VIEWS OF FIVE KHANH HOA VIET CONG PRISONERS OF WAR ON OBJECTIVES OF CURRENT VC MILITARY ACTIVITY, THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES HAD THE VC TAKEN NHA TRANG, FUTURE VC PLANS AND STRATEGY, AND POPULAR RESPONSE TO VC FORCES.

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06772377
• Document Creation Date: January 28, 2019

-T3-Pr:ofed for Release: 201 C6-677277
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable
e PRIORITY
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STATE/INA DIA NMCC/MC iSECEIEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA $OO ONE
DWI EXO o FBIS DCS IRS AID A
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This material 'Contains information effecting the National Defense of the 'United States within the meaning of the Espionage Lawn. Title 18. U.S.C.
Seca. 793 and 794. the tninalniscon or revelation of which in ani manner to an unauthorized percon is prohibited by law.
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THIS IS AN NFORMATION REPORT. NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.
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CONF
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SUBJECT
0611405. Z
SOUTH VIETNAM
CITE
DIST 6 FEBRUARY 1968
3.3(h)(2)
VIEWS OF FIVE KHANH HOA V IET CONG PRISONERS OF
CURRENT VC M IL IT FR Y ACT IV,IT
THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES HAD THE VC TAKEN NHA
TRANG , FUTURE VC PLANS AND STRATEGY, AND
POPULAR RESPONSE TO VC FORCES.
WAR ON OBJECTIVES OF
A CQ
SOURCE
VIETNAM NHA TRANG (4 FEBRUARY 1968)
AN AMERICAN OBSERVER, FROM THE INTERROGATION
OF FIVE KHANH HOA PROVINCE V IET CONG WHO WERE
CAPTURED DURING ENEMY ATTACKS ON NHA TRANG
DURING THE PERIOD 29 JANUARY - 4 FEBRUARY 1968.
THE FIVE VIET CONG INCLUDED ONE POLITICAL
CADRE, HUYNH TUONG, ASSIST ANT SECRETARY OF
THE NHA TRANG MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE AND A
CANDIDATE -MEMBER OF THE KHANH HOA PROVINCE
C ITTEE; AND FOUR MILITARY CADRES: DUONG
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SENIOR LIEUTENANT, COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE
NHA TRANG MUNICIPAL UNIT; LE TRONG CACH, FIRST
LIEUTENANT, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE SQUAD
LEADER TRAINING SCHOOL AND ASSISTANT COMMANDER
FOR COMBAT AND TRAINING OF THE KHANH HOA
PROVINCIAL UNIT; HUYNH CHIEU, FIRST LIEUTENANT
IN THE KHANH HOA PROVINCE UNIT AND SUBSECTOR
GUERRILLA LEADER; AND NGUYEN VAN NHO, LIEUTENANT
AND EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF THE NHA TRANG MUNICIPAL
K-90 COMPANY.
1. ASKED WHAT THEY WERE TOLD THE OBJECTIVE WAS OF THE
VIET CONG (VC)/NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY (NVA) ATTACKS THROUGHOUT
SOUTH VIETNAM, WHICH BEGAN ON 29"JANUARY 1968, THE PRISONERS
REPLIED AS FOLLOWS:
A. HUYNH TUONG, POLITICAL CADRE: THE OBJECTIVE WAS
TO SEIZE CONTROL OF THE CITIES, ESTABLISH A NEW GOVERNMENT
WHICH WOULD INCLUDE ANY ELEMENTS OPPOSED TO PRESIDENT NGUYEN
VAN THIEU AND VICE PRESIDENT NGUYEN CAO KY, AND ASK THE
AMERICANS TO LEAVE SOUTH VIETNAM.",
B. SENIOR LIEUTENANT DUONG VAN XA: AFTER STUDYING
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RE SOLUT ION
13 OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST PARTY ON
20 DECEMBER 1967 AND STUDYING THE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS TO
ATTACK SOUTH VIETNAM ON 20 JANUARY:1968, HE KNEW THE REASON
FOR THE ATTACKS WAS TO SEIZE GOVERNMENT POWER. THE VC THOUGHT
IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO ATTACK SOUTH VIETNAM SUCCESSFULLY
BECAUSE THE BALANCE OF FORCES BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE
VC, WAS FAVORABLE, THUS THE VC WOULD BE ABLE TO TAKE OVER THE
GOVERNMENT IN SAIGON. BY APPLYING THE THREE -PRONGED TACTIC--
MILITARY, POLITICAL AND PROSELYTING--THROUGHOUT THE CAMPAIGN,
THE VC BELIEVED THAT THEY COULD BRING ENOUGH PRESSURE ON
THE AMERICANS TO FORCE THEM TO LEAVE SOUTH VIETNAM. BY
PRESSURE THE VC MEAN THE STRENGTH OF VIETNAMESE AND WORLD
OPINION AGAINST THE AMERICAN STAND IN VIETNAM, WHICH WOULD
FORCE THE AMERICANS TO PULL OUT OF VIETNAM.
