DAILY SUMMARY - 1950/04-1950/06

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Daily Summary Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06749478
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2019

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KOREA
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1. Government reported to be near panic�US Ambassador
Muccio reports from the Southern Korean Government's
provisional capital at Taejon that the situation in South
Korea is rapidly deteriorating. Muccio expressed the
opinion,after prolonged consultation with top Korean
leaders, that he could "hold them in line a little longer"
but that there was danger they might soon panic. Muccio
strongly urges an all-out US effort before the "desperate"
situation gets "out of hand."
EUROPE
2. West Germans favorable toward Schuman Plan draft�US
High Commissioner McCloy in Frankfurt has learned from
a high official of the Federal Republic that the Germans
were impressed with the presentation of the Schuman Plan
made recently by French Economic Adviser Monnet and that
the fundamentals of the Plan are acceptable to the Germans.
The West German official said that despite indications of
trouble with the Dutch and the possibility that Benelux would
not go along with the Plan, the Germans were prepared to go
ahead with the French and Italians if necessary. McCloy
comments that Chancellor Adenauer is throwing all his
authority behind the Plan, telling the industrialists that it
has such tremendous political significance that they must
conform.
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KOREA
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1, South Koreans disheartened--US Embassy Korea reports
that the South Koreans and their Government are seriously
dispirited by the course of hostilities, and particularly by
the loss of Seoul, Pointing out that visible evidences of
US assistance have been few thus far, the Embassy ex-
presses the opinion that a very strong effort on the part of
the US Air Force and Navy will be needed if the, situation
is to be stabilized and that the sight of US aircraft in action
during the next few days will be necessary to maintain
morale among South Korean troops engaged on the Han
River line.
2. YUGOSLAVIA: Attitude toward Korean situation--The US
Delegation to the UN has been informed by Yugoslav Security
Council representative Bebler that his government privately
supports and understands the US action on Korea but could
not publicly support the US resolution in the SC because of
Yugoslavia's ideological war with the USSR. Bebler ad-
mitted the resolution "might Prove to be in Yugoslavia's
direct interest if Yugoslavia were attacked next." Bebler
expressed the opinion that in order to keep the sympathy
of Marxists in "Democratic People's" countries and the
'USSR, Yugoslavia must be extremely careful not to appear
to be a creature' 6E the West. Bebler remarked that he knew
the US was not out to rule Yugoslavia or any other independ-
ent country and commented that the difficulty arose from
the colonial or semi4ascist nature of several US-backed
governments throughout the world.
�
US Ambassador Allen reports from Belgrade that
in an extensive conversation with Tito on the Yugoslav �
position regarding the Korean question, Tito stated that
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� his chief aim was to convince world opinion of Yugoslav
independence from any bloc, while showing clearly his
condemnation of aggression. In this connection, Tito said
that he must keep constantly in mind that if the Cominform
suddenly attacked Yugoslavia, Moscow would seek to justify
the attack as a purely defensive measure. Tito implied
that the Yugoslav Government would abide by any Security
Council decisions taken in accord with the UN Charter and
remarked that he did not expect the Korean situation or re-
ported troop movements in the Balkans to interrupt his
plans for departing shortly for his summer capital� at Bled.
(CIA Comment: Recent reports of Soviet military acti-
vity in the Balkan area, Including those regarding Soviet Black Sea
naval maneuvers with a hypothetical landing on the Turkish
Black Sea coast, appear to be part of a Soviet war-of-nerves
in that area. Soviet sabre rattling will probably continue
and may be intensified, but the strong US reaction to Soviet-
inspired aggression in Korea will probably discourage the
USSR from any Soviet-Satellite military aggression in the
Balkans.)
3.3(h)(2)
3. INDOCHINA: French favor prompt attack on Viet Minh.forces-- C/A/5
US Anibassador Bruce in Paris transmits the opinion of P.ignon,
.French .High Commissioner for Indochina, that the develop-
ments in Korea make imperative the immediate destruction
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of the Communist-led Viet Minh forces in Indochina.
Pignon expressed confidence that the Viet Minh forces
can be eliminated, but commented that the margin of
success could be increased only if the French forces
in Indochina receive prompt delivery of additional US
aircraft. Pignon expressed the feeling that Bao Dai
will return to Indochina after taking a badly needed rest
at Vichy.
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KOREA
I. Korean morale raised by Truman's announcement�US
Ambassador Muccio reports from Suwon (about twenty
miles south of Seoul) that the US decision to provide mili-
tary support has greatly raised morale, and that the ex-
pected air support raises the hope that it may now be
possible to rally the disintegrating South Korean Army
and re-group for a stand along the south bank of the Han
River,
SOVIET UNION
2. Soviet attitude toward Korean issue at the UN--US .
Representative Austin reports frit= the UN in New York
that during a recent conversation with UN Secretary-
General Lie and Soviet representative Malik, Malik repeated-
ly questioned the legality of the recent UN action on Korea.
Malik argued that the UN decision on Korea was illegal
because neither the USSR nor the "lawful representatives"
of China participated in the Security Council decision.
Later in the conversation., Malik remarked that he still
intended to depart for Moscow the first week of July and
he avoided making any estimate regarding the length of
his absence.�
3. East Germany compared to North Korea�The Berlin
� element of the US High Commission for Germany ex.-
presses the opinion that the Korean invasion adds to the
evidence that the USSR is accelerating the time table for
its revolutionary offensive in various areas in the world,
. including Germany. The Berlin element recommends
a careful analysis of the whole pattern of Korean develop-
ments in recent years for clues to Soviet plans regarding
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Germany, because the "evident analogy" betWeen North
Korea and East Germany makes it plain that the Soviet
plans for East Germany are evolving toward an eventual
attempt to use the German Democratic Republic in the
same manner as North Korea. The Berlin element be-
lieves that the Germans are keenly aware of the implica-
tions for their own country of the Korean situation, and
that the manner in which the West deals with the Commu-
nist aggression in Korea will make a "strong impression"
in Germany.
(CIA Comment: CIA believes that the Germans
regard the Korean conflict as a test case of the US ability
to deal effectively with a critical situation.)
4. No Soviet military preparations in Germany and Austria--
General Handy, Commander in Chief of US Forces in
Europe, reports that there are no indications of aggres-
sive Communist Military action in Germany. Handy states
that the bulk of the Soviet occupation armies seem to be
engaged in normal maneuvers and that the German Demo-
cratic Republic has manifested no warlike intentions.
General Keyes, Commander of US forces in Austria,
reports that there are no indications of a change in the
present situation in Austria at this time.
(CIA Comment: No evidence is available indicating
Soviet preparations for military operations in the West
European theater, but Soviet military capabilities in Europe
make it possible for the USSR to take aggressive action with
a minimum of preparation or advance notice.)
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5. Soviet combined maneuvers in Balkans reported--US
Embassy Ankara transmits a Turkish government re-
port originating in the Turkish legation in Bulgaria
that the Soviet Black Sea fleet is planning to hold
maneuvers during the latter part of August which
would involve a seaborne landing on the Turkish Black
Sea Coast. According to souice, there will also be
maneuvers of land forces at approximately the same
time in Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia
with hypothetical objectives to the West and South.
(CIA Comment: The report of combined Soviet
maneuvers in the Balkan-Turkish area probably forms 1_
part of a Soviet war of nerves against the West. The �
firm stand of the United States in Korea, however, will
\distourage such manifestations of Soviet pressure along
the Soviet periphery.)
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GENERAL
1. US to approach USSR on Korean invasion--The Department
of State has instructed US Ambassador Kirk in Moscow to
raise the question of the Korean invasion with Soviet For-
eign Minister Vishinsky and to ask the USSR to use its
influence to effect the withdrawal of the invading forces
immediately. The Department hopes that such an approach
will make it clear to the USSR that aggressive action by
the Satellites involves Soviet prestige directly, thus forcing
the Kremlin to be more cautious in pushing such tactics to
extremes in the future. The Department also considers
that prompt and explicit exposure in Western propaganda
of Soviet responsibility for a clear-cut case of aggression
should go far toward disrupting the increasingly effective
Soviet "peace offehsiv.e."
2. Dutch reaction to Korean invasion--Dutch Foreign Minister
Stikker has expressed the opinion to US Ambassador Chapin
in The Hague that if the US should "permit" South Korea to
fall, "the consequences for all Asia, but particularly for
Southeast Asia, would be absolutely disastrous," and the
� Western world could "write off" the whole area forever.
Stikker added that the effect on Western Europe would be
�
"lamentable." The Dutch Foreign Minister believes the
action in Korea to be "one more Russian bluff," but a very
serious one, and he is convinced the USSR does not want war
and would back down if strong, immediate counteraction were
taken. Stikker declared there was no time to wait for Security
Council action and expressed the hope that the US would land
troops: Stikker concluded his interview with the Ambassador
by saying "all eyes are on America."
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. 3. Soviet troop movement against Yugoslavia reported--
3.3(h)(2)
/t a considerable number of troops
,
are being moved through Rumania toward Bulgaria and
Yugoslavia. , seven military trains
composed of fifteen to twenty cars which are completely
blacked-out are transporting tanks, artillery, and munitions
to the south.
(CIA Comment: CIA believes thata buildup of
Soviet military equipment and strategic transport facilities
in the Balkans has been under way for some time. There
is little evidence, however, that Soviet military personnel
in the Balkans have been increased sufficiently to enable
the USSR to undertake military action in the area at this
time.)
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GENERAL
1. Embassy Moscow's views on Korean conflict--US Embassy
Moscow, in assessing the implications of the present Korean
conflict, expresses the opinion that the North Korean offen-
sive against the Republic of Korea constitutes a. clear-cut
Soviet challenge to the United States which should be answered
firmly and swiftly because it constitutes a direct threat to US
leadership of the free world against Soviet-Communist im-
perialism. The Embassy points out that the defeat of the
Republic of Korea would have grave and unfavorable reper-
cussions for the US position in Japan, Southeast Asia, and in
other areas as well, and expresses the .view that the US is
obligated to make clear to the world without delay that the
US is prepared to assist the Republic of Korea maintain its �
independence by all means at US disposal, including military
assistance and vigorous action in the UN Security Council. The
Embassy believes that any delay on the part of the US "could
suggest' to the USSR the possibility of 'precipitating with �
impunity immediate action against Indochina and other points
along the boundary of the Soviet sphere. The Embassy also .
believes that the USSR probably calculated that the US will
be inclined to accept "neutralization" of the Korean civil war
which would lead to eventual victory by.North Korea, thus ex-
panding the Soviet empire Without the use of Soviet military
forces. The Embassy reiterates its belief that the USSR is not
yet ready to risk.full-scale war with the West, and "comments
that the present Korean situation thus offers the US an oppor-
tunity to show firmness and determination and, at the same time,
to unmask important Soviet weaknesses to the eyes of the world �
and particularly in Asia, where popular ideas Of Soviet power�
have been grossly exaggerated as a result of recent Soviet .
political and propaganda successes. �
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(CIA Comment: CIA concurs in general with Embassy
Moscow's estimate of Soviet intent in precipitating civil war
in Korea and further agrees that successful aggression in
Korea will encourage the USSR to launch similar ventures else-
where in the Far East. In sponsoring the aggression .in Korea,
the Kremlin probably calculated that no firm or effective
countermeasures would be taken bY..the West: However, the
Kremlin is not willing to undertake a global war at this time,
and firm and effective countermeasures by the West would
probably lead the Kremlin to permit a settlement to be negotiat-
ed between the North and South Koreans. If the venture in Korea
Is successful, the Kremlin will fully explbit the "western failure"
in Korea in an effort to undermine the. western position throughout
the world. Effective action by the UN to control the Korean situa-
tion is possible only through military sanctions involving the im-
mediate conclusion of "interim agreements" providing for armed
contingents from member nations to enforce the TM cease fire
order.)
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GENERAL
2,1i3n1950
1. UK pressing France to increase Bao Dai's authority-- CIA'S
US Embassy London reports that, according to a Foreign
Office official, the UK is informing the French Govern-
ment of its opinion that France has failed to take even
immediately feasible steps toward increasing Bao Dai's
international prestige. The French are being informed
that failure to establish a separate ministry for indo-
China and to hum over the Saigon palace to Bao Dai has
made it difficult for the UK to explain the French position
to India and other Asian nations. The UK is adding that it
has been hoping for a suitable occasion to announce the
elevation of the UK Consulate General in Saigon to Lega-
tion status.
EUROPE
2. GERMANY: Adenauer's illness causes concern--US High
Commissioner McCloy in Germany reports that Chancellor
Adenauer's continued serious illness has created recurrent
doubts among Germans and others as to the power of the
Government to survive without serious results should
Adenauer be incapacitated. McCloy comments that the fact
that much top-priority government business is now at a
standstill is a spectacular demonstration of the extent to
which Adenauer has converted the Federal Government into
a "one-man show".
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3. RUMANIA: Warning of break in relations proposed--
The US Legation in Bucharest, submitting its views con-
cerning serious restriction on Legation communications
occasioned by Rumania's recent refusal of visas for US
diplomatic couriers, believes it likely that the Rumanian
Government is determined to break relations but is doing
so by means of "Slow strangulation," in order to damage
US prestige as much as possible in the process. The Lega-
tion suggests for consideration that the US warn Rumania
Empffeftly that it must 'Suspend relations unless the visa
difficulties are cleared up. The Legation observes that if
concessions are made, its position will be somewhat im-
proved; if not, the US will at least be saved from a long
period of "compounded humiliation".
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EUROPE
1. GREECE: Rapprochement with Yugoslavia being delayed--
US Charge Minor in Athens reports that he has been un-
successful in his efforts to persuade the Greek Foreign
Office to go ahead with the exchange of ministers with
Yugoslavia. According to Minor, Under Secretary for
Foreign Affairs Politis asserted that, while he understood
the international importance of improved Greek-Yugoslav
relations, it was virtually impossible to sell the idea to
the Greek public so long as Yugoslav "provocations" re-
garding Greek Macedonia continued. In reply to Minor's
suggestion that the Greek Government might proceed to
exchange emissaries without making any further commit-
ments, Politis asserted that this would also be unacceptable
to the Greek public. Minor accordingly recommends that
the US make no further efforts at this time in Greece to
strengthen Greek-Yugoslav ties.
(CIA Comment: CIA agrees that the Greek Govern-
ment would find it politically dangerous to proceed with
establishment of closer ties with Yugoslavia so long as the
Yugoslav Government continues its public references to the
status of the small Slav-speaking minority in Greek
Macedonia.)
23 JUN 1950
2. ITALY: Proposals to be made on Trieste--US Ambassador
Dunn in Rome has learned that Italy will soon approach
Yugoslavia with suggestions aimed at relieving current
tensions regarding the Trieste issue and improving the
atmosphere between the two countries. According to Dunn,
the Italians will suggest: (a) the restoration of interzonal
traffic and the return of seized interzonal vessels; (b) the
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cessation of repressive measures against Trieste Italians,
including recruitment for forced labor; and (c) the pro-
tection of the properly rights of Italians who have had to
leave the Yugoslav zone of the Trieste territory. Dunn
comments that the Italians would be willing to set aside the
Trieste issue and attempt to settle other differences but
only if satisfied that the gradual absorption of Zone B by
Yugoslavia is halted. The Ambassador adds that Italian
readiness to settle other outstanding Italian-Yugoslav
problems will depend on the Yugoslav reactions to the
forthcoming proposals, and expresses his conviction that
Yugoslav rejection of the Italian approach would eventually
cause Italy to bring the matter before an international forum.
