THE ENEMY THREAT TO KHE SANH

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02547967
• Document Creation Date: January 28, 2019

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
3.5(c)
Intelligence Memorandum
The Enemy Threat to Khe Sanh
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2 February 1968
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WARNING
This document contains classified information ill ti flie national seeity
of Ow l'ilited States N% ithin the iticanilig ()I Ow csrion;p41. (;1)(10.
Title 18, Suctions 793, 791. and 79S.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
2 February 1968
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Enemy Threat to Khe Sanh
Summary
Enemy preparations for the long expected offen-
sive at Khe Sanh appear at an advanced stage, and a
major attack could be launched at any time.
Two full Communist divisions--comprising at
least six infantry regiments with artillery support--
are emplaced within striking distance of the outpost.
In addition, at least two infantry regiments of the
North Vietnamese 320th Division have been deployed
to an area in the north-central DMZ from where they
could move to interdict and harass allied reinforce-
ments moving from the east toward Khe Sanh.
During the last two weeks enemy forces near Khe
Sanh have continued to build up their supply caches
and strengthen their fortified positions in the
area. They have also bolstered their antiaircraft
(AAA) defenses in the area, adding a number of heavy
machine guns and possibly 37-mm. and 57-mm. AAA.
Having launched their major offensive against
the urban areas in South Vietnam, the Communists prob-
ably now view the Khe Sanh front as a major new pres-
sure point with which to help overextend and weaken
the allied militar �osition in South Vietnam. There
is evidence in that they hope to coordinate
their offensive in the Khe Sanh area with a general
push against various allied strongpoints along the
DMZ, in the central highlands, and in northwestern
III Corps.
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Note: This memorandum, an update of of 3.5(c)
the same title issued on 10 January, was produced solely
by CIA. It was prepared jointly by the Office of Current
Intelligence and the Vietnamese Affairs Staff.
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The Build-up
1. Developments in recent weeks strongly sug-
gest that the Vietnamese Communists intend once again
to increase military pressure against the strategically
placed outpost at Khe Sanh, on Route 9 in Quang Tri
Province.
2. The post, approximately nine miles from the
Laotian border, is used as a base for observation and
interdiction of enemy infiltration activities in the
area. It was last besieged in the winter of 1967,
following the movement of the North Vietnamese 325C
Division into the western DMZ area. This division
has again moved into the region, after a period of
rest and refitting in North Vietnam.
indicates that its three regiments--
the 95C, the 101D, and the 29th--along with elements
from the 324B Division, have conducted extensive re-
supply and reconnaissance activities near Khe Sanh
during December and January.
3. The units mentioned above probably would take
the primary role in any Communist effort to step up
action at Khe Sanh. Recent Communist deployments
have also put the enemy in a position to throw in the
bulk of the North Vietnamese 304th Division in any
major assault. This division had been located near
Vinh in North Vietnam.
it began to move south in November. Three in-
fantry regiments and one artillery regiment were in-
volved. At the same time, the North Vietnamese 320th
Division, which had been stationed in the Hanoi area,
also began to move south. At present the 320th
Division is located in the north central DMZ area,
above Camp Carroll. At least two regiments and the
headquarters element of this division are in the area.
The 320th's role appears to be that of interdicting,
harassing, and neutralizing the allied positions
at the Rockpile and Camp Carroll. This would dilute
allied capability to reinforce or relieve the gar-
rison at Khe Sanh.
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The Current Situation
4. Since the outbreak of major enemy activity
on 30 January, the military situation in the Demili-
tarized Zone/western Quang Tri Province araa--the
anticipated focal point of a Communist offensive--
has remained unusually quiet�
5. The Communists' timetable for major attacks
in this sector, presumably in concert with the wide-
spread attacks elsewhere, is believed to have been
delayed in part at least by the unusually heavy
allied aerial bombardment against North Vietnamese
positions threatening Khe Sanh and the network of
allied strong points just below the zone. The Com-
munists my also be waiting for the most advantageous
weather conditions.
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6. There are indications 3.3(h)(2)
recent US B-52 strikes may have seriously
disrupted the command and control facilities of the so-
called "Khe Sanh Front," the major new North Vietnamese
Army headquarters located northwest of Khe Sanh in
Laos. This front headquarters is believed to be the
senior command authority responsible for controlling
enemy tactical operations in the Khe Sanh area.