C. FIRST LIEUTENANT LE TONG CACH: HE WAS NOT
TOLD OF THE OBJECTIVE OR THE PURPOSE OF THE ATTACKS, BUT
PERSONALLY FELT THAT IT WAS TO REGAIN THE OFFENSIVE.
D. FIRST LIEUTENANT HUYNk CHIEU: HE WAS TOLD BY
COLONEL HOANH, KHANH HOA PROVINCIAL UNIT COMMANDER, THAT
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THE PURPOSE OF THE ATTACKS WAS TO SEIZE POWER IN SOUTH VIETNAM.
E. LIEUTENANT NGUYEN VAN NHO: COLONEL HOANH, THE
KHANH HOA PROVINCIAL UNIT COMMANDER, TOLD HIM THAT THERE HAD
BEEN INSTRUCTIONS FORA GENERAL ASSAULT AND UPRISING. THE
PURPOSE OF THE ASSAULT WAS TO SEIZE POWER AND "ASK" U.S.
TROOPS TO RETREAT FROM VIETNAM. HE HIMSELF BELIEVED THAT
ONE OF THE PURPOSES OF THE ATTACKS WAS TO GAIN VICTORIES IN
BATTLE FOR THE VC SO THAT THE VC WOULD BE IN A GOOD POSITION
FOR PEACE TALKS.
2. WHEN ASKED WHAT FUTURE CONTINUING RESPONSIBILITIES
EACH OF THEM WERE GIVEN BEYOND'THE IMMEDIATE ATTACK ORDER,
THE PRISONERS REPLIED AS FOLLOWS:
A. HUYNH TUONG: HE WAS TO ORGANIZE FOOD SUPPLIES
FOR THE CITY OF NHA TRANG. (nTERROGATOP'S COMMENT: IN VIEW
OF HIS POSITION WITH THE VC, TUONG PROBABLY HAD GREATER
RESPONSIBILITIES THAN THIS.)
4
B. SENIOR LIEUTENANT XA: HE HAD NO ORDERS OR
INSTRUCTIONS FOR) FUTURE OPERATIONS IF THE ATTACK ON NHA TRANG
WAS SUCCESSFUL. HE WAS TOLD, HOWEVER, THAT HE WOULD BE IN
CHARGE OF THE MILITARY IN THE CITY. IF THE ATTACK FAILED,
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HIS ORDERS WERE TO STAY IN THE CITY AND AWAIT FURTHER
INSTRUCTIONS.
C. FIRST LIEUTENATN CACH: IF THE ATTACK ON NHA
TRANG WAS SUCCESSFUL, HE WAS TO LEAD THE PEOPLE IN A GENERAL
UPRISING, ORDER GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) OFFICIALS AND
ARMY OF VIETNAM (ARVN) OFFICERS TO GO HOME, AND PUBLICLY
EXECUTE THOSE WHO DID NOT COOPERATE. HE WAS ALSO TO ATTACK
AND SEIZE THE RADIO STATION AND TO MAKE AN APPEAL TO. THE
PEOPLE FOR ASSISTANCE. VC ARMED FORCES WOULD BE SENT TO
OTHER AREAS-AS.NEEDED, AND THE ENTIRE 8TH BATTALION (BN)
(OF THE 18/B NVA REGIMENT) WOULD BE SENT TO ANOTHER AREA
OUTSIDE NHA TRANG. IN THE EVENT THE ATTACK ON NHA TRANG
FAILED, HE AND HIS MEN WERE TO WITHDRAW TO BENH CANG (BP 988555)
WHERE HE WOULD MEET AND JOIN THE 8TH BN.