(CIA Comment: The Yugoslays would react favorably
to the general idea of setting aside the Trieste issue tempo-
rarily but will reject the Italian allegation of Yugoslav re-
pressive measures in Zone B. Yugoslavia is likely to counter
with similar allegations regarding treatment of the Slovene
minority under Italian jurisdiction and with charges that
Zone A of the Trieste Territory is being absorbed by Italy.)
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GENERAL
1. Bao Dai's "objectives" in visiting France--US Ambas-
sador Bruce in Paris has learned from Emperor Bao
Dai's entourage already in France that Bao plans to re-
main in France for about two months. The Emperor's
advance guard, which is vigorously defending the
Emperor's visit, stated that the four main reasons for
Bao's visit at this time are: (a) to provide close moral
support and direction for the Vietnamese delegates meet-
ing with French representative's to work out methods for
speeding up the achievement of Indochinese independence
within the French Union; (b) to conclude an agreement
with the French defining the powers of the Vietnamese
High Commissioner in France and the French High Com-
missioner in Indochina; (c) to clarify the responsibilities
and functions of the new Vietnamese army; and (c) to
arrange for an early return of the Empress to Vietnam.
Bruce comments that the foregoing "reasons" may have
been filled in after Bao's decision to visit France and
that the Vietnamese are apparently determined to use
Bao's presence in France to their best advantage.
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GENERAL
1.. Egyptian King reportedly favors British presence in Suez--
US Ambassador Caffery in Cairo has been confidentially in-
formed that King Farouk has expressed the belief that total
evacuation of British troops from the Suez area would not
be to Egypt's advantage. Caffery comments that although
the. Prime Minister and Foreign Minister were reportedly
dismayed at the. King's attitude, British Field Marshal Slim
might now find the atmosphere more favorable for discussion
of Anglo-Egyptian defense problems when he returns to Egypt
next month.
2. British attitude toward Tibet--US Ambassador Douglas in
London has learned that the UK is prepared to recognize
Chinese Communist sovereignty over Tibet, but only with
the understanding that Tibet continue to be regarded as
autonomous. The UK considers that any attempt to inter-
vene in Tibet would be "impractical and unwise.," primarily
because: (1) Tibet's inaccessibility makes it virtually im-
possible to do anything to strengthen Tibetan military capa-
bilities for resisting Chinese Communist aggression; and
(2) Britain is not now sufficiently interested in the area to
warrant risking embroilment wit4.Communist China over the
fate of Tibet. �
�
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FAR EAST
20 JUN 1950
1. INDOCHINA: Bao Dai reportedly discouraged and depressed--
US Consul General Gullion in Saigon, in summarizing his im-
pression of Bao Dai's present attitude toward the future of
Vietnam, reports that Bao Dai appeared to be profoundly de-
pressed and discouraged during a recent; prolonged inter-
view. Bao Dal (who has now firmly decided to go to France)
remarked that he would "wait and see" before deciding upon
the date of his return from France, and Gullion comments
that Bao obviously conceives of his coming visit as a means�
of wringing further concessions from the French as the price
for his retuin. Bao believes that the French military effort
in Indochina is going badly and feels that the French 'are
welching" on their political promises for granting greater
autonomy to the new State of Vietnam. In estimating how
Bao Dai s state of mind may affect the course of events in
Indochina, Gullion comments that although Bao's present
attitude may be transitory, the fact remains that Bao is
seriously considering a "stay away" strike against the French
and that Bao's present disconsolate attitude is far from that
of a single-minded leader of an anti-Communist crusade.
(CIA Comment: Bao Dal's imminent departure from
Indochina, on the eve of the technical conference scheduled
for 20-25 June between France and the three new Indochinese
states and just prior to initial delivery of US aid, is primarily
a bargaining move aimed at extracting a French commitment
to expand the "limited independence recently granted Viet-
nam within the French Union. A prolonged stay in France by
Bao Dai would seriously hamper French attempts to create a
non-Communist nationalist movement in Indochina, and Bao's
flat refusal to return to Vietnam could lead to a collapse of
the current French political effort in Indochina.)
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EUROPE
1. ITALY: Attitude toward Schuman plan negotiations�US
Ambassador Dunn in Rome reports that the Italian delega-
tion to the Schuman plan negotiations has been instructed
to maintain and defend a "truly European attitude," while
�
at the same time endeavoring to "keep the door always
open for the UK." The Italian delegation was reminded
�
that the objective of the negotiations is to assure free
access by Europe to coal, steel, and ore at non-discrimi-
natory prices and was authorized to make sacrifices relat-
ing to the elimination of uneconomic plant capacity in Italy.
Dunn adds that the Italian Government recognizes that a
workable agreement may be obtained for the continent that
would not attract the UK and that, in such an event, the
fate of the Schuman plan would depend on the US attitude.
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EUROPE
I. UNITED KINGDOM: Views on Labor .party yanwhlet--
According to US Ambassid-Or Douglas, the recent Labor
Party pamphlet on European unity is a badly expressed
reaffirmation of the Labor Party s belief in a cautious
approach to political or economic European unity and its
opposition to a supra-national European authority, Douglas
believes the pamphlet, though seriously embarrassing to
the government, will have little if any effect on government
policy and will not fundamentally affect the relationship be-
tween the US and British governments. Douglas has been
confidentially informed that Prime Minister Attlee had
neither seen nor approved the document before it was
issued and surmises that other :responsible Ministers were
largely ignorant of the pamphlet's contents prior to publica-
tion.
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EUROPE
1. DENMARK: Concern regarding defense reported�US Am-
bassador Anderson in Copenhagen reports that, during an
extended conversation with Prime Minister Hedtoft, the
Prime Minister reaffirmed his concern and anxiety regard-
ing Denmark's security and defense needs. The Prime
Minister considers that fear of war and uncertainty re-
garding Danish security provided by Western defense plans
are "daily growing stronger" in the minds of the Danish
people, who do not wish "to be occupied and later, liberated."
Partly as a result of this uncertainty among the Danish people,
the Prime Minister feels that current Communist peace pro-
paganda is having some effect.
Doctuneat
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GENERAL
1., French views on West German police force--According
to US Ambassador Bruce in Paris, the French will agree
to the establishment of a small West German security
force, but they will insist that it be clearly understood
that there is no connection between the increase of the
police powers of the West German Government and the
remilitarization of the Soviet Zone. The French are
willing to permit a police force of about 500 men for the
Bonn enclave and would agree to having the Federal Gov-
ernment control the provincial police under some circum-
stances. Bruce comments that the French Foreign Office
is still very anxious over the possibility of an "armanents
race" between eastern and western Germany.
Document No.
EU
Cf::::11131R;-Lei
DECLASSIFIED
Pate:
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TO: �Ts
4 Apr 77
77 /17E1:3
15 JUN 1950
1317
0
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GENERAL
1. Possibility of Satellite union reported--US Ambassador
Chapin at The Hague has been informed by the Israeli
Minister there that a Communist "friend' (evidently the
Hungarian Minister at The Hafue)recently remarked that
"one should not be surprised' at the development of a ,
political union between Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and
Czechoslovakian Source also stated that he had been given
the impression that the first move in establishing such a
political union would be the creation of a Southeast Euro-
pean grouping, partly as a counterpoise to the Atlantic
Pact Source commented that although such a union
might eventually be incorporated into the USSR, such
action would be deferred indefinitely.
(CIA Comment: Although the formation of a South-
east European grouping cannot be discounted entirely as
a possible Soviet effort to counter the growing consolida-
tion of Western Europe, such a move by the Kremlin is
not likely at this time. The establishment of a federation
of Satellites would increase the possibility of collusion
among Satellite leaders which might lead to a defection
similar to Tito's. CIA has no evidence that the USSR has
been able to eliminate Satellite nationalism sufficiently to
justify assuming the risk inherent in establishing such a
bloc at present.)
Document No.
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14 JUN 1950
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T 0 E T
GENERAL
1. USSR invited to name civiLiaa commissioner for Austria--
US Ambassador Kirk in lVfoscow, in concert with his British
and French colleagues, has delivered an invitation to the
USSR to join the three Western Powers in designating
civilian high commissioners for Austria to replace the pres-
ent military commanders. The Western Powers are taking
this action "at an early date" to strengthen the authority of
the Austrian Government and to ease the occupation burdens
on Austria. In the note, the Western Powers reaffirm their
readiness to settle without delay all outstanding issues of
the Austrian treaty and indicate their feeling that the appoint-
ment of civilian high commissioners for Austria will consti-
tute progress toward the restoration of a free and independent
Austria.
Document 17o.
NO Clf.Iss. 0
Cl; CJ2J : TS
T:ALcro, 4 Apr .77
Autil 13-2C 77. 1763.
4,1,4
Date:
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T 0 Wir RET
GENERAL
1 2 JUN 1950
1 3 1 4
1. Views on recognizing Ho regime--According to US Embassy
New Delhi, Indian Secretary for External Affairs Bajpai has
received a message from Prime Minister Nehru (now in
Djakarta) in which Nehru agreed with Bajpai that it would be
unwise for the United States of Indonesia to recognize the
pro-Communist Ho Chi Minh regime in Indochina at this
time. Nehru added that the Indonesian Government has no '
intention of recognizing Ho or of taking the initiative in con-
vening an Asian conference on the Indochinese question.
Bajpai informed the Embassy that: (a) the Indonesian Govern-
ment.was "closely in step" with the Government of India in
its attitude toward Indochina; and (b) the Government of India
would recognize as the government of Indochina that group
which achieved effective control of the country.
Document No.
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Apr 77
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GENERAL
1. Western Commandants reply to U15R on Berlin elections �The
Department of State has agreed to the proposed text of a letter,
to be sent by the Western Commandants in Berlin to the Soviet
Commandant, which takes issue with the seven Soviet conditions
for city-wide elections and re-emphasizes the general prin-
ciples that guide the Western approach to the reunification of
Berlin. In the proposed text, the Commandants insist on a free-
ly elected city government for Berlin, with the guarantee of
city-wide freedom for all individuals and democratic political
groups, before, during, and after the elections. The Comman-
dants point out that, because the occupation forces are intended
to guarantee the civil rights of the Berliners, there is no reason
to make the holding of elections conditional upon the withdrawal
of occupation forces. The Commandants also State that quadri-
partite work in the Kommandatura should be resumed only when
the abolition of the veto permits the expeditious handling of
business.
2. British and French views on German export control--US High
Commissioner McCloy in Frankfurt expresses doubt that he
could persuade his British and French colleagues to approach
the West German Government with a demand for corrective
action regarding controls over the export of strategic items to
the Soviet bloc. McCloy states that British and French repre-
sentatives in the High Commission are unable to agree on strict
controls for German exports as long as their home governments
do not themselves apply stricter controls than they are now
doing. The representatives point out that, in the absence of such
action on the part of the British and French governments, the
Germans would charge discrimination.
Document No.
0 JUN 1950
1313
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9 JUN 1950
EUROPE
UNITED KINGDOM: Further reaction to the Schuman plan--
According to US Ambassador Douglas in London, the UK's
chief economic planning official has categorically stated that
the British are not preparing counter proposals to the Schuman
plan and has declared that the UK Government is well aware of
the political importance of the Schuman proposal. The British
planning official expressed his personal view that the British
would support the plan, even at the cost of economic disadvan -
tages, provided there was "reasonable assurance" that it would
work. Douglas comments that these remarks express the sincere
views of a planning official intimately involved in consideration
of the Schuman plan bdt expresses MS' doubt ttiatluch remkiks
Accurately' represent the true feelings of higher government
officials responsible for the 3 June communique. Douglas further
.conaments that because Foreign Minister Sevin, whom he suspects
a0aying been largely responsible for the communique, is in the
hospital and Attlee, who is more favorable to the plan, is there-
.fore-plaYing a larger role in foreign policy, the British position
may be gradually modified.
�
ID o f.ra=e-nt No .
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TOP R E T
GENERAL
1. Indonesia takes neutral stand on Indochina�US Ambassador
Cochran in Djakarta reports that when he expressed to Indo-
nesian Premier Hatta the concern felt by the US over the
Indonesian Parliament's recent resolution regarding Indo-
china, Hatta characterized the move as a political maneuver
to forestall a more radical proposal and indicated his govern-
ment does not contemplate the calling of an inter-Asian con-
ference on Indochina, as the resolution suggests. Hatta told
Cochran that Indonesia does not wish to recognize either
Bao Dai or Ho Chi Minh so long as neither is in control. He
pointed out that Indonesian policy was to foster unity in
genuine nationalist movements in the Far East, not to divide
them. Hatta declared his government intends to consult
individually with other friendly governments in an effort to
achieve a French yielding of sovereignty in Indochina.
8 JUN 1950
1311
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7 JUN 1950
EUROPE
1. THE NETHERLANDS: Optimism reported cowing--
According to US Ambassador Chapin in The ague, the
Dutch "are now all for the Schuman plan," which they
welcome as a contribution to the integration of Western
Europe. Chapin believes that the Dutch, who have replaced
their traditional neutrality with a new willingness to parti-
cipate in international affairs, now exhibit a more positive
feeling in regard to the future of the Netherlands and of
Western Europe. The Dutch are now more optimistic that
European civilization can survive, and they are eager and
-ready to play their part in the integration which they be-
lieve to be essential to this survival.
FAR EAST�
2. INDONESIA: Parliament favors Ho Chi Minh--US Ambas-
sador Cochran in Djakarta, in reporting the interest of the
Indonesian Parliament in the problem of Vietnamese inde-
pendence, notes the existence of a "genuine, albeit mis-
guided," Indonesian sentiment Strongly favoring the_Ho Chi
Minh regime in Indochina. Cochran estimates that if a
choice were,demanded in terms of retaining Western assist-
ance or pursuing an independent foreign policy, the Indonesian
Parliament would favor 'support for Ho. The Ambassador
points out that parliamentary pressure was recently exerted
for immediate recognition of the Ho regime and that Indo-
nesian Premier Hatta was successful at that time in substi-
tuting a resolution favoring study of the problem of independ-
ence for the people of Vietnam, as well as a possible inter-
Asian conference to find a solution for the Indochina conflict.
44,
TOP
ET
D0ellm2nt O.
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OM- S
S.-5
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TOP SVPRET
GENERAL
1. Possible Kremlin conference on Southeast Asia--US Embassy
Bangkok expresses the opinion that the imminent departure
for Moscow of the Soviet Minister and the former Charge,
following the recent departure of other Soviet officials may
indicate that an important consultation or planning conference
on Southeast Asia will soon take place in Moscow. According
to the Embassy, the British representatives in Bangkok con-
cur in the view that the USSR may be calling an urgent meeting
in order to decide upon immediate steps to prevent or counter
the strengthening of Southeast Asia. by the Western Powers.
