THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06772383
• Document Creation Date: January 28, 2019

Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06772383 /92c_.c.�
VMS t)
ILSeerer7
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM
The Situation in Vietnam
RCIIIVAL RECORD
AGENCY
PLEASE RETURN. TO
ARCHIVES
Top et
125
5 February 1968
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06772383
3.5(c)
EO
13526
3.3(h)(2)
EO
13526
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06772383
Information as of 1600
5 February 1968
HIGHLIGHTS
Allied forces appear to be gaining the upper
hand in most of South Vietnam's urban areas. Most
provincial capitals throughout the country were
relatively quiet on the �night 4-5 February, although
the Communists stepped up their activity in and
around Saigon. The government is taking steps to
alleviate the plight of the approximate 170,000
refugees caused by the fighting.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
Allied forces appear to be regaining the upper hand
in most of South Vietnam's urban areas (Para. 1).
MACV claims that about 20,300 enemy have been killed
since 30 January (Para. 2). A Communist assault on
Hill 861 has been driven back (Paras. 3-5). Commu-
nist forces are maintaining strong pressure against
government security installations in the Saigon area
(Paras. 6-10). Quang Tri city and Hue are under
pressure but the situation elsewhere in I Corps is
quiet (Paras. 11-13). In II Corps, allied reaction
forces are encountering heavy opposition to sweeps
near several cities (Paras. 14-15). The III Corps
area, except for Saigon, was reported quiet on
4-5 February (Para. 20). The Communist offensive
seems to have abated somewhat in IV Corps during the
past 24 hours (Paras. 21-22).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
The government is continuing to mobilize its resources
to deal with problems resulting from the Communist
attacks (Paras. 1-2). President Thieu is displaying
a new confidence and has authorized steps to rally
popular support (Paras. 3-5). General Khang, com-
mander of the III Corps area around Saigon, and an-
other officer appointed to command the capital area
itself, may be accused by an Upper House committee
of laxity in protecting Saigon (Paras. 6-7). Khang,
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06772383
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06772383
-16
104
166
\ NORTH
\ VIETNAM
4..
Demilitarized Zone
QUANG TRI
Khe Sanh
c..�
THUA THIE
��,1
THAILAND
-12
Tonic\
C. Sap
���
QUANG NAM
QUANG TIN
QUANG
NGAI
KONTUM
BINH DIN
PLEIKU
PHU
BON
CAMBODIA)
PHU
YEN.',
uY Hoa
DA R LAC
KHANH
HOA
rs-
4.) TAY
NINH
BINH
LONG
BINH
UONG
PHUOC
LONG
QUANG DUC
TUYEN
Lat �
ouc
NINH
THUAN1
LAM DONG
LONG
KHAN
BINH
TUY
TI-WAN
KIEN
PHONG
DAO
PHU OUOC
DINH TUN
� VI
NH
GI Ak
DINH
PH UOC
TUT
an
Thiet
V1NH
BINH
fit
GULF OF
� SIAM
CH UONG
THIEN
AN
XUYEN
BA X UY EN
BAC LIEU
0
SOUTH VIETNAM
5 FEBRUARY
50 75 100 Mrles
.
50 75 100 N:lorneters
16
.2
69513 2-68 CIA
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06772383
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06772383
T Co
I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. Allied forces appear to be regaining the
upper hand in most of South Vietnam's urban areas.
Most provincial capitals were relatively quiet on
the night of 4-5 February and into the morning,
although the Communists stepped up their activity
in and around Saigon. Heavy fighting continued
for the sixth consecutive day in Hue. To the
north, US Marines drove back an enemy assault on
Hill 861 in the Khe Sanh defense perimeter. Com-
munications suggest that the enemy in the western
highlands is making battle preparations.
2. MACV now claims that about 20,300 Commu-
nists have been killed in the fighting since 30
January. Another 4,500 have been captured, as well
as over 4,700 weapons. Allied losses in the same
period now stand at 1,597 killed and 6,931 wounded.