D. FIRST LIEUTENANT CHIEU: IF THE ATTACKS ON NHA
TRANG WERE SUCCESSFUL, HE WAS TO FORM HIS GUERRILLA UNIT TO
PROTECT DEMONSTRATORS WHO WHOULD BE GATHERED TO DEMONSTRATE
AND HELP SET UP A NEW GOVERNMENT. HE WAS ALSO TO USE HIS
GUERRILLAS TO SET UP DEFENSES AROUND SECTOR HEADQUARTERS IN
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ORDER TO PROTECT THE VC IN :EEIR POLITICAL PROPAGANDA EFFORT.
IN THE EVENT OF FAILURE, HE WAS TO WITHDRAW TO THE LO VOI
AREA WITHIN VINH NGOC VILLAGE (CP 022551) AND CONTACT A
STAFF OFFICER FOR NEW INSTRUCTIONS.
E.. LIEUTENANT NHO: HE HAD NO ORDERS FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS.
3. WHEN ASKED IF THEY WERE TOLD, AND IF THEY BELIEVED,
THAT THZ.POPULATION WOULD JOIN IN A GENERAL UPRISING AGAINST
GVN AND AMERICAN FORCES, THE PRISONERS REPLIED AS FOLLOWS:
A. HUYNH TUONG: HE WAS TOLD THAT THE POPULATION
WOULD JOIN THE GENERAL UPRISING, ANd HE BELIEVED THAT THEY
WOULD IN MOST AREAS. BECAUSE OF THE ABSENCE OF STRONG
POLITICAL FEELING AMONG THE PEOPLE OF KHANH HOA PROVINCE,
HOWEVER, HE DID NOT EXPECT TO RECEIVE MUCH HELP FORM NHA
TRANG RESIDENTS.
B. SENIOR LIEUTENANT XA: POLITICAL CADRES TOLD
HIM THAT AFTER REVIEWING THE SITUATION THEY BELIEVED THAT
THE POPULATION WOULD JOIN IN THE ATTACK BY STAGING DEMONSTRATIONS.
HE HIMSELF BELIEVED THAT THAT WOULD BE THE CASE.
C. FIRST LIEUTENANT CACH: HE WAS TOLD THAT THE
PEOPLE WOULD JOIN THE VC FORCES IN A GENERAL UPRISING AGAINST
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THE GVN AND THE AMERICANS. HE SAID THAT FOR REASONS HE
COULD NOT PUT INTO WORDS, IT WAS HARD: FOR HIM TO BELIEVE THE
PEOPLE WOULD HELP THE VC.
D. FIRST LIEUTENANT CHIEU: HE WAS TOLD THAT THE
PEOPLE WOULD OFFER THEIR ASSISTANCE TO THE VC. HE BELIEVED
THAT IF SECTOR HEADQUARTERS WERE DESTROYED, THEN THE RADIO
STATION WERE CAPTURED, AND THEN NEWS OF THE GVN DEFEAT WERE
BROADCAST, THE PEOPLE WOULD SUPPORT THE VC REVOLUTION.
E. LIEUTENANT NHO: HIS COMMANDERS TOLD HIM; AND
HE HIMSELF BELIEVED, THAT THE POPULATION WOULD JOIN IN A
GENERAL UPRISING AND SUPP0R7 THE VC BY DEMONSTRATIONS.
4. ASKED WHAT ACTUAL SUPPORT THEY RECEIVED FROM THE
PEOPLE, THE ANSWERS WERE:
A. HUYNH TUONG: VC FORCES RECEIVED ALMOST NO HELP
FROM THE POPULACE.
B. SENIOR LIEUTENANT XA: SO FAR AS HE KNEW PEOPLE
DID NOT SUPPORT THE VC.