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9. Meanwhile, regimental strength elements of
the North Vietnamese 325 "C" and 304th Divisions have
continued to maneuver into battle positions to the
north, west, and south of Khe Sanh. Sharply intensi-
fied aerial photoreconnaissance of the Khe Sanh area
has provided tentative indications of a major at-
tempt by the North Vietnamese to dig their way toward
the strategic US combat base--an "encroachment with
fortifications" reminiscent of the Dien Bien Phu
tactics. Photography indicates that the Communists
have been preparing positions ever closer to the
Marine garrison but not occupying them. Should the
North Vietnamese begin to construct communications
trenches leading forward from these positions, the
parallel to Dien Bien Phu would become even stronger.
10. Moreover, US aircraft during late January
reported the presence of 37-mm. and/or 57-mm. enemy
antiaircraft artillery weapons in the hills north and
west of Khe Sanh. In addition, a recent Communist
defector reported that some 20 field artillery pieces
were being towed by vehicles through Laos to firing
positions near Khe Sanh. The introduction of these
weapons would significantly enhance the enemy's fire-
power capability against both the Khe Sanh garrison
and allied aerial resupply and reinforcement efforts
in the area.
11. To the east of Khe Sanh, regimental-size
elements of the North Vietnamese 320th Division,
supported by reconnaissance and artillery/rocket
units, have concentrated near Camp Carroll and the
Rockpile. Two additional North Vietnamese regiments--
the 803rd and the 270th--pose a continuing threat
to the area between Con Thien and Gio Linh. The
North Vietnamese 324 "B" Division's 90th Regiment
continues to engage in extensive food and ammuni-
tion resupply movements to forces in the west-cen-
tral part of the Demilitarized Zone. The division's
812th Regiment is located southwest of Quang Tri
city.
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Enemy Objectives
12. The most obvious conclusion to be drawn
from the build-up around Khe Sanh is that the enemy
may hope to wipe out the US garrison there and the
Civilian Irrgular Defense Group (CIDG) camp at
Lang Vei, about five miles to the southwest on
Route 9. The Communists have long regarded Khe Sanh,
located near the infiltration corridors in Laos, as
a thorn in their side. According to the latest
available information, the garrison at Khe Sanh is
defended by four infantry battalions, and an artil-
lery battalion of the 26th Marine Regiment. In
addition, an ARVN ranger battalion is deployed along
the garrison's outer defense perimeter. The CIDG
camp at Lang Vei has about 320 men,
13. The Communists, however, do not need a
force of upwards of 20,000 men to overrun Khe Sanh
and Lang Vei. If the build-up is as extensive as
suspected, and all of these units are destined to
be committed to an offensive in the area, the pri-
mary purpose of the Communists may prove to be much
broader. By attacking Khe Sanh, they would hope
to draw US reinforcements into the area, tie them
down to static defensive positions, and inflict
maximum casualties on US forces over a protracted
time period. By occupying the high ground around
Khe Sanh and setting up ambushes along Route 9,
the only overland route into the area, the enemy
could make resupply and reinforcement a difficult
and costly proposition, especially if he has de-
veloped an effective antiaircraft capability. Mon-
soon rains have closed large portions of Route 9,
compounding the problem and making resupply largely
dependent on airlift.
14. Allied reinforcement difficulties would
be increased if the enemy managed to sustain his
current offensive around and in the urban areas of
the country. Reaction to this thrust has so far
tied down numerous allied maneuver battalions and
reserve forces
15. A final objective of the Khe Sanh build-up
would be to harass and foil the strong-point barrier
system which is being implemented in the DMZ north
of Khe Sanh and in the infiltration corridors of Laos.
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16. Enemy strategy as outlined above fits in
with the enemy's efforts during 1967 in fighting the
main force war partly from peripheral areas adjacent
to border sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia. By
positioning his forces in these areas, the enemy
sought to lure US units away from populated areas,
disperse them, and inflict a maximum number of cas-
ualties in the process. This relieves pressure on
main force units operating in populated areas and
enables them to coordinate with local force units to
disrupt the pacification program and attack allied
outposts and base camps around urban areas. Since
the start of the "winter-spring campaign" in October,
the enemy has employed this strategy in II Corps and
III Corps.
17. The next few days are expected to bring
poor flying weather to the Khe Sanh/DMZ area, thereby
seriously restricting allied tactical air support
and resupply efforts. Moreover, sizable numbers of
allied forces who otherwise would be available as
reinforcement to positions under siege in northern
and western Quang Tri Province have been diverted
to clearing and securing the many areas recently
attacked from Quang Tri city southward to Hue. These
factors weigh heavily in favor of possibly imminent
offensive activity at Khe Sanh, probably in coordi-
nation with major thrusts against allied positions
along the central and eastern portions of the DMZ.
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