Khe Sanh
3. Early on 5 February, US Marines drove
back an assault on Hill 861, on the edge of the
Khe Sanh defense perimeter. The assault was pre-
ceded by a heavy rocket, mortar, and artillery
barrage on the hilltop positions and on the main
Khe Sanh base camp. Communist losses totaled 108
killed'. American casualties were 14 killed and
32 wounded.
5 February 1968
I-1
&EC RET
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06772383
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06772383
Situation in Saigon
6. Communist forces are maintaining strong
pressure against government security installations
in the Saigon area, notwithstanding a 24-battalion
allied clearing operation.
7. An estimated enemy battalion overran the
8th precinct Police headquarters in Saigon the night
of 5 February. The situation in this precinct and
in precincts 6 and 7--all of which are located in
� Cholon, the southwestern section of the capital--has de-
teriorated to the point that they have been removed
from Municipal Police jurisdiction and placed under
a three-battalion Ranger task force.
8. Elsewhere in Saigon, only a small number
of terrorist incidents and snipings have been re-
ported. US officials estimate that only a relatively
small force of Viet Cong--as few as 100--remains'ac-
tive. Viet Cong elements in the Saigon attacks have
been described as wearing a variety of outfits, rang-
ing from Buddhist robes and civilian attire to South
Vietnamese Army, Regional Force, Chieu Hoi, and jungle
green uniforms.
9. There was reported to be an abundant supply
of rice and bread in the shops of Saigon and Cholon
as of 4 February. Some merchants, however, are ap-
parently not selling rice, obviously waiting for prices
to soar. It is estimated that the Saigon populace can
last until 9 or 11 February without additional food
supplies from outside.
5 February 1968
1-2
9S ET
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06772383
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06772383
�-�) TO jj2....8-RelrE.7.----f
I Corps
11. US forces reported three major contacts--
each with an enemy battalion--near Quang Tri city on
5 February. The Communists were routed in two of
the engagements. No results are available on the
third. Heavy fighting erupted:in Trieu Phong, a
district capital just to the north of Quang Tri
city.
12. Bitter door-to-door fighting was con-
tinuing in Hue as US and South Vietnamese soldiers
moved against pockets of enemy resistance in sev-
eral sectors of the city. The enemy is clinging
tenaciously to its positions, which include strong-
points in the citadel and on the south bank of the
Huong River.
13. The situation is reported as quiet in
the capital cities of Quang Tin, Quang Ngai and
Quang Nam provinces.
II Corps
14. In the western highlands, allied reac-
tion forces are sweeping for enemy concentrations
near the provincial cities of Kontum, Pleiku, and Ban
Me Thuot. Battalion size engagements between allied
and enemy forces are reported north of Kontum and
southeast of Pleiku.
5 February 1968
1-3
ET
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06772383
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06772383
-I TO P.
15. Enemy forces are reported to be active in the
Cam Ranh area. A clash between about 60 Viet Cong
and Republic of Korea forces has been reported in
the northern sector of the city, an area which has
previously seen little or no enemy activity.
16. In Tuyen Duc Province, an estimated six
enemy companies renewed the attack on allied posi-
tions in and around the city of Da Lat. Communist
forces appear to be gaining the upper hand in the
city and a US battalion is being diverted.
Ninh Thuan Province
17. Although there have been no enemy attacks
reported against the provincial capital or district
towns of coastal Ninh Thuan Province in II Corps,
Viet Cong forces have reportedly entered, unopposed,
a number of Revolutionary Development hamlets in the
province. Between 31 January and 5 February, Commu-
nist units entered 12 hamlets that had either been
worked by Revolutionary Development teams during 1967
or were scheduled for development under the 1968 pro-
gram. None of the 12 hamlets had a team present. In
addition, one hamlet protected by a team was harassed
during this period.
18. The primary objectives of the Viet Cong in
the 12 hamlets was reportedly to obtain foodstuffs
and to propagandize. against. the South Vietnamese
Government, the US,- and the Revolutionary Development
program. By a show of strength in these hamlets,
the enemy is almost certainly attempting to detract
from pacification efforts previously considered com-
pleted. In the hamlets scheduled for development dur-
ing 1962, the Communists reportedly attempted.to
recruit youth for their own forces andto discourage
hamlet residents from-cooperating.