(CIA Comment: The recall of Soviet representatives
from Bangkok, combined with the recall for consultations of
� top diplomatic personnel from all the Soviet diplomatic posts
(except China) in Eastern Asia, indicates that the Kremlin is
probably reviewing its over-all policy for the Far East. The
additional presence in Moscow of the Soviet Ambassador to
the US, a Far Eastern expert familiar with US thinking, is
further evidence that the USSR is formulating new tactics de-
signed to counter Western attempts to strengthen anti-Com-
munist efforts in the Far East, especially in Southeast Asia.)
6 JUN 1950
1309
2. East German-Polish "deal" suggested--US Embassy Moscow
reports that present evidence points to a "Soviet-inspired
deal" whereby Poland might offer the East German govern-
ment (GDR) a maritime outlet in the Stettin area. The Embassy
states that this action might take the form of outright territorial
concession (thus actually modifying the Oder-Neisse frontier)
or of an' agreement permitting:the GDR access to and use of a
special port zone.
(CIA Comment: Although it is possible Poland will grant
the GDR, right of access to Stettin and the use of a special port
zone, '(IA does not believe that the USSR will modify the Oder-
Neisse frontier in the near future.)
- 1 -
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RET
EUROPE
3. UNITED KINGDOM:. British thinking on Schuman proposal--
US Ambassador Douglas in London expresses the belief that
the British, fully aware that the French would not accept the
proposal, suggested a ministerial meeting to discuss the
Schuman plan prior to foilval negotiations in-the hope that
the other participating continental powers could be weaned
away from French leadership and thus induced to follow
British suggestions for dealing with the matter. Douglas
further estimates that the British made their suggestion as
a challenge to "renewed'' French leadership on the continent
because the UK was not prepared to participate in the Schuman
proposal and at the same time was unprepared to pay the conse-
quences for not joining. The Ambassador .also expresses the
view that a basic cause for British reluctance to participate
in the Schuman plan is their fear of exposing themselves to
forces which would jeopardize the UK's ability to plan and
which might interfere with their program of full employment.
NEAR EAST-AFRICA
4.
�
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TOP E T
GENERAL
5 JUN 1950
1308
Bruce.suggests US support for Schuman plan�US Ambassador
Bruce in Paris reports that since the UK has found the Schuman
plan unacceptable, there is "naturally great concern" among
the Western European:countries to be assured that the US
still favors the proposed integration of coal and steel industries
of various countries Ainder an international authority. Bruce
points out that it will not be easy for the participating countries
to agree upon, integration terms acceptable to their respective
parliaments, and recommends that the US "sympathetically
and vigorously" encourage the French initiative. As a possi-
bility for indicating US moral support, Bruce suggests that
consideration be given to a US statement publicly congratulating
France and the other participants on the spirit and scope of the
Schuman plan.
Document No. !;.(
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TOP RET
� GENERAL
3 JUN 1950
13p7
1. Soviet Etrogram for-East Germany reviewed--US representa-
tive Page in Berlin, in reviewing the general Soviet program
for Eastern Germany, expresses the opinion that the Kremlin
"is making substantial progress" in its attempts to assimilate
the eastern zone and comments that the most remarkable point
in this progress is that such a "foreign imposed totalitarianism"
is taking hold despite native antagonisms. The US representa-
tive believes thatthe east German youth organization is success-
fully utilizing many Nazi�psychological and social patterns and
the age-old German craving for group solidarity. Page remarks
that the recent Communist-inspired youth rally in Berlin was an
impressive demonstration of strength and that the present east
German youth organization is comparable to the Hitler youth
group-in its corresponding stage of development. Page potnts
out that the Communist "digestion process" in Eastern Germany
� is far from complete, but adds that, pending a major change in
� the world picture, the Communist steamroller for converting
East Germans is unlikely to be halted by any IoCal tactics.
clnIs
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411/
GENERAL
1. US plans reply to Soviet note on Trieste --The Department
of State has advised VS mission abroad of its conclusion
that a reply to the Soviet note- on Trieste of 20 April cannot
be avoided; The Department explains that Soviet refusal
to fix a date for future meetings on the Austrian treaty -
until a reply has been received to the Trieste note is the
chief reason for the present decision. The Department also
indicates it now shares the view of the British and the French
that reiteration at this time of the 20 March 1948 declaration
on Trieste (favoring return to Italy of the whole Territory
of Trieste) will increase prospects for eventual success in
Italian-Ytigoslav negotiations regarding Trieste.
2
Document No.
2 JUN 1950
1306
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TOP T
GENERAL
Di JUN 1950
1305
1. Declaration on Schuman plan to be issued According to
US Ambassador Bruce in Paris, the text of the French declara-
tion on the Schuman industry pooling plan has already been
accepted by Belgium, Luxembourg, and Italy and will probably
be issued 2 June 1950. Bruce adds that the Netherlands will
probably join in the declaration after trying to make some
reservations, and that the UK will not join in the declaration
as now drafted. Bruce observes that one school of French
thought, in which Socialists are prominent, favors altering the
present terms of the declaration in the hope that the UK might
eventually participate. The opposing school holds that the UK
will never surrender the measure of sovereignty called for
under the plan, and that the UK would be given an opportunity
to obstruct the development of the plan if invited to participate
in the forthcoming deliberations on "a special basis." This
school also considers the British economy in its present form
to be "almost irreconcilable with the fundamental purposes"
of the Schuman plan.
Document No,
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GENERAL
1. UK refuses advance commitment to Schuman proposals--
According to US Embassy London, the British Foreign
Office is still unwilling to commit itself in advance to the
essential principles of the Schuman proposal for pooling
Western European coal and steel resources and therefore
cannot accept the French view that such a commitment is
a prior condition to participation in the planned seven-
power talks. The UK has reiterated its desire to parti-
cipate in any discussion of the question and to adopt a
positive attitude generally toward the Schuman proposals,
but has indicated its inability to make a prior commitment
to pool resources and set up a joint authority. A Foreign
Office spokesman has expressed to Embassy London the
view that British participation, is essential to the success
of the planned talks and has declared that the British would
have "a great deal to contribute."
J. 1\11 t
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CRET
GENERAL
?, 9 MAY 1950
1303
1. Multilateral talks proposed on Schuman plan�US Embassy 3js
Paris has learned from a French official that the French and
� SITS
Germans have agreed to begin multilateral negotiations soon
on the Schuman proposal for pooling coal and steel resources
and that the French are confident that the Benelux countries
and Italy will join the negotiations on the basis already agreed
to by France and Germany. Meanwhile, according to US
Embassy London, the UK is willing to participate in direct
Franco-German discussions on the proposal, but feels that
a full international conference is not the appropriate way to
approach the problem. The British are opposed to announc-
ing their agreement on general principles before the practical
details have been worked out. The French, however, plan to
proceed with the proposed conference, fearing that discussion
of the details of the Schuman plan at this time would cause
delays which would make its eventual adoption much more
difficult and probably impossible.
EUROPE
2. SPAIN: Cabinet changes rumored--US Charge Culbertson in ijC
Madrid, for the first time. in three years, gives "substantial
credence" tel current rumors of an impending change in the
Spanish Govitnment. According to Culbertson, there is some
hope that Fitinco will dismiss Minister of Industry and
Commerce Suances, who is "in more trouble and hot water
than ever tiefore." If Franco replaces Suances with a man
of ability and liberal policies, Culbertson will be inclined to
recommend that the US assist the Spanish economy in order
to demonstrate US willingness to encourage liberalization in
the economic as well as the political field.
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(CIA Comment: CIA believes that Suances is in a
weak position, but that, for reasons of prestige, Franco may
attempt to postpone any Cabinet changes until after expected
favorable action on the Spanish question by the UN General
Assembly. Although Suances' successor would probably take
steps designed to attract foreign investment, economic
liberalization would be avoided as far as possible. In any
event, liberalization of political controls is not likely.)
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TO'`"a CRET
GENERAL
1. Austrian Treaty deadlock continues--US Embassy London
reports that at the last meeting on the Austrian Treaty the
Soviet delegate continued his attempts to. inject theTrieste
issue into the negotiations. The Soviet deputy insisted that
no date could be set for the next meeting until the Western
Powers had answered the 20 April SOviet note -which accused
the Western Powers of violating the Italian Peace Treaty
provisions on Trieste. The Western delegates replied that
they would be in London on 10 July ready to resume negotia-
tions.
(CIA Comment: By injecting the Trieste issue into
the Austrian Treaty talks, the USSR has again demonstrated
that it is under no compulsion at this time to reach agree-
ment with the West either on individual issues or on an over
settlement. In addition to using the Trieste issue as an
excuse for further stalling on the Austrian Treaty, the USSR
probably hopes by this means to embarrass the West in its
relations with Italy and Yugoslavia and to demonstrate that
the West does not carry out its international obligations.)
Document No.
z7 Mk 1950
1362
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4t. 5
T 0 R E T 1301
GENERAL
1. Views of Dutch Ambassador to USSR on Soviet outlook�US
Ambassador Chapin at The Hague transmits the view of the
Dutch Ambassador to the USSR that no possibility exists of
Internal. Soviet revolution or of an easing of the international
situation as a-result either of- Soviet domestic problems or
Stalin's death. The Dutch Anibassador foresees instead a
.Soviet evolution with a rising standard of living through .a
.succession at four 5-year plans. He is convinced, despite
rapid Soviet military preparations, that war on a major
scale is presently impossible in Soviet planning and the USSR�
does not make "major mistakes.ar take unnecessary gambles?'
However, he regards war within five years to be a distinct
possibility if the USSR should succeed in discovering and
developing rich new oil deposits, possibly in the Batum area
or Siberia. The Dutch Ambassador concluded the interview
with the hope that Western unification would proceed rapidly
as the only effective counterpart to Soviet expansion, declar-
ing his belief. that a firm stand for the next four or five years
would halt such expansion and perhaps may even force a slight
withdrawal.
.2. 1.,s2y.a.t.I.4 believes USSR wants return to UN.--US Ambassador
-Douglas in London. has been told in strict confidence by a �
Bri.tiSh Foreign Office official that Trygve Lie found Soviet
� leaders concerned by the situation created by their UN walk-
out and wanted.49.'keturn but cannot do so �:until the problem
of Chinese repre6entatian is settled. Lie reportedly gained
the impression that the USSR would not defeat the proposal
for a meeting of the UN Security Council meeting on the
ministerial level, provided. the Chinese question were solved
in advance. Stalin expressed to Lie no hostility concerning
� the idea of a meeting of the heads of state but emphasized the
need for careful preparation :for meetings on. any level. The
British Foreign Office official indicated that Lie made no
.specific proposals while in. London.
Document No.
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TOP RET 3
GENERAL
1. UK seeks settlement of Anglo-Egyptian treaty.-- A Foreign
Office representative has informed US Embassy London
that the UK has advised the Egyptian Government of the
desirability of settling the UK-Egyptian treaty on a basis
of "mutual trust and equality." The British Army Chief
of Staff, Field Marshal Slim, is expected to visit Egypt,
while en route to Australia in June, in order to discuss the
purely military aspects of the problem and to point out to
the Egyptians their inability to defend themselves and the
necessity for Anglo-Egyptian defense. According to the
Foreign Office informant, the defense arrangements en-
visaged include integration of planning, joint headquarters,
and joint air defense.
Document No.
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T*JWET
GENERAL
1. US representation in Schuman plan talks opposed--US
Ambassador Bruce in Paris expresses the view that the
US should continue to manifest general support for the
Schuman proposal to pool the French and German coal
and steel inclastries but should not become directly in-
yolked in the preliminary stage of negotiations and there-
by limit US freedom of judgment concerning the plan that
may emerge. Bruce believes that the US should not be
represented, even by observers, on the working committees
at this stage, and observes that the French will be eager to
keep. the US informed of developments. Bruce feels that
active US participation would be misinterpreted, declaring
that even the appearance of American direction will jeopar-
dize acceptance of the proposal in France. Bruce considers
it important that all US representatives abroad adopt a com-
mon attitude on the Schuman proposal. He adds that these
views are concurred in by US Ambassador Harriman.
Docums,nt No.
MAY 1950
1299
s
NO in Class. 0
E] DECLASSIFIED .
C=.17,D TC: TS S
Arr 77
----,;:`(1-41412.49_78__
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e,
T RET
GENERAL
fug" mni IUDU
1298
1. Report on progress of US policy toward Yugoslavia�In
commenting on US policy towards Yugoslavia, US Embassy
Belgrade expresses the view that marked progress has
clearly been made toward the establishment of a Yugoslav-
Western working relationship based on mutual advantage
and mutual respect for rights and independence. However,
the Embassy indicates, in discussing the serious concern
of the Yugoslays over the continuance of US financial help,
that if patience is not exercised in establishing a satis-
factory economic relationship with Yugoslavia, there is
danger that US-Yugoslav relations will become "so soured"
that the US might lose some of the "extraordinary political -
benefits" already won through the gradual reorientation of
Yugoslavia toward the West..
, Concerning Yugoslavia's relations with its neighbors,
the Embassy reports a genuine Yugoslav desire to improve
relations with both Greece and Italy and points to hopeful
signs that Yugoslavia and Greece can make mutually profit-
able progress in normalizing their relationship; the Embassy
feels, however, that the Italians may be inclined to hold back
from a broad effort to improve relations with Yugoslavia.
2. Australians set back at Commonwealth Conference�US
Ambassador Jarman in Canberra estimates that the recent
Commonwealth meeting on Southeast Asia will have a salutary
psychological effect on Southeast Asia and will complement
the effect of US policy for the area. Commenting that the
conference was a failure from the Australian point of view,
lw reports that the Australian objective was to force agree-
Teneon a three-fold plan embracing Commonwealth technical
the provision of emergency relief supplies and the setting
up of a longer range credit scheme, a program which was
- 1 -
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NO CHANGE in Class.
n DECLASSIFIED ,
C.asso C:L1.1711) TO: TS
11.zr.:2.)�4 21::-T. 77
R E T 9 MAR
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'4t
successfully opposed by the UK and Canada on the grounds
that it was economically unrealistic. Jarman observes that
Australian conduct at the conference strengthens the view
of the Embassy that the Government is determined to estab-
lish a foreign policy which will be independent of the UK
and the entire Commonwealth wherever general agreement
cannot be obtained.
2
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GENERAL
1. Soviet official discounts war as alternative�US Ambassador
Kirk in Moscow transmits from a "reliable source" an
account of a conversation between Trygve Lie, Secretary-
General of the UN, and Arkady Sobolev, an official of the
Soviet Foreign Office, on the subject of increasing US-Soviet
tensions, during which Lie asked point blank if the USSR was
headed for war. According to the account, Sobolev replied
he did not foresee war as an alternative because the USSR
considers the outcome "too uncertain and too dangerous."
Kirk comments that eVen though Sobolev, in view of his pre-
vious relationship with Lie, -might be expected to speak more
freely on this occasion, he probably is not "sufficiently cogni-
zant" of Politburo views to lend "major importance" to his
statement. (Sobolev vas-Assistant Secretary-General of the
UN from 1946 to April 1949.)