C. FIRST LIEUTENANT CACH: THE PEOPLE GAVE NO SUPPORT
TO THE VC BECAUSE THEY WERE TOO BUSY TRYING TO CELEBRATE
D. FIRST LIEUTENANT CHIEU: THE PEOP
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SUPPORT BECAUSE THE PEOPLE HAD NOT HAD ENOUGH CONTACT WITH
REVOLUTIONARY IDEAS. THE VC HAD NOT HAD ENOUGH TIME TO
EDUCATE THEM. FLEEING THE CITY HE TRIED TO BUY AN INCENSE
STICK AND A BOTTLE OF BEER9 BUT WAS RECOGNIZED ASA VC AND
THE SHOPOWNER WOULD NOT SELL TO HIM. THE PEOPLE WERE
DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ARREST OF MANY VC.
E.. LIEUTENANT NHO: THE PEOPLE GAVE NO SUPPORT TO THE VC.
5. ASKED IF THEY WERE LED TO BELIEVE THAT THE VC/NVA
ATTACKS IN THE SOUTH WOULD BE SUPPLEMENTED BY MAJOR
OFFENSIVE ACTION IN THE NOCH AT KHE SAN OR THE DEMILITARIZED
ZONE (DMZ)9 THE PRISONERS !:".PLIED THAT THEY HAD NOT BEEN TOLD
THIS.yOULD HAPPEN. XUYNH TUONG REMARKED9 HOWEBER'9 THAT THE
VC WERE VERY HAPPY TO HEAR THAT 529000 ARUN TROOPS WERE BEING SENT TO
THE DMZ TO REPLACE AMERICAN TROOPS9 BECAUSE IF THE AMERICAN
TROOPS COULD NOT CONTROL THE SITUATION9 HOW COULD_
THE ARVN? FIRST LIEUTENANT CHIEU REPLIED THAT HOANH,
THE COMMANDING. OFFICER OF THE KHANH HOA PROVINCIAL UNIT, HAD
TOLD Him THAT EVERY PROVINCE CAPITAL WOULD COME UNDER ATTACK.
6. ASKED IF THEY WERE AWARE OF ANY EFFORT TO ORGANIZE
"ALLIANCE FOR PEACE AND DEMOCRACY" AS A COALITION MOVEMENT TO
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NEGOTIATE WITH THE NATIONAL LJBERATION FRONT U;LF), THE
PRISONERS MADE THE FOLLOWING REPLIES:
A. HUYNH TUONG: HE HAD FIRST HEARD OF THE ALLIANCE
FOR PEACE AND DEMOCRACY AT A COMMITTEE
MEETING IN EARLY DECEMBER 19C!� AT THAT MEETING, HE AND ABOUT
40 OTHER MILITARY AND POLITICAL CADRES WERE INSTRUCTED
ON HOW TO ORGANIZE THIS FRONT. ALL 'ELEMENTS WHO WOULD OPPOSE
THIEU AND KY, INCLUDING HIGH-LEVEL GVN OFFICIALS SUCH AS
PROVINCE CHIEFS, COULD JOIN :HE FRONT. THE VC HAD NOT ORGANIZED
AHE FRONT IN KHANH HOA PROVINCE BECAUSE THAT COULD BE DONE
ONLY WHERE THE VC DOMINATED THE SITUATION. IF THE VC HAD
HELD NHA TRANG, THE VC .J.IOULD HAVE ORGANIZED THIS FRONT
IMMEDIATELY. ALLIANCE FOR PEACE AND DEMOCRACY WAS NOT THE
NAME OF THE FRONT; IT WAS WHAT THE FRONT WAS. THE ACTUAL
NAME OF THE FRONT WOULD BE CHOSEN LAT,ER. TUONG SAID THAT HE
HAD HEARD OVER THE RADIO THAT THE FRONT HAD BEEN FORMED IN
BAN ME THUOT, DARLAC PROVINCE AND IN SAIGON, AND THAT THE
FRONT IN SAIGON WAS CALLED "ALLIANCE .FRONT FOR PEOPLE, PEACE,
AND DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH VIETNM.
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B. SENIOR LIEUTENANT KA:. THE NLF HAS FORMED AN
ORGANIZATION CALLED "LIEN HIEP LUC LUONG DAN TOC, DAN CHU VA
HOA BINH" (ALLIANCE OF THE PEOPLE'S FORCES FOR DEMOCRACY AND
PEACE). THE ORGANIZATIP1IS TO
GATHER ENOUGH POPULAR SUPPORT TO FORCE THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT
IN SOUTH VIETNAM OUT OF POWER AND TO PUT IN POWER A
NEW GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD THEN ACCEPT A COALITION GOVERNMENT.