19. US officials in Ninh Thuan.have.for sometime
noted a propensity of the Viet Cong to wait until
teams move out Of a hamlet before trying to.reassert
control. Hamlets under the protection of these teams
have, no doubt, been harassed, but only seldom have
they been made the target of .a significant armed at-
tack.
5 February 1968
1-4
CRET
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06772383
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06772383
;112JAiitigEF
III Corps
20. American observers in the area report
no new outbreaks of Communist activity, except
in the Saigon area. Enemy forces still pose a
threat to some provincial capitals including An
Loc and Phu Cuong.
IV Corps
21. The Viet Cong offensive seems to have
abated somewhat during 5 February in the delta prov-
inces. There has been a significant amount of de-
struction in many of the provincial towns and civilian
casualties were probably high. Press reports indicate
that in the heavily populated town of My Tho at least
60 civilians have been killed and about 680 wounded.
22. During the night of 5 February an enemy
force, estimated at a battalion, attacked Go Cong
provincial city, but was repulsed. There was sporadic
snipek fire in several other cities.
5 February 1968
1-5
TOP
RET
Approved for Release: 2019/01/1-7 C06772383
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06772383
II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. The government is mobilizing its resources
to handle problems arising from the Viet Cong of-
fensive. On the morning of 4 February all prov-
ince chiefs, with the exception of those in Da Lat,
Ban Me Thuot, Kontum, and Hue, where communications
are not functioning, were asked for damage assess-
ments. Several of the ministries have been dele-
gated specific responsibilities for dealing with
the situation, and the government has issued an
appeal to friendly countries for donations of food,
medicine, clothing, and building materials to as-
sist the estimated 170,000 refugees caused by the
week's events.
2. The Ministry of Economy
has been given the job of seeing
that Saigon is adequately supplied with rice. The
Ministries of Health and Social Welfare are responsi-
ble jointly for the distribution of food and cloth-
ing through retail stores. The Ministry of Interior,
in conjunction with the mayor of Saigon and the na-
tional and municipal police directors, will take
responsibility for clearing Saigon of Viet Cong.
Plans include organizing "surround-and-search" opera-
tions in all areas, screening all residents, issuing
new identification cards, and--at some later date--
tightening control of Saigon by reinstituting the
"five-family" system. Under this system, each group
of five families elects a chief to whom they are
responsible and who in turn reports to the police.
Thieu on Various Aspects of the Situation
3. President Thieu appears to be much more
sure of himself and confident of his decisions in
this crisis than he has been under less pressing
circumstances.
Thieu's secretary Nguyen Van Huong, in a 3
February conversation with Thieu, suggested that the
appointment of Vice President Ky to head the joint
Vietnamese-US task force would give fresh impetus to
rumors �that Ky has been gaining power at Thieu's ex-
pense and is favored by the Americans. Thieu, in con-
trast to his usual attitude, brushed aside the possibil-
ity, commenting that he welcomed US assistance on the
task force, as well as the suggestion that Ky head it.
He said he regarded this as a good opportunity to give
Ky something positive and important to do. Huong
feels that Thieu's statement was
sincere and noted no hint of criticism or resentment in
his tone.
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06772383
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06772383
TOSkreirrT
4. On the subject of rounding up popular support
for the government, Huong reportedly proposed to
Thieu that representatives of the various religious
and political groups and other prominent personalities
be invited to meet with government leaders to pledge
their support and possibly sign a manifesto of support.
Huong is already attempting
to contact many of these individuals and has been ap-
proached by others.
5. Thieu is apparently attempting to clear up the
constitutional problems surrounding his declaration
of martial law and other emergency measures. The au-
thority cited for the martial law decree is a pre-
constitution proclamation in 1965 of a state of war,
permitting emergency measures. Huong says he has been
instructed to prepare a new decree compatible with
the constitution and to make arrangements for securing
National Assembly approval. He was also instructed,
to put a definite time limit in
the new decree or to arrange for an eventual constitu-
tional amendment which will set a one-month limit
to any declaration of martial law. Huong emphasized
that neither Thieu nor any other official intends to
violate the constitution.