2. Views on defection of Czechoslovak UN delegate--According
to US-Embassy Belgrade, the Yugoslav Deputy FOreign Min-
ister for European Affairs considers the defection of Czecho-
slovak UN delegate Houdek of "tremendous importance" be-
cause Houdek is an old line Marxist who had never belonged
to the "halfway collaboration" school of Benes and MaSaryk.
The Yugoslav official reportedly feels. confident that the
Czechoslovak Government and other Satellites will find it
increasingly difficult to find suitable candidates for :overseas
posts. Embassy Belgrade expresses the view that the treat-
ment Houdek receives in the US will have material bearing
on the "general question of Titoism" and points out that those
inclined. toward Titoism would be greatly discouraged if
Houdek is-notgiven the status of a political refugee.
22 MAY 1950
1297
Document No.
NO CHANGE in Class. ri
DECLASSIFIED
Class. C:L12,7C:7 TO: TS S
D.: .1 1o, 4 103.7 77
Auth: LDA 77;1733
nn
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CRET
GENERAL
1. Berlin Youth Rally to be confined to Soviet sector--Head-
quarters of US Forces in Germany reports that at a Berlin
conference on 4 May attended by General Kotikov, the Soviet
Commandant in Berlin; the chairman of the Free German
Youth (FDJ); and other high officials, the following decisions
were made regarding the FDJ rally scheduled for the weekend
of 27-29 May: (a) under no circumstances will participants
in the rally be permitted to enter the western sectors of
Berlin; (b) "mass quarters" close to the western sector hor-
de's tin not be used; and (c) without special permission, rally
participants will not be permitted to distribute propaganda in
the western sectors.
(CIA Comment: On the basis of recent evidence, CIA
believes the FDJ will avoid any occasion of major conflict
with the west sector police during the rally. CIA continues
to believe, however, that either planned or unpremeditated
incidents of violence within the western sectors are likely to
occur.)
THE AMERICAS
2. BOLIVIA: General strike becomes revolutionary attempt--
the general strike has now become
a revolutionary attempt by a combination of the rightist 1VINR
(National Revolutionary Movement) and Communist-led PIR
(Party of the Revolutionary Left) involving pitched battles with
government forces in which approximately sixty persons have
been killed to date. US Embassy La Paz states that disturb-
ances are confined to the capital.
(CIA Comment: Although pressure on the Bolivian
Government is great, there is a fair chance for its survival .
so long as the military support it as effectively as at present.)
Docum2nt No.
(43
2 0 MAI 1950
12q6
Agmy/S
R
s0 - 3.3(h)(2)
NO C::::-2.:2 1-..-1 Class. Ei
0 DECIL:A.2-::IFT.:D.
D.T.:A L.E.7�1!o, 4 Apr 77
TO ACRE T Auth..; r.:3A RfG. 77/:.763
Dat.): 2 9 MAR
_ 1978 By:
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TAC1E T
GENERAL
1. Western reply to Soviet note on Trieste opposed--US Am-
bassador Dunn in Rome recommends that the contemplated
Western reply to the Soviet note on Trieste be postponed
until the views of the Italian Government can be obtained.
Dunn believes that any reply at all will "almost certainly"
work against the US interest is establishing an atmosphere
conducive to the succestful negotiation of an Italo-Yugoslav
.settlement of the Trieste problem. Dunn observes that
�Italo-Yugoslav relations on this matter have recently im-
proved and. that a progressive decrease in the tension may
be expected if new elements are not injected .into .the situa-
tion. Dunn believes that any Western reply which did not
specifically reaffirm the tripartite dedlaration of 20 "March
1948 (favoring the return of the whole Territory of Trieste
to Italy) would jeopardize Italian Foreign Minister Sforza's
ability to control his government's approach to the problem.
.Dunn also points out that a reply that did reaffirm the
20 March 1948 position would offend the Yugoslays.
(CIA Comment: CIA concurs in Ambassador Duim's
assessment of the Italian state of mind concerning the Trieste
problem.)
Document, No.
II MAY 1950
S is
1295
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DECLASSIFiLD
Class. C-1P2ICL'D TN S
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Auth: 77/17^,3
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129G
1.
2. Possible US effort to obtain German unification--The Depart-
ment of State has informed US High Commissioner McCloy
of its willingness to make one more real effort to unify both
Berlin and Germany before recognizing the division of the
country. The Department indicates it has little hope such
an effort will succeed but feels willing to go through with it
because: (a) important German leaders believe that Western
moves favoring all-Berlin and all-German elections must be
more than mere propaganda maneuvers; and (b) the French
apparently require positive evidence of Soviet unwillingness
to re-establish Berlin as a unified, quadripartite city before
considering the possibility of making Berlin a 12th German
Land. The Department believes negotiations could be carried
on at first by an exchange of US-Soviet notes, following which
a conference might be held if differences began to narrow and
if the atmosphere of recrimination were absent.
Document No.
NO CHANOT,1 in Class. 0
DECLASS:f=
Class. CHA:= TO: TS S C
DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77
Auth: DDA REG. 77/1763
1/4
- 1 -
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3/Ts 3.3(h)(2)
S1S
sir
RET Date:
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T 0 Pie R E T
3. US plans protest on Soviet Zone police for 25 May--The
Department of State has. advised US Embassy Moscow
that the US formal protest to the USSR over the militariza-
tion of the East German police should be made public in
time to receive maximum German press treatment on
26 May, two days before the Communist Youth Rally in
Berlin, The Department suggests that the Embassy
endeavor to coordinate with the British and French in
presenting the protest notes to the Soviet Government on
25 May.
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GENERAL
1. Italian concern over Western views on Trieste�US Am-
bassador Dtinn in Rome has learned that Premier De
Gasperi has instructed Foreign Minister Sforza :it is
"politically imperative" to bring back from London
Allied reassurances regarding Italy's vital interests in
the Free Territory of Trieste. De Gasperi is particu-
larly anxious that Italy obtain: (a) Allied cooperation in
persuading the Yugoslays to free traffic between the two
zones of the Territory; (b) Allied assistance in re-estab-
lishing minimum human rights in the Yugoslav Zone�es-
pecially freedom of religion; and (c) Yugoslav administra-
tion of its Zone in a manner not prejudicial to the eventual
implementation of the 20 March 1948 tripartite declara-
tion (which favors restoration of all Trieste to Italy).
According to a high official of the Italian Foreign Office,
both British Foreign Secretary Bevin and French Foreign
Minister Schuman have given Sforza assurances that they
stand behind the 20 March declaration.
FAR EAST
2. CHINA: Nationalist evacuation of Chou Shan Islands--US
Charge Strong in Taipei comments, concerning the Chinese
Nationalist withdrawal from the Chou Shan Islands, that
although there may be sound military reasons for the move,
the abandonment of the islands will have an adverse psycho-
logical effect on civilians and military personnel on Taiwan
and will have adverse political effects abroad. In Strong's
opinion, the evacuation will reduce the life of Chiang Kai-
shek's regime, even though one of Chiang's motives may
have been to gain time. Strong has informed US Embassy
1 7 MAY 1950
int
3
Document No.
NO.CHAGE in Class. 0
0 DECLASSTFIED
Class, CaAE?C'ED TO: _TS
DDA Mo, 4 Apr 77
Auth: 1270. 77/176
niAR 797 By
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Manila that .he estimates the removal of US personnel
from Taiwan will be necessary at an earlier date than
previously contemplated.
(CIA Comment: CIA does not believe that the
mere concentration of Nationalist forces on Taiwan, fol-
lowing the withdrawal from the Chou Shans, will materially
increase the Chinese Government's defensive capabilities.
CIA further believes that the relaxation of the Nationalist
blockade of East China ports, as a consequence of abandon-
ment of the Chou Shan bases, will materially benefit the
Chinese Communist economy.)
2
4471,tA
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GENERAL
1. North Atlantic Council meetings--At the close of the
15 May sessions in London of the current North Atlantic
Council, Secretary of State Acheson made the following
summary of remarks by the various Western foreign
� ministers: (a) there is need for concerted 'effort in the
economic and defense spheres to strengthen the Atlantic
community; (b) it is important to make a coordinated
and intensified psychological presentation of the Western
view; (c) organizational solutions of Western problems
should not duplicate or confuse existing machinery; and
(d) there is both unanimous feeling that the UN must be
supported and universal concern over the danger of the
Soviet boycott.
2. Views on Schuman's Franco-German proposal--US Am-
bassador Bruce in Paris characterizes French Foreign
Minister Schuman's proposal to pool French and German
coal and steel resources as "the most imaginative and
far-reaching approach that has been made for generatiow
to a settlement of the fundamental differences between thee
twonations." Bruce points out that many objections will
�
be raised against the plan, but a consideration of possible
difficulties should not be permitted to dampen the enthus-
iasm the proposal merits.. Bruce considers it important
that the scheme not lose its "present momentum" and that
negotiations to implement the proposal begin as quickly
as possible.
(CIA Comment: CIA anticipates some opposition to
the Schuman proposal will develop in Frante, Germany, and
the UK. The French Government, however, will be able to
overcome immediate French objections if it can convince
Parliament, that the plan will not result in serious French
unemployment- German predominance in the arrangements,
and the disadvantages of cartelization. )
Document No.
NO CHANGE in Class.
0 DECLASSIFILD �
Class. .CEA].J.CED TO: TS S
4 Mil I I UjV
1292
S's
SP
414/10 Auth: DDA REG, 77/176'i
DDA ific:nio, 4 .A,,r2 77
OrA
Date g 9 MAR 1478 By: VI;
T 0 P drt/R E T
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THE AMERICAS
3. VENEZUELA: Break with USSR imminent--US Embassy
Caracas has been told by a reliable source that the Vene-
zuelan Government will break relations with the USSR
sometime during the current week. According to a high
police official, a strong anti-Communist group in the
government is urging that drastic action be taken against
all Communists, including the splinter "Black Communist
Party" which was not affected by the 13 May decree out-
lawing the regular Communist Party. �
(CIA Comment: There is a strong probability that
Venezuelan-Soviet diplomatic relations will be broken in
the immediate future. Such action would deprive the USSR
of an important channel for the direction of Communist
activities in Latin America.)
TOP
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54
GENERAL
5 MAY 1950
1291
1. Survey of London three-power meetings--In a summary
report on the three-power meetings in London, Secretary
of State Acheson expresses the view that progress has
been made toward reaching a better understanding of the
fundamental questions confronting the Western Powers. The
Secretary feels that this understanding will pave the way for
improved cooperation and more effective concerted action
in the future.
In his discussions with the British concerning the
UK position in the world and the US-UK relationship, Acheson
believes the following British preoccupations have emerged:
(a) an emphasis upon the Labor Party's domestic program
and British viability by 1952; (b) a desire for a "special
relationship" with the US; (c) a desire to maintain a Com-
monwealth-sterling area-world position as distinguished
from the role of an European power; (d) a resulting em-
phasis upon developing the NATO as an Atlantic community
"umbrella" as opposed to the French theory of developing
such strictly European organizations as OEEC; and (e) a
concern over divergencies in US-UK policy, such as has
been illustrated in the Chinese and colonial questions.
Document No.
NO CHANGE in Class. 0
ED DECLASSIFIED
'Class. CHANGED TO: TS S
DDA MEmo, 4 Ap:: 77
�, � ,
Auth: _
Dato.:- 29 MAR 1978
01�,
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54
13 MAY 1950
1290
GENERAL
1. Western Ministers discuss world situation--In their London
discussion of the world situation, Secretary of State Acheson
set forth before Foreign Ministers Bevin and Schuman the
following considerations as deserving strong emphasis:
(a) the USSR, by pouring much of its national income into
preparedness, has created so wide .a gap between its readi-
ness and that of the West that immediate action is now re-
quired on an interim, or mid-term, plan as drawn up by the
western defense ministers; (b) it is urgently necessary to
create an economic foundation to support the required military
effort and conditions of life in the West; (c) full use of German
production is a matter of urgency and requires the attention
of the Western Powers; (d) although the vitality and strength
of the West, including relations in the North Atlantic area, �
have first priority, the problems of Asia are very important
and the Western Powers must maintain their position in the
East while building in the West; and (e) the West must make
it clear in presenting any action taken to increase western
strength that no aggressive intent exists. Foreign Ministers
Bevin and Schuman approved this statement of the situation.
Turning to the problems of the UN ,with particular re-
ference to China, Acheson declared that the question of Chinese
representation was linked to major matters of US foreign policy.
Because the US considers the USSR now possesses a position
of dominance in China, from which it threatens all Southeast
Asia, the US believes admission of the Chinese Communists
to the UN is potentially more dangerous than a continued
impasse in the UN. Acheson indicated that the 'Us does not
intend to take any positive action which would enable the UK
to win a UN majority for admission of the Chinese Communists.
The three foreign ministers then agreed that the Chinese ad-
mission question would be left until one of the governments
informed the other two of its interest in re-opening the issue.
Document No.
37
NO CHANGE in Class. 0
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Clas. C:LINC:D TO: TS
DDA Apr 77
,90*/
T 77/1-kS'i
0 P E T
9 MAR , Ey:
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2. US position on New Guinea problem--The Department of
State has instructed US Ambassador Jarman in Canberra
to inform the Australian Government that, although the US
believes a trusteeship under Dutch administration to be a
generally favorable solution of� the New Guinea problem,
the US neither supports nor opposes the recent Netherlands
Cabinet decision to continue administering New Guinea as
a dependent territory. Jarman is also to express the view
that the US believes it can best contribute to a solution by
refraining from lending support to either party and by a-
waiting the results of present efforts of the Netherlands
and Indonesia to reach a settlement.
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GENERAL
1. Acheson and Bevin continue discussions--Continuing their
discussions in London of the world situation, Secretary of
State Acheson and British Foreign Secretary Bevinagreed
that it would be premature at this time to make final deci-
sions on the question of the future relationship between the
US and Europe and that a US statement indicating willing-
ness to work out necessary arrangements would be sufficient.
They also agreed that no new organizational machinery ap-
peared necessary to formalize such a relationship. Acheson
emphasized the desirability of prompt settlements of two
current US-UK problems: petroleum and the structure of
a European Payments Union.
Turning to the German problem, Bevin indicated
that he considered it to be the most important item on the
agenda of the Foreign Ministers' Conference; Acheson and
Bevin agreed that the way ought to be left open for Germany
to become associated eventually with the North Atlantic or
They also agreed that direct occupational con-
trols, especially over German domestic affairs, ought to be
gradually relaxed according to plan, and not merely in re-
sponse to German pressure. Acheson then strongly urged
that the West should try, during the limited period in which
strong influence can still be exerted over Germany, to en-
sure the development of a democratic pattern of life in that
country.
Concerning East-West trade, Acheson emphasized
the necessity of quicker policy decisions on the composition
and use of the 1-A and 1-B lists, especially on those issues
where the interests of military security seemed to conflict
with those of trade. Bevlii felt that the UK position gener- �
ally paralleled that of the US, but added that he would discuss
the details with the British Board of Trade.