C. FIRST LIEUTENANT CHACH: HE BELIEVED THAT THE
PURPOSE OF THE ATTACK WAS TO INDUCE ,THE VC ARMED FORCES TO
SUPPORT THE VC POLITICAL STRUCTURE WHICH WOULD THEN SET UP
A GOVERNMENT COMP'.:ED OF ALL VC PARTIES AND THE BEST MILITARY
OFFICERS, THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF THIS NEW GOVERNMENT WOULD
BE TO FORCE THE U.S. TO CHANGE ITS POLITICAL STAND IN SOUTH
VIETNAM.
D. FIRST LIEUTENANT CHIEU: HE WA NOT AWARE OF ANY
EFFORTS TO ORGANIZE AN ALLIANCE FOR PEACE AND DEMOCRACY.
E. LIEUTENANT NHO: HE HAD NOT BEEN TOLD ABOUT THIS FRONT.
7. ASKED IT THEY WERE AWARE OF ANY PLANS FOR FOLLOW-UP
STEPS IN THE CURRENT STRATEGY AND IF SO, WHAT WERE THEY,
THE PRISONERS AN D:
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A. HUYNH TuONG: IF T
THERE WILL BE PEACE.
B. SENIOR LIEUTENANT XA:
41.1
HE CURRENT STRATEGY SUCCEEDS,
FURTHER MOVES.
HE WAS NOT AWARE OF ANY
C. FIRST LIEUTENANT CACH: H
E WAS UNAWARE OF ANY
FUTURE PLANS, BUT STATED THAT THE VC FORC
ES COULD CONTINUE TO FIGHT.
D. FIRST LIEUTENANT CHIEU: AN U
N IDENT IF IED PERSON
TOLD HIM THAT AFTER SUCCESS, THE HARD CORE C
OMMUNIST ELEMENTS
IN SAIGON WOULD ISSUE NEW AND FURTHER ORDERS.
E. LIEUTENANT NHO: HE DID NOT KNOW
FUTURE VC PLANS.
8. ASKED HOW THEY EXPECTED THE NLF AND/OR HANOI T
NYTHING ABOUT
0
EXPLAIN THE FAILURE OF CURRENT MILITARY ACTIVITIES, I
FACT CURRENT MILITARY STRATEGY FAILS TO ACHIEVE VC MILT
, �
OBJECTIVES, THE PRISONERS REPLIED:
TARY
A. HUYNH TUONG: HE DID NOT KNOW. HE BELIEVED
CURRENT VC MILITARY ACTIVITIES HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL BECAUSE
THE NLF RADIO HAD ANNOUNCED MANY VICTORIES AND THE FRONTS
HAD BEEN ESTABLIS
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B. SENIOR LIEUTENANT XA: THE NLF AND HANOI WILL
DENY THE NEGATIVE FACTS PRESENTED BY THE GVN AND WILL TELL
ONLY ABOUT THE GOOD POINTS OF THE ATTACKS.
C. FIRST LIEUTENANT CACH: HE HAD NO IDEA.
D. FIRST LIEUTENANT CHIEU: HE DID NOT KNOW. HE STATED
"THE STRONGER OUR BELIEF IN VICTORY BEFORE, THE WEAKER IT IS NOW."
E. LIEUTENANT NHO: HE DID NOT KNOW BECAUSE IN
HIS rOSITON HE WAS NOT ABLE TO FIND OUT. IF IT IS TRUE
THAT VC ATTACKS HAVE FAILED TO ACHIEVE VC MILITARY OBJECTIVES,
THEN THE FAILURE WILL STRONGLY AFFECT THE MORALE OF NVA
TROOPS AS WELL AS THAT OF THE PEOPLE IN NORTH VIETNAM.
9.
SAIGON DISSEM
STATE USMACV 7TH AF CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF
REPORT CLASS CONF IAL NO FOREI
ADVANCE COPIES SENT ELECTRICALLY TO USIE-MEMBERS.
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