Possible Investigation of Senior Officers
6. The first note of real discordjias.been struck
in the generally. cooperative attitudes shown thus far
by the various.elements-of the government. 3.3(h)(2)
the. Upper House defense
cOMmittee met on 5 February and concluded that the de-
fense of Saigon lacked strong leadership. during the crisis.
Senator Tran Ngoc Nhuan., senior committee member present,
will therefore call for an early investigation of the mili-
tary leadership when the Upper House meets in plenary ses-
sion on 6 February. Those officers .specifically picked
for investigation are reportedly III Corps Commander Khang
and Colonel Nguyen Van Giam, appointed Commander of the
Capital Military'District during the crisis. 3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
5 February 1968
11-2
RET
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06772383
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06772383
"......---v...f
22
102 104
C INA
-
,
'N...:
1,
\...
...,_
N.
--- .
11�. 106
14-
/ .`���.'
:Lao Cai
:�-..
CH INA 108
t' Nan-nin
l.,
-JO
N ing-ming
22
20
�
. Al
(
��.,
. ...mai
.
-,... _.,
"N r-
-....i
Samneua
LAOS
Yen Bap
.. .*%...
� C..........Sony 'Y
t.I a!
HANOI ��-vGla
...?
Nguyen Lang Son .....,�
a ep Hoa
: c^Ninh
..:.'
- .
Haipliong. ...�rt, 6-1
..
�I8WRT
-
102
P.
,or
r5.----,
.
..�9 .
*
..
� -N../
7.4c,,,..,
\
%
,�. ,
\
)
/
i
)
1
k.,
\
(DB � , uo
Thanh
Vinh
,----
� c---.. .....
\-.
\
TIT'
,
c
)1'
. P......
."--:-.�.!le
g
Hoa
0 F
TONKIN
IS
Oong Hoi
..
..----) DEMARCATION LINE
%)
THAILAND
NORTH VIETNAM
5 FEBRUARY
CON NTIAL
--
PI SOUTH
H �
� � .
\ VIETNAM .
LAOS ----2 16
)
��fle
l
::::t..^."*.::::,=.�:74.'::.;;;',�,:i icT
0 25 50 75 Niles ..,..
.
,
9-.
r
\--N. si,.
/ 106
O ..,
25 50 75 Kilometers
104
69514 2-68 CIA
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06772383
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06772383
III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM
namese
ity is
unusual activity on the part of North Viet-
AN-2 aircraft, but the purpose of the activ-
not yet clear.
2. Transports of this type, modified for a
ground attack role, bombed a radar facility, in Laos
on 12 January. The facility supports US air opera-
tions against North Vietnam. The attack was not a
success, and it could be that the AN-2s are prepar-
ing for a second try. On the other hand, there are
certain tenuous indications that the AN-2s could be
directed against allied forces in the vicinity of
the Demilitarized Zone.
3. North Vietnam is believed to have five AN-2
aircraft configured for tactical operations. The
planes probably are based at Hiep Hoa--a small air-
strip located about 20 miles northeast of Hanoi.
Considerable message activity has been noted between
Hanoi and Hiep Hoa during the past three days and
on 5 February an undetermined number of AN-2s were
directed to fly from Hiep Hoa to Hanoi.
5.
during the same period, however, raise the possi-
bility that the AN-2s could be directed against
other areas. On 2 February, Nan-fling Airfield in
Communist China contacted Hanoi/Gia Lam to get a
5 February 1968
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06772383
3.5(c)
3.5(c)1
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06772383
TOPT
report on projected weather .conditions at Vinh. In
recent weeks, the
North Vietnamese may .be .attempting to develop an.
emergency landing: facility .at Ninh to support air
operations in the vicinity of the Demilitarized Zone.
On 3 February three North Vietnamese AN-2s and two
similar. Chinese aircraft were noted flying from
Meng-tzu to Nan-fling in.Communist.China.
6. There is no indication
that the AN-2s at Nan-ning or at Hanoi
have departed their bases for any fields in southern
North Vietnam. Air defense nets, however, continue
to carry reports of allied 'air and ground activity
in the vicinity of the zone, and it is conceivable
AN-2s or MIGs could be deployed to this area.