Document No.
72 MAY 1950
1289
S's
SP
3 to
NO CHANGE in Class. 0
0 DECLASSIFIED
Class. CHAW22D TO: TS S
DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77
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T .0-77 - R E T
GENERAL
1. Acheson and Bevin discuss Western problems --During a .
discussion of the world situation with Secretary of State
Acheson in London, British Foreign Secretary Bevin ex-
pressed considerable concern over the possibility that the
USSR might develop two big civil wars, one starting from
Eastern Germany and one in Southeast Asia. Bevin cited
the Greek civil war as an example of Soviet capability for
starting civil wars without participating in them. He agreed
with Acheson that Western military defenses and the asso-
ciation of the North Atlantic Treaty must be strengthened,
but commented that such a strengthening would require the
coordinated action of the Atlantic community and must be
based on economies that would carry the weight without
jeopardizing standards of living. Bevin stated that the UK
has a dual approach to the problem: (a) to organize Europe
as efficiently as possible; and (b) to stay under the umbrella
of the Atlantic "organism." also emphasized that the
UK's economic and financial 'situation places limits on its
ability to build its defenses. Acheson stated that he recog-
nized that a broader economic base would be necessary to
increase the Western defense effort and added that it was
clear to the US that its interest in Europe would not stop
with 1952. He expressed the hope that a definite program
for that period would be formulated by the end of 1950.
Concerning Southeast Asia, Bevin said: (a) that
all of the area could be held if India and Pakistan settle
their differences and remain with the West; and (b) the UK
� cannot contribute much economic assistance to the area.
In a lengthy discussion on China policy, Bevin stressed the
importince of preventing present US-UK differences from
� dveloping into an open split which might prejudice coopera-
tion elsewhere. He expressed strong doubts about the pre-
sent value of the UK position in. China, but said that it was
irreversible, and might in the end prove to be wise.
TOP
Do'cument. No.
1288
s fs
5/s
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0
DD
,.E T
Date:
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411
Turning to the colonial question, Bevin expressed
his concern and hope that the US would review its position
in the light of the "progressive" evolution in British colo-
nial policy. He stated that the loss of colonial areas would
be fatal to allied defenses, and it was agreed that the US and
UK positions should be further discussed than effort to reach
agreement before trusteeship matters arise in the next UN
meeting.
� EUROPE
2, GREECE: Relations with Yugoslavia�US Embassy Athens
reports that during a recent conversation at the Greek For-
eign Office, the Yugoslav Charge &Affairs suggested an -
exchange of Ministers with the Greek Government and Greek
Premier Plastiras agreed. The Yugoslav Charge stated
that Yugoslavia has sent a representative to Geneva to dis-
cuss with the International Red Cross the question of the
Greek children in Yugoslavia. He also suggested resumption
of rail and other communications between Yugoslavia and
Greece.
(CIA Comment: CIA believes that the Yugoslav pro-
posal to exchange representatives with Greece is another
step in Yugoslavia's efforts to strengthen its capability
for resisting Soviet pressure by rapprochement with its
neighbors.)
FAR EAST
3. AUSTRALIA: Attitude toward New Guinea question�The
Australian Government has informed US Embassy Canberra
that it intends to deliver formally to the Indonesian Govern-
ment about 15 May a note expressing Australian concern
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over the future of Netherlands New Guinea. The note will
declare that: (a) Australia does not considerIndonesian
claims to Netherlands New Guinea justified; and (b) if a
change in the status of-Netherlands New Guinea is contem-
plated, Australia will press its own claims for the area,
on the grounds of security.
.THE AMERICAS
4. HAITI: Military junta ousts President Estime --US Charge c141COPF
Burns in Port-au-Prince reports that the situation is out-
wardly calm following the ouster of President Estime by a
military junta. The Embassy expresses the opinion that
this move resulted from the military's apprehension that
Estime might attempt to assume dictatorial powers prior
to the presidential elections scheduled for 1952.
(CIA Comment: CIA believes that although the
junta's seizure of power may be a setback for the use of
constitutional processes in effecting changes in Western
Hemisphere governments, other more immediate US se-
curity interests will not be materially affected.)
-3
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T
24891 T 0 / RET
GENERAL
1. Soviet response to proposed all-Berlin elections�US
Commanding General Taylor in Berlin reports that the
recent Soviet response to the Western proposal to hold
all-Berlin elections, in view of the conditions imposed,
is regarded by US officials, West Berlin leaders, and
the general public "as tantamount to refusal" to permit
-elections. Taylor expresses the opinion that the Soviet
demand for troop withdrawal from Berlin and for abroga-
tion of the 1949 Occupation Statute� (which would restore
Soviet veto rights in the government of all Berlin) is
"wholly unacceptable" to the Western Powers.
11 0 MAY 1950
1287
(CIA Comment: CIA agrees that the Soviet response
to the Western proposal constitutes a refusal to hold all
elections, and believes that the Soviet reply is merely
a propaganda attempt to counter the favorable effect on the
Berlin population of the Western proposal.)
2. Acheson and Schuman review Western objectives�In re-
viewing world-wide objectives of the West with French For-
eign Minister Schuman in Paris, Secretary of State Acheson
expressed the opinion that the next three or four years
would be critical because the USSR, by devoting proportion-
ately more of its budget to military activities than the West,
is widening the military gap, and might be induced by the
altered balance of forces to take hostile measures in 1953-
54. Acheson and Schuman agreed that in view of this situa-
tion, the West must strengthen its economic base, begin to
put into operation its Hague military program, attach and
utilize the great resources of West Germany, and coordinate
propaganda efforts to give continuing expression to Western
objectives. In response to Acheson 's observation that the
control of East-West trade has great strategic significance,
SchUman remarked that France has agreed to renounce all
deliveries that would strengthen the USSR.
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Schuman speke eloquently of the excellent state
of Franco-American relations, declaring that the majority
of the French people felt that the European recovery pro-
gram had saved the economy of France and that of Europe.
In regard to divergent US-French views, Schuman-declared
thatthe -US attitude on colonial problems had caused France
some concern. He added that France had abandoned colonial-
ism, but that chaos would result if the political evolution of
backward areas preceded economic evolution. In reference
to the French position� in Indochina, Schuman emphasized
that although France will not leave Indochina, it cannot re-
main there without help and still meet current commitments
for European defense. Schuman commented that although it
was not possible to so inform the Vietnamese now, the 8 March
Agreements would "obviously" be modified after the end of
the present conflict in Indochina. Schuman agreed to the pro-
posed unilateral US statement on Indochina, and noted that in
the next few days a French Ministry of Associated States would
be created which would take control of Indochinese affairs out
of the colonial office. Schuman and Acheson agreed on the
importance of keeping Southeast Asia out of Communist hands,
and on the primary responsibility of the French for holding
Indochina, with the US acting in a supporting role. Schuman
made a plea for the immediate delivery by the US of fighter planes
and small naval vessels to be used in controlling the smuggling
of arms to the rebel forces in Indochina.,
At a later meeting, Acheson and Schuman agreed that
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization needs a continuing
executive to supply the foreign ministers with necessary in-
formation. In discussing Germany, Acheson expressed the
view that there are probably only 18 months to three years
left to the Western Powers to influence developments in Ger-
many, regardless of the period of occupation, and that Germany
mast be "irrevocably aligned to the West." He added that the
West should not contemplate building up German military
forces, but must offer security and an economic future to the
'Germans. Acheson and Schuman agreed that the German
nation must be increasingly integrated with Western Europe.
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EUROPE
1� ITALY: Attitude toward NAT--US Ambassador Dunn in
Rome has been informed by Italian Foreign Office officials
that the Italian Government is "intensely interested" in�
the immediate strengthening of Italy's political and eco-
nomic collaboration with North Atlantic Treaty (NAT)
countries. The Italian officials favor the establishment
of a permanent political organization to facilitate the
solution of common problems of NAT countries and
report that Foreign Minister Sforza is "seriously con-
sidering" proposing at London that preparations be made
for establishing a 'common" NAT Army "with the fullest
possible standardization and a real unified command."
Dunn comments that he is impressed by the deep desire
of Italian officials to play a more responsible role in NAT
affairs and expresses the view that failure to accept Italian
Government leaders as equal partners with leaders of the
US, UK, and France will: (a) weaken them in the eyes both
of their followers and their enemies; and (b) encourage the
advocates of Italian neutrality in the cold war. Dunn strongly
believes that taking Italy into closer confidence and fuller
partnership would 'pay good dividends" by assuring stronger
Italian support in solving problems of the West.
(CIA Comment: CIA concurs in the above estimate.)
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GENERAL':
1,, Ambassador Kirk suglasicouing UNSC OB �US A mbas-
rsador Kirk in Moscow believes that it would be inopportune
to effect UN withdrawal from Greece by discontinuing UNSCOB
at the next General Assembly meeting and dropping the Greek
case from the agenda9 especially in light of the many signs of
Increased Soviet aggressiveness on all fronts. The Ambassador
feels that the suspension of Soviet-directed guerrilla activities
In Greece is only a temporary tactical move stemming basically
from the Yugoslav defection and adds that nothing has happened
In the past year to suggest that the USSR will pause more than
momentarily in the application of its expansionist pressures on
everyweak front to be found in the free world�
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THE AMERICAS
I. VENEZUELA: glsitftimEkt la.......W*ead --US Ambas-
sador Donnelly in Caracas reports that the oil strike in
Venezuela is spreading, and that the government may soon
take positive action to control any violence which may occur.
The Ambassador also reports that an abortive attempt by
60 to 80 armed civilians to seize the airforce base Boca
del Rio, near Maracay, resulted in the wounding of two army
officers and the death of one attacker.
(CIA Comment: CIA believes that the Venezuelan
Government will be able to control strike violence and pro-
vide adequate protection for oil installations.)
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GENERAL
1. Views on disposition of Dutch New Guinea--The Department
of State has received a note from the Dutch Ambassador in
Washington stating that the Netherlands Cabinet has reached
the conclusion that New Guinea should remain under Dutch
authority and now requests US support in this matter. In the
note, the Netherlands Government states 'that the transfer
� of authority over this area to either Australia or the United
� States of Indonesia would be "unacceptable" to the Nether-
lands and observes that: (a) the Round Table Conference
agreed that the political status of New Guinea would be settled
through bilateral Indonesian-Dutch negotiations; and (b) nego-
tiations to date have shown that the Indonesian Government
is not prepared to arrive at a solution satisfactory to the
Netherlands. The Netherlands Government points out that
the UN Commission on Indonesia, which will receive the re-
- port of the mixed Dutch-Indonesian Commission, may be
able to assist the parties in reaching an agreement, and
comments that the UN Security Council may have to consider
the Problem if agreement is not reached.
Meanwhile, the Australian Government has reiterated
its intentionlo protect what it considers to be Australia's
' vital strategic interest in Netherlands New Guinea and has
Indicated that Australia is prepared to entertain solutions
� other than outright Australian control over the area.
(CIA Comment: CIA believes that the Netherlands
� position favoring continued Dutch control over New Guinea,
which was inspired by recent Australian statements that
Indonesian control over that area could not be tolerated,
may quiet the Australian Government's fears. CIA further
believes that Indonesian knowledge of the adamant Nether-
lands position will further weaken Netherlands-Indonesian
relations, .because the Indonesians still expect to acquire
Netherlands New Guinea before the end of 1950.)
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TM AMERICAS
2. VENEZUELA: Possible dissolution of Communist Party.-- etR
US Embassy Caracas reports that the military junta is con-
sidering the dissolution and suppression of the Communist
k Party in Venezuela. ,
(CIA Comment: CIA believes that the current Com-
munist-inspired oil workers' strike will probably lead to
government action to dissolve the Communist Party. CIA
further believes that if the party is outlawed, the government
will take strong and effective measures to eliminate Commu-
nist influence throughout Venezuela.)
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EUROPE
1. CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Relations with US reviewed�US Am-
bassador Briggs in Prague expresses the opinion that the
size of the US Embassy staff and its functions in the imme.-
diate- future must be viewed in the light of what appears to
be the recent basic change in the Czechoslovak attitude to-
ward the US, which Briggs attributes to direct Soviet inter-
ference on a scale not previously evident. Briggs comments
that regardless of the reason for the new Czechoslovak hos-
tility, it must be accepted as a fact. In this situation, the
Ambassador suggests that the US: (a) avoid becoming in-
volved in a public altercation with the Czechoslovak Govern-
ment; (b) immediately close the Czechoslovak consulates
in Pittsburgh and Cleveland; and (c) proceed promptly to
effect fairly large Embassy personnel reductions.
FAR EAST
2. THE PHILIPPINES: Reported Cabinet reshuffle--US Am-
bassador Cowen in Manila reports that he has received
confirmation from a "reliable official" Philippine source
that President Quirino is preparing a Cabinet reshuffle.
(CIA Comment: CIA believes that any attempts
by Quirino to reshuffle his Cabinet are not likely to strengthen
his rapidly weakening political position, in view of the present
widespread loss of confidence in Quirino's leadership even
*among leaders of his own Liberal Party, including Vice Presi-
dent Lopez.)
MAI IVWi
1282
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1281.
GENERAL
1. US attitude on Anglo-Egyptian relations--The Department SI1S
of State has instructed US Ambassador Caffery in Cairo to
inform Egyptian Government- officials, at his discretion
and after discussions with his British colleague, that the
US earnestly hopes the UK and Egypt will be able to reach
a satisfactory and reasonable settlement of their differences
regarding the British military position in Egypt. The Depart-
ment adds that the US strongly supports the UK in this matter
on the grounds that: (a) a satisfactory settlement on present
British terms would be in Egypt's own interest; and (b) it is
extremely important to Near East security and world peace
for the UK to have certain strategic facilities in Egypt, parti-
cularly in the Suez Canal Zone area.
,
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'RETTAS
EUROPE
1. ITALY: Developments in relations with Yugoslavia--US Am-
bassador Dunn in Rome has been informed by the Italian
Foreign Office that reparation negotiations are being re-
sumed with Yugoslavia as a means of keeping "the door open
for eventual broader conversations." According to Dunn's
informant, this tactic is being championed by Foreign Minis-
ter Sforza, who is encountering opposition at lower Foreign
Office levels to any negotiation with Yugoslavia until all
pending issues can be approached simultaneously.
MAY 1950
1280
einls
2. CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Pressure against US Embassy continues-- ..4k
US Ambassador Briggs in Prague reports that, as a result of
continuing pressure by Czechoslovak authorities, a large
number of the Embassy's local employees have resigned.
Briggs adds that pressure against local Embassy employees
is being maintained and estimates that the resignation of a
considerable number of additional clerical employees is
inevitable.
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41.11
EUROPE
1. GERMANY: Adenauer backs European Council entry-- SS
According to US High Commissioner McCloy in Bonn,
Chancellor Adenauer has privately declared he now feels
prepared to proceed with the entry of the Federal Republic
into the Council of Europe. Adenauer indicated that the
recent resolution of the income tax problem and the High
Commission's clarification of the manner in which the
German delegation fo the Council might communicate with'
the Council's secretariat have enabled him to come to this
decision. The Chancellor proposes to put the matter before
his Cabinet prior to the London meeting of the western
Foreign Ministers, postponing Bundestag debate until after
that meeting. Adenauer believes that he will receive the
unanimous support of the Cabinet and a small majority in
the Bundestag even if, as McCloy warned, the London meet-
ing does not produce "a set of new concessions to Germany."
