFAVORABLE TWIST. UNABLE TO COMPREHEND
THAT VC RESPONSE MAY HAVE EXCEEDED U.S. EXPECTATIONS, THESE VIET-
NAKESE INSTEAD TRY TO RATIONALIZE WHY THE U.S. WANTED THE VC TO SUCCEED
EVEN AT THE COST OF U.S. PERSONNEL AND PROPERTY .NOT TO MENTION THE
COST TO A CLOSE ALLY.
�-�
2 , STILL, THESE ACCOUNTS SHOULD NOT BE ,OVEREMPHASIZED. THE VAST
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MAJOR IT Y OF T HE POPULATION CONT INUES TO -SUPPORT U.S. PRESENCE AND
APPRECIATES U.S. ACT IONS AND SACRIFIcES. AN. OLDT IME VIETNAMESE
�
NATIONALIST POINTS OUT THAT IN HIS VIEW THE VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES
COULD NOT HAVE TURNED BACK THE VC THRUST' 'AGAINST THE CAPITAL IF THEY
�
HAD NOT BEEN SUPPORTED BY U.S. FORCES. ...HE SA ID THAT HIS FRIENDS FEEL
HE SAME WAY. SOME SOURCES EVEN CON1E:ND. THAT THE U.S CARR IED
T HE BRUNT OF THE FIGHT AGAINST T H.E VC AND WAS 'RESPONSIBLE FOR SAVING
THE CITY FROM A VC T AKEOVER � AN EX.��ARVN OFFICER BELIEVES THAT
THE U.S. SHOULD BE COMMENDED FOR ITS EFFECTIVE BUT MEASURED REACTION
TO THE VC THREAT. THIS SOURCE COMPARED U. S. PRUDENCE WITH THE
FRENCH PENCHANT FOR OVER-REACTION. HE OBSERVED THAT THE
A1ERICANS EMPLOYED ARTILLERY AND AIR SUPPORT IN SUCH A WAY AS TO
MINIMIZE CIVILIAN CASUALTIES, SOMETKING WHICH, IN HIS OPINION,THE
FL NCH WOULD NEVER HAVE DONE. HOWEVER 'SEVERAL., OT HER SOURCES
HAVE CRITICIZED THE U.S. FORCES FOR DESTROYING VIETNAMESE LIVES AND
PROPERTY IN COMBAT OPERATIONS. ALTHOUGH HARD FACTS ARE DIFFICULT TO
COME BY, THERE ARE MANY STORIES CIRCULATING CONCERNING T HE tNUMBER OF
. ,
CIVILIAN CASUALTIES, AND THE AMOUNT OF � PROPERTY DAMAGE CAUSED BY U.S.
ARTILLERY AND AIR SUPPORT- M ISSIONS.
27. HELD Dl SS: -STATE USMACV Tril AIR FORCE. i .D R/JUSPAO (MR. ZORTH I AN
5 ONLY) C I NCPAC PACFLT A RPAC PACAF.�-�
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