7. An unconfirmed sighting report by a US air
observer on 31 January noted the presence of a newly
graded, smooth, dirt runway--about 4,000 feet in
length--located approximately 16 miles north of the
zone. Such a facility could be used for AN-2 ground
support operations in northern South Vietnam.
5 February 1968
TOP
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06772383
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06772383
IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to report.
5 February 1968
'11"-ET
Approved for Release: 2019/01./17 C06772383
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06772383
TOPT
V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. Hanoi's first statement on negotiations
since the beginning ofthe Communist offensive in
the South was a routine rejection of the San Antonio
formula and President Johnson's 1 February comments
on the prospects for settling the war. A commentary
in the party daily Nhan Dan, broadcast on 5 February.,
claimed that the US was still"setting conditions"
by demanding "reciprocity." The US was urging the
Vietnamese people to "pay.a price". by stopping or
slowing down the patriotic struggle. This demand,
the essence of the San Antonio formula, was repeated
by the President on 1 February, according to Nhan
Dan. The paper reiterated that Foreign Minister
Trinh's 29 December "will" talk formulation was the
"just stand" of North Vietnam and that it was re-
ceiving increasingly wider international support.'
2. The Hanoi statement did not directly con-
nect events in the South with the question of set-
tling the war. In keeping with other North Viet-
namese statements, it made no mention of recent
interpretations of the San Antonio formula by US
officials.
Giap Reportedly Tours Defense Sites
3. The AFP correspondent in Hanoi supplies
the first report of a current public appearance by
North Vietnamese Defense Minister Giap in many
months. The 5 February dispatch claims that Giap
and other significant politburo members visited
military units in Hanoi during the Tet holidays.
Giap reportedly visited antiaircraft units, �a tour
he frequently takes at this time of the year.
4. Although we have no confirmation of Giap's
reappearance, the AFP copy from Hanoi is censored
and is probably based on a North Vietnamese newscast.
Official Hanoi newscasts do make a practice of fabri-
cating public appearances of prominent leaders.
5 February 1968
V-1
TOP RET
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06772383
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06772383
TOP SEfertf
VI. OTHER MAJOR ASPECTS
1. Cargo deliveries to North Vietnam by for-
eign flag ships in January totaled about 192,300
tons, some 45,000 tons more than the previous
high set in May 1967. Large deliveries of food-
stuffs, fertilizer, and petroleum accounted for
the increase. Foodstuff deliveries totaled
56,300 tons, and fertilizer amounted to 25,400
tons. About 34,400 tons of petroleum were de-
livered, of which 25,200 tons originated in the
USSR, 7,000 tons in Chile, and 2,200 tons in
Rumania. These deliveries coincided with un-
usually high petroleum deliveries--some 21,200
tons--to China for the North Vietnamese account.
The deliveries to China may be for subsequent
transshipment to North Vietnam. Routing through
China may have been designed to overcome insuffi-
cient storage in North Vietnam or to offset pre-
vious deliveries from China to North Vietnam.
2. Layover time for ships in North Vietnam
averaged less than 15 days in January compared to
33 days in August 1967. The heavy cargo deliveries
in January, may increase layover time in February
to about 20 days.
3. Twenty Soviet ships--14 dry cargo and 6
tankers--delivered 65,600 tons of cargo to North
Vietnam in January compared with the monthly
average of about 55,600 tons during 1967. Two
ships originated in the Black Sea and 18 in Far
Eastern ports. Eleven Chinese dry cargo ships
delivered 49,000 tons of cargo in January, com-
pared with only five ships and 17,000 tons of
cargo in December. One Soviet ship has arrived
in February, at least six more are en route, and
about five others have been scheduled to make
voyages to Haiphong this month from Vladivostok.
4, North Vietnamese exports by sea in January
totaled 43,200 tons and included 38,900 tons of
coal. This is slightly higher than the tonnage
shipped in December, but still some 26,400 tons
below the monthly average exported during the first
half of 1967.
5 February 1968
VI-1
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06772383
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
3.5(c)