1 MAY 1950
1279
2. CZECHOSLOVAKIA: US urked not to break relations�US CielS
Embassy Prague estimates that the recent Czechoslovak
note demanding a two-thirds reduction in the Embassy's
staff because of alleged espionage was intended either to
goad the US into breaking relations with Czechoslovakia
or, if the US does not do that, to score a significant propa-
ganda victory and henceforth to restrict the Embassy's
operations severely. The Embassy considers that even
though Czechoslovak conduct amply justifies a break in
diplomatic relations, it is not to the advantage of the US
to do so at this time; the Embassy argues that the presence
of the US mission in Czechoslovakia encourages the anti-
Communist population and that the Embassy will still be
1
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able, despite restrictions, to provide useful information
and guidance to the US. Embassy Prague, believing that
the Kremlin probably ordered the Czechoslovak Govern-
ment to make things as difficult as possible for the US
but not to take the initiative in severing relations, suggests
that this by itself is sufficient reason for the US to remain in
Prague.
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AUSTRALIAN CLAIMS TO DUTCH NEW GUINEA
A recent action of the Australian Government, aimed
at ga irking control over Dutch New Guinea, may gravely threaten
Australia's relations with both the Indonesian and Netherlands
Governments and will have severe' repercussiohs throughout
South and Southeast Asia,
The Australian Government informed the Indonesian
Government'on 29 April that Australia was directly concerned
In present Dutch-Indonesian negotiations regarding the future
status of Dutch New Guinea and that Australia should be con-
sidered "as sole or, at least, part administrator" of the Nether-
lands territory. (This stand is known to have the strong and
considered support of the entire Australian Cabinet.) External
Affairs Minister Spender informed the Netherlands Minister in
Canberra on 19 April that Australia's minimum objective,is to
keep the Indonesians out of New Guinea and that Australia would
do so by force, if necessary. He added that no Australian Govern-
ment which countenanced entry of the Indonesians into New Guinea
Could survive more than a week and that Australia would withdraw
from the UN rather than admit such an eventuality.
Australia has long regarded the position of Dutch New
Guinea. as a major factor in Australian military security. Jap-
anese penetration of New Guinea during World War II heightened
this concern considerably and the Australians fear that any
Netherlands-Indonesian settlement of the future of Dutch New
Guinea will seriously jeopardize Australian national security
interests. Although it is unlikely that Australia will support -
its miew by the use of armed force, its attempts to intervene in
Dutch-Indonesian negotiations will cause considerable ill-will
among the Netherlands officials and bitterness among the Indo-
nesians who have hitherto regarded the Australians as champions
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of Indonesian independence. News of the Australian action
has not yet been released to the press, but it is unlikely -
that secrecy can be maintained. When the Australian Policy
becomes known publicly, Australia's hope of becoming a
leader of non-Communist elements throughout South and
Squtheast Asia will be blasted. Communist propaganda direct-
ed against Australia and the Western powers will be greatly
strengthenid and the entire issue will weaken Western influence
Asia.
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EUROPE
1. USSR: Soviet reaction to Acheson policy statement-- US CIF}
Ambassador Kirk in Moscow estimates that Secretary
Acheson's recent enunciation of "total diplomacy" has
made an important impression on the Kremlin. In addition
to the vehement proaganda reaction against the concept
of "total diplomacy",Kirk notes a feeling among qualified
foreign observers that there are signs of apprehension
among Soviet authorities. The Ambassador expresses the
opinion that the establishment by the US of a specific practi-
cal outline for world policy and action--a procedure which
the Communists themselves have long followed�materially
threatens the achievement of Soviet objectives.
THE AMERICAS
2, CHILE: Serious disturbances expected
�
on May Day in Santiago.
arms have been distributed to Communists,
and that plans have been made for serious violence. While the
disturbances will further aggravate Chilean economic problems,
It is not considered likely that the overthrow of the government
will result.
Document No.
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28 APR 1950
itt a 7
1. YUGOSLAVIA: Developments in foreign policy--US Am-
bassador Allen in Belgrade expresses the opinion that
Marshal Tito's statement of foreign policy in his "state
of the union" message before the Yugoslav Parliament on
27 April was "in many respects an overture to the West."
Allen adds that the most direct reference was in regard
to relations with Italy, when Tito stated that the "govern-
ment of Yugoslavia desires that relations between Yugo-
slavia and Italy should be the best possible," and declared
that presently unsolved problems should not be permitted
to endanger good relations. Allen feels that although no
specific mention of Trieste was made, it was obvious that
Tito had "clearly opened the door" to the Italian Govern-
ment for negotiation on the Trieste issue.
(CIA Comment: CIA believes that Tito's speech
represents an important contribution to the improvement
of Yugoslavia's relations with the West and to the strength-
ening of Yugoslavia's position in relation to the USSR.)
erp s
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EUROPE
I. USSR: Estimate of Soviet intent--US Embassy Moscow, in SI1S
summarizing a basic estimate of Soviet intentions prepared
by its joint Intelligence Committee, expresses the view that
the Kremlin is waging a "ruthless and unrelenting" war
against the free world, in which "cold war" and 'shooting
war" are merely tactical phrases. The Embassy considers
that the USSR has already passed through the first phase of
its postwar plan, which required the extension of Soviet
control through revolutionary conquests and the simultaneous -
rehabilitation of Soviet heavy industry and the military machine.
In the Embassy's opinion, the Soviet offensive is now in its
second openly revolutionary phase, in which the Kremlin is
relying upon a wave of rebellion against "imperialism" in the
dependent areas and upon Western economic depression to
bring certain new regions under Soviet control. The Embassy
comments that, to accomplish these objectives, the USSR is
steering a course as close as possible to but short of a full-
scale war. The Embassy adds that the danger of war through
Soviet miscalculation will grow and that incidents and "limited
hostilities" may occur, but estimates that Moscow will probably
endeavor to avoid a showdown until the USSR attains overwhelming
superiority of force.
(CIA Comment: CIA concurs in the above estimate.)
2. CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Anti-US plan reported�The US Consulate SITS
in Munich has learned from "a paid informant" of unknown
reliability that the USSR has ordered the Czechoslovak Govern�
ment to institute strict security surveillance of the US Embassy
and its employees in Prague and to prepare a protest note to
justify a demand for closing the Embassy. According to source,
the USSR is concerned over laxness on the part of the Czechoslovak
�
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EUROPE
security police and complained about the resultant freedom
for Americans to carry on espionage operations. The in-
formant added that a trial of an American citizen or a member
of the Embassy staff is to be prepared, wherein trial, sentence,
and deportation would follow the lines of the recent Gubitchev
Incident in the US.
(CIA Comment: CIA believes that although the USSR
intends to reduce US representation and activity in Czechoslo-
vakia to a minimum, a complete severance of Czechoslovak
relations with the US in the immediate future is not likely.) �
THE AMERICAS
3. BOLIVIA: Anti-Communist conference proposed--US Ambas-
� sador Florman in La Paz reports that the Bolivian Government
has proposed to other South American republics that a meeting
of foreign ministers be held at La Paz during May for the
purpose of establishing a uniform policy designed to "put a
stop" to Communist activities in South America. (The Bolivian
Government recently expressed deep concern regarding what
it considered to be an international Communist organization in
South America and suggested to the Department of State that
the US might send observers to a conference of South American
republics to consider the problem. The Department expressed
the view that bilateral conversations between Bolivia and its
neighbors would be more effective than a general conference.)
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GENERAL
ET
17 UK to rec aze ordan annexation of Arab Palestine�
Britis two-reign ice clar� in discussing with US
Ambassador Doiaglas in London British plans for recog-
nizing Jocrdan's annexation of Arab palestine, expressed
the Foreign Office views that: (a) the time had come to
back King Abdullah against the Arab League; and (b) recog.7.-
nition of the annexation would provide a good opportunity
for the UK to extend de jure recognition to Israel. The
official expressed the hope that the US ould also recognize�
the annexation but declared that the UK would probably go
� ahead with its plans anyhow.
EUROPE
2. YUGOSLAVIA: Attitude on Trieste�US Ambassador Allen
In Belgrade has been informed by Yugoslav Deputy Foreign
Minister Popovic that although Yugoslavia still desires to
� settle the Trieste question by direct negotiation with Italy,
his government believes that "no Italian government could
make a satisfactory compromise settlement at the present
time?' Popovic added that the Yugoslav Government was
. convinced that it would be best for all concerned to let the
Trieste question "remain quiet for a while?'
(CIA Comment: CIA concurs with the above views.)
26 APR 19bU
1275
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25� APR 1950
1274
� GENERAL
1. US views on Western Germany--The Department of State SIS
observes to US High Commissioner McCloy in Frankfurt
that the apparently growing tendency of West German Gov-
ernment and opposition leaders to proceed more cautiously
in bringing the Federal Republic into-the Western commu-
� nity of nations may indicate a reluctance to take sides in
the East-West struggle. The Department considers that
although there may be some legitimate basis for this new
German caution, it is important to disabuse the Germans
of "any notion that the use of the East-West situation to
wring concessions from the West can be productive or help-
ful.,i0 1 The Department comments that such tactics by the
Germans could only "undermine whatever confidence may
have already developed in other Western countries regard-
ing the German people and Government" and would "create
a climate which would hardly be conducive to the granting
of broader powers to the Federal Republic' in the near future."
FAR EAST
2, INDONESIA: Griffin recommends US aid--US represen-
tative Griffin concludes his survey of the need and prospects
for US aid to Southeast Asia with a recommendation for an
assistance program for Indonesia totaling more than $14 mil-
lion. The recommended program emphasizes the need for
general aid in the fields of agriculture, health, and education,
with particular assistance requested for the PurAliase of cot-
ton textiles for clothing. Griffin feels that vigorous and prompt
action in all phases of the program is required to prevent
further deterioration of the Indonesian economy. Griffin be-
lieves that Indonesia is a "promising example of an effort
to introduce Western-type democracy" to Southeast Asia and
comments that Indonesian officials "have energy, good
high intentions, and integrity" but lack. experience in posts
of great responsibility.
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GENERAL
1. Views on Soviet note regarding Trieste--US Ambassador
Allen in Belgrade suggests that, in view of the recent
Soviet note demanding immediate implementation of the
Italianpeace treaty terms applying to Trieste, the merits
of the solution envisagpd by the peace treattsignatdries
should be re-examined. Allen observes that the Italian peace
treaty (which would establish a unified Free Teriitorybf
Trieste under UN governorship) constitutes the only solution
which is binding today on all parties concerned and which
all parties are equally committed to support. The Ambassador
believes, however, that direct negotiations between Yugoslavia
and Italy should be continued "as long as there is any likelihood
they may succeed," and adds that the major difficulty in his
suggested return to the treaty solution would be to prevent both
the Italians and Yugoslays from gaining the impression they
were being "sold out."
Meanwhile, US Political Advisor Unger in Trieste, in
assessing Soviet motives.for their recent note, expresses the
opinion that the ultimate aim of the USSR is "apparently to
� see" the Free Territory of Trieste established under the
treaty formula. Unger comments that the establishment of
a unified Free Territory under UN governorship would: (a) keep
alive discord between Yugoslavia and Italy; (b) prevent the
Western Powers from fulfilling their 20 March proposal for
returning all of the Free Territory of Trieste to Italy; (c) secure
� the withdrawal of Allied troops; and (d) open the possibility of
Cominform control of a strategic area beyond the present limits
of the Soviet orbit.
24 APR 1950
1273
US, .Ambassador Douglas in London reports that the
British;Foreign Office considers the Soviet note to be a move
to �"throw a wrench into the works" at a time when the Western
Powers are seeking an Italian-Yugoslav settlement of the Trieste
issue. According to Douglas, the USSR may also hope "to force
the Western Powers" to re-state their 20 March proposal and
thus embitter the Yugoslays.
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GENERAL
I. Possible improvement in Greek-Yugoslav relations --US Am-
bassador Grady in Athens has been advised by Greek Premier
Plastiras that the Yugoslav Charge has' officially notified Plas-
tiras that the Yugoslav Government is prepared to exchange
Ambassadors with Greece at once. Plastiras has not yet
replied to the Yugoslav offer.
(CIA Comment: CIA believes that both Yugoslavia
and Greece will take steps toward improving their relations
in order to strengthen their capabilities to resist Cominform
pressures, but that development of cordial relations will be
handicapped by such issues as: (a) the Greek children kid-
napped during the Greek civil war and still detained in Yugo-
slavia; (b) Yugoslav territorial claims on Greek Macedonia;
and (c) Greek distrust of Yugoslav Communism.)
NEAR EAST-AFRICA
S
2, IRAN: Views on US aid--According to US Embassy Tehran, eva(r
Iranian Chief of Staff Razmara is convinced that government
disorganization and corruption are the main factors delaying
emergency measures to check the unemployment crisis and
the government is unaware of the urgency of the present sit-
uation. Razmara also expressed the belief that any US eco-
nomic aid to Iran should be accompanied by the "tightest"
controls. .The Embassy points out that Razmara's recom-
mendation coincides with the Embassy's belief that the most
important results obtainable from US aid would be the oppor-
tunity afforded the US to exert influence toward achieving
internal reforms.
1
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FAR EAST
3. CHINA: Projected Nationalist air attack�US Air Attache
Taipei reports that the Nationalist Air Force has concentrated
more than 100 fighters, fighter-bombers, and bombers on
two airfields in the Choushan Islands for a projected raid on
the Shanghai and Nanking airfields. The attack would be the
heaviest undertaken by� the Nationalists to date and the Attache
comments that: (a) the Communists are probably aware of
the details of the forthcoming raid; and (b) the Nationalist con-
centrations offer the Communists an ideal chance to destroy a
great portion of the Nationalist air combat potential. .
(CIA Comment: CIA believes that the Nationalists run
a grave risk of heavy losses from: (a) a surprise Communist
raid on the planes concentrated in the Choushan Islands; or
(b) the probability that the Communists will put their air force
in operation for the first time in order to counter the projected
Nationalist raid on Shanghai and Nanking. In either event, Na-
tionalist capabilities for defending the Choushans and Taiwan
would be seriously weakened.)
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GENERAL
1. US to defer protest on East German militarization�The
Department of State has advised US Embassy London of
its decision to defer the projected protest to the USSR
over the militarization of the East German police, in view
Of the opposition of British Foreign Secretary Bevin and
the reluctance of French Foreign Minister Schuman to
make the protest at this time. The Department believes
that the question should be examined at the forthcoming
meeting of the Western Foreign Ministers, and expresses
the opinion that a tripartite statement after this meeting
would be more effective than a unilateral US protest now.
(Both Bevin and Schuman have expressed theleeling that
the proposed protest should be discussed at the meeting of
the three Foreign Ministers.)
EUROPE
2. USSR: Protest on Western position in Trieste--US Am-
bassador Kirk in Moscow has been handed a note on Trieste
by Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister_ Gronayko which denounces
"alleged" US-UK violations of the Italian peace treaty and
calls for the establishment of a Free Territory according
to the terms of the Italian peace treaty. The USSR contends
that the; Violations transform Trieste..`irito a US-UK military
and naval base" and "constitute a threat to the peace and
security of Europe." The USSR also insists on the im-
mediate and precise fulfillment of the Italian peace treaty
provisions, including (a) the, naming of a governor and the
establishment of a temporary governing council; and (b) the
withdrawal of the US and UK troops.
Document No.
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(CIA Comment: CIA believes that the USSR has
become more aggressive at this time regarding the Trieste
issue in the hope of taking advantage of the renewed tension
and disagreement arising from conflicting Italian and Yugoslav
claims to Trieste territory. In addition to planning to exploit
the protest for propaganda purposes, the Kremlin probably
estimates that its insistence on an immediate solution in
conformity with the terms of the Italian peace treaty will:
(a) prejudice prospects for any negotiated settlement between
Italy and Yugoslavia by intensifying already inflamed feelings;
and (b) seriously complicate the position of the US, the UK,
and France in regard to Trieste. The Kremlin may also wish
to publicize its basic legal position for possible use in attacking
any settlement that may be negotiated in the future.)
Soviet reply to US protest on missing plane--US Am-
bassador Kirk in Moscow reports that, in a note delivered by
Soviet Foreign Minister Vishinsky in response to the US
protest over the missing US Navy airplane, the USSR cate-
gorically rejects the US position and specifically denies that
the Navy plane was unarmed. The USSR also refuses to con-
sider the US demands for indemnities and for punishment of
the Soviet aviators involved in the incident. In regard to the
US request that the Soviet Air Force be instructed to avoid
similar incidents in the future, the USSR asserts that current
orders to the Soviet Air Force "will remain in force." Kirk
comments that, during the conversation which followed
Vishinsky's presentation of the note, the Soviet Foreign
Minister appeared calm and unruffled and neither vindictive
nor aggressive.
� s '
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GENERAL
1. Developments on Hong Kong aircraft--US Embassy London
has been informed by UK Minister of State Younger that
arrangements are virtually complete for determining on
26 April 1950 if the British can take executive action to
prevent the release to the Chinese Communists of the
former Chinese Nationalist airplanes now under litiga-
tion in Hong Kong. When pressed for assurances that the
planes would be kept at Hong Kong pending the ruling of
the Hong Kong court on an appeal for an injunction to pre-
vent Communist removal of the aircraft, Younger responded
that "it seemed reasonable" to assume that the planes
could be detained for a few days and "expressed the hope
that this could be accomplished." (The Hong Kong court has
scheduled the hearing on the appeal for 27 April 1950.)
Document No.
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EUROPE
1269
1. GERMANY: British attitude on proposed all-German elections--
US Embassy London has been informed by Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick,
who is scheduled to become the UK High Commissioner for Ger-
many, that he is in general agreement with the US proposal that
the Western Powers offer to negotiate with the USSR for an all-
German electoral law. Kirkpatrick believes, however, that such
a Western offer would be "most effective" if made during the
forthcoming meeting of the US, UK, and French Foreign Minis-
ters (US High Commissioner McCloy in Germany and the Depart-
ment of State favor making the offer prior to the meeting of the
three Foreign Ministers). The Embassy points out that Kirk-
patrick has not yet discussed this problem with British Foreign
Secretary Bevin, who will make the final decision.
Berlin Assembly to propose all-city elections.--US Com-
manding General Taylor in Berlin reports that West Berlin
political leaders have agreed to have the Berlin Assembly
adopt on 20 April a resolution addressed to the four command-
ants in Berlin calling for all-Berlin elections. Taylor adds that,
at the insistence of the Berlin political leaders, the Western
political advisers have agreed to notify the Soviet Commandant,
as well as the Berlin Assembly, of Western approval of the
Assembly's call for city-wide elections.
2. DENMARK: Views on West European problems-.US Ambas-
sador Anderson in Copenhagen reports that, during her first
official interview with Danish Prime Minister Hedtoft, the
Prime Minister expressed concern over the problem of
strengthening the West European community and over the
',prospect for continued US interest in the affairs of Western
EUrope after. 1952. The Ambassador adds that Hedtoft's
anxiety over the future of Western Europe stems largely from
Or: c -
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EUROPE
1. CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Attitude toward US�US Ambassador
Briggs in Prague expresses the opinion that the recent
"irresponsible behavior" of the Czechoslovak Government
indicates that it is determined to reduce diplomatic and
other relations with the West to the level prevailing in
Moscow. The Ambassador reports that his representations
to Czech Foreign Minister Siroky regarding present US
Czechoslovak relations resulted in little more than "frankly
expressed disagreements" and that Siroky gave no indica-
tion he was Influenced In any way by the interview. Briggs
comments that the Czechoslovak Government may utilize
the coming "espionage" trials in Prague for mounting a
major propaganda onslaught against the US.
61
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� GENERAL
1. Yugoslav reaction to US-UK-French demarche�US
Ambassador Allen in Belgrade, in assessing the reaction
of Yugoslav Deputy Foreign Minister Popovic to Allen's
presentation of the US part of the US-UK-French demarche
to Yugoslavia on the Trieste problem, expresses the opinion
that Popovic appeared to appreciate the good intentions and
initiative of the three governments. In response to Allen's
reference to Yugoslav actions which might arouse fears
that Yugoslavia intended to annex Zone B in the Trieste
territory, Popovic declared that the Yugoslav authorities
in Zone B "had never and would never take any step except
In answer to similarritaliaii measures in Zone A." Popovic
emphasized the "genuine desire" of the Yugoslav Govern-
ment to improve relations with Italy by settlement of the
Trieste "and other questions." The British Charge informed
Allen that the reaction to his representations..was similar to
Popovic's response to Allen.
Meanwhile, US Ambassador Dunn in Rome reports
that Italian Foreign Minister Sforza, after being informed
of the nature of the US-UK-French demarche to Yugoslavia,
"indicated some regret that our approach in Belgrade had
not been a little stronger." Sforza assured Dunn, however,
that the Italian Government was determined to "leave every
� door open" to the possibility of discussing the Trieste ques-
tion with Yugoslavia. Sforza added that if Yugoslavia
� "trampled.on the recognized rights of Italy in connection
with Trieste," the Italian Government would use every
means at its disposal to draw the attention of the world to
the Yugoslav actions.
17 APR 1950
1267 I
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2. UK views on Hong Kong airplanes USAmbassador
-Douglas in London reports that, during a discussion of
a memorandum from the British Foreign Office regard-
ing the former Chinese Nationalist aircraft at Hong Kong,
a high British Foreign Office official reiterated that the
matter was in the hands of the courts. and reminded the
US representative of the limited executive power available
to the Hong Kong authorities for preventing the departure
of the planes. The British official expressed the opinion
that the aircraft would not leave Hong Kong before the
British had time to reach a decision at the ministerial
level. Douglas expresses the belief, that unless there is
some unforeseen solution, the controversy over the Hong
Kong aircraft will be concluded in the near future in a
manner "highly unsatisfactory from the US point of view."
(Although the British official made no mention of reported
discussions in Hong Kong which might lead to an out-of-
court settlement, he expressed the desire of the British
Government to find "any legitimate escape from its
dilemma.") Meanwhile, the UK has requested the US to
comment on the memorandum on the Hong Kong aircraft,
particularly with respect to the effect which British
acquiescence to Communist possession of the aircraft
would have on Western European nations now cooperating
with the US and the� UK in denying aircraft and parts to
the Soviet Satellites.
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GENERAL
1. Reduction of US and UK Embassies in Moscow opposed--
US Embassy Moscow reports that since the revaluation of
the ruble it has carefully considered the desirability of
reducing its operations. The Embassy states that in the
light of all facteirs involved and particularly the crucial
nature of US-Soviet relations, it is convinced that curtail-
ment of the Embassy Moscow's operations would be detri-
mental to US national interests out of all proportion to
the additional cost which continuance would entail.
The Embassy believes that the same reasoning
should militate against the decision apparently made by
the British to halve the size of their Moscow Embassy,
especially since such a reduction would have a deplorable
effect on joint US-UK operations.
THE C. I.
TO T7.1' D �,
THIS '
TION
�OP
15 APR 1950
1266
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. T 0 P E T
ANNEX
15 April 1950
GREEK GOVERNMENTAL PROSPECTS
The prospect for the establishment of a more stable
and effective Greek government has improved somewhat with
the resignation of the Venizelos Cabinet. Venizelos, who has
been under considerable pressure from the US and from with-
in his own party, now appears willing to cooperate in the
broad centrist coalition under General Plastiras which he had
originally agreed to support after the recent national elections.
Plastiras will probably be able to form a government capable
of surviving at least its initial parliamentary tests.
Such a cabinet's majority will probably be small, how-
ever, and its continued stability is problematical., Venitelos'
attempt to assume the role of premier has undoubtedly re-
sulted in strained relations with his prospective colleagues
and has thus laid the basis for future dissension which might
wreck the new government. At the same time, the Palace
and right wing politicians are strongly opposed to Plastiras
as premier and will take every opportunity to undermine him.
Should the Plastiras solution fail, other temporary govern-
mental combinations might be tried, but the resulting instabil-
-itr would probably soon make new national elections an
absolute necessity.
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FAR EAST
] 4 APR 1911
1265
1. THAILAND: Immediate US aid for Thailand urged--US CIPI
representative Griffin, continuing his survey of the need
and prospects for US aid to Southeast Asia, recommends
are $11 million assistance program for Thailand to make
Improvementsin the fiCids of agriculture, :health, education,
transport, telecommunicatfons, and industry. Griffin feels
that the extension of such assistance to Thailand, which he
considers to have a high degree of administrative and poli-
tical stability, will strengthen the country's will and ability
to resist both internal and external Communist pressures ,
by improving economic conditions and convincing the Thai
people that they have not been abandoned by the West. Griffin
believes that although Thailand is not presently faced With
emergencies as serious as those existing in Indochina and
Burma, immediate implementation of an aid program is
imperative to obtain the maximum political impact by indicat-.
ing the "reality" of pest US statements of interest in Thailand's
welfare.
THE AMERICAS
2. BOLIVIA: Anti-Communist Conference suggested�US Ant- er 9
bassador Florman in La Paz reports that the President and
Foreign Minister of Bolivia are deeply concerned over Com-
munist activities in Bolivia and South America and plan to
seek US counsel on the advisability of a conference of ten
South American countries to consider mutual defense against
Communism. The Foreign Minister expressed the thought
that the US might prefer to send qualified observers rather
than official representatives to such a conference.
�
THE I, A
TO TH
THIS DOMEN
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EUROPE
1 S PR 1950
1264
1. GERMANY: West to propose all-German elections�The _
Department of State has authorized US High Commissioner
McCloy in Frankfurt to proceed with his plan for having
the High Commission follow up the recent Federal Republic
proposals on German witty by offering to negotiate with the
USSR a law governing elections to an all-German constituent
assembly. The Department believes that the High Commis-
sion's offer should include a brief statement to the effect
that, if agreement is reached on the law, consideration should
then be given to the form of quadripartite control for a unified
Germany. The Department points out that the statement re-
garding quadripartite control must make clear from the be-
ginning that the West "would insist" on a liberalized system
-of control which would permit the proposed all-German Gov-
ernment to function effectively.
Attitude toward Federal Republic's role in Europe--
US High Commissioner McCloy has been informed by a high
official of the Federal Republic that Chancellor Adenauer and.
the Chairman of the Social Democratic Party, Schumacher,
agree that the entrance of the Federal Republic into the Coun-
cil of Europe would mean a "definitive .separation" of East
and West Germany. According to source Chancellor Adenauer
and Schumacher also believe that the Federal Republic should
be granted "increased participation" in European affairs com-
mensurate with the increased risk and responsibility assumed
by the Federal Republic in entering the Council of Europe.
Source expressed the opinion that Adenauer should be invited
to report on the German situation at the forthcoming London
Conference of Western Foreign Ministers and suggested
Adenauer's advice be followed 'at least to a limited extent"
on the Berlin issue and on other East-West problems involving
Germany.
THE C. I,
TO T: T�� ,
THIS D/.1.1�.1...
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NEAR EAST-AFRICA
2, INDIA: Increasing generaLunfriendliness toward US reported--
US Ambassador Henderson in New Delhi expresses the opinion
that a feeling of unfriendliness toward the US has been increas-
ing in India during the last eight months. Henderson attributes
this increased unfriendliness to several factors, including wide-
spread beliefs among Indians that: (a) the US is not giving India
any substantial economic assistance during this difficult period
in Indian history; (b) the US favors Pakistan in the Kashmir.
dispute; (c) the US is attempting, by exercising its economic
power in various ways, to force India to abandon national eco-
nomic planning. Henderson suggests that this resentment,
although largely generated spontaneously over a long period,
has been fanned both by an undercover campaign encouraged
by a group of "politicians and sycophants" around Prime Minis-
ter Nehru and by systematic open attacks on the US made by
Socialists and Communists. Henderson believes that although
the present trend in Indian feeling might be slowed by such
factors as the conviction of certain Cabinet members and other
leaders that India must adopt a more cooperative attitude in
dealing with Western democracies, Indian resentment toward
the US will grow as India's economic and political difficulties
increase.
Prime Minister Nehru still plans Karachi trip �US
Ambassador Henderson has been authoritatively informed that
Prime Minister -Nehru intends to visit the Pakistani Prime
Minister in Karachi about 22 April 1950, regardless of increased
pressure on him from various "influential quarters" to make
no definite plans at this time. According to 'source, some ad-
visers are urging Nehru not to make the visit unless the flow
of Hindu refugees from East Pakistan diminishes. Henderson's
informant added that an Indian delegation may soon visit Pakis-
tan to discus trade matters.
2
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GENERAL
I. UK against protest now on East German militarization--US
Ambassador Douglas in London has been informed by the
British Foreign Office that Foreign Secretary Bevin has
decided against making a formal protest at this time to the
USSR over the formation of a militarized police force in
East Germany. According to Douglas, Bevin suggests that
the US, UK, and French Foreign Ministers consider the
matter at their forthcoming meeting. Douglas comments
that he will press for reconsideration of the present British
decision as soon as possible.
31 APR 1950
1263
2. US, UK, French demarche to Yugoslavia�US Ambassador
Allen in Belgrade has been authorized by the Department
of State io join with his French and British colleagues there
in expressing concern to the Yugoslav Foreign Minister re-
garding the tension developing between Italy and Yugoslavia
over the Trieste question. As part.of the joint statement,
the Department suggests that the three Western representa-
� tives point out the advantages to both Italy and Yugoslavia
In stabilizing their relations generally and the importance
� of avoiding further provocative speeches and actions in re-
gard to Trieste. The Department suggests, if the Yugoslays'
reaction to the deinarche "leaves no doubt" of their intention
to annex the Yugoslav zone of the Trieste Territory in the
near future, that their attention be drawn to the serious con-
sequences such an action would have on relations between
Yugoslavia and the West. The Department has also instructed
US Ambassador Dunn in Rome to inform the Italian Govern-
ment, in conjunction with his French and British colleagues
there, of the nature and extent of the demarche to the Yugoslav
Goverment:,
En, Document No. La
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GENERAL
I. McCloy's views on German unity and all-Berlin elections--
US High Commissioner McCloy in Frankfurt believes that
the projected Western call for all-Berlin elections does not
minimize the necessity of following up the proposal recently
made by the Federal Republic for all-German elections.
McCloy feels that the two proposals are "quite separate"
parts of the present Western propaganda and political cam-
paign designed to regain the initiative in Germany, disrupt
the Soviet zone election plans, and enlist the psychological
support of the Germans. McCloy expresses the opinion that
the Western Powers cannot afford to remain silent on the
German unification problem until a statement can be issued
by the US, UK, and French Foreign Ministers at their forth-
coming meeting, and suggests that the High Commission
should now propose to negotiate with the USSR a law govern-
ing elections to a constituent assembly for all of Germany.
McCloy adds that a statement later by the Foreign Ministers
on German unity may be more effective if made following a
Soviet refusal to negotiate or impossible Soviet counter-
proposals.
FAR EAST.
JJ. Mti 1950
1262
2. INDOCHINA: Estimate of Indochinese situation--US Charge
d'Affaires Gullion in Saigon, in reviewing prospects for
further liberalization of the French attitude toward Indochina,
expresses the opinion that it is "highly unlikely" the French
will make a definite statement of their "evolutionary" inten-
tions regarding Indochinese independence, largely because of
the local conditions in Indochina and the continuing Vietnamese
governmental crisis. In support of this opinion, Gullion points
to the growing trend among the Vi mese, in their exhilaration
4
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over new freedoms, to revise in their minds the
8 March Accords and to sidestep the necessity for co-
ordinated action with the other Indochinese states and
the French. The Charge comments that, in view of this
Vietnam attitude, the prospect of additional concessions
from the French .would merely further distract the Viet-
namese from the problem of successfully assuming their
present responsibilities. Gullion believes, however, that
the. French can still make substantial concessions to
Vietnam, within the framework of the 8 March Accord,
� by: (a) permitting the Vietnamese a greater voice in the
distribution of US aid; (b) expediting the transfer of
powers; (c) accelerating the creation of military sectors
under Vietnam control; and (d) giving the Vietnamese a
share in the control of communications, civil aviation,
customs, and exchange.
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'THE c. OBJECTION
iTO THE D.Lc..AssiFicATIoN
gHIS DOCUMENT.
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T 0 R E T
GENERAL
1. French views on Indochinese problems --US Ambassador
Bruce in Paris has been informed by the Secretary-General
of the French Foreign Office, Parodi, that Foreign Minister
Schuman favors transferring responsibility for the conduct
of Indochinese affairs from the Ministry of Overseas France
"at the earliest possible date" and that Schuman hopes to
reach an agreement on the issue with his Cabinet colleagues
soon. Parodi also informed Bruce that consideration ill
be given immediately to the advisability of an early French
statement on the concessions to Indochinese nationalism
embodied in the 8 March agreements, with the aim of con-
ciliating public opinion in the US and in the interested Asian
states. Parodi added, however, that the French would not
be willing to make at this time an "evolutionary statement"
giving a timetable for Indochinese independence, primarily
because of the "inability" of the Vietnamese "to carry out
satisfactorily the responsibilities with which they have
already been charged."
ENT1AL
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GENERAL
1. Yugoslavia proposes Trieste solution--US Ambassador Dunn
in Rome has been informed by an Italian Government official
that, during a meeting in Belgrade between the Italian Minister
there and two Yugoslav officials, the Yugoslays stated that
their Government sincerely wished to solve outstanding
questions with Italy. The Yugoslav officials commented that
the Trieste issue hung like a dark cloud over Italo-Yugoslav
relations and then reported that their Government was now
convinced that a solution to the Trieste issue was not possible
along ethnic lines and had to be onthe basis of Zone A going to
Italy and Zone B going Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav representa-
tives also stated that their Geivernment was prepared to enter
into such an agreement with Italy as soon as practical and
that Yugoslavia was prepared to renounce all claims to
Trieste as a part of this agreement. According to Dunn's in-
formant, the Italian Minister merely responded that any such
proposal as that outlined by the Yugoslav officials would be
entirely unsatisfactory to the Italian Government.
THE C .
TO TH
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OBJECTION
�2IFICATION OF
T
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1260
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DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77
DDA EG. 77 1763
Date: / By:
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0
TOP RET
GENERAL
1. Opposition to protest on East German militarization�US
Embassy London has learned that General Robertson, UK
High Commissioner for Germany, is opposed to a formal
� Western protest to the IffiSR regarding the militarization
of-police units in East Germany. (The Department of State �
informed the French and British on 24 March 1950 of its
intent to object to this militarization and asked the British
and French to consider joining the US in the protest.)
Robertson believes that while such a protest would have
a favorable propaganda effect in the US, the UK, and
France, the release of figures on the number and equip-
ment of the Soviet zone police would adversely affect the
morale of Germans in West Germany and western Berlin.
The Embassy also transmits the opinion of Sir Ivone Kirk-
patrick, who is scheduled to succeed Robertson as UK High
Commissioner for Germany, that the effectiveness of the
proposed protest for propaganda purposes has been dimin-
ished by�reports carried in German newspapers revealing
the possibility of the protest and giving the Western esti-
mate of the size and equipment of the Soviet zone police.
The Embassy reports that Robertson's recommendation
opposing the proposed protest has already been submitted
to UK Foreign Secretary Bevin and expresses the opinion
that the Secretary is not likely to override the High Com-
missioner in this matter.
(CIA Cominent: CIA believes: (a) the revelation
of the size and equipment of the East German police will
have no adverse effect on the morale of Germans in West
Germany and western Berlin; and (b) the prospects for bene-
ficial propaganda effects of the protest have been reduced by
the delay so far and by the leak to the German press.)
THE C. T." ".1 OBJECTION
TO TH . ' 2ICATION OF .Afittgiwkwnt
;HIS D
7 APR 1950
1259
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TO: TS S
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. 77/1763
Date : �By: ei
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- 24862
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3 Li
TOP SECRET
EUROPE
1, GERMANY: All-Berlin election prbposal approved--The
Department of State has authorized the� Berlin branch of
the US High Commission, acting jointly with British and
French representatives, to support the Berlin City Assem-
bly in proceeding with the proposed approach to the USSR
for all-Berlin elections. (Under the plan approved by the
Department: (a) the Berlin City Assembly on 13 April.
1950
1950 would address a resolution-to the four commandants
in Berlin requesting their endorsement of city-wide elec-
tions; and (b) the three Western commandants in Berlin
would immediately accept the resolution, make a written
statement the next day, and await the Kremlin's reaction.
The Western proposal for city-wide elections is designed
primarily to counter the scheduled Berlin Youth Rally and
May Day celebrations being sponsored by Communist
organizations in the Soviet sector of Berlin.)
Prompt Western action on German unity suggested--
US Ambassador Kirk in Moscow, in discussing the question
of Western action regarding the German unity issue, con-
curs with the recommendation of the US High Commissioner
in Germany that German unity should be vigorously and
promptly supported by the West. Kirk suggests as a possible
line of action that a statement by the High Commissioner con-
cerning elections for an all-German Constituent Assembly
be made "as early as possible," and be followed by a
separate tripartite declaration supporting this proposal at
the meeting of Foreign Ministers early in May 1950,
Reported Soviet-East German peace treaty--US
Legation Bern reports receipt of information from a here-
tofore fairly reliable "Satellite source"that the USSR has
decided to administer a "knockout blow" to US policy
6 APR 1950
1258
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Auth: DDA ET,G 77 1763
By:.
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in Germany by offering a peace treaty to the East German
Government According to the Legation's source, the treaty
will be offered on 8 or 9 May 1950 and will include the re-
turn to Germany of certain former. German territory now
held by Poland.
(CIA Comment: CIA believes that the USSR is un-
likely to conclude a separate peace treaty with the East
German Government in the near future.)
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GENERAL
1. Developments on Hong Kong aircraft--US Ambassador
Douglas in, London has been informed by the British
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs that there will
shortly be full ministerial consideration of the question
of the aircraft held in Hong Kong to decide what action
the UK can take with respect to disposal' of the aircraft.
The Minister commented that the UK is "between the
devil and the deep blue seat, in this matter, but assured
Douglas that advance notice would be given the US before
releasing the planes to the Chinese Communists.
EUROPE
. 5 APR 1950
1257
CI4Is
2. BELGIUM: Leopold's position unchanged--US Ambassador CIA
Murphy in Brussels has learned that King Leopold has not
� changed his original position that he will let Parliament
decide whether he will return to rule. Murphy expressed
the opinion that the Regent may either: (a) call on the
Catholics to form a one-party government to restore
Leopold to the throne; or (b) dissolve the Parliament
� and return the issue to the electorate. Murphy comments
that a one-party (Catholic) government could probably be
formed for the purpose of returning Leopold to the throne,
but only with, "considerable private misgivings" among,
Catholic leaders.
To THE
�
pas DOC
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41,
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NO CHANGE in C1as. ri
LD DECLASSIFIED
Class. C-11172ED TO: TS S
� DI:11 Memo, 4 Apr 77
Auth: DDA :3G. 77/1763
Coq.
Date: ).1 By: -CT
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e
24860
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TOP SERET
. GENERAL
1. Views on proposals for German unification�The Berlin
branch of the US High Commission expresses the view that
the desirability for the Western Powers to make an "early
determination" of their position on the issue of German
unification is emphasized by the growing possibility that
the USSR may seize the initiative on this issue in the near
future. The Berlin branch believes the USSR may attempt
to counter Western proposals on the German unity.issue by
offering all-German elections, a peace treaty, and the with-
drawal of occupation troops on conditions which would be
extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the West to meet
at this time. n
Meanwhile, the Department of State, in discussing
the possibility of Western action on the German unity issue,
has expressed the opinion that there are dangers in proceed-
ing too far along the road to German unity based only on
free elections. The Department adds that German unity
could follow only after full agreement between the West and
the USSR on the conditions under which the prospective all-
German government would function.
NEAR EAST-AFRICA
2. JORDAN: King reported ready to resume Israeli talks�US
Minister Drew in Amman has been informed by King Abdullah
that following the Jordan parliamentary elections of 11 April
1950, he intends to resume peace negotiations with Israel and
simultaneously to inform the Arab League of his action and
call on the Arab states to negotiate with Israel. Abdullah
added that if the other Arab states oppose his action, he is
fully prepared to face expulsion from te League. Drew
4 APR 1950
1256
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TOP RET
observes, however, that among Palestinian Arabs there
is strong opposition to Jordan's negotiating with Israel
and that Abdullah's "serene optimism�regarding the
support he expects to result from the coming Jordan elec-
tions should therefore be regarded with caution.
(CIA Comment: CIA concurs in Minister Drew's
estimate and believes that Abdullah is either talking for
effect or seriously underestimating the dislocations that
would result in the Arab world if he should persist in his
stated intentions.)
2 -
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24q59
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GENERAL
3 APR 1950
1255
1. USSR to erotet formation of Austrian endarmerie unit-- emy - TS
US Commanding General Keyes in Austria reports that a
meeting of the Quadripartite Military Directorate for
Austria has-been "called and instigated" by the Soviet
element for 4 April 1950 to discuss Soviet charges re-
garding "the illegal formatiOn of an Austrian gendarmerie
regiment in the Western Zones-" According to Keyes,
the Soviet representatives contend that the sub-divisions
of a future Austrian army, are evident in the gendarmerie
regiment and that because .of this, the Austrian Govern-
ment is failing to fulfill basic Allied Control Council agree-
ments. Keyes expresses the opinion that the Soviet repre-
sentative to the Directorate Will offer a resolution: " -
(a) :instructinthe .Austtiali7GOverndient -to fulfill '
Allied decisions regarding demilitarization and the pro-
hibition of military activity in the ranks of the police and
gendarmerie; and (b) establishing' a four-power commis-
sion to investigate the facts relating to the activities and
organization of the gendarmerie regiment.
2. Decision on all-Berlin election proposal urged--:US Com-
manding General Taylor. in Berlin reports that following
a discussion by the Western military commandants in
Berlin of the suggested Western proposal to the USSR for
all-Berlin elections, the British and French commandants
have referred the matter to their superiors. Taylor ex-
presses the opinion that timing now appears urgent and
suggests that plans for making the proposal to the USSR
be carried forward without delay. Taylor points out that
Berlin Assembly President Suhr has publicly gone on
c.3
record in favor of an approach to the USSR and has hinted 1.4
THE C.].
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NO - CHANGE in, Class. n
fl DECLASSIFIED
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DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77
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Auth: DDA G., 77/1763
(//(ate: BY;
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that "popular pressure" may be brought to bear on the
commandants if they do not reach a decision soon. Taylor
expresses the belief that 20 April 1950 would be the most
suitable time for the proposal to be made because of May
�Day and the Berlin Communist Youth Rally scheduled for
28 May.
FAR EAST
3. BURMA: Immediate US aid recommended--US representa-
tive Griffin, continuing his survey of the need and prospects
"for US aid to Southeast Asia, recommends that, regardless
of the present Burmese Government's leftist leanings,
immediate US aid be extended to Burma in order to combat
present chaotic conditions which invite the spread of Com-
munism. Griffin suggests aid in the fields of agriculture,
health, and education, as well as rehabilitation of destroyed
villages and reconstruction of transport and communications,
all of which he feels would directly contribute to increased
Burmese stability. Griffin expresses the opinion that re-
liance on the UK to carry the major responsibility for eco-
nomic and technical aid to Burma would be a mistake, both
because of limited Commonwealth resources and because
of "excessive mutual suspicion and antagonism" between
the Burmese and the British.
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24F.'5R TO'
GENERAL
1. British favor change in Western stand on Austrian treaty--
US Embassy London has been informed that UK -foreign
Secretary Bevin is now prepared to accept the Soviet text
for two of the disputed articles of the Austrian treaty "as
a last resort" in reaching a general settlement. Bevin is
"agreeable in principle" to the withdrawal of Western
proposals regarding Austria's obligation to restore the
property and rights of UN nationals and to the elimination
of the treaty article obliging Austria to pay pre -Anschluss
debts, provided that both these problems are handled in
a separate agreement with Austria. Bevin suggests that
his proposals be discussed by the three Western.Foreign
Ministers at their forthcoming meeting in London and that
the Austrian Government not be informed meanwhile of
this consideration of a change in the Western position.
1. fi"'. �
T:: :;..i�.LJ OBJECTION
TO 'El:, DEC IFICATION OF
THIS DOC
1 APR 1950
125i1�
1
pactroient No.
.za.4
U DECLASSIFIED
Class. CHANGED TO: TS $
DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77
kith: DDA . 77/1763
ittt : 16 3 7? BY: 00
NO CHANGE in Class